In Re Integration of the Nebraska State Bar Ass'n

275 N.W. 265, 133 Neb. 283, 114 A.L.R. 151, 1937 Neb. LEXIS 56
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 20, 1937
DocketNo. 30179.
StatusPublished
Cited by130 cases

This text of 275 N.W. 265 (In Re Integration of the Nebraska State Bar Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Integration of the Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265, 133 Neb. 283, 114 A.L.R. 151, 1937 Neb. LEXIS 56 (Neb. 1937).

Opinion

Carter, J.

This matter comes before the court upon the petition of David A. Fitch and others praying that the bar of the state of Nebraska be integrated by rule of this court. The petition recites that petitioners are a committee of lawyers of the Nebraska State Bar Association appointed to investigate and report concerning the integration of the bar of the state of Nebraska; that the committee made its report to the Nebraska State Bar Association and that it was duly approved by said association; that the report as approved provided for its submission to all members of the bar of the state and for the taking of a referendum by a secret mail vote thereon; that said report has been submitted and the vote taken with the result that 595 members of the bar. voted for bar integration by supreme court rule and 155 against; that petitioners feel that a large majority of the members of the bar of this state, as well as informed public opinion, favor bar integration by supreme court rule as a means of providing better service to the public by the legal profession, of effectively combating the unauthorized practice of law, and of improving the ethical standards of the profession and giving to it the high public esteem that it should enjoy.

The presentation of this petition to this court immediately raises the question of the power of the court to proceed in the manner suggested by the petitioners.

Section 1, art. II of the Constitution of Nebraska, provides: “The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.” It is clear that this constitutional provision requires that the three departments of government must be kept separate and that each mhst operate only within its own sphere.

*285 Section 1, art. V of our Constitution, vests the judicial power of the state in this and other courts named therein in the following language: “The judicial power of the state shall, be vested in a supreme court, district courts, county-courts, justices of the peace, and such other courts inferior to the supreme court as may be created by law; but other courts may be substituted by law for justices of the peace within such districts, and with such additional civil and criminal jurisdiction as may be provided by law.”

The Constitution does not, by any express grant, vest the power to define and regulate the practice of law in any of the three departments of government. In the absence of an express grant of this power to any one of the three departments, it must be exercised by the department to which it naturally belongs because “It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that each department of government, whether federal or state, ‘has, without any express grant, the inherent right to accomplish all objects naturally within the orbit of that department, not expressly limited by the fact of the existence of a similar power elsewhere or the express limitations in the Constitution.’ 1 Andrews’ American Law (2d .ed.) sec. 182, p. 221.” In Matter of Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 672. And, also, in the case of State v. Washburn, 167 Mo. 680, 67 S. W. 592, the Missouri court aptly stated the rule in the following language: “All governmental powers are in their natures either legislative, executive or judicial. The Constitution does not undertake to define what acts fall within the one class or the other, but leaves every act to be classified according to its nature, recognizing that the essentials which distinguish those that belong to one department from those that belong to the two others are discernible to the learned mind. But in that article of the Constitution all the powers of the state government are disposed of, and every one who lawfully exercises any state governmental function is able to trace the source of his authority to one of the three departments there named. The power, whatever its character, can be exercised only by or under authority of the separate magistracy to which by the Constitution it is assigned.”

*286 There being no express grant of power in the Constitution to any of the three departments of government to define and regulate the practice of law, the question is — to what department does that power naturally belong ?

In the case of In re Disbarment Proceedings of Newby, 76 Neb. 482, 107 N. W. 850, this court said:

“Attorneys practicing in the district courts of this' state are officers of the courts in which they practice. Their position is an honorable one; they are the trusted advisers of the court. There can be no doubt that the court has ample power to protect itself against dishonorable and corrupt practitioners. * * *

“Our statute contains no provision for disbarment proceeedings. This matter is left to the common-law power and duty of the various courts. It is a principle of general, if not uniform, application that the court which is entrusted with the power and the duty of determining the qualifications for admission to the bar has, by implication, the power and duty also to determine when those qualifications are wanting, and when the privilege of that high calling has been forfeited. This court has the sole power of admission to the bar, and therefore has sole power to annul such admission when sufficient cause appears. Charges of misconduct and deceit in the district court are properly entertained and dealt with in that court. Charges of criminal or immoral conduct calling for disbarment should be addressed to this court.” See, also, State v. Goldman, 127 Neb. 340, 255 N. W. 32.

In State v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 268 N. W. 95, we held that this court was vested with exclusive power to determine the qualifications of persons who may be permitted to practice law in this state, was possessed of the exclusive power to disbar licensed attorneys who have been unfaithful to the trust which the court reposed in them, to define the practice of law and to punish by contempt proceedings persons not licensed to practice law for usurping the privilege of acting as attorneys. See, also, Rhode Island Bar Ass’n v. Automobile Service Ass’n, 55 R. I. 122, 179 Atl. 139; People *287 v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 ; Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N. W. 910.

In sustaining the Bar Integration Act passed by the legislature of Kentucky, the supreme court of that state said:

“The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice. That we have, in deference to the Bar Integration Act (Ky. St. secs. 101-1, 101-2), set up a standing board of commissioners and machinery to conduct and report on investigations concerning the conduct of attorneys, does not alter the fact that we are but exerting an inherent power. * * *

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Disciplinary Counsel v. Rossi
2025 Ohio 5398 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2025)
Houser v. American Paving Asphalt
299 Neb. 1 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 2018)
State Ex Rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Lile
2008 OK 82 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2008)
Florida House of Representatives v. Crist
990 So. 2d 1035 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2008)
Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court
120 P.3d 1092 (Arizona Supreme Court, 2005)
In Re Seelig
850 A.2d 477 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2004)
In Re Estate of Reed
672 N.W.2d 416 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 2003)
Pennington County v. State ex rel. Unified Judicial System
2002 SD 31 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 2002)
Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth
2001 Ohio 1308 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2001)
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth
754 N.E.2d 219 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2001)
State Ex Rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Krepela
610 N.W.2d 1 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 2000)
Cotton v. Steele
587 N.W.2d 693 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1999)
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Nienaber
1997 Ohio 314 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)
Opinion No. (1996)
Nebraska Attorney General Reports, 1996
In Re Shannon
876 P.2d 548 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1994)
Fullmer v. State Farm Insurance Co.
514 N.W.2d 861 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 1994)
In re Tocci
624 A.2d 548 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1993)
State Ex Rel. Stephan v. Williams
793 P.2d 234 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1990)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
275 N.W. 265, 133 Neb. 283, 114 A.L.R. 151, 1937 Neb. LEXIS 56, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-integration-of-the-nebraska-state-bar-assn-neb-1937.