In re: J.C.

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: August 6, 2025
• Docket: 25-91
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-91

Filed 6 August 2025

Forsyth County, No. 23JT000076-330

IN THE MATTER OF:

J.C.

Appeal by respondent-father from an order terminating parental rights

entered 21 October 2024 by Judge Thomas W. Davis V in Forsyth County District

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 June 2025.

Theresa A. Boucher for petitioner-appellee Forsyth County Department of Social Services.

Matthew D. Wunsche for appellee Guardian Ad Litem

Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellant father.

FREEMAN, Judge.

Respondent-father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to

J.C. (“Jimmy”).1 Counsel for respondent-father filed a no-merit brief under Rule

3.1(e) of North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. After careful review of the two

issues identified in counsel’s brief, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating

1 A pseudonym is used to protect the juvenile’s identity pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 42(b). IN RE: J.C.

Opinion of the Court

respondent-father’s parental rights. See In re L.E.M., 372 N.C. 396, 403 (2019)

(affirming the trial court’s order terminating an individual’s parental rights after

reviewing the issues identified in the no-merit brief).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In January 2023, Ebony Davis gave birth to Jimmy. Immediately following his

birth, Jimmy tested positive for fentanyl, cocaine, and THC.2 Due to Jimmy’s

substance exposure, Jimmy continued to be hospitalized for three months after his

birth. On 26 April 2023, Forsyth County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed

a juvenile petition alleging that Jimmy and his siblings were neglected. 3 That same

day, the trial court granted non-secure custody of Jimmy to DSS and after his release

from the hospital, Jimmy was placed into foster care.

On 1 May 2023, after DSS petitioned for continued non-secure custody of

Jimmy, a hearing was held. Respondent-father was present at the hearing. In its

subsequent 11 May 2023 order, the trial court granted continuing non-secure custody

of Jimmy to DSS and ordered testing to determine whether respondent-father was

Jimmy’s biological father.

On 16 June 2023, the trial court adjudicated Jimmy neglected. Respondent-

father was not present for the hearing. Based on that hearing, the trial court stated

2 Jimmy’s mother did not appeal the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights and is

not a party on appeal. 3 Respondent-father is not the biological father of Jimmy’s siblings. Therefore, Jimmy’s siblings are not the subjects of this appeal.

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in its corresponding 23 July 2023 order that despite DSS’ ongoing efforts to contact

respondent-father—after paternity testing results determined he was Jimmy’s

biological father—DSS could not reach him. The trial court ordered respondent-

father to enter a case plan, submit to random drug screens, refrain from incurring

new criminal charges, and demonstrate his ability to meet Jimmy’s developmental

needs. Jimmy remained in the same foster care placement, but the trial court granted

respondent-father weekly visitation. On 22 August 2023, a DSS social worker was

able to contact respondent-father to discuss his reunification efforts and intentions

with Jimmy.

The trial court held its first permanency planning hearing on 6 September

2023, which respondent-father attended. Based on that hearing, the trial court stated

in its corresponding 26 September 2023 order that respondent-father had multiple

pending criminal charges, was “acting in a manner inconsistent with the health and

safety of” Jimmy, and needed to enter a case plan. That order established Jimmy’s

primary plan as reunification and his secondary plan as guardianship, and granted

respondent-father weekly supervised visits with Jimmy. Jimmy remained in the

same foster placement.

After DSS received non-secure custody of Jimmy, respondent-father visited

Jimmy only twice, once on 12 October 2023, and again on 16 January 2024. He did

not send Jimmy cards, gifts, or letters. According to respondent-father, his job and

the responsibility of taking care of his nine other children left little time for him to

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visit with Jimmy. On 10 January 2024, a DSS social worker contacted respondent-

father to share that Jimmy was having surgery and respondent-father asked how

Jimmy was doing. Respondent-father did not attend Jimmy’s surgery and did not

speak with a DSS social worker again.

On 16 January 2024, after failing to submit previously requested drug testing,

respondent-father completed a DSS-requested hair and urine drug screening. His

urine drug screen yielded positive results for cocaine, THC, and norbuprenorphine.

His hair drug screen yielded positive results for THC, methamphetamines, cocaine,

and fentanyl.

On 7 February 2024, the trial court held another permanency planning

hearing. Respondent-father did not attend the hearing. The trial court found in its

corresponding 8 March 2024 order that respondent-father: was not making progress

to reunite with Jimmy; had tested positive for multiple controlled substances on 16

January 2024; had only visited Jimmy twice; continued to face pending criminal

charges; and failed to complete portions of his case plan.

On 16 June 2024, respondent-father entered into a DSS case plan which

required him to take parenting, substance abuse, and mental health classes. The

trial court held another permanency planning hearing on 24 July 2024, and DSS filed

a petition to terminate Davis’s and respondent-father’s parental rights under

subsections 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (5) and (7) of our General Statutes that same day.

Because of his arrest for additional criminal charges on 20 March 2024, respondent-

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father was incarcerated during the 24 July 2024 permanency planning hearing. In

its order following this permanency planning hearing, the trial court found that

although respondent-father had entered into a case plan on 16 June 2024, he had not

fully complied with the case plan. The trial court found that respondent-father had

completed some parenting classes during his incarceration.

The trial court held a hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights on

23 September 2024. The trial court heard testimony from social worker Vera Ford,

respondent-father, and the guardian ad litem (“GAL”). Ford specifically testified that

no steps had been taken by respondent-father to legitimate Jimmy. Further, the trial

court received a GAL report, an affidavit from DSS describing that no paternity

affidavit had been filed with DSS, Jimmy’s birth certificate, and all previous orders

in the case.

On 21 October 2024, the trial court entered an order terminating

respondent-father’s parental rights, concluding that DSS proved by clear, cogent, and

convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate respondent-father’s parental

rights under subsections 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (5) and (7) of our General Statutes and

that such termination would be in Jimmy’s best interests. The trial court found in

relevant part:

37. [Jimmy] was born out of wedlock, Jervey Clark is the biological father of said child and he has not prior to the filing of the petition,

a. established paternity judicially or by affidavit filed in the

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Department of Human Resource central registry or

b. legitimated or petitioned to legitimate said child pursuant to G.S. 49-10 or

c. legitimated the child by marrying the mother of the child or

d. provided substantial financial support or consistent care with respect to the child and mother.

Further, the trial court concluded in relevant part:

41. [Jimmy] is a 20-month-old infant child.

42. Currently [Jimmy] is in a safe, stable, and appropriate home where he has lived since discharge from the hospital following his birth. This is a prospective adoptive home. The likelihood of adoption is very likely. [Jimmy] is thriving in this home. He looks to his prospective adoptive parents for comfort and guidance. [Jimmy] calls his foster parents mom and dad. He demonstrates love and affection to his foster parents as they do to him. He is meeting developmental milestones.

43. There is no bond between [Jimmy] and his mother, Ebony Davis.

44. There is no bond between [Jimmy] and his father, Jervey Clark.

45. The permanent plan adopted by the Juvenile Court for [Jimmy] is Adoption. The termination of parental rights of Ebony Davis and Jervey Clark is the only method available to accomplish the permanent plan.

Respondent-father timely appealed.

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction to review any “order that terminates parental

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rights or denies a petition or motion to terminate parental rights.”

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(7) (2023). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review the trial

court’s order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights.

III. Standard of Review

“We review a district court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) to

determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing

evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811,

814 (2020) (cleaned up). “Unchallenged findings of fact are deemed supported by

competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” Id. Accordingly, “we review only

those findings needed to sustain the trial court’s adjudication . . . [and] an

adjudication of any single ground for terminating a parent’s rights . . . will suffice to

support a termination order.” Id. at 814–15. Thus, if this Court affirms a trial court’s

conclusion “that a particular ground for termination exists . . . we need not review

any remaining grounds.” Id. at 815. Further, “whether a trial court’s findings of fact

support its conclusions of law is reviewed de novo.” Id. But a “trial court’s

determination of a child’s best interests . . . is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.”

Id. at 822.

IV. Discussion

Here, respondent-father’s counsel has demonstrated full compliance with Rule

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3.1(e) of our Rules of Appellate Procedure.4 Therefore, we conduct an independent

review of the issues raised in the no-merit brief. See In re L.E.M., 372 N.C. at 402.

Respondent-father’s counsel identifies two issues for our independent review: (1)

whether the trial court erred in concluding grounds existed to terminate respondent-

father’s parental rights; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in

determining termination was in Jimmy’s best interest.

A. Adjudication

A trial court may terminate the parental rights of a father of a child born out

of wedlock upon a finding that the father has not, before the filing of the termination

of parental rights petition:

a. Filed an affidavit of paternity in a central registry maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services; provided, the court shall inquire of the Department of Health and Human Services as to whether such an affidavit has been so filed and the Department’s certified reply shall be submitted to and considered by the court.

b. Legitimated the juvenile pursuant to provisions of G.S. 49-10, G.S. 49-12.1, or filed a petition for this specific purpose.

c. Legitimated the juvenile by marriage to the mother of the juvenile.

d. Provided substantial financial support or consistent care with respect to the juvenile and mother.

4 Although respondent-father’s counsel advised respondent-father of his right to file a pro se

brief in accordance with Rule 3.1(e), respondent-father did not submit a pro-se brief to this Court. See N.C.R. App. P. 3.1(e).

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e. Established paternity through G.S. 49–14, 110–132, 130A–101, 130A–118, or other judicial proceeding

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) (2023). “When basing the termination of parental rights on

this statutory provision the court must make specific findings of fact as to all [five]

subsections and the petitioner bears the burden of proving the father has failed to

take any of the [five] actions.” In re I.S., 170 N.C. App. 78, 88 (2005).

Here, DSS social worker Vera Ford testified that Jimmy was born out of

wedlock, and that although respondent-father was determined to be the “biological

father of the child through DNA testing,” respondent-father had taken no other legal

steps to legitimate Jimmy. Ford testified, and DSS submitted documents into

evidence showing, that no affidavit of paternity had been received by DSS; no special

legal action or petition to legitimate Jimmy had been filed by respondent-father;

respondent-father and Jimmy’s mother were not married; and respondent-father did

not provide “substantial financial support to consistent care with regard to” Jimmy

and Jimmy’s mother.

Based on this evidence, the trial court found that:

37. [Jimmy] was born out of wedlock, Jervey Clark is the biological father of said child and he has not prior to the filing of the petition,

a. established paternity judicially or by affidavit filed in the Department of Human Resource central registry or

b. legitimated or petitioned to legitimate said child pursuant to G.S. 49-10 or

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c. legitimated the child by marrying the mother of the child or

d. provided substantial financial support or consistent care with respect to the child and mother.

The trial court did not err in concluding respondent-father failed to establish

paternity prior to the filing of the termination of parental rights petition as required

by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5). The trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact are

supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the form of DSS testimony and

reports, and these findings support the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed

to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights under subsection 7B-1111(a)(5).

Because we affirm the trial court’s termination of respondent-father’s parental rights

under subsection 7B-1111(a)(5), we decline to review the trial court’s conclusions that

grounds for termination existed under subsections 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (7). See In

re J.S., 374 N.C. at 815.

B. Disposition

The second issue respondent-father’s counsel identified for review is whether

the trial court abused its discretion in determining that termination of respondent-

father’s parental rights was in Jimmy’s best interest. “After an adjudication that one

or more grounds for terminating a parent’s rights exist, the [trial] court shall

determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.”

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2023).

In each case, the court shall consider the following criteria

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and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant:

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.

(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.

(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.

The trial court is required to consider all of subsection 7B-1110(a)’s criteria,

but “written findings of fact are” only required “if there is conflicting evidence

concerning the factor such that it is placed in issue by virtue of the evidence presented

before the trial court.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 822 (cleaned up). These findings are

binding on this Court “if supported by any competent evidence” and we review the

trial court’s determination of a child’s best interests under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) for

abuse of discretion. Id. (cleaned up). “An abuse of discretion is a decision manifestly

unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a

reasoned decision.” Id. (cleaned up).

Here, the trial court entered written, supported factual findings of all the

required statutory factors:

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42. Currently [Jimmy] is in a safe, stable, and appropriate home where he has lived since discharge from the hospital following his birth. This is a prospective adoptive home. The likelihood of adoption is very likely. [Jimmy] is thriving in this home. He looks to his prospective adoptive parents for comfort and guidance. [Jimmy] calls his foster parents mom and dad. He demonstrates love and affection to his foster parents as they do to him. He is meeting developmental milestones.

43. There is no bond between [Jimmy] and his mother, Ebony Davis.

44. There is no bond between [Jimmy] and his father, Jervey Clark.

45. The permanent plan adopted by the Juvenile Court for [Jimmy] is Adoption. The termination of parental rights of Ebony Davis and Jervey Clark is the only method available to accomplish the permanent plan.

Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in determining that termination of respondent-father’s parental

rights was in Jimmy’s best interest.

V. Conclusion

Because the trial court did not err in concluding grounds existed to terminate

respondent-father’s parental rights or in determining that such termination was in

Jimmy’s best interest, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating

respondent-father’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.

Judges GRIFFIN and STADING concur.

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Report per Rule 30(e).

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