In Re Humberto Rosales Cruz v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: September 30, 2024
• Docket: 13-24-00469-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-24-00469-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE HUMBERTO ROSALES CRUZ

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Longoria, Tijerina, and Peña Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina1

Humberto Rosales Cruz filed a pro se pleading in this Court. Although this pleading

is unclear, it appears that Cruz contends that the district clerk failed to timely send his

article 11.07 application for writ of habeas corpus to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

and that the trial court failed to notify him regarding related events. We liberally construe

Cruz’s pleading as a petition for writ of mandamus.2 See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 19.1

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions). 2 To the extent that Cruz’s contentions may be construed to concern a pending post-conviction

habeas proceeding, we lack jurisdiction. See Padieu v. Ct. of Apps. of Tex., Fifth Dist., 392 S.W.3d 115, (delineating the plenary power of the appellate courts), 25.2 (governing the perfection of

appeal in criminal cases), 52 (describing the requirements for filing original proceedings);

In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship, 189 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, orig.

proceeding [mand. denied]) (“The function of the writ of mandamus is to compel action by

those who by virtue of their official or quasi-official positions are charged with a positive

duty to act.”).

In a criminal case, to be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must establish

both that the act sought to be compelled is a ministerial act not involving a discretionary

or judicial decision and that there is no adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged

harm. See In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (orig. proceeding);

In re Harris, 491 S.W.3d 332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam);

In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). If the

relator fails to meet both requirements, then the petition for writ of mandamus should be

denied. See State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Apps. at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d

207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding). It is the relator’s burden to properly

request and show entitlement to mandamus relief. See id.; In re Pena, 619 S.W.3d 837,

839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding); see also Barnes v. State,

117–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding) (indicating that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction when an article 11.07 application is pending). Similarly, to the extent that Cruz’s contentions may be construed as an original claim for habeas corpus relief, we lack jurisdiction. The original jurisdiction of a court of appeals to issue a writ of habeas corpus is limited to those cases in which a person’s liberty is restrained because the person has violated an order, judgment, or decree that has been rendered in a civil case, and thus the intermediate courts of appeals do not have original habeas jurisdiction in criminal matters. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221(d); Ex parte Braswell, 630 S.W.3d 600, 601–02 (Tex. App.— Waco 2021, orig. proceeding); In re Quinata, 538 S.W.3d 120, 120 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, orig. proceeding); In re Ayers, 515 S.W.3d 356, 356 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

2 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiam)

(“Even a pro se applicant for a writ of mandamus must show himself entitled to the

extraordinary relief he seeks.”). This burden includes providing a sufficient record to

establish the right to mandamus relief. In re Schreck, 642 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2022, orig. proceeding); In re Pena, 619 S.W.3d at 839; see also TEX. R. APP. P.

52.3(k)(1)(A) (delineating the required form and content for a petition in an original

proceeding), 52.7(a) (providing that the relator “must file” a record including specific

matters).

Article V, § 6 of the Texas Constitution delineates the appellate jurisdiction of the

courts of appeals, and states that the courts of appeals “shall have such other jurisdiction,

original and appellate, as may be prescribed by law.” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6(a); see

Powell v. Hocker, 516 S.W.3d 488, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (orig. proceeding). The

main source of original jurisdiction for the courts of appeals is provided by § 22.221 of the

Texas Government Code. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221; In re Cook, 394 S.W.3d

668, 671 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2012, orig. proceeding). In pertinent part, this section provides

that the intermediate appellate courts may issue writs of mandamus against specified

judges in our district and “all other writs necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of the court.”

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221(a), (b); see In re State ex rel. Best, 616 S.W.3d 594, 599

& n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (orig. proceeding). We have no jurisdiction to issue a writ of

mandamus against individuals or entities other than those specified in the government

code unless it is necessary to enforce our jurisdiction. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 22.221(a), (b); see, e.g., In re Washington, 7 S.W.3d 181, 182 (Tex. App.—Houston

3 [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“We have no jurisdiction to issue a writ of

mandamus against a district clerk unless such is necessary to enforce our jurisdiction.”).

The Court, having examined and fully considered Cruz’s petition for writ of

mandamus, is of the opinion that it should be dismissed in part and denied in part. To the

extent that Cruz seeks mandamus relief against the district clerk, we dismiss Cruz’s

petition for writ of mandamus for lack of jurisdiction. The government code does not

provide us with general mandamus jurisdiction over a district clerk, and Cruz has not

shown that the issuance of a writ against the district clerk is necessary to enforce our

appellate jurisdiction. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221(a), (b); In re Washington, 7

S.W.3d at 182. To the extent that Cruz seeks mandamus relief against the judge of the

trial court, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. Cruz has not met his burden to

obtain mandamus relief insofar as, inter alia, his pleading fails to comply with the appellate

rules, and he failed to file a record in support of his claims. See In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d

at 388; TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3, 52.7. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is

dismissed in part and denied in part.

JAIME TIJERINA Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the 30th day of September, 2024.