In re Isabelle W.

2017 ME 81, 159 A.3d 1225, 2017 WL 1737866, 2017 Me. LEXIS 87

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 81 Docket: Sag-16-463 Submitted On Briefs: April 27, 2017 Decided: May 4, 2017

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

IN RE ISABELLE W.

HUMPHREY, J.

[¶1] The father of Isabelle W. appeals from a judgment of the District

Court (West Bath, Dobson, J.) terminating his parental rights to the child

pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A), (B)(2) (2016).1 We affirm the judgment

because the record contains sufficient evidence to support the court’s

findings, by clear and convincing evidence, of at least one ground of parental

unfitness and that termination is in the child’s best interest.2 See, e.g.,

In re M.S., 2014 ME 54, ¶¶ 14-15, 90 A.3d 443.

[¶2] The child was placed in the custody of the Department of Health

and Human Services in June 2014, when she was ten days old, upon reports

that the mother was abusing heroin and nonprescribed medication and had a

1 The court also terminated the mother’s parental rights to the child. The mother has not appealed from the judgment.

2 In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judgment, the father

argues that the Department’s actions exhibited gender bias. The record contains no support for this accusation. 2

history of domestic violence toward the father, and that the father was unable

or unwilling to protect himself or the child from the risk of harm posed by the

mother. The child has been in Department custody for her entire life since

then, except for an unsuccessful trial placement with the mother in September

and October 2015 that lasted seven weeks.

[¶3] In September 2014, the father agreed to the entry of a jeopardy

order in which the court ordered him to participate in “services and treatment

as recommended by the Department, including completing a substance abuse

evaluation, parenting education, domestic violence treatment, and individual

therapy.” In March 2015, he signed a rehabilitation and reunification plan,

see 22 M.R.S. § 4041(1-A)(A)(1) (2016), providing that for the child to be

returned to his care, he would have to engage in mental health treatment and

“[d]emonstrate an understanding of domestic violence” issues and their

effects on children.

[¶4] The Department filed a petition seeking termination of the father’s

parental rights on April 21, 2016, more than twenty-two months after the

child entered Department custody.

[¶5] After a two-day hearing on the Department’s petition, the court

found the following facts, which are supported by competent evidence in the 3

record. See In re M.S., 2014 ME 54, ¶ 13, 90 A.3d 443. The father has failed to

participate consistently in mental health treatment and he has been minimally

engaged with the other services outlined in the rehabilitation and

reunification plan. In May 2016, for example, the father had not

communicated with the Department in months. His visits with the child have

been sporadic and inconsistent throughout the proceedings. The court

specifically found that the father—and not the foster parent, as the father

suggested—was responsible for his missed visits. The father has also failed to

demonstrate that he recognizes the risk posed by the mother’s ongoing

substance abuse problems. At the time of the termination hearing, the mother

was pregnant, and both the mother and the father acknowledged that the

father might also be the father of this new child.

[¶6] Since entering Department custody, the child has resided with her

maternal grandmother. She is in a safe, nurturing home where her needs can

be met, and she is happy and healthy. The grandmother wishes to adopt the

child.

[¶7] Based on these facts, the court found, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the father is unfit to parent the child on three grounds: (1) he is

unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and these 4

circumstances are unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to

meet the child’s needs, (2) he is unable or unwilling to take responsibility for

the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, and

(3) he has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with

the child. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv). The court also found,

by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the father’s parental

rights is in the child’s best interest. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).

[¶8] Given the factual findings described above, the court’s unfitness

and best interest determinations constitute neither clear error nor an abuse of

discretion. See In re R.M., 2015 ME 38, ¶ 7, 114 A.3d 212 (“We review the

court’s factual findings for clear error and its ultimate conclusion regarding

the best interest of the child for an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts, and

the weight to be given them, through the trial court’s lens.”); see also 22 M.R.S.

§ 4050(3) (2016) (providing that one of the purposes of the statutes

governing termination of parental rights is to “[p]romote the adoption of

children into stable families rather than allowing children to remain in the

impermanency of foster care”); In re B.P., 2015 ME 139, ¶ 19, 126 A.3d 713.3

3 We are not persuaded by the father’s argument that the court committed clear error when it

found that “the Department has made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunify the family” in accordance with 22 M.R.S. § 4041 (2016). First, the finding is well-supported by the record; and second, as we have explained, “[t]he Department’s compliance with its rehabilitation and 5

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Nathaniel Seth Levy, Esq., Brunswick, for appellant Father

Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

West Bath District Court docket number PC-2014-15 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY

reunification duties as outlined in section 4041 does not constitute a discrete element requiring proof in termination proceedings, nor does the failure of the Department to comply with section 4041 preclude findings of parental unfitness.” In re Doris G., 2006 ME 142, ¶ 17, 912 A.2d 572.