In Re Homer D. - Dissent

CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedAugust 22, 2017
DocketM2017-00298-COA-R3-PT
StatusPublished

This text of In Re Homer D. - Dissent (In Re Homer D. - Dissent) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Homer D. - Dissent, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

08/22/2017 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs August 1, 2017

IN RE HOMER D., ET AL.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Overton County No. 16-JV-74 Daryl A. Colson, Judge ___________________________________

No. M2017-00298-COA-R3-PT ___________________________________

FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J. M.S., dissenting.

The majority opinion dismisses this appeal due to the failure of the appellant, Sarah R. P. B., the child’s mother, to sign the initial notice of appeal as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) or to file an amended notice that included her signature within the thirty-day time period for perfecting appeals. The majority has concluded that although the amended notice of appeal “did contain Appellant’s signature, it was filed . . . more than thirty days after the entry of the trial court’s judgment. As such, it, too, is insufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on this Court.” I recognize that the majority opinion is based on two recent Court of Appeals decisions, but I respectfully disagree with those decisions and with the notion that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) is jurisdictional. I also disagree with the notion that the statute compels this court to dismiss appeals in parental termination cases without affording the parent the opportunity to cure the defect by subsequently signing an amended notice of appeal even if that occurs after the expiration of the thirty-day time period set out in Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a).1

The statute at the center of this controversy is Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d), which went into effect on July 1, 2016. It succinctly states that “[a]ny notice of appeal filed in a termination of parental rights action shall be signed by the appellant.” In my opinion the statute is clear and unambiguous; therefore, “we must apply its plain meaning in its normal and accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would limit or expand the statute’s application.” Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 1 I wish to acknowledge that this opinion and my recent dissent in In re Nevaeh B., No. W2016- 01769-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL ____ (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2017) are based in significant part on the dissent authored by the Hon. Andy D. Bennett, Judge of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, in In re Jayden R. et al., No. M2016-02336-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL ____ (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017). 2004). When ascertaining the meaning of a statute, the courts should give effect to every word used in the statute. Lee Med. Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted). We presume that the General Assembly used each word deliberately. State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tenn. 2007) (citations omitted). A related notion is that “[t]he Court will decline to ‘read in’ language into the statute that the General Assembly did not place there.” Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594, 604 (Tenn. 2012).

Reading the words in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) in their natural and ordinary sense and without reading in any words not used, there is no mandate compelling the dismissal of an appeal when a parent appellant fails to sign the notice of appeal. I also see no words that prevent the courts from affording an opportunity to cure the deficiency if the parent fails to sign the notice of appeal. Furthermore, the statute does not state that the signature of the parent is jurisdictional. Therefore, the statutory mandate is not jurisdictional, and failure to initially comply with the statute does not prevent the court from affording the appellant parent an opportunity to cure the deficiency.

Although the clear and unambiguous statute does not require, or permit, construction of its meaning, I will discuss the first Court of Appeals decision wherein this court ruled that the signature requirement is jurisdictional, and the absence of the parent’s signature is cause for dismissal of the appeal. See In re Gabrielle W., No. E2016-02064- COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 2954684, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 2017).2 Gabrielle relied on cases and statutes from three states to determine that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) was jurisdictional. I believe these cases are distinguishable because the statutes and/or rules of appellate procedure from these states present a different circumstance than the one in Tennessee.

Gabrielle relied on Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-1109, but it is distinguishable because the Utah statute not only requires the signature of the appellant, it expressly states that “the appeal shall be dismissed” if the appellant fails to comply. Utah R. App. P. 53(b) is also fully consistent with the statutory mandate. Thus, the Utah appellate rule and statute expressly require dismissal. See State ex rel. D.E., 147 P.3d 462, 463 (Utah 2006). As noted earlier, the Tennessee statute does not state that “the appeal shall be dismissed.”

It is also significant to note that Utah’s rule of appellate procedure also includes a fifteen-day grace period to amend the notice of appeal if certain circumstances are met.

2 Gabrielle has been followed in the past two weeks in two other cases: In re Catherine J., No. W2017-00491-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 3141825, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 2017); In re Mya V., M2016-02401-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 3209181, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2017). -2- See Utah R. App. P. 53(b). Thus, the appellate rule contains an exception not included in the statute; nevertheless, the rule applies. In Tennessee, the rules of appellate procedure do not incorporate the statute and none of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure require a signature on the notice of appeal.3

The South Dakota law relied on in Gabrielle states that “[t]he failure of the appellant and his or her attorney to sign a notice of appeal . . . deprives the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to decide the appeal.” S.D. Codified Laws § 15-26A-4. That is not the case in Tennessee because Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) does not address jurisdiction. Moreover, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) does not state that the court is required to dismiss the appeal if the parent fails to comply with the signature requirement without affording the parent the opportunity to cure any deficiency.

In North Carolina, N.C. R. App. P. 3.1(a), cited in Gabrielle states, “If the appellant is represented by counsel, both the trial counsel and appellant must sign the notice of appeal . . . .” The notice of appeal is viewed as incomplete if it lacks a signature. See In re I.T.P-L., 670 S.E.2d 282, 285 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

David Keen v. State of Tennessee
398 S.W.3d 594 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2012)
Lee Medical, Inc. v. Paula Beecher
312 S.W.3d 515 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2010)
In Re I.T.P-L.
670 S.E.2d 282 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2008)
Eastman Chemical Co. v. Johnson
151 S.W.3d 503 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2004)
State v. Strode
232 S.W.3d 1 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2007)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
In Re Homer D. - Dissent, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-homer-d-dissent-tennctapp-2017.