An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA 24-988
Filed 2 July 2025
Stokes County, Nos. 22JT000075-840, 22JT000076-840, 22JT000077-840
IN THE MATTER OF: J.E.K., L.S.T., W.R.K.
Appeal by respondent from orders entered 29 May 2024 by Judge Thomas B.
Langan in District Court, Stokes County. Heard in the Court of Appeals
12 June 2025.
David A. Perez, for respondent-appellant mother.
Reeves Divenere & Wright, by Anne C. Wright, for petitioner-appellee Stokes County Department of Social Services.
James N. Freeman, for Guardian Ad Litem.
ARROWOOD, Judge.
Respondent-appellant (“mother”) appeals from three orders terminating her
parental rights as to juveniles J.E.K., L.S.T., and W.R.K.1 (collectively, “the
juveniles”). For the following reasons, we affirm the orders of the trial court.
1 Initials are used to protect the identities of the minors. IN RE: J.E.K.
Opinion of the Court
I. Factual Background
On 25 August 2022, Stokes County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) took
non-secure custody of the juveniles after DSS received a report that the juveniles
were living in an extremely disorderly house with an inattentive mother who had
potential drug issues. A social worker made contact with the family, finding the home
in a dangerous condition and in disarray, and mother’s mouth covered in sores,
indicating drug use. The family had a CPS history involving an injurious
environment and domestic violence, and mother had been diagnosed with a variety
of drug- and mental health-related disorders; her urine screen on 25 August was
positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl. The father of the juveniles (“father”)
was in prison when this case was initiated.
On 6 September 2022, the trial court granted permanent legal and physical
custody of J.E.K. and L.S.T. to their maternal grandmother. At a hearing on
1 December 2022, the trial court established a primary plan of reunification at to all
of the juveniles. The order found that mother was not cooperating with drug screens,
but that her visits with her children were going well. The juveniles had been placed
in foster homes, and their maternal grandmother did not appear in court. On
13 December, father overdosed, but was revived by an EMS application of Narcan.
The next permanency planning hearing was 30 March 2023, where the court
found that mother had failed to show up for eleven drug screens dating back to
13 September 2022. Of the four drug screens she did receive, one was negative, two
-2- IN RE: J.E.K.
were positive for fentanyl and one was positive for cocaine, hydrocodone,
methamphetamines, opiates, and amphetamines. She also failed to attend
appointments to address her mental health and substance abuse. Father also failed
to show up for a number of drug screens, and one of his visitations ended early due
to his impairment. He was ultimately removed from the visitation schedule after he
failed to attend two consecutive visitations. The trial court entered an order
maintaining reunification as the primary plan and ending father’s visitation.
In April 2023, mother admitted to using fentanyl, and both she and father were
failing to make weekly contact with the social worker following the March hearing.
Mother tested positive for amphetamines on 29 June. The trial court changed the
primary plan to adoption that same day. As the year progressed, mother continued
to either fail to show up for drug screens, or test positive for fentanyl, cocaine, and
methamphetamines. Mother missed appointments to set up visitation with her
children and failed to maintain contact with her social worker. Father tested positive
for cocaine, fentanyl, and methamphetamines in August, and later that month was
reincarcerated. The trial court scheduled a hearing to review termination of parental
rights.
At the adjudication hearing, the trial court found that appropriate grounds
existed for the termination of mother’s parental rights. The court found that “mother
has failed to address her mental health, substance abuse, domestic violence, housing
and financial insecurity, and her parenting challenges, which caused the juvenile[s]
-3- IN RE: J.E.K.
to be removed from her care.” At the disposition hearing, the trial court found that
the juveniles were well-bonded to the families that intended to adopt them, that the
likelihood of adoption was high, and that termination of mother’s parental rights
would aid in adoption. Mother’s parental rights were subsequently terminated, and
she entered notice of appeal on 26 June 2024.
II. Discussion
Mother raises one issue on appeal, that the trial court erred and abused its
discretion in determining that it was in the best interest of the juveniles to terminate
the parental rights of mother, when improper findings were made under the criteria
of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2) and (3). We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Termination of parental rights involves two hearings, each with their own
standard of review. The trial court uses the first, adjudicatory, hearing to determine
whether any grounds exist for the termination of parental rights under N.C.G.S. §
7B-1111. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e) (2024). The standard of review for this hearing “is
whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence
and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law.” In re Clark, 72
N.C. App. 118, 124 (1984). We review conclusions of law de novo. In re K.J.M., 288
N.C. App. 332, 339 (2023). At the second, dispositional, hearing the trial court
determines whether it is in the best interest of the child for the parent’s rights to be
terminated. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). We review a trial court’s decision to terminate a
-4- IN RE: J.E.K.
parent’s rights at this hearing for abuse of discretion. In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App.
215, 222 (2004).
B. Determination of Juvenile’s Best Interest
Once grounds for the termination of parental rights have been found by the
trial court at the adjudication hearing, the trial court considers the following six
criteria in determining whether termination is in the juvenile’s best interest:
(1) The age of the juvenile. (2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. (3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile. (4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. (5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement. (6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). The trial court is required to “consider” all six criteria in
making its decision; however, it is not required to make written findings regarding
all six, but only for those that are relevant. In re D.H., 232 N.C. App. 217, 220–21
(2014).
At issue in the case sub judice are findings of fact made by the trial court
relating to the juveniles’ father. Before the 12 March 2024 adjudication hearing,
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA 24-988
Filed 2 July 2025
Stokes County, Nos. 22JT000075-840, 22JT000076-840, 22JT000077-840
IN THE MATTER OF: J.E.K., L.S.T., W.R.K.
Appeal by respondent from orders entered 29 May 2024 by Judge Thomas B.
Langan in District Court, Stokes County. Heard in the Court of Appeals
12 June 2025.
David A. Perez, for respondent-appellant mother.
Reeves Divenere & Wright, by Anne C. Wright, for petitioner-appellee Stokes County Department of Social Services.
James N. Freeman, for Guardian Ad Litem.
ARROWOOD, Judge.
Respondent-appellant (“mother”) appeals from three orders terminating her
parental rights as to juveniles J.E.K., L.S.T., and W.R.K.1 (collectively, “the
juveniles”). For the following reasons, we affirm the orders of the trial court.
1 Initials are used to protect the identities of the minors. IN RE: J.E.K.
Opinion of the Court
I. Factual Background
On 25 August 2022, Stokes County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) took
non-secure custody of the juveniles after DSS received a report that the juveniles
were living in an extremely disorderly house with an inattentive mother who had
potential drug issues. A social worker made contact with the family, finding the home
in a dangerous condition and in disarray, and mother’s mouth covered in sores,
indicating drug use. The family had a CPS history involving an injurious
environment and domestic violence, and mother had been diagnosed with a variety
of drug- and mental health-related disorders; her urine screen on 25 August was
positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl. The father of the juveniles (“father”)
was in prison when this case was initiated.
On 6 September 2022, the trial court granted permanent legal and physical
custody of J.E.K. and L.S.T. to their maternal grandmother. At a hearing on
1 December 2022, the trial court established a primary plan of reunification at to all
of the juveniles. The order found that mother was not cooperating with drug screens,
but that her visits with her children were going well. The juveniles had been placed
in foster homes, and their maternal grandmother did not appear in court. On
13 December, father overdosed, but was revived by an EMS application of Narcan.
The next permanency planning hearing was 30 March 2023, where the court
found that mother had failed to show up for eleven drug screens dating back to
13 September 2022. Of the four drug screens she did receive, one was negative, two
-2- IN RE: J.E.K.
were positive for fentanyl and one was positive for cocaine, hydrocodone,
methamphetamines, opiates, and amphetamines. She also failed to attend
appointments to address her mental health and substance abuse. Father also failed
to show up for a number of drug screens, and one of his visitations ended early due
to his impairment. He was ultimately removed from the visitation schedule after he
failed to attend two consecutive visitations. The trial court entered an order
maintaining reunification as the primary plan and ending father’s visitation.
In April 2023, mother admitted to using fentanyl, and both she and father were
failing to make weekly contact with the social worker following the March hearing.
Mother tested positive for amphetamines on 29 June. The trial court changed the
primary plan to adoption that same day. As the year progressed, mother continued
to either fail to show up for drug screens, or test positive for fentanyl, cocaine, and
methamphetamines. Mother missed appointments to set up visitation with her
children and failed to maintain contact with her social worker. Father tested positive
for cocaine, fentanyl, and methamphetamines in August, and later that month was
reincarcerated. The trial court scheduled a hearing to review termination of parental
rights.
At the adjudication hearing, the trial court found that appropriate grounds
existed for the termination of mother’s parental rights. The court found that “mother
has failed to address her mental health, substance abuse, domestic violence, housing
and financial insecurity, and her parenting challenges, which caused the juvenile[s]
-3- IN RE: J.E.K.
to be removed from her care.” At the disposition hearing, the trial court found that
the juveniles were well-bonded to the families that intended to adopt them, that the
likelihood of adoption was high, and that termination of mother’s parental rights
would aid in adoption. Mother’s parental rights were subsequently terminated, and
she entered notice of appeal on 26 June 2024.
II. Discussion
Mother raises one issue on appeal, that the trial court erred and abused its
discretion in determining that it was in the best interest of the juveniles to terminate
the parental rights of mother, when improper findings were made under the criteria
of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2) and (3). We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Termination of parental rights involves two hearings, each with their own
standard of review. The trial court uses the first, adjudicatory, hearing to determine
whether any grounds exist for the termination of parental rights under N.C.G.S. §
7B-1111. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e) (2024). The standard of review for this hearing “is
whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence
and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law.” In re Clark, 72
N.C. App. 118, 124 (1984). We review conclusions of law de novo. In re K.J.M., 288
N.C. App. 332, 339 (2023). At the second, dispositional, hearing the trial court
determines whether it is in the best interest of the child for the parent’s rights to be
terminated. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). We review a trial court’s decision to terminate a
-4- IN RE: J.E.K.
parent’s rights at this hearing for abuse of discretion. In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App.
215, 222 (2004).
B. Determination of Juvenile’s Best Interest
Once grounds for the termination of parental rights have been found by the
trial court at the adjudication hearing, the trial court considers the following six
criteria in determining whether termination is in the juvenile’s best interest:
(1) The age of the juvenile. (2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. (3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile. (4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. (5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement. (6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). The trial court is required to “consider” all six criteria in
making its decision; however, it is not required to make written findings regarding
all six, but only for those that are relevant. In re D.H., 232 N.C. App. 217, 220–21
(2014).
At issue in the case sub judice are findings of fact made by the trial court
relating to the juveniles’ father. Before the 12 March 2024 adjudication hearing,
their father relinquished his parental rights. A parent who relinquishes his parental
rights may revoke the relinquishment within seven days. N.C.G.S. § 48-3-706 (2024).
In each disposition order, the trial court found that barriers to the adoption of these
juveniles included the fact that the revocation period for father’s relinquishment had
-5- IN RE: J.E.K.
not yet expired. The disposition orders were rendered the same day the adjudication
hearings were held, 12 March, where father relinquished his rights. Therefore, the
revocation period lasted until 19 March 2024. However, the disposition orders were
not signed and entered until 29 May 2024, after the revocation period had expired,
making these findings of fact factually inaccurate of the date of entry.
The significance of this inaccuracy to mother’s appeal is not clear from her
brief. Her brief appears to combine the contention that the other findings were
insufficient with an argument that the trial court was required to make a final finding
regarding father’s revocation period, due to its relevance to criteria (2) and (3).
However, mother fails to address or challenge any of the other findings of fact or
conclusions of law in the disposition order. Two of these conclusions were that
adoption was likely for the juveniles, and that termination of mother’s parental rights
would aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan, which was adoption. Mother
never argues in her brief that father’s revocation of his relinquishment of parental
rights would make adoption any less likely, nor does she argue that the termination
of his rights would not aid the permanent plan. The unchallenged, and therefore
binding, findings of fact demonstrated that the juveniles in question lived in
welcoming homes and were well-bonded with adults who intended to adopt them,
circumstances tailor-made to lead to adoption. Further, it is axiomatic that
termination of mother’s parental rights would serve a plan of adoption, since adoption
could not occur without termination.
-6- IN RE: J.E.K.
If mother reads In re D.H. to require written findings for all evidence
pertaining to relevant criteria, she is mistaken. There, the holding was limited to
forbidding trial courts to fail to enter any written findings of fact under relevant
criteria; we did not opine on what the nature of the requisite findings had to be. See
In re D.H., 232 N.C. App at 221. While the trial court found this revocation period to
be relevant enough to place in the findings, whether or not father revoked his
relinquishment was not dispositive in this case. Our Supreme Court has previously
underscored the language of criteria (2), which is a finding of the likelihood of
adoption, not certainty, and criteria (3), whether termination would aid in the
accomplishment of a permanent plan. In re E.F., 375 N.C. 88, 93 (2020) (emphasis in
original). The Court held that the fact that the father’s rights were not terminated
did not render findings under these criteria erroneous. Id. This case is similar.
Mother presents no evidence that father’s continued parental rights would make
adoption unlikely, and the evidence from the proceedings indicates that any attempts
by father to preserve his rights and thwart adoption would be fruitless.
Mother also cites In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3 (2019), which she argues stands for
the proposition that the trial court must make a written finding of fact whenever
there is conflicting evidence under one of the criteria. Even if this is a correct reading
of the case, there was no conflicting evidence presented at the hearing regarding
father’s relinquishment. Thus, in summary, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by entering disposition orders that contained a factual inaccuracy, where
-7- IN RE: J.E.K.
that inaccuracy did not deprive the court of sufficient findings of fact to support the
termination of mother’s rights, and where the trial court was not required to correct
this finding.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
Judges WOOD and FLOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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