In re I.E.M.

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: November 5, 2021
• Docket: 85A21
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCSC-133

No. 85A21

Filed 5 November 2021

IN THE MATTER OF: I.E.M.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 18

November 2020 by Judge William J. Moore in District Court, Robeson County. This

matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 30 September 2021,

but was determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule

30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

J. Edward Yeager, Jr., for petitioner-appellee Robeson County Department of Social Services.

Lindsey Reedy for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Garron T. Michael for respondent-appellant mother.

ERVIN, Justice.

¶1 Respondent-mother Joanna W. appeals from an order entered by the trial court

terminating her parental rights in her daughter, I.E.M. 1 After careful consideration

of respondent-mother’s challenges to the trial court’s termination order in light of the

record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s order should be

affirmed.

1 I.E.M. will be referred to throughout the remainder of this opinion as “Iris,” which

is a pseudonym used for ease of reading and to protect the identity of the juvenile. IN RE I.E.M.

Opinion of the Court

¶2 The Robeson County Department of Social Services became involved with Iris’

family in July 2018 because of concerns arising from respondent-mother’s mental

health and the manner in which she supervised Iris. On 3 October 2018, DSS

received a neglect referral alleging that respondent-mother, who had been living with

Iris in a shelter as the result of their displacement following a recent hurricane, had

been involuntarily committed and diagnosed as suffering from paranoid

schizophrenia.

¶3 On 5 October 2018, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging that Iris was a

neglected juvenile and obtained nonsecure custody of the child.2 In its petition, DSS

alleged that a social worker had learned that respondent-mother was hearing voices

and had attempted to leap from a relative’s moving car after “God told her to free

herself.” In addition, DSS alleged that respondent-mother had admitted to a social

worker that, while she had been hearing voices, she did not know that she had been

diagnosed as suffering from a mental health condition. After the social worker and

respondent-mother discussed possible safety placements for Iris, DSS placed Iris with

a maternal cousin.

¶4 After a hearing held on 16 January 2019, Judge Daniels entered an

adjudication order finding that Iris was a dependent juvenile and a separate

2 On 16 January 2019, Judge Judith M. Daniels allowed DSS to assert that Iris was a

dependent, as well as a neglected, juvenile. IN RE I.E.M.

dispositional order finding that respondent-mother had undergone a psychological

examination and that the examining psychologist had concluded that respondent-

mother would be “unable to parent [Iris] for the indefinite future.” As a result, Judge

Daniels ordered that Iris remain in DSS custody and approved a primary plan of

reunification with respondent-mother and a secondary plan of adoption.

¶5 Following a permanency planning hearing held on 20 November 2019, the trial

court entered an order on 15 January 2020 finding that respondent-mother had

entered into a Family Services Case Plan with DSS and was seeing a “peer support

person” at the Stephens Outreach Center for sixteen hours per week. In addition, the

trial court found that respondent-mother’s therapist believed that respondent-mother

remained unable to care for herself or Iris as a result of her severe paranoid

schizophrenia and approved a primary permanent plan for Iris of adoption, with a

secondary plan of guardianship with a relative.

¶6 On 20 December 2019, DSS filed a petition seeking to have respondent-

mother’s parental rights in Iris terminated on the grounds that she had willfully

allowed Iris to remain in a placement outside the home for more than twelve months

without making reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that had led to

Iris’ removal from her home, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2); willfully failing to pay a

reasonable portion of the cost of the care that Iris had received during the six month

period immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition, N.C.G.S. § 7B- IN RE I.E.M.

1111(a)(3); and dependency, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). The issues raised by the

termination petition came on for hearing before the trial court at the 23 September

2020 session of the District Court, Robeson County. On 18 November 2020, the trial

court entered an order concluding that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Iris

were subject to termination on the basis of her willful failure to make reasonable

progress toward correcting the conditions that had led to Iris’ removal from her home,

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), and dependency, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6), and that the

termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights in Iris would be in Iris’ best

interests. Respondent-mother noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court’s

termination order.

¶7 A termination of parental rights proceeding is conducted in two phases. At the

adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether any of the statutory grounds

for terminating a parent’s parental rights delineated in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 exist, see

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 (2019), with the petitioner being required to prove the existence

of any applicable ground for termination by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6, (2019). In the event that the trial court determines

that the petitioner has established the existence of at least one ground for

termination, the case moves to the dispositional phase, at which the trial court must

“determine[ ] whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best

interest.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). IN RE I.E.M.

¶8 In seeking relief from the trial court’s termination order, respondent-mother

argues that the trial court erred by determining that her parental rights in Iris were

subject to termination. In reviewing the trial court’s adjudication decision, we are

required to determine whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by clear,

cogent, and convincing evidence and whether its findings, in turn, support the trial

court’s conclusions of law. In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 392 (2019). According to well-

established North Carolina law, unchallenged findings of fact are “deemed supported

by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407

(2019). On the other hand, the trial court’s conclusions of law are subject to de novo

review by an appellate court. In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019).

¶9 As an initial matter, we will examine whether the trial court erred in

determining that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Iris were subject to

termination on the basis of a willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct

the conditions that had led to Iris’ removal from respondent-mother’s home pursuant

to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). A parent’s parental rights in a child are subject to

termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) in the event that the parent “has

willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than

12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress

under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to

the removal of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). The reasonableness of a IN RE I.E.M.

parent’s progress in addressing the conditions that led to the child’s removal from the

family home “is evaluated for the duration leading up to the hearing on the motion or

petition to terminate parental rights.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 815 (2020) (cleaned

up).

¶ 10 In challenging the trial court’s determination that respondent-mother’s

parental rights in Iris were subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1111(a)(2), respondent-mother argues that the trial court acted on the basis of a

misapprehension of law relating to this ground for termination consisting of an

erroneous belief that any evidence concerning progress that respondent-mother had

made after the filing of the termination petition was irrelevant. Although this Court

has clearly held that, “where it appears that the judge below has ruled upon the

matter before him upon a misapprehension of the law, the cause will be remanded to

the [trial] court for further hearing in the true legal light[,]” Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C.

18, 22, (1960) (cleaned up), we conclude that respondent-mother has failed to

demonstrate that the trial court acted on the basis of any misapprehension of the

applicable law in the course of finding that respondent-mother’s parental rights in

Iris were subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).

¶ 11 In attempting to persuade us that her challenge to the trial court’s termination

order has merit, respondent-mother begins by directing our attention to the

testimony provided by Kylene Chavis, who served as respondent-mother’s peer IN RE I.E.M.

support specialist at the Stephens Outreach Center and had begun assisting

respondent-mother after the filing of the termination petition. When respondent-

mother’s trial counsel asked Ms. Chavis to describe the manner in which she had

provided respondent-mother with support, counsel for DSS stated that, “Judge, if I

may object to this. Your Honor, this is actually — what she’s testifying to is after the

date the petition was filed, so not relating to adjudication, Your Honor.” During the

ensuing colloquy between the trial court and counsel, the trial court asked

respondent-mother’s trial counsel, “How is it — how is what happened after the

petition was filed relevant?” After considering the response that respondent-mother’s

trial counsel made to this inquiry and the other arguments that were made by the

parties, the trial court overruled DSS’ objection.

¶ 12 Although respondent-mother acknowledges that the trial court overruled the

DSS objection, she insists that this aspect of her challenge to the trial court’s

termination order has merit on the theory that the trial court “never corrected its

incorrect statement of the law regarding the relevance of post-petition facts.”

However, despite the fact that trial counsel for DSS clearly misstated the applicable

law, the existence of such a misstatement by counsel for a party coupled with a related

inquiry posed by the trial court to counsel for another party cannot be equated to an

affirmative “statement of the law” or the adoption of the position espoused by DSS’

trial counsel by the trial court, particularly given that the trial court signaled its IN RE I.E.M.

rejection of the argument advanced by counsel for DSS by overruling that party’s

objection.

¶ 13 In addition, respondent-mother attempts to buttress her challenge to the trial

court’s termination order by noting that the trial court did not make any findings of

fact predicated upon Ms. Chavis’ testimony and suggesting that the trial court’s

statement in Finding of Fact No. 10 conflicts with Ms. Chavis’ assertion that she had

not provided respondent-mother with any financial support. The trial court is not,

however, “required to make findings of fact on all the evidence presented, nor state

every option it considered.” In re E.S., 378 N.C. 8, 2021-NCSC-72, ¶22 (citations

omitted). For that reason, the absence of any findings of fact that appear to be

directly based upon Ms. Chavis’ testimony does not establish that the trial court

failed to consider what Ms. Chavis had to say. In addition, the statement contained

in Finding of Fact 10 with which respondent-mother takes issue is supported by the

testimony of a social worker that the peer support provided by the Stephens Outreach

Center included a financial component, which the social worker defined as “somebody

helping [respondent-mother] manage her money,” an interpretation of Finding of

Fact No. 10 that appears to be consistent with Ms. Chavis’ testimony that she would

“consistently contact [respondent-mother] and make sure” she was paying her bills.

Thus, the trial court’s treatment of Ms. Chavis’ testimony does not establish that it

acted upon the basis of a misapprehension of law in deciding that respondent- IN RE I.E.M.

mother’s parental rights in Iris were subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. §

7B-1111(a)(2).

¶ 14 On the other hand, an examination of the record developed before the trial

court indicates that other witnesses provided testimony concerning events that

occurred after the filing of the termination petition. For example, the maternal

cousin who served as Iris’ caretaker throughout the pendency of the entire proceeding

testified about respondent-mother’s visits with Iris, including a visit that occurred

during the same month as the one in which the termination hearing was held.

Similarly, respondent-mother testified concerning her recent visits with Iris, her

current living situation, and the attempts that she had made to find a support person.

Thus, the trial court did, in fact, hear considerable testimonial evidence relating to

the period of time that followed the filing of the termination petition.

¶ 15 Finally, the record developed at the adjudication hearing contains substantial

documentary evidence relating to the period of time after the filing of the termination

petition. For example, the trial court took judicial notice of the file from the

underlying juvenile proceeding, a set of documents that included orders associated

with two hearings that occurred after the filing of the termination petition. In

addition, DSS introduced, over respondent-mother’s objection, a one hundred page

exhibit that was titled “Termination of Parental Rights Time Line” and contained 809

numbered paragraphs detailing a considerable amount of relevant information IN RE I.E.M.

concerning the period of time extending from the filing of the initial juvenile petition

until a few weeks prior to the termination hearing. The trial court expressly stated

in its termination order that it had taken the timeline into consideration in reaching

its decision.

¶ 16 According to respondent-mother, however, the trial court should have

refrained from considering the timeline because it was “replete with hearsay

statements” and was “based primarily upon third-party reports or out-of-court

statement[s] made to [DSS] by a variety of declarants.” A general objection of the

type that respondent-mother lodged against the timeline is insufficient to show that

the trial court committed an error of law, however, given that, “where a judge sits

without a jury, the trial court is presumed to have disregarded any incompetent

evidence and relied upon the competent evidence.” In re J.M.J.-J., 374 N.C. 553, 558

(2020) (cleaned up). Respondent-mother has failed to identify any inadmissible

hearsay evidence upon which the trial court erroneously relied in the course of

making the findings of fact contained in its termination order and has failed, for that

reason, to establish that the trial court erred by considering the timeline in deciding

that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Iris were subject to termination.

¶ 17 Thus, the record clearly reflects that the trial court overruled a relevance-

based objection to the admission of testimony relating to events that occurred after

the filing of the termination petition and that a substantial amount of evidence IN RE I.E.M.

concerning such post-petition events was received during the adjudication hearing in

both testimonial and documentary form. On the other hand, respondent-mother has

failed to offer anything more than mere speculation in attempting to show that the

trial court erroneously failed to consider evidence relating to the period of time

following the filing of the termination petition. Such a showing is simply insufficient

“to overcome the presumption of correctness at trial.” State v. Ali, 329 N.C. 394, 412

(1991). For that reason, we hold that respondent-mother’s contention that the trial

court acted on the basis of a misapprehension of law in the course of finding that

respondent-mother’s parental rights in Iris were subject to termination pursuant to

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) lacks merit and that, since this argument constitutes the

only basis upon which respondent-mother has challenged the trial court’s

determination that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Iris were subject to

termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), the trial court did not err by

finding the existence of this ground for termination.

¶ 18 Having upheld the trial court’s determination that at least one ground for

terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in Iris existed, we need not address

the validity of respondent-mother’s challenge to the trial court’s determination that

respondent-mother’s parental rights in Iris were subject to termination for

dependency pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 194

(2019) (stating that “a finding of only one ground is necessary to support a IN RE I.E.M.

termination of parental rights”). In view of the fact that the trial court did not err by

finding that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Iris were subject to termination

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) and the fact that respondent-mother has not

advanced any challenge to the trial court’s determination that the termination of her

parental rights would be in Iris’ best interest, we affirm the trial court’s termination

order.