In re H.L.M.

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: April 15, 2014
• Docket: 13-1027
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1027 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 15 April 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

H.L.M., T.D.M. Caldwell County Nos. 12 JT 146-47

Appeal by respondent mother from orders entered 26 June

2013 by Judge Mark L. Killian in Caldwell County District Court.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 March 2014.

No brief filed for petitioner-appellee father.

Robert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant mother.

HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.

Respondent mother appeals from the orders entered in this

private proceeding terminating her parental rights to two

children. On appeal, Respondent contends the trial court made

insufficient findings of fact to support both the grounds for

termination and the conclusion that termination of her rights

was in the juveniles’ best interests. We vacate the termination

order and remand the matter. -2- Petitioner father and respondent are the biological parents

of the juveniles, who were born in 2001 and 2005. On 19

December 2011, the parties reached a consent agreement regarding

custody of the juveniles. The consent order provided that

petitioner would have primary custody of the juveniles, that

neither party would be required to pay child support, and that

respondent would have visitation with the juveniles, subject to

mutually agreeable conditions.

On 3 October 2012, petitioner filed petitions to terminate

respondent’s parental rights alleging she had willfully

abandoned and failed to support the juveniles. The matter came

on for hearing on 1 May 2013 in Caldwell County District Court’s

juvenile division. On 26 June 2013, the trial court entered

orders terminating respondent’s parental rights to both

juveniles. After making findings of fact, the trial court

concluded that grounds existed to support termination and that

it was in the best interests of the juveniles to terminate

respondent’s parental rights. Respondent gave timely notice of

appeal in writing on 25 July 2013.

Respondent’s first two arguments on appeal are that the

trial court’s findings of fact do not support its conclusions -3- that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. We

agree.

At the adjudicatory stage of a termination of parental

rights hearing, the burden is on the petitioner to prove by

clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that at least one ground

for termination exists. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(f) (2013);

In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908

(2001). Review in the appellate courts is limited to

determining whether clear and convincing evidence exists to

support the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact

support the conclusions of law. In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288,

291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000), appeal dismissed, disc. review

denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9 (2001).

“For this Court to exercise its appellate function, the

trial court must enter sufficient findings of fact and

conclusions of law to reveal the reasoning which led to the

court’s ultimate decision.” In re D.R.B., 182 N.C. App. 733,

736, 643 S.E.2d 77, 79 (2007). “When a trial court is required

to make findings of fact, it must make the findings of fact

specially.” In re Harton, 156 N.C. App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d

334, 337 (2003) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, 52(a)(1)

(2001)). A termination order that omits findings of fact -4- necessary to support the grounds for termination must be

reversed. See In re C.N.C.B., 197 N.C. App. 553, 558, 678

S.E.2d 240, 243 (2009).

In this case, the trial court’s findings of fact do not

adequately support the grounds for termination. The grounds for

termination are identified in one vague finding of fact in each

order:

5. The Respondent, the mother of the minor child, is not a fit and proper person to have custody of the minor child involved herein and that the mother’s parental rights in and to the said minor child should be terminated on the grounds that:

The mother has willfully abandoned the child for at least six consecutive months immediately [sic] filing of the petition. [Respondent], the child’s mother, has not seen the child or provided support for the minor child for the last six (6) months.

The trial court’s orders sufficiently recite the statutory

grounds for terminating parental rights enumerated in N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2013). See In re L.M.T., ___ N.C. ___,

___, 752 S.E.2d 453, 455 (2013) (“The trial court’s written

findings must address the statute’s concerns, but need not quote

its exact language.”). However, we hold that the trial court’s

findings of fact do not shed light on the reasoning supporting

either ground. In fact, the trial court’s orders are devoid of -5- any findings describing respondent’s specific actions or

omissions that support its conclusion that respondent willfully

abandoned the juveniles or failed to provide adequate support

for the children. Instead, the trial court made only a few

findings describing the history of the case, and then set forth

its ultimate findings related to the grounds for termination.

These findings are insufficient to permit appellate review of

the termination orders. Accordingly, we vacate the termination

orders and remand the matter so that the trial court may, if

supported by sufficient evidence, enter new adjudication and

disposition orders containing sufficient findings of fact.

Because we vacate the adjudication of both grounds

supporting termination and remand the matter, we need not

address respondent’s argument pertaining to disposition.

However, we note that the trial court is required to make

findings addressing the relevant factors set out in N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013).

VACATED and REMANDED.

Judges ERVIN and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).