In re Jeffrey Reich

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. California
• Decided: November 19, 2025
• Docket: 25-10499
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

2 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

3 FRESNO DIVISION

5 In re ) Case No. 25-10499-B-7 ) 6 JEFFREY REICH, ) Docket Control No. MLO-2 ) 7 ) Debtor. ) 8 ) ) 9 )

11 MEMORANDUM RULING ON PAMELA REICH’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S ORDER AND 12 MEMORANDUM RULING ON MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL

13 —————————————————————————————

14 Richard Ryan McMath, MCMATH LAW OFFICE, for Pamela Reich, Movant.

15 Megan Zavieh, ZAVIEH LAW, for JEFFREY REICH, Respondent.

16 —————————————————————————————

17 RENÉ LASTRETO II, Bankruptcy Judge: 18 19 INTRODUCTION 20 Extraordinary remedies are imposed sparingly. 21 Reconsideration of a federal court order is one of those 22 remedies. Often requested but rarely granted, these motions are 23 commonly used to reargue unsuccessful contentions. Here, a 24 creditor and estranged spouse of the debtor wants to invoke the 25 extraordinary remedy so creditor’s disqualified counsel can 26 continue representation in this case. But no manifest error of 27 /// 28 /// 1 law or fact or newly discovered evidence exists here. The motion 2 for reconsideration will be DENIED. 1 3 4 I. 5 BACKGROUND 6 A. 7 Motion to Disqualify Counsel 8 On September 11, 2025, the court issued an order 9 disqualifying attorney Shane Reich (“Shane”) from representing 10 his mother, Pamela Reich (“Pamela”) in his father, attorney 11 Jeffrey Reich’s (“Jeffrey”) chapter 7 bankruptcy. Pamela and 12 Jeffrey are in the throes of a contentious decade long 13 dissolution case. 14 The court issued a 27-page ruling outlining three 15 independent reasons why Shane was disqualified. First, Shane was 16 employed by Jeffrey’s law firm for twenty years, during which 17 time he directly represented Jeffrey in litigation in which his 18 financial status was a significant issue. Both attorney/client 19 and otherwise confidential communications concerning Jeffrey’s 20 finances require protection from the risk of disclosure. The 21 disqualifying fact here is Shane’s successive representation of 22 Pamela adverse to Jeffrey without Jeffrey’s informed written 23 consent under circumstances where Shane acquired confidential 24 information including attorney/client communications. 25 /// 26

27 1 The following is the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 52 (Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 7052). Any finding of fact deemed 28 a conclusion of law is so adopted. Any conclusion of law deemed finding of 1 Second, Shane’s work at Jeffrey’s firm as bookkeeper gave 2 Shane access to confidential information concerning the firm’s 3 finances. The court weighed the conflicting evidence about 4 Shane’s role as bookkeeper and found testimony of Jeffrey’s 5 accountant to tip the persuasive scale in Jeffrey’s favor. 6 Jeffrey has alleged that Shane misappropriated hundreds of 7 thousands of dollars from the firm. Shane strenuously denies 8 that fact. In reply to the opposition to the disqualification 9 motion, Jeffrey stated he would not pursue that claim. 10 Third, even independent of the attorney/client relationship 11 or bookkeeper relationship, the inherent authority of the court 12 to disqualify can be applied when the facts support a finding 13 that a fiduciary or confidential relationship arose such that the 14 continued representation of a party adverse to the one with whom 15 the relationship arose would betray that relationship. 16 Such is the case here. The court found that the facts 17 supported a finding that a fiduciary or confidential relationship 18 arose between Jeffrey and Shane such that representation of 19 Pamela by Shane would betray that relationship. Aside from 20 Shane’s lengthy employment by Jeffrey, Shane is Jeffrey’s son. 21 Confidential information was bound to be shared given the 22 circumstances. The risk of use of confidential information by 23 Shane was sufficient to disqualify Shane as a prophylactic 24 remedy. 25 Fourteen days after the court issued its opinion and order, 26 Pamela (with new counsel) filed this motion for reconsideration. 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. 2 The Parties’ Contentions 3 1. Pamela’s Contentions. 4 Pamela contends first that she was denied due process. Her 5 theory is that, as the court noted, Jeffrey Reich’s reply 6 declaration in the underlying motion stated that he was not going 7 to pursue his asserted claim that Shane and Pamela allegedly 8 misappropriated funds from the “community property law firm.” 9 Therefore, Pamela argues, she was denied the opportunity to 10 respond to that statement, which she claims is untrue. The 11 purported significance of this is that Jeffrey’s pursuit of the 12 claim amounts to a waiver of confidentiality “associated” to the 13 allegation. 14 Second, Pamela posits that the court did not address that 15 Jeffrey had a fiduciary duty to Pamela to provide information 16 concerning community property assets as required by Cal. Fam. 17 Code. §§ 721(b) and 1100(e). She further posits that any 18 information Shane may have had about Jeffry’s finances was 19 information Jeffrey was legally required to share with Pamela 20 anyway. Pamela argues that Shane represented both her and 21 Jeffrey during the relevant time frame and thus was not 22 disqualified from representing Pamela now. She also argues that 23 no harm to Jeffrey can occur because of Shane’s representation of 24 Pamela because Jeffrey was bound by law to share the information 25 with Pamela anyway. 26 Third, Pamela urges that the information Shane obtained 27 while employed by the “community property law firm” over the 28 /// 1 course of twenty years was not confidential because Jeffrey 2 stopped “trusting” Shane with firm finances after the end of 3 2016. 4 5 2. Jeffrey’s Contentions in Opposition. 6 Jeffrey’s opposition raises five issues. First, motions for 7 reconsideration are not meant to re-litigate issues and are only 8 to be used in extraordinary circumstances. Nothing presented by 9 Pamela, Jeffrey argues, warrants the extraordinary relief 10 requested. 11 Second, Jeffrey urges there is no manifest error of law or 12 fact. Shane, Jeffrey argues, has always been fully aware of his 13 relationship with Jeffrey, whether as his attorney, as his 14 employee, as his bookkeeper, and as his son. No newly discovered 15 evidence was presented. 16 Third, Jeffrey contends that Pamela’s inability to respond 17 to Jeffrey’s statement that he would not pursue the 18 misappropriations claim against Shane is irrelevant. The nature 19 of briefing in court is the reply is the last word. 20 Fourth, Jeffrey argues that the court is not required to 21 respond to every argument presented by a party. 22 Fifth, Jeffrey claims that his marriage to Pamela does not 23 render his rights as Shane’s client moot. Jeffrey is entitled to 24 rely on confidentiality. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 3. Pamela’s Reply. 2 Pamela’s reply (Doc. #218) repeats the same points as the 3 motion. She now argues the opposition was late.2 Pamela 4 reiterates her complaint that the court considered the reply on 5 Jeffrey’s motion to disqualify denying her due process. 6 Additionally, she reiterates that Jeffrey’s fiduciary duties to 7 Pamela under state law made Shane’s duty to maintain Jeffrey’s 8 confidences “evaporate.” Again, Pamela argues that any remaining 9 confidence that Jeffrey reposed on Shane was merely general 10 business and litigation strategy and not protected.3 11 12 C. 13 JURISDICTION 14 This court’s jurisdiction arises by reference from the 15 United States District Court for the Eastern District of 16 California under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). The District Court has 17 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This court may hear and 18 finally determine this motion as it asks the court to reconsider 19 /// 20

2 The opposition was filed one day late. It was filed on October 31, 2025, and 21 was due October 30, 2025. Though Pamela “objects” to the late filed opposition, she points to no prejudice and she has filed a substantive reply. 22 Since the one day tardiness does not affect Pamela’s reply, and Pamela did not request a continuance of the hearing, the court will overlook Jeffrey’s 23 counsel’s error. 3 In reply, Pamela raised for the first time the argument that Jeffrey’s 24 maintenance of any privilege may be waived by the “crime-fraud” exception to California’s lawyer-client privilege. Cal. Ev. Code § 956. Since the 25 argument was raised in reply, it is therefore waived. Autotel v. Nevada Bell Telephone Co., 697 F.3d 846, 852 fn3 (9th Cir. 2012) quoting Turtle Island 26 Restoration Network v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 672 F.3d 1160, 1166 fn8 (9th Cir. 2012). But even if not waived, Pamela points to nothing in the record 27 showing Jeffrey sought or obtained Shane’s services to enable Jeffrey to commit a crime or fraud. Cal. Ev. Code § 956(a). Pamela has the burden to 28 show a prima facia case of crime or fraud. Cunningham v. Connecticut Mutual 1 its own order and this matter is a core proceeding under 28 2 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2)(A). 3 4 II. 5 DISCUSSION 6 A. 7 Standards on Motion for Reconsideration. 8 Decisions regarding a disqualification of counsel are 9 reviewed for abuse of discretion. Paul E. Iacono Structural 10 Engineer, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983). 11 The rulings of the trial court on a disqualification motion is 12 not disturbed if there is any sound basis for the court’s action. 13 Cohn v. Rosenfeld, 733 F.2d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 1984). The 14 court’s ruling on the motion to disqualify was subject to the 15 court’s discretion. There is ample basis in the record for the 16 court’s ruling disqualifying Shane. A bankruptcy court’s denial 17 of a motion for reconsideration is also reviewed for abuse of 18 discretion. In re Donovan, 871 F.2d 807, 808 (9th Cir. 1989); 19 Rigby v. Mastro (In re Mastro), 585 B.R. 587, 591 (B.A.P. 9th 20 Cir. 2018). 21 A motion for reconsideration is considered to be a Rule 9023 22 motion which incorporates Civ. Rule 59(e). Clinton v. Deutsche 23 Bank Nat’l Trust Co., (In re Clinton), 449 B.R. 79, 83 (B.A.P. 24 9th Cir. 2011).4 To succeed on a motion for reconsideration, 25 movant needs to (1) present newly discovered evidence, (2) show 26 clear error, or (3) show an intervening change in controlling 27

28 4 References to “Rule” shall be to the Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. references to “Civ. 1 law. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma Gmb H & Co., 2 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009). Mere disagreement with a 3 court’s application of a standard is not manifest error of law or 4 fact. Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993). 5 A manifest error is one that amounts to a complete disregard of 6 the controlling law or evidence in the record. Black’s Law 7 Dictionary Manifest Error pg. 622 (Ninth Edition 2009); In re Oak 8 Park Calabasas Condo. Ass’n, 302 B.R. 682, 683 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 9 2003). 10 Although Rule 59(e) permits a District Court to reconsider 11 and amend a previous order, the rule offers an “extraordinary 12 remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and 13 conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters. v. Estate of 14 Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). 15 Pamela points to no newly discovered evidence or intervening 16 change in controlling law to support her motion for 17 reconsideration. Pamela, instead, depends upon the “manifest 18 error” ground. As will be seen, no manifest error of law or fact 19 was committed requiring the court to reconsider its previous 20 order. 21 22 B. 23 Pamela Received Due Process. 24 Due process requires notice “reasonably calculated, under 25 all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 26 pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 27 their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 28 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 1 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010); Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 225 2 (2006)(due process does not require actual notice.) An alleged 3 due process violation cannot constitute reversible error unless 4 the party asserting the violation can demonstrate prejudice. See 5 Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 545 F.3d 764, 776, 777 (9th 6 Cir. 2008) partially abrogated on other grounds as recognized by 7 Nichols v. Marana Stockyard & Livestock Mkt., Inc. (In re 8 Nichols), 10 F.4th 956, 962 (9th Cir. 2021). Upon objective 9 examination of the record in this case, one should conclude that 10 Pamela received due process. 11 12 1. The Court’s Consideration of Jeffrey’s Reply Declaration. 13 Pamela has made much of the fact the court considered 14 Jeffrey’s reply declaration filed in support of the motion to 15 disqualify. Specifically, Jeffrey stated that he would not 16 prosecute his claim against Shane for misappropriation. Pamela 17 argues that she did not have the opportunity to respond to the 18 statement. 19 Pamela is incorrect. She filed this motion for 20 reconsideration, and her response seems to assert that Jeffrey 21 will prosecute the claim even though he said he would not. This 22 “evidence standoff” does not amount to newly discovered evidence 23 in any form. Evidence in the possession of the party before the 24 judgment was rendered is not newly discovered. Feature Realty, 25 Inc. v. City of Spokane, 331 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). 26 Cases construing “newly discovered evidence” either under Civ. 27 Rule 60(b)(2) or Civ. Rule 59 uniformly hold that events 28 occurring after the trial are not newly discovered evidence 1 within the meaning of the Civil (or Bankruptcy) Rules. State of 2 Washington v. United States, 214 F.2d 33, 46 (9th Cir. 1954) 3 cert. denied 348 U.S. 862 (1954). There is nothing in the record 4 suggesting Jeffrey retracted his statement from his reply 5 declaration after the court’s ruling. Pamela did not provide any 6 evidence that Jeffrey’s “retraction” could not have been 7 discovered at an early stage. And more importantly, the evidence 8 of Jeffrey’s alleged “retraction” is not of such magnitude that 9 production of it earlier would likely have changed the outcome of 10 the case. Defenders Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 929 (9th 11 2000). This is true for three reasons. 12 First, Jeffrey’s testimony that he was not pursuing the 13 claim was not a controlling factor in the disqualification. It 14 was a factual refutation to Shane’s claim that the 15 attorney/client privilege is waived by Jeffrey pursuing the 16 embezzlement claim. It is also not relevant to the inherent 17 power of the court to disqualify which did not depend on the 18 attorney/client relationship. Pamela continues to ignore this 19 fundamental issue. 20 Second, Pamela ignores the court’s analysis that even if 21 Jeffrey’s threats concerning Shane’s alleged embezzlement from 22 the law firm would result in a waiver of the attorney/client 23 privilege – and they would not – the waiver would be very narrow. 24 Doc. #174 pp. 23-24).5 Also, Shane’s argument ignores the 25 5 Extent of a waiver is narrowly defined and information required to be 26 disclosed must fit strictly within the confines of that waiver. Sony Cmptr. Ent. Am., Inc. v. Great American Ins. Co.; 229 F.R.D. 632, 635 (N.D. Cal. 2005) quoting Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal.App.3d 27 1097, 1052 (1987). Any waiver would be limited to what Shane is permitted to 28 disclose to defend himself. That does not result in a complete waiver as to 1 court’s inherent power to disqualify. Id. Shane never denied 2 that Jeffrey reposed trust and confidence in Shane. Id. 3 Third, this entire argument is a red herring. If there is a 4 claim against Shane for embezzlement – and the court has not 5 found any such claim to be valid at this time – that claim is not 6 Jeffrey’s to pursue because it would be property of the 7 bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C § 541(a)(1). The trustee of 8 Jeffrey’s bankruptcy estate has standing to pursue the claim. 9 11 U.S.C. § 323; Rule 6009. There is nothing in the record 10 establishing the Trustee’s pursuit of the claim. The argument is 11 meritless. 12 13 2. The Court’s Ruling was Consistent with Due Process. 14 In an undeveloped argument, Pamela asserts that the court’s 15 application of its inherent powers to find a confidential 16 relationship between Shane and Jeffrey independent of any 17 attorney/client or bookkeeper relationship was a violation of due 18 process because it was not argued by Jeffrey in his motion to 19 disqualify. 20 This ignores the facts. Jeffrey’s notice of motion (Doc. 21 #65) references confidential information Shane as both an 22 attorney and employee and also raised attorney/client and 23 fiduciary duties. The memorandum of points and authorities (Doc. 24 #68) referenced Shane’s duty to maintain confidences under Cal. 25 Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rules 1.6 and 1.9. Rule 1.6 references 26 Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 6068(e)(1). That section sets forth the 27 duty of an attorney to: 28 /// 1 Maintain inviolate the confidence and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of 2 his or client. 3 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e)(1). 4 Jeffrey argued in his memorandum of points and authorities 5 that Shane was barred from using Jeffrey’s confidential 6 information because of Cal. Rule of Prof’l Conduct 1.9. Jeffrey 7 also argued that Shane’s confidentiality obligations went beyond 8 the work at the “community property law firm.” 9 The duty of confidentiality is broader than the 10 lawyer/client privilege and protects virtually everything the 11 lawyer knows about the client’s matters regardless of the source 12 of information. Elijah W. v. Superior Court, 2016 Cal.App. 4th 13 140, 151 (2013) citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6068(e)(1); Dietz 14 v. Meisenheimer & Herron, 177 Cal.App. 4th 771, 787 (2009); Rst. 15 3d Law Governing Lawyers § 59 (“[C]onfidential information 16 consists of information relating to representation of a client, 17 other than information that is generally known).” 18 It is unreasonable to argue that Pamela was “blindsided” by 19 the court’s analysis. The record on the motion to disqualify 20 included several references to Shane’s unfettered access to 21 confidential information about Jeffrey. Jeffrey trusted Shane and 22 shared detailed financial information with him, Shane handled 23 legal cases on behalf of Jeffrey, and Shane had a close, 24 confidential relationship with Jeffrey. Doc. #69 filed May 23, 25 2025. Jeffrey states he never gave Shane permission to share 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 information with Pamela. He told Shane to “not take sides.” Doc. 2 #104 filed June 17, 2025.6 3 Pamela received due process. There is nothing in the record 4 showing how Pamela’s presentation to the court has been 5 compromised in any way or that Pamela has been prejudiced in any 6 way other than her initial chosen counsel being disqualified. 7 8 C.

9 The Court Considered Jeffrey and Pamela’s Mutual Fiduciary Duties. 10 11 1. The Mutual Fiduciary Duties did not Obviate the Need for 12 Disqualification. 13 Pamela argues in the motion for reconsideration that the 14 court did not consider the mutual fiduciary obligations that 15 Jeffrey and Pamela had to each other and continue to have until 16 their marriage is dissolved. Pamela contends that the 17 application of those fiduciary duties excuses Shane’s obligation 18 to Jeffrey to maintain confidences. But the court did indeed 19 consider the fiduciary duties and will once again explain why 20 Pamela is improperly conflating the family law fiduciary duties 21 with Shane’s duties to maintain confidences. 22 Cal. Fam. Code §§ 721(b) and 1100(e) do establish certain 23 relationships and fiduciary duties between spouses. Section 24 721(b) establishes a fiduciary relationship between spouses in 25 transactions between themselves such that neither spouse shall 26 6 The argument also ignores the court’s accommodations. The record shows that 27 Jeffrey’s original notice of the disqualification motion erroneously stated that filing opposition was unnecessary. Pamela filed opposition anyway and 28 asked for additional time for further briefing. The court granted the request 1 take unfair advantage of the other. The spouses are subject to 2 the same rights and duties of non-marital business partners. 3 Cal. Fam. Code § 1100(e) provides that the fiduciary 4 relationship between spouses extends to management and control of 5 community property until the assets have been divided by a court. 6 That includes full disclosure of material facts and equal access 7 to all information pertaining to the value and character of 8 community assets and debts. There is no doubt that those duties 9 exist between spouses. 10 Absent from the record here though, and this motion, is any 11 authority providing that a fiduciary whether an attorney, 12 employee or otherwise holding confidential information is excused 13 from maintaining confidentiality absent consent. That consent 14 must be written in most instances. The duties Jeffrey and Pamela 15 have to each other are their duties. The court has been provided 16 no authority that Shane’s duties to Jeffrey in Shane’s various 17 capacities are excused because Shane at one time was employed by 18 a community property asset – the law firm. 19 Jeffrey’s legal obligations to Pamela concerning information 20 about community property while Shane was defending Jeffrey from 21 collection actions were not Shane’s own obligations. The 22 disqualification was not because Shane shared information with 23 Pamela but rather because the confidential relationship Shane had 24 with Jeffrey existed and posed a risk of that information being 25 shared. Jeffrey’s statutory duties to Pamela are Jeffrey’s 26 statutory duties. Shane is not the arbiter of the information 27 spouses are duty bound to share. The issue on the motion to 28 disqualify is the confidential relationship, not the sharing of 1 information. The potential for misuse was the issue on the 2 disqualification motion. 3 Involving the court in determining the extent of permissive 4 communication by Shane is a clear reason why disqualification is 5 necessary here. No inquiries should be made into the 6 communication when the attorney/client relationship was direct. 7 Confidential information between an attorney and a client is 8 presumed. Fiduciary Trust International of California v. 9 Superior Court, 218 Cal.App. 4th 465, 486 (2013). 10 11 2. The Authorities Pamela Relies Upon Are Distinguishable. 12 Pamela once again relies on In re Rindlisbacher, 225 B.R. 13 180 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) to argue Shane is free to share 14 confidential communications with Jeffrey because Jeffrey is 15 continuing to assert that Pamela and Shane allegedly 16 misappropriated hundreds of thousands of dollars from the law 17 practice. The court has already discussed why that argument is a 18 “red herring.” 19 Nevertheless, there are additional distinguishing factors. 20 First, Pamela admits Rindlisbacher’s holding is inapposite 21 to the facts here. Doc. #194. 22 Second, Pamela’s contention that Rindlisbacher affirms an 23 attorney’s freedom to betray confidences if there is a breach of 24 duty by the client expands Rindlisbacher’s holding beyond its 25 text. The panel’s discussion referenced by Pamela dealt with the 26 client’s duty to pay fees, not the sort of duties implicated in 27 this matter. Id. at 183. 28 /// 1 Third, the panel in Rindlisbacher held that there was no 2 waiver by the client when the now-adverse attorney asked for 3 information which the client had discussed in confidence. Id. at 4 184. Rindlisbacher is inapplicable and not persuasive here. 5 Pamela also cites Arden v. State Bar of California, 52 Cal. 6 2d 310, 320 (1959) to argue that Jeffrey challenged Shane’s 7 integrity by accusing Shane of misappropriation, and so Jeffrey 8 waived protection of his confidential communication with Shane. 9 First, the Ninth Circuit has cast doubt on the continuing 10 vitality of Arden. In Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th 11 1964, the Circuit declined to follow Arden because Arden and 12 other cases (some of which are cited by Pamela here) had evidence 13 that the attorney represented both sides of the same transaction. 14 Not so here. There is nothing in the record suggesting that 15 Jeffrey consented to Shane representing both him and Pamela. 16 There is no “transaction” that Pamela or Shane identify where 17 both sides consented to dual representation. 18 Second, the court in Arden pointed to evidence that the 19 original client (a birth mother) consented to her attorney 20 simultaneously representing the adoptive parents. The attorney 21 in Arden also disclosed to the birth mother his duty to divulge 22 information to the adoptive parents. Arden, 52 Cal. 2d at 318. 23 Third, even the citation to Arden in Pamela’s reply, Arden 24 52 Cal. 2d at 317-319 demonstrates why Arden is not persuasive 25 here: 26 There is evidence in the record indicating that (previous client) gave her consent to petitioner’s 27 representation of (later clients).... 28 Emphasis added. 52 Cal. 2d at 318. Also: 1 …the rationale of these decisions is that the common employment of the attorney remove the communication 2 of the parties to one another and to the attorney from the privileged category. 3 4 Id. 5 The Arden Court also noted the attorney testified he advised 6 the previous client of his intention to share information. Id. at 7 319. 8 In short, Arden is of no assistance to Pamela here since the 9 record in Arden showed consent. Such consent has not been shown 10 on the record here. 11 Pamela also cites Croce v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.App. 2d 18 12 (1937). There, an attorney jointly represented several clients 13 and the court ruled the communications are not privileged among 14 the clients themselves. 15 However, Croce has been widely rejected and its continued 16 vitality has been called into question. Kim v. The True Church 17 Members of Holy Hill Community Church, 236 Cal.App. 4th 1435, 18 1455 (2015) citing Fiduciary Trust International of California, 19 218 Cal.App. 4th at 482-486. 20 In Zador Corp. v. Kwan, 31 Cal.App. 4th 1285 (1995) also 21 cited by Pamela, the Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s 22 disqualification of counsel because the former client who brought 23 the motion consented to counsel’s continued representation of 24 former client’s current opponent “notwithstanding any diversity 25 that may have developed.” Id. at 1303. Informed, written consent 26 was obtained in Zador. Not so here. 27 Finally, Pamela reasserts that under Banning Ranch 28 Conservancy v. Superior Court, 193 Cal.App. 4th 903 (2011) Shane 1 only received from Jeffrey unprivileged general business and 2 litigation information after Jeffrey stopped “trusting” Shane 3 with the “community property law firm’s” money in 2016. The 4 court already distinguished Banning in its original decision. 5 6 D. 7 Civ. Rule 60(b)(6) is Inapplicable. 8 Civ. Rule 60(b)(6) permits the court to relieve a party or 9 its legal representative from a final judgment order or 10 proceeding for “any other reason that justifies relief.” (Fed. R. 11 Bankr. Proc. 9024). The rule grants Federal Courts broad 12 authority to relieve a party from a final judgment…provided that 13 the motion…is not premised on one of the grounds for relief 14 enumerated in clauses (b)(1)-(b)(5) Liljeberg v. Health Servs. 15 Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 at fn. 11 (1988). Application of this 16 rule requires extraordinary circumstances which prevented a party 17 from presenting his case. Lal v. California, 610 F.3d at 518, 18 524 (9th Cir. 2010) cits. omitted. 19 Pamela does not provide any evidence or analysis of how she 20 was unable to present her case in opposition to the motion to 21 disqualify. There are no extraordinary circumstances presented 22 by Pamela that would warrant such relief under Civ. Rule 23 60(b)(6). 24 25 CONCLUSION 26 Pamela has not demonstrated any newly discovered evidence 27 that would change the court’s decision on the motion to 28 disqualify. For the foregoing reasons, no manifest error of law 1 or fact occurred on the motion to disqualify. Accordingly, the 2 motion shall be and hereby is DENIED. A separate order shall 3 issue. 4 5 | Dated: Nov 19, 2025 By the Court

a“ 7 ora ené Ldstreto II, Judge 8 United States Bankruptcy Court 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

1 Instructions to Clerk of Court Service List - Not Part of Order/Judgment 2

3 The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment or other court generated document transmitted herewith to the 4 parties below. The Clerk of Court will send the Order via the BNC or, if checked , via the U.S. mail. 5

6 Jeffrey Kane Reich 11520 N. Via Campagna Dr. 7 Fresno, CA 93730

8 Irma Edmonds 2501 West Shaw Avenue, Ste. 124 9 Fresno, CA 93711

10 Anthony D. Johnston 1600 G Street, Ste. 103 11 Modesto, CA 95354

12 Megan Zavieh 12460 Crabapple Road 13 Ste 202-272 Alpharetta, GA 30004 14 Peter B. Bunting 15 2304 W. Shaw Ave. Ste. 103 Fresno, CA 93711 16 Richard Ryan McMath 17 2100 Garden Rd. Bldg. B, Suite J 18 Monterey, CA 93940

19 Shane Reich P. O. Box 1381 20 Clovis, CA 93613

22 23 24 25 26 27 28