In Re Herold Radio & Electronics Corporation

191 F. Supp. 780, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5211
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 13, 1961
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 191 F. Supp. 780 (In Re Herold Radio & Electronics Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Herold Radio & Electronics Corporation, 191 F. Supp. 780, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5211 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).

Opinion

HERLANDS, District Judge.

What factors determine the choice between Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq.) and Chapter X (11 U.S.C.A. § 501 et seq.) ?

This question — long debated but never resolved judicially by a pat formula — is the vortex of the present controversy.

United in their common advocacy of Chapter XI are the debtor, Bankers Trust Company (the largest secured creditor), and the Official Creditors’ Committee. Ranged on the other side are three protagonists of Chapter X: the Securities and Exchange Commission and two debenture holders, Milton A. Abernethy and Kaufmann, Alsberg & Co. The S.E.C. and the two bondholders are the movants herein.

I.

The S.E.C. has moved (1) to intervene in the pending Chapter XI proceeding of the debtor and (2) to dismiss the Chapter XI petition filed by the debtor and the proceeding under Chapter XI unless, within a period to be fixed by this Court, the petition is amended to comply with the requirements of Chapter X for the filing of a debtor’s petition or a creditors’ petition under Chapter X is filed.

Abernethy, a purchaser of $15,000 face amount of the debtor’s 6% convertible subordinated debentures, has also moved for a dismissal of the Chapter XI petition on the ground that proceedings should have been brought under Chapter X.

The S.E.C.’s and Abernethy’s dismissal motions are joined in by Kaufmann, Als-berg & Co., a member firm of the New York Stock Exchange and the owner of $154,000 face amount of the aforesaid issue of debentures. Kaufmann, Alsberg & Co. is alleged to be the largest single bondholder of the said issue, which totaled $1,500,000.

II.

That it is easier to state a legal proposition than to apply it is again illustrated by the arguments of the parties. They rely on the same decisions; they pledge allegiance to the same principles. However, they differ sharply on the bearing that those same decisions have upon the particular facts of this case. What are the “significant” features of this case and its “controlling” aspects is, therefore, the critical question.

The desiderata pertinent to the S.E. C.’s motion to intervene and the S.E.C.’s and Abernethy’s motions to dismiss the Chapter XI proceeding are closely interrelated, if not basically the same. They will, therefore, be considered together.

III.

A measure of “sound discretion” and “business” judgment resides in the Court in deciding these motions. Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 1940, 310 U.S. 434, 456, 60 S.Ct. 1044, 84 L.Ed. 1293; General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 1956, 350 U.S. 462, 467, 468, 76 S.Ct. 516, 100 L.Ed. 550; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Liberty Baking Corporation, 2 Cir., 1957, 240 F.2d 511, 516, certiorari denied 1957, 353 U.S. 930, 77 S.Ct. 719, 1 L.Ed.2d 723; In Re Lea Fabrics, Inc., 3 Cir., 1959, 272 F.2d 769, 772, judgment vacated, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Lea Fabrics, 1960, 363 U.S. 417, 80 S.Ct. 1258, 4 L.Ed.2d 1515. This discretion has been described as “within the purview of the district court’s discretionary exercise of its equity powers.” In re Transvision, Inc., 2 Cir., 1955, 217 F.2d 243, 246, certiorari denied Security and Exchange Commission v. Transvision, Inc., 1955, 348 U.S. 952, 75 S.Ct. 440, 99 L.Ed. 744.

Like all judicial discretion, it is a discretion that “must be a legal dis *784 cretion, rather than one merely at will” (Cf. Afran Transport Co. v. Motor Tanker Bergechief, 2 Cir., 1960, 185 F.2d 119, or one that simply expresses the court’s “own notions of equitable principles.” Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., supra, 310 U.S. at page 457, 60 S.Ct. at page 1054.

Discretion that is premised on the wrong criteria or that disregards well-settled principles is said to transcend “the allowable bounds” and is reversible. General Stores Corp v. Shlensky, supra, 350 U.S. at page 468, 76 S.Ct. at page 520; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Liberty Baking Corporation, supra, 240 F.2d at page 516, note 10.

IV.

The crucial consideration in a choice between Chapter X and Chapter XI is “the needs to be served.” General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, supra, 350 U.S. at page 466, 76 S.Ct. at page 519.

The resolution of that problem depends “on the facts of the case whether the formulation of a plan under the control of the debtor, as provided by Chapter XI or the formulation of a plan under the auspices of disinterested trustees, as assured by Chapter X and the other protective provisions of that chapter, would better serve ‘the public and private interests concerned including those of the debtor.’ Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 [60 S.Ct. 1044] (1940).” General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, supra, 350 U.S. at page 465, 76 S.Ct. at page 518.

Whether Chapter XI relief is adequate “is to be determined by the problems likely to be faced in the attempt to restore the debtor to health.” Grubbs v. Pettit, 2 Cir., 1960, 282 F.2d 557, 562. And it has been pointed out that the district court may not overlook “the very narrow scope of Chapter XI.” Securities and Exchange Commission v. Liberty Baking Corporation, 2 Cir., 1957, 240 F.2d 511, 516, certiorari denied, 1957, 353 U.S. 930, 77 S.Ct. 719.

In the following cases, Chapter X was preferred to Chapter XI: General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, supra; Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., supra; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Liberty Baking Corporation, supra.

In the following cases, Chapter XI was preferred to Chapter X: Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., 6 Cir., 1956, 231 F.2d 859; In Re Transvision, Inc., supra; In re Lea Fabrics, Inc., supra.

The surface alignment of the six leading decisions becomes plastic in the-hands of those who, by a process of selective emphasis that disregards context, find statements in the opinions and facts in the records that seemingly can be-moulded to fit either side of rival arguments in a particular case.

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191 F. Supp. 780, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-herold-radio-electronics-corporation-nysd-1961.