In Re HEALY

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit·Decided August 7, 2025·No. 24-2311·Unpublished

Opinion

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

IN RE: NOAH P. HEALY,

Appellant

2024-2311

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 15/171,621.

Decided: August 7, 2025

NOAH P. HEALY, Charlottesville, VA, pro se.

OMAR FAROOQ AMIN, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for appellee Coke Morgan Stewart. Also represented by KAKOLI CAPRIHAN, AMY J. NELSON.

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge, and SCARSI, District Judge.1

1 Honorable Mark C. Scarsi, District Judge, United States District Court for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

2 IN RE: HEALY

PER CURIAM.

Noah P. Healy appeals a decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board sustaining the examiner’s rejection of all pending claims of U.S. Patent Application No. 15/171,621 as patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Ex parte Noah P. Healy, No. 2023-002702, 2024 WL 3440209 (P.T.A.B. July 16, 2024) (“Decision”). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Healy is the named inventor on the ’621 application , entitled “System and Method of Price Discovery for Exchange Market.” J.A. 48. The ’621 application is directed to systems and methods “for discovering and publishing clearing prices of commodities within exchange markets.” J.A. 80; see also J.A. 81–82 (“method for operating a commodity market through a coordinate discovery market”). The application explains that “exchange markets traditionally work by constantly maintaining a balance between supply and demand” by changing the price of commodities. J.A. 49 ¶ 4. The application also states that conventional methods and systems for operating exchange markets “are roughly nine centuries old,” “would be recognizable to early Renaissance Venetians,” and “suffer from well-known flaws, such as manipulative practices, money laundering, and crash instability.” J.A. 48 ¶ 3.

The ’621 application purports to overcome these drawbacks of conventional exchange markets, as well as additional challenges posed by technological advances, by proposing “a different logical construct for an exchange market, which dictates a different set of rules for interaction of the relevant participants.” J.A. 48 ¶ 2. The claimed invention purportedly “link[s] a positive sum forecasting market to a negative sum clearing house in a mutually negative reinforcement control loop” by “providing a temporal sequence of clearing prices and accepting future price speculation from speculators along with an investment,” combining the investments “into a bett[o]r pool,” and paying

IN RE: HEALY 3

“the speculators who most correctly predicted the future prices” using “a pari-mutuel payout.” J.A. 50 ¶ 7. This method separates speculation from trading “so that speculator incentives can be inverted to align with producers and consumers” while still allowing producers and consumers “to utilize the pricing information provided by speculators when determining how much of a commodity to buy or sell.” Id. ¶ 8.

Claim 1 is illustrative: 1. . . . A system for discovering and publishing clearing prices of commodities within exchange markets, the system comprising:

an intermediary market server configured to receive, aggregate, and publish pricing information to and from participants, which, using a telecommunication network , simultaneously publishes prices and predictions on clearing prices for a plurality of commodities to at least one speculator device associated with a speculator comprising a graphical user interface, at least one producer device associated with a producer of at least one commodity comprising a graphical user interface, and at least one consumer device associated with a consumer of at least one commodity comprising a graphical user interface; wherein the at least one speculator device, via the graphical user interface, exchanges data with the intermediary market server related to purchasing interests in at least one commodity of the plurality of commodities according to a different logical construct that dictates a different set of rules for interaction of relevant participants by participant type, wherein speculators do 4 IN RE: HEALY

not directly perform any transactions with producers or consumers and do not purchase or handle any commodities, and instead provide predictions on clearing prices of the plurality of commodities backed by a financial investment placed with the intermediary market server, wherein the intermediary market server allocates returns on investments based on information measurement and provides a means to directly state a degree of influence of each participant in the exchange markets, removing price and temporal priority to allow separation of speculation from trading so that speculator incentives are inverted to align with producers and consumers; wherein the at least one producer device, via the graphical user interface, exchanges data with the intermediary market server related to selling the at least one commodity ; wherein the at least one consumer device, via the graphical user interface, exchanges data with the intermediary market server related to buying the at least one commodity ; a clearing house module configured to receive offers of sale, offers to buy, produce contracts for received offers, handle monetary payments related to transactions between producers and consumers, and provide a volume seeking price discovery in the exchange markets and coordination on a non-zero sum basis in which all participants are rewarded for realizing mutual

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gains by making mutually consistent decisions ; wherein, in response to transactions being processed by the intermediary market server between producers and consumers at a clearing price, the system tracks interactions of pluralities of different participants at different times and measures information content of actions taken in roles of producer, consumer, and speculator , providing feedback as a four party commodities market operates, and the system organizes information, measurements, presentation, and execution, transforming generated matched pairs of producers and consumers creating commodities transactions , providing rewards payments to speculators based on accuracy of prediction for clearing prices of the commodities transactions that positively contribute to implement a positive sum commodity market, and the speculator is rewarded from an investment pool based on a level of accuracy and a calculation of a percentage of change from influence provided by each speculator prediction and investment to move a current price to an actual clearing price according to a pari-mutuel betting schema with a positive sum pari-mutuel information gathering provided by the system, wherein the at least one speculator device, and each contributing speculator, are paid a fraction of impact that each investment of the speculator or contributing speculator had on moving a current market price toward the actual clearing price of commodities exchanged between producers and 6 IN RE: HEALY

consumers, with larger proportional gains returned for relatively bigger correct moves; wherein instances and opportunity for price manipulation and hedging in the marketplace are reduced, efficiency of the marketplace is increased, and cost of operation is reduced, by having speculators directly provide price information to the marketplace.

J.A. 28–29.

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