In Re Hidy

364 B.R. 679, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 973, 2007 WL 896377
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedMarch 23, 2007
Docket19-60019
StatusPublished

This text of 364 B.R. 679 (In Re Hidy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Hidy, 364 B.R. 679, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 973, 2007 WL 896377 (Mo. 2007).

Opinion

ORDER SUSTAINING, IN PART, AND OVERRULING, IN PART, TRUSTEE’S OBJECTIONS TO EXEMPTIONS

ARTHUR B. FEDERMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.

Debtor Charles Ernest Hidy seeks to exempt funds he received for unused sick and vacation benefits after he was terminated from his employment. The Debtor claims that a portion of these funds are exempt under § 525.030 of the Missouri Statutes as earnings from employment. In addition, he claims that the entire amount should be exempt under § 513.427 because, although he had been terminated prepetition, his right to receive these benefits had not yet been determined as of the date of the bankruptcy petition. The Trustee objects on both grounds. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) over which the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 157(a), and 157(b)(1). For the reasons that follow, the Trustee’s Objections will be SUSTAINED, in part, and OVERRULED, in part.

By letter dated October 24, 2005, the City of Independence, Missouri, informed the Debtor that the City’s fire chief had recommended that the Debtor be terminated from his employment with the City’s fire department, effective ten days from the date of the letter. The Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 Petition on March 2, 2006. On July 17, 2006, an arbitrator issued a decision finding that the Debtor was in fact terminated ten days after October 24, 2005, and sustaining the City’s decision to terminate the Debtor’s employment. Subsequently, the City sent an electronic direct deposit in the amount of $10,263.28 to the United Consumers Credit Union, attempting to deposit the funds into the Debtor’s account there. Because the Debtor had previously closed this account at the Credit Union, the Credit Union then sent a cashier’s check in the same amount to the Chapter 7 Trustee on August 10, 2006. The Trustee is currently holding these funds.

These funds represent approximately twenty years of accrued vacation and sick leave benefits that the City owed the Debt- or, less applicable withholding taxes. Debtor’s counsel requested the Trustee to turn over the funds, but the Trustee refused, responding that the money was property of the estate, it had not been scheduled as an asset in the Debtor’s schedules, and it had not been claimed as exempt. Thereafter, the Debtor twice amended his schedules, and currently claims $7,650 of the funds are exempt under § 525.030.2, and, alternatively, all of the funds are exempt under § 513.427. The Trustee objects to the claimed exemptions.

*681 Claimed exemptions are presumed to be valid and the Trustee bears the burden of proving that the exemptions are invalid. 1

Section 525.030.2 allows a debtor to exempt a portion of his earnings from garnishment. The statute defines “earnings” as “compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program.” 2 The Trustee asserts these funds are not “earnings” under the statute because (i) the statute does not specifically identify unused vacation and sick as earnings; (ii) these benefits are a gratuity in that the employer voluntarily gives them to the employee despite the fact that the employee is not working during the time vacation or sick leave is used; and (in) if the Debtor had been garnished while he was employed by the City, the City would not have turned his accrued leave benefits over to the creditor.

The Supreme Court of Missouri has held that “[a] paid vacation or pay accumulated by an employer without the interposition of a trust is generally regarded as additional earnings of an employee” under § 525.030. 3 Therefore, the court concluded that money in a vacation fund was earnings because (1) the contributions made by the employer, and the payments made to the employees from the fund, were proportional to the hours worked by the employees; (2) once the employee met the requirements for receiving money from the vacation fund, the employee had a right to receive it; (3) the vacation benefit was subject to federal and state tax withhold-ings when it was paid to the employee; and (4) the vacation benefit was part of the remuneration agreed upon by the parties. 4 Additionally, the court said, “[a]lthough contributions to a welfare fund are often not technically characterized as wages, they have been held to represent a part of the consideration being given to the workers for their services and have in certain circumstances been regarded as having the same legal effect as wages.” 5

There is no allegation that the Debtor’s benefits in this case are subject to a trust. And, since the Trustee has not offered any evidence to show that the Debtor’s vacation and sick benefits are anything other than customary vacation and sick benefits earned over the years the Debtor worked for the City, I find that these benefits were proportional to the hours he worked; he had the right to be paid for the unused vacation and sick pay when he was terminated; the benefits were subject to federal and state tax withholdings when the City paid them to him; and they were part of the remuneration agreed upon by the Debtor and the City. In essence, they were a part of the “compensation paid” to the Debtor for his personal services as a firefighter. They are, therefore, earnings under § 525.030.2.

Since the Debtor is not a head of household, seventy-five percent of the funds are not subject to garnishment, and are thus exempt, under § 525.030.2. The Debtor’s exemption under that provision *682 will be allowed in the amount of $7,697.46. 6 Alternatively, the Debtor claims the money is exempt under § 513.427. Since I have already determined that $7,697.46 of it is exempt under § 525.030.2, only the remaining $2,565.82 is at issue at this point.

Section 513.427 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very person by or against whom an order is sought for relief under [the Bankruptcy Code], shall be permitted to exempt from property of the estate any property that is exempt from attachment and execution under the law of the state of Missouri or under federal law, other than [§ 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code].” 7 The Debtor points to State ex rel. Government Emp. Ins. Co. v. Lasky, in which the Missouri Court of Appeals held that, in order to be the subject of a garnishment, a debt owed to the debtor (i.e., the fund to be garnished) must be certain and not contingent. 8

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Related

State Ex Rel. Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Lasky
454 S.W.2d 942 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1970)
Benn v. Cole (In Re Benn)
340 B.R. 905 (Eighth Circuit, 2006)
Alexander v. Jensen-Carter (In Re Alexander)
270 B.R. 281 (Eighth Circuit, 2001)
Larry K. Alexander v. Mary Jensen-Carter
44 F. App'x 32 (Eighth Circuit, 2002)
Bambrick v. Bambrick Bros. Construction Co.
132 S.W. 322 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1910)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
364 B.R. 679, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 973, 2007 WL 896377, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-hidy-mowb-2007.