In re: Ivan Ricardo Pizarro Martinez and Janelech Marie Marquez Bayon

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico
• Decided: January 7, 2026
• Docket: 25-01590
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 1 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

2 IN RE CASE NO. 25-01590 (ESL) 3 IVAN RICARDO PIZARRO MARTINEZ and JANELECH MARIE MARQUEZ CHAPTER 13 BAYON 4

Debtors 5 OPINION AND ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION 6 This case is before the court upon the Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Case filed by the Debtors on December 4, 2025 (the “Motion for Reconsideration”, dkt. #54). 7 For the reasons stated herein, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 8 Factual and Procedural Background 9 1. On September 30, 2025, Debtors’ former counsel filed an Amended Motion Resigning Legal Representation (dkt. #43) requesting, among other things, that Debtors be 10 granted thirty (30) days to obtain new legal representation from entry of an order granting the 11 motion, and that all deadlines and pending mattes be held in abeyance during such time (dkt. #43). 12 2. The motion resigning legal representation was granted on October 6, 2025 (dkt. #44). Thus, the thirty (30) days lapsed on November 5, 2025. 13 3. On October 15, 2025, the court held a confirmation hearing wherein it granted 14 Debtors thirty (30) days to respond to the unfavorable report of the Chapter 13 Trustee (the 15 “Trustee”) at dkt. #45, that is, by November 14, 2025. See Minutes [of] Contested Chapter 13 Confirmation Hearing, dkt. #47. Debtors were present and represented by counsel. 16 4. On November 11, 2025, Debtors’ new counsel filed a Notice of Appearance and 17 Motion for Extension of Time (the “Notice”, dkt. #50), requesting thirty (30) days to respond to 18 any pending matters. 5. The record reflects that the Notice (dkt. #50) was not granted. As such, the deadline 19 to respond to the unfavorable report remained November 14, 2025. 20 1 6. On November 18, 2025, the court issued an Order Dismissing Chapter 13 Petition (dkt. #51) case upon Debtors’ failure to “reply to trustee’s unfavorable report”. 2 7. On December 4, 2025, the Debtors filed a for Motion for Reconsideration of Order 3 Dismissing Case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 (dkt. #54). Debtors argues that a manifest error of 4 law has occurred because the Debtors had until December 11, 2025, to respond to the unfavorable report upon the filing of the Notice (dkt. #50). 5 8. The court ordered the Trustee to state her position as to Debtors request for 6 reconsideration of dismissal. See dkt. #55. 7 9. On December 29, 2025, the Trustee filed a Motion in Compliance with Order Dkt. 55 (dkt. #57), stating that “no objection that debtors be granted 21 days in order to address the 8 pending issues and therefore, that the motion for reconsideration be held in abeyance until 9 debtors’ compliance” (id., pp. 2-3, ¶ 6). 10 Applicable Law and Analysis (A) Motion for Reconsideration Standard under Fed. R. Civ. P". 59(e) 11 Motions for reconsideration “are not recognized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in haec verba.” In re Mujica, 470 B.R. 251, 253 13 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2012), aff'd, 492 B.R. 355 (D.P.R. 2013). See also Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 510 U.S. 859 (1993), abrogated 14 on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075–76 (5th Cir. 1994); In re 15 Pabon Rodriguez, 233 B.R. 212, 218 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1999), aff'd, 2000 WL 35916017 (B.A.P. 1st 16 Cir. 2000), aff'd, 17 F. App'x 5 (1st Cir. 2001), citing Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991); Portugues–Santa v. B. Fernandez Hermanos, Inc., 614 F.Supp.2d 221, 225 17 (D.P.R. 2009); In re Martinez, 2013 WL 3808076, at *4 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2013); In re Acosta, 497 18 B.R. 25, 31 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2013). Rather, federal courts have considered motions so denominated 19 as either a motion to “alter or amend” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or a motion for relief of 20 1 judgment or order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)1. See Fisher v. Kadant, Inc., 589 F.3d 505, 512 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting a motion for reconsideration implicated either Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b)). 2 “These two rules are distinct; they serve different purposes and produce different 3 consequences. Which rule applies depends essentially on the time a motion is served. If a motion 4 is served within [fourteen (14)] days of the rendition of judgment, the motion ordinarily will fall under Rule 59(e). If the motion is served after that time, it falls under Rule 60(b).” Pabon 5 Rodriguez, 233 B.R. at 219, quoting Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243. 6 “The substance of the motion, not the nomenclature used or labels placed on motions, is 7 controlling.” In re Lozada Rivera, 470 B.R. 109, 112–113 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2012). Thus, for example, even if filed within the time limit for a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), a motion 8 seeking relief on grounds of “excusable neglect” will be treated as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) 9 motion, because Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own 10 procedural failures. See In re Lozada Rivera, 470 B.R. at 113, citing 12–60 Moore's Federal Practice Civil § 60.03. Also see United States v. $23,000 in U.S. Currency, 356 F.3d 157, 164– 11 165 (1st Cir. 2004) (even if timely filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), a motion seeking relief on 12 grounds of excusable neglect will be treated as Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) motion, because Fed. R. 13 Civ. P. 59(e) does not provide a vehicle for party to undo its own procedural failures); Jennings v. Rivers, 394 F.3d 850, 854–856 (10th Cir. 2005) (a motion timely filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 59(e) but asserting ground for relief specified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), should be evaluated 15 under standards applicable to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motions). 16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) authorizes the filing of a written motion to alter or amend a judgment after its entry. To meet the threshold requirements of a successful Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion, 17 such motion must demonstrate the “reason why the court should reconsider its prior decision” and 18 “must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature” to induce the court to reverse its 19 earlier decision. In re Schwartz, 409 B.R. 240, 250 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008), citing Pabon Rodriguez, 20 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) are made to contested matters under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023 and 9024, respectively. 1 233 B.R. at 218. See also Mujica, 470 B.R. at 254. For a motion for reconsideration to succeed, “the movant must demonstrate either that newly discovered evidence (not previously available) 2 has come to light or that the rendering court committed a manifest error of law.” In re Redondo 3 Constr. Corp., 2019 WL 6130938, at *3 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2019), aff'd, 621 B.R. 81 (D.P.R. 2020), 4 quoting Mulero-Abreu v. P.R. Police Dep't, 675 F.3d 88, 94 (1st Cir. 2012). See also Pabon Rodriguez, 233 B.R. at 218; BBVA v. Vazquez (In re Vazquez), 471 B.R. 752, 760 (B.A.P. 1st 5 Cir. 2012), citing Aybar v. Crispin–Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997); In re Zutrau, 563 B.R. 6 431, 449 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2017), citing Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 7, n. 2 7 (1st Cir. 2005), quoting Pomerleau v. W. Springfield Pub. Sch., 362 F.3d 143, 146, n. 2 (1st Cir. 2004). 8 Federal courts have consistently stated that a motion for reconsideration of a previous 9 order is an extraordinary remedy that must be used sparingly because of interest in finality and 10 conservation of scarce judicial resources. See Pabon Rodriguez, 233 B.R. at 218. In practice, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motions are typically denied because of the narrow purposes for which they are 11 intended. See id.; Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 245 (1st Cir. 12 2007) (motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) are reviewed for abuse of discretion, reversing only 13 where “the original judgment evidenced a manifest error of law ... or in certain other narrow situations”). 14 “A motion for reconsideration ‘does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own 15 procedural failures and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance 16 arguments that could or should have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment.” Redondo, 2019 WL 6130938 at *2, quoting Marks 3-Zet-Ernst Marks GmBh & Co. KG v. 17 Presstek, Inc., 455 F.3d 7, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2006). When a party is made aware that a particular 18 issue will be relevant to its case but fails to produce readily available evidence pertaining to that 19 issue, the party may not introduce that evidence to support a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. See Pabon Rodriguez, 233 B.R. at 218. “Where evidence is not newly discovered, a party may not 20 submit that evidence in support of a motion for reconsideration.” Redondo, 2019 WL 6130938 at 1 *3, quoting Lepore v. Vidockler, 792 F. 2d 272, 274 (1st Cir. 1986). Neither can the party use this motion to raise novel legal theories that it had the ability to address in first instance. See 2 Pabon Rodriguez, 233 B.R. at 218. A motion for reconsideration cannot be used as a vehicle to 3 re-litigate matters already litigated and decided by the court. See Standard Química de Venezuela 4 v. Central Hispano International, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 202, 205, n. 4 (D.P.R. 1999). A such, a party moving for Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) relief may not repeat arguments previously made, see Prescott 5 v. Higgins, 538 F.3d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 2008), “rehash arguments previously rejected or … raise 6 ones that ‘could, and should, have been made before judgment issued.” Soto-Padró v. Public 7 Buildings Authority, 675 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). “[M]otions for reconsideration should not give parties a ‘second bite at the apple’ or ‘another roll of the dice’ ”. 8 Redondo, 2019 WL 6130938 at *2, quoting Conway v. A.I. DuPont Hosp. for Children, 2009 WL 9 1492178, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2009). Also see In re Vazquez, 471 B.R. at 761(“in denying 10 reconsideration, the bankruptcy court correctly applied the First Circuit precedent against a second bite at the apple: litigants may not use Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to advance arguments they 11 could have made earlier”). “It is therefore exceedingly difficult for a litigant to succeed in a Fed. 12 R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion.” In re Mujica, 470 B.R. at 254, citing ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, 13 Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2008). (B) Discussion 14 The Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Case (dkt. #54) was filed sixteen 15 (16) days after the case was dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 is thus inapplicable. Moreover, no 16 manifest error of law exists where the deadline for Debtors to respond has lapsed. A request for an enlargement of time must be made through a separate motion, not via a notice of appearance. 17 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). 18 Further, and as noted by the Trustee at dkt. #57, Debtors have yet to address the matters 19 raised in the Trustee’s unfavorable report. As such, the reason why this case was dismissed has yet to be cured. 20 1 CONCLUSION

9 For the reasons stated herein, the Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Case (dkt. #54) is DENIED. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 7" day of January 2026.

5 ip ique S. Lamoutte 6 United States Bankruptcy Judge

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