In re H.H.

2024 IL App (4th) 231210-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 8, 2024
• Docket: 4-23-1210
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 231210-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is March 8, 2024 NOS. 4-23-1210, 4-23-1211 cons. not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re H.H., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Tazewell County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 23JA90 v. (No. 4-23-1210) ) Casey H., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) --------------------------------------------------------------------- ) In re A.H., a Minor ) No. 23JA91 ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. (No. 4-23-1211) ) Honorable Casey H., ) David A. Brown, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Turner concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding (1) respondent’s concession that he was unable to care for the minors was sufficient to support the trial court’s dispositional order, (2) his challenge to the court’s fitness finding was moot as the court only needed one basis to support the dispositional order, and (3) even if mootness did not apply, the court’s finding of unfitness was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2 Respondent, Casey H., appeals from the trial court’s order finding him unfit and

unable to care for his minor children, H.H. (born May 2021) and A.H. (born August 2022). The

court also found the minors’ mother, Angel R., unfit, but she is not a party to this appeal. Respondent argues the court’s finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On June 6, 2023, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship alleging

H.H. and A.H. were neglected under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile

Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)) in that their environment was injurious to their

welfare. The State alleged Angel contacted the Illinois Department of Children and Family

Services (DCFS) because she was experiencing mental health and alcohol difficulties and DCFS

had no contact information for respondent. DCFS later determined respondent was in jail for armed

robbery, armed violence/possession of a dangerous weapon during the commission of a felony,

aggravated battery (two counts), retail theft (two counts), mob action, and battery for events that

occurred on March 24, 2023 (Kendall County case No. 23-CF-475). The State provided

respondent’s criminal history, which included the following convictions: (1) possession of

“15<299 Object/Part LSD” (Kendall County case No. 16-CF-366), (2) driving under the influence

of drugs (Kendall County case No. 16-DT-191), (3) corporal injury on spouse/cohabitant (Fresno

County, California case No. F22901323), and (4) dissuading a witness by force (Fresno County,

California case No. F22901625). At the time the petition was filed, respondent had two active

warrants in California for a probation violation. The trial court entered an order granting temporary

custody of the minors to DCFS.

¶5 On August 29, 2023, respondent filed his answer to the State’s petition, wherein he

stipulated the State had evidence to prove the aforementioned allegations. The trial court

proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing. DCFS caseworker Kevin Pfeifer testified respondent was

not present when the cases were opened, and he later learned respondent was in jail awaiting trial

-2- on various felony charges. Pfeifer also testified the case was opened as a result of Angel’s mental

health and alcohol addiction issues and protective custody of the minors was taken when Angel’s

mental health failed to stabilize. The guardian ad litem (GAL) asked the court to find the petition

proven as to respondent because he stipulated to the allegations in the petition. The court found

the State proved the petition by a preponderance of the evidence.

¶6 On October 25, 2023, the trial court held a dispositional hearing. Caseworker

Raevenn Heerman discussed her report and informed the court that respondent had been released

from jail three days prior and was in the process of searching for employment and housing.

Heerman was unsure if the charges against respondent were dropped or if he was out of custody

on pretrial release. She scheduled an appointment with respondent to complete an integrated

assessment. Respondent testified he was found not guilty on all charges in the Kendall County

case and was on pretrial release for a pending misdemeanor matter out of Kane County.

Respondent testified he was self-employed as a professional tattoo artist and had been staying at

his sister-in-law’s house in Yorkville, Illinois. Respondent testified his goal was to gain custody

of the minors, but it was not feasible at the time of the hearing because he needed to obtain

employment and a stable home. Respondent testified he communicated with the caseworker and

scheduled visitation.

¶7 The State asked the trial court to give DCFS guardianship of the minors with the

right to place. As to respondent, the State argued he was unfit due to his extensive criminality and

the items listed in the petition were sufficient to support such a finding. Counsel for respondent

stated:

“As far as [respondent’s] concerned, he has no objection to the service

recommendations within the report. Based on his testimony today, one of the

-3- charges that was referenced in the petition was dismissed because he was found not

guilty. I think he’s more of an unable status at this point which he’s admitted and,

you know, he set up visitation. He’s cooperating. We would just be asking that he

be found unable due to lack of stable housing at this point.”

¶8 The GAL asked the trial court to find respondent unfit based on the stipulated

allegations in the petition, the caseworker’s report, and the testimony presented. The court entered

a dispositional order and found it was in the best interest of the minors to be made wards of the

court. The court found respondent unfit based on his criminality and unable due to his housing.

¶9 This appeal followed.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 The Juvenile Court Act provides a two-step process for the trial court to decide

whether a minor should become a ward of the court. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 18. The first

step is the adjudicatory hearing on the State’s petition for adjudication of wardship. At this stage,

the court must consider whether the minor is abused, neglected, or dependent. 705 ILCS

405/2-18(1) (West 2022). If the court makes such a finding, then the court determines whether it

is consistent with the health, safety, and best interest of the minor and the public that the minor be

made a ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 2022). When a minor is made a ward of

the court, the court determines the proper disposition, which may include removal of the minor

from the custody of their parents. 705 ILCS 405/2-22(1) (West 2022). A finding on any one of

these three grounds—unfit, unable, or unwilling—provides a proper basis for removal of a minor.

In re Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d 985, 992 (1998).

¶ 12 The trial court’s dispositional order will be reversed only if the court’s findings of

fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the court committed an abuse of discretion

-4- by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order. In re J.W., 386 Ill. App. 3d 847, 856 (2008). A

trial court’s finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion

is clearly apparent or the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence

presented. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498 (2002).

¶ 13 Respondent argues the trial court’s order finding him unfit and making the minors

wards of the court was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, he argues he was

acquitted of the Kendall County charges that served as a basis for the State’s petition and his

conduct did not contribute to the minors’ injurious environment. The State contends respondent

has waived his challenge to the court’s dispositional order because he conceded he was unable,

and therefore, whether he was also unfit is moot as the court only needs one basis to support

removal.

¶ 14 This case is analogous to Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d 985. In that case, the respondent

mother conceded during the dispositional hearing that she was unable and asked the trial court to

find her unable instead of unfit or unwilling. Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 990. The court found

her to be unfit and unable. Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 991. On appeal, the respondent mother

argued the court’s finding that she was unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 991. The First District explained custody of a minor can be taken

away if the parent is adjudged to be either unfit, unable, or unwilling. Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d

at 992. When the respondent conceded she was unable, she waived her challenge to the trial court’s

fitness finding. Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 991-92. Thus, the appellate court found that a finding

of unable was sufficient alone to support the trial court’s judgment and the issue of the trial court’s

additional finding that the respondent was unfit was moot. Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 992-93;

see In re Harriet L.-B., 2016 IL App (1st) 152034, ¶ 31 (collecting cases).

-5- ¶ 15 The same reasoning applies to the case at bar. Respondent conceded he was unable

to care for the minors at the dispositional hearing, and the trial court found him unfit and unable.

Respondent continues to concede on appeal that he was unable. The issue respondent now raises,

i.e., whether the court’s finding that he was unfit was against the manifest weight of evidence, is

moot because the court’s finding that he was unable still stands. The court only needed one ground

to provide a proper basis for removal. Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 992.

¶ 16 Even assuming, arguendo, the issue of respondent’s fitness was not moot, his

argument would nonetheless fail. When determining one’s fitness to act as a parent, the focus is

on the parent in question instead of the child’s best interest. In re M.B., 332 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1004

(2002). Here, the trial court found respondent unfit due to his criminality. Respondent contends

the court made no specific mention of any actual criminal convictions and one could reasonably

assume the court improperly relied on the acquitted charges when finding him unfit. However,

there is no evidence in the record on appeal showing the court considered the acquitted charges,

and we presume the court knew the law and applied it properly absent affirmative evidence to the

contrary. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 345 (2000). Further, the record supports that the court was

made aware of the acquitted charges by the caseworker’s and respondent’s testimonies. Even

without considering the acquitted charges, respondent had a history of criminality that rendered

him unfit at the time of the dispositional hearing. The evidence showed respondent had four

convictions, two active warrants, and a pending misdemeanor in Kane County for which he was

on pretrial release. Therefore, the court’s dispositional order finding respondent unfit was not

against the manifest weight of evidence.

¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 18 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

-6- ¶ 19 Affirmed.

-7-