In re J.C.

2023 Ohio 1501

Opinion

[Cite as In re J.C., 2023-Ohio-1501.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: J.C. : APPEAL NO. C-220293 TRIAL NO. 21-660Z :

:

: O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 5, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Patsy Bradbury, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee State of Ohio,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Joshua A. Thompson, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant J.C. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant J.C. challenges the juvenile court’s decision to

classify him as a Tier II sex offender. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedure

{¶2} Over the course of one year, 14-year-old J.C. subjected his 8-year-old

cousin to a series of sexual acts, including rape. In 2021, the state filed a complaint in

the juvenile court charging J.C. as a delinquent child under R.C. 2152.02 for rape in

violation of R.C. 2907.02. According to the complaint, J.C. allegedly locked the door

during the encounters and threatened his victim. The complaint was one of 18 filed in

the juvenile court, part of a broader prosecution of J.C. for sex offenses committed

against three younger cousins when J.C. was 13 to 14 years old. Eventually, the state

dismissed 15 counts of rape and one count of gross sexual imposition in exchange for

J.C.’s admission to three complaints charging him with rape. The juvenile court

accepted J.C.’s admissions and adjudicated him delinquent. Because J.C. was 14 years

old at the time of the offense in this case, the juvenile court had discretion to classify

him as a sex offender and select his sex-offender tier. See R.C. 2152.83(B).

{¶3} At the juvenile-offender-registration hearings, the state requested that

J.C. be classified as a juvenile sex offender. In support, the state relied on testimony

from J.C.’s probation officer and Dr. Nicole Leisgang, as well as Dr. Leisgang’s expert

report and statements from the victims’ families. J.C. opposed the state’s request,

relying on testimony of J.C.’s experts, Dr. Purcell Taylor, a National Youth Advocate

Program clinician, therapist Michelle Fischer, and Talbert House psychologist Dr.

Maitee Soto. Additionally, J.C. submitted into the evidence Dr. Taylor’s expert report,

an outpatient services progress report, and statements from J.C. and his family.

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{¶4} The magistrate determined that J.C. be classified as a juvenile offender

registrant and a Tier II sex offender. J.C. objected to that classification. The juvenile

court accepted the magistrate’s findings, adopted the magistrate’s decision, and

ordered J.C. to register as a Tier II sex offender. The juvenile court based its decision

on the testimony of Dr. Leisgang, Dr. Taylor, and Dr. Soto, as well as the expert reports.

The juvenile court considered the nonexhaustive list of statutory factors in R.C.

2152.83(D) and specifically found that J.C. failed to demonstrate genuine remorse or

compunction for the offenses and that the expert testimony indicated that he was a

public safety threat. See R.C. 2152.83(D)(2)-(3). In addition, the juvenile court found

that although J.C. was participating in and cooperating with court-ordered treatment,

there was evidence that J.C. would require a longer-than-usual course of treatment.

See R.C. 2152.83(D)(6).

{¶5} The juvenile court also considered, as it must, the nonexhaustive list of

statutory factors in R.C. 2950.11(K). See R.C. 2152.83(D)(4). Relevant here, the

juvenile court found that classifying J.C. was supported by the fact that J.C. was

adjudicated delinquent for rape in three cases for offenses that occurred over the

course of one year against the eight-year-old victim in this case, and the eight- and six-

year-old victims in J.C.’s other cases. See R.C. 2950.11(K)(2)-(4), (6), and (8). The

juvenile court acknowledged that J.C. experienced sexual abuse as a child and that he

was diagnosed with depression and an unspecified trauma disorder. See R.C.

2950.11(K)(7). Further, the juvenile court expressed concern over J.C.’s inability or

difficulty with acknowledging the behaviors underlying and preceding his conduct. See

R.C. 2950.11(K)(10).

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{¶6} Finally, the juvenile court addressed R.C. 2929.12(B)’s and (C)’s list of

aggravating and mitigating factors, as required by R.C. 2952.83(D)(5). The juvenile

court found J.C.’s conduct severe because J.C.’s relationship with the victim facilitated

the rape, which inflicted serious mental injuries on the victim, exacerbated by the

victim’s young age. See R.C. 2929.12(B)(1)-(2) and (6). And the juvenile court found

no substantial grounds to mitigate J.C.’s conduct. See R.C. 2929.12(C). J.C. appeals

his Tier II sex-offender classification.

II. Law and Analysis

{¶7} In a single assignment of error, J.C. argues that the juvenile court

abused its discretion when it classified him as a Tier II sex offender. J.C. does not

dispute that the juvenile court considered the statutory factors prescribed by R.C.

2152.83(D), 2950.11, and 2929.12(C)-(B). Rather, J.C. disputes the juvenile court’s

factual findings and analysis of those facts under the relevant statutory factors.

Juvenile Courts Exercise Broad Discretion When Classifying Juvenile Offenders

{¶8} The juvenile court is vested with broad discretion over whether to

classify a child as a sex offender for eligible offenses committed when the child was 14

years old. In re R.B., 2021-Ohio-2112, 174 N.E.3d 480, ¶ 46 (1st Dist.). Further, our

review of a child’s sex-offender classification is “highly deferential.” Id. We review a

juvenile court’s classification for an abuse of discretion. In re P.R., 1st Dist. Hamilton

Nos. C-180166 and C-180167, 2019-Ohio-4751, ¶ 23. An abuse of discretion exists

when a court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v.

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).

{¶9} In Ohio, a child adjudicated delinquent for certain crimes may, through

an exercise of the juvenile court’s discretionary authority, be classified as a sex

offender. See R.C. 2152.83. The statutory scheme is designed to “ ‘reintegrat[e] 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

juveniles back into society’ by emphasizing ‘individual assessment, the best interest of

the child, treatment, and rehabilitation.’ ” In re K.B., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170542,

2018-Ohio-4810, ¶ 4, quoting In re C.A., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23022, 2009-Ohio-

3303, ¶ 62, and State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 88, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000).

Before exercising its discretion to classify a child as a sex offender, the juvenile court

must consider a tapestry of enumerated factors in several statutes. The offense “ ‘is

only one of many pieces of relevant information the juvenile court may consider, and

the level of the offense is not determinative of the level of classification.’ ” In re K.B.,

at ¶ 4, quoting In re N.Z., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-100, 2014-Ohio-157, ¶ 17.

{¶10} R.C. 2152.83(D) requires the court to consider, among other things, 1.)

the nature of the offense, 2.) the child’s remorse or compunction, 3.) public interest

and safety issues, 4.) the statutory factors set forth in R.C. 2950.11(K) and 2929.12(B)-

(C), and 5.) the results of any treatment or assessments. See R.C. 2152.83(D)(1)-(6).

In addition, the following R.C. 2950.11(K) factors were relevant to the juvenile court’s

classification decision: 1.) the offender’s age, 2.) the victim’s age, 3.) the number of

victims, 4.) the offender’s mental health, and 5.) the nature of the sexual conduct in

question. See R.C. 2950.11(K)(1)-(4), (7)-(8). Finally, R.C. 2929.12(B) instructs the

court to consider nine nonexhaustive factors suggesting the conduct at issue was more

serious than the typical offense. Here, the court discussed 1.) the severity of the harm,

2.) whether the harm was exacerbated by the victim’s age, and 3.) whether the

offender’s relationship with the victim facilitated the offense when it determined if the

conduct was more severe than conduct normally constituting the offense. See R.C.

2929.12(B)(1), (2), and (6). In contrast, R.C. 2929.12(C) identifies four nonexhaustive

factors that suggest the offender’s conduct is less serious than the typical offense.

5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

{¶11} J.C. challenges the juvenile court’s findings and analysis of several R.C.

2152.83(D) factors. First, he argues that the trial court improperly considered the

underlying facts of two other delinquency adjudications in its analysis of the nature of

the offense, which occurred before J.C. turned 14 years old. But the statute instructs

the juvenile court to “consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to * * *

[t]he nature of the sexually oriented offense.” R.C. 2152.83(D). J.C. has not explained

how these adjudications are not relevant to the juvenile court’s classification decision

for the delinquency adjudication in this case. Nor has he provided any caselaw to

support his argument.

{¶12} Next, he contends that the evidence demonstrates his genuine remorse

and compunction under R.C. 2152.83(D)(2). While the juvenile court found that J.C.

had not shown genuine remorse or compunction for the offense, it acknowledged that

J.C. accepted some responsibility for his actions. Moving to the public interest and

safety considerations under R.C. 2152.83(D)(3), the juvenile court found that J.C.

posed a threat to public interest and safety. In response, J.C. emphasizes testimony

from several of his witnesses to argue that J.C. is unlikely to reoffend and that he poses

a minimal threat to the public. He contends that the results of his treatment contradict

the juvenile court’s classification decision. See R.C. 2152.83(D)(6).

{¶13} But the juvenile court considered the relevant statutory factors and

made findings supported by the evidence in the record, including J.C.’s witnesses and

expert report. Dr. Taylor noted that J.C. posed a “low to moderate range for future

sexually acting out behavior” and failed to recognize the behaviors that preceded his

deviant sexual behaviors. While Fischer highlighted J.C.’s progress, she noted that he

would benefit from more treatment. Likewise, Dr. Soto testified that J.C. benefitted 6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

from outpatient services but cautioned that his treatment would take longer than other

cases. She testified that J.C. accepted responsibility for his actions, but needed to work

on understanding both the damage inflicted on his victims and the circumstances that

triggered his behaviors to prevent future incidents.

{¶14} While J.C. appears to agree with the juvenile court’s findings under R.C.

2950.11(K), he challenges the juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C).

But the juvenile court’s findings under the relevant R.C. 2929.12(B) factors are

similarly supported by the record. While J.C. argues that there was no evidence

indicating that the victim’s harm was exceptionally serious, statements made to the

magistrate by the victim’s parents indicated that the victim is living with “serious

consequences” and needed treatment and therapy. And despite J.C.’s contention that

the juvenile court’s finding that his relationship with the victim facilitated the offense

lacks evidentiary support, J.C.’s actions and remarks to Dr. Leisgang suggest that he

leveraged familial trust to conceal the acts and coerce the victims in all three cases.

{¶15} Finally, J.C. challenges the efficacy and wisdom of juvenile-sex-offender

classifications. He emphasizes research and studies that question the efficacy of

placing children on sex-offender registries and suggest that sex-offender registries

impede the treatment of children adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses.

{¶16} We recognize that “juveniles are less culpable than adults [and] their

bad acts are less likely to reveal an unredeemable corruptness.” In re C.P., 131 Ohio

St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, ¶ 40. But this court does not set policy—

that is the role of the legislature. We must follow the law enacted by that body. As such,

we are constrained to review the juvenile court’s classification decision for an abuse of

discretion, which commands a degree of decisional latitude. While we scrutinize the

juvenile court’s exercise of discretion, we are prohibited from substituting our own 7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

judgment for that of the juvenile court. See Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169,

559 N.E.2d 1301 (1990).

{¶17} Because the juvenile court’s conclusions are supported by the evidence

in the record, we cannot conclude that J.C.’s Tier II sex-offender classification was

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. And so we hold that the juvenile court did

not abuse its discretion when it classified J.C. as a Tier II sex offender.

III. Conclusion

{¶18} We overrule J.C.’s single assignment of error and affirm his Tier II sex-

offender classification.

Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.