In re Halladjian

174 F. 834, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5266
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts
DecidedDecember 24, 1909
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 174 F. 834 (In re Halladjian) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5266 (circtdma 1909).

Opinion

EOWELE, Circuit Judge.

Four petitioners presented themselves for naturalization. They were examined, and, except as stated below, were shown to be duly qualified for citizenship. All testified that they were Armenians by race. Halladjian was born at Aintab, Ekmakjian at Dikranagerd or Diarbekir, and Mouradian at Adana, all in Asiatic Turkey. Bayeutz was born in a suburb of Constantinople on the west side of the Bosphorus. T find that all were white persons in appearance, not darker in complexion than some persons of north European descent traceable for generations. Their complexion was lighter than that of many south Italians and Portuguese. The United States opposed the naturalization of all these persons upon the ground that they were not “free white persons,” within the purview of Rev. St. § 2169 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1333). The assistant district attorney submitted a brief in opposition to the petitions, and referred the court to certain letters written by the Chief of the Bureau of Naturalization; the argument contained in the letters being adopted by the United States as its own. The court has also been aided by a brief filed in support of the petitions by two members of the bar as amici curke, and it has welcomed notes and references which other persons have furnished it, attracted by the importance of the case.

Brief mention should be made here of a sentence found in one of the letters referred to which was addressed to an assistant district attorney of the United States:

"This office :s * ' * must request ® * * that yon will oppose the granting of naturalization to Hindoos or East Indians, and tliat. you will instruct’ the clerks of courts in your district to refuse to accept declarations of intention or to file petitions for naturalization, upon behalf of such aliens.”

Tlie second request was made without due consideration. The clerks of tlie federal courts are not subject to instruction by district attorneys, or by the United States itself, as a party to a judicial proceeding. That a clerk should refuse.to file a petition for naturalization, which contains all proper allegations, because of his judgment of the color, race, or other qualification of the petitioner, would violate the clerk’s official duty. The clerk may, as an act of personal kindness, call the statute of 1882 to the attention of one who appears plainly to he a Chinaman, and may suggest that his petition will almost certainly he dismissed; but, if the petitioner persists, the petition must he filed. The act of 1882 (Act May 6, 1882, c. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 61 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1333]), forbids the naturalization of Chinamen; it does not deny them access to a court.

Rev. St. § 2169, reads as follows:

"The provisions of this title [Naturalization] shall apply to aliens being free white persons, and to aliens oí African nativity, and to persons of African descent.”

[836]*836, The 'phrase.“free-white persons” (lates.-from the earliest federal statute regulating naturalization. Act March 26, 1790, c. 3, 1 Stat. 103, provided for the naturalization of “any alien, being a free white person.” The phrase was repeated in Act Jan. 29, 1795, c. 20, 1 Stat. 414, and in Act April 14, 1802, c. 28, 2 Stat. 153. The same language was used in sundry later modifications ‘ of the lav/. Act March 22, 1816, c. 32, 3 Stat. 259; Act May 26, 1824, c. 186, 4 Stat. 69; Act May 24, 1828, c.:il6, 4 Stat. 310. Act July 17, 1862, c. 200, § 21, 12 Stat. 597, provided for the naturalization of “any alien,” being an honorabfy discharged soldier, without qüálification, and seems thus to have provided that añy person of the class described might be naturalized, irrespective of color. He who had rendered military service was deemed worthy of citizenship'. In the earlier statutes the requirement of white color was expressed at the beginning of the sections which provided generally the conditions and methods of naturalization, sections which correspond to Rev. St. •§§ 2165-2168 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 1329-1333). Act July 14, 1870, c. 254, § 7,-16 Stat. 256, permitted'the naturalization of “aliens of African nativity and * * * persons of African descent.” Rev. St. 1873, §§ 2165-2168, omitted mention of “free white persons,” thus opening naturalization to all aliens. Notwithstanding this universal inclusion, yet the special inclusion of Africans made by the act of 1870 was expressly, though needlessly, continued in section 2169, as follows:

“Tire provisions of this title [Naturalization] shall apply to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”

The intent of Congress in passing section 2169 in its original form was to insure by express inclusion the right of Africans to be naturalized like all other persons. By Act Reb. 18, 1875, c. 80, 18 Stat. 318, passed “to correct errors and to supply omissions in the Revised Statutes,” section 2169 was amended to take its present form, thus again limiting naturalization to (1) free white persons, and (2) Africans within the act of 1870. The broad phrase “any alien” was left unchanged in sections 2165-2168, and its meaning therein was defined and cut down-by section 2169. This is the most reasonable construction of section 2169 in its present form. To make the additional express inclusion of whites by the amendment of 1875 operate to exclude all other persons from naturalization is an awkward.construction, but seems inevitable. By Act May 6, 1882, c. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 61, the courts were forbidden to naturalize Chinese.

With the freedom of the petitioners the court need not concern itself. All applicants for naturalization, inasmuch as they reside in the United States, are necessarilj'- free. Since 1790 the requirement of white color in persons naturalized has been expressed in the same words (except between 1873 and 1875), Africans qualified except as to color may now be naturalized, indeed, though they are not white, and Chinese are altogether excluded, whether they are white or not. These exceptions are created by express provisions of statute limited, réspec-tivefy, to Africans and Chinese. Other applicants, qualified except as to color, may now, as always, be naturalized if they are “white,” and may not be naturalized if they are not “white.” These petitioners [837]*837«-.re neither Chinamen nor Africans of any sort, and the court has here to decide whether they are white or not.

The United States contends that the words “white persons” should be construed to mean Europeans and persons of European descent. Even this definition is ambiguous, llayentz is a European by birth and previous residence, yet the United States contends that his petition should be dismissed because he does not belong to a race which is “European or white.” The United States contends that the proper distinction is not one of mere nativity or of personal color; that "white” is the equivalent of “European,” and is used to—

“describe the variations of domicile or origin which are so closely associated with the mental development of a people.” “European, or its analogous term, white man, * i;- is intended, not merely to describe the local habitat of the person to whom applied, but as a brief and convenient designation ilescj iotivo of the prevailing ideals, standards, and aspirations of the people of Europe.”

These phrases suggest that the education and intelligence of the petitioner furnish part of the test of his statutory color, but the United States docs not thus interpret its own language above quoted.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
174 F. 834, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5266, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-halladjian-circtdma-1909.