In Re Griffin

302 B.R. 1, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1550, 2003 WL 22861597
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Arkansas
DecidedSeptember 11, 2003
Docket2:02-BK-70245M
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 302 B.R. 1 (In Re Griffin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Griffin, 302 B.R. 1, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1550, 2003 WL 22861597 (Ark. 2003).

Opinion

ORDER

On June 2, 2003, Mary McGehee, a creditor in this bankruptcy case, filed a proof of claim for $353,343.99. The debt evidenced by the claim is secured by a deed of trust executed by the Debtor, Stephen A. Griffin (“Debtor”), in 1999 to City National Bank of Fort Smith. The claim was later amended to be the sum of $371,446.49.

The Trustee filed an objection to the claim of Mrs. McGehee and a hearing was conducted at Hot Springs, Arkansas, on July 30, 2003. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court sustained the Trustee’s objection to the claim to the extent the total claim exceeded $304,260.09. The Court took under advisement the issue of the amount of legal fees that could be added to the allowed portion of the claim.

The matter before the Court is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157 and this Court has jurisdiction to enter a final judgment.

The creditor, Mrs. McGehee, is the mother of Barbara Griffin, who is the Debtor’s wife. On or about January 13, 2003, Mrs. McGehee, after consulting with Diane Sexton, her attorney, purchased the note payable to City National Bank of Fort Smith and took an assignment of the deed of trust. Mrs. McGehee paid $304,260.09 for the note, according to her testimony.

Mrs. McGehee testified that she purchased the note to help her daughter and son-in-law retain possession of a house on Lake Ouachita in Montgomery County, Ar *3 kansas. 1 Mrs. McGehee stated that post petition, Barbara Griffin has paid her monthly rent equal to the ongoing accrual of interest on the note. She testified that she does not know the reason her claim is for more than $304,260.09 but that she relies totally on her counsel, Ms. Sexton, concerning these matters.

Filed by Ms. Sexton and introduced into evidence at the hearing on the Trustee’s objection, the claim and the subsequent amended claim contain no documentation as proof of Mrs. McGehee’s claim. At the hearing, the creditor demonstrated that some of the extra charges were for attorney fees but failed to show the basis for the remaining charges. The Trustee does not object to a secured claim in the amount of $304,260.09 and additional monies for reasonable attorney’s fees, insurance, and accrued interest, to the extent these can be documented.

Ms. Sexton submitted a statement for attorney’s fees for $17,071.20, which she argues should be allowed as part of Mrs. McGehee’s secured claim. While the Trustee does not dispute that reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in protecting Mrs. McGehee’s interest are properly allowed as part of her secured claim, he argues that Ms. Sexton’s application is unreasonable in amount. He contends that services charged were not performed to protect Mrs. McGehee’s interest in the property or were not performed for the benefit of Mrs. McGehee at all. Therefore, the Court must examine Ms. Sexton’s fee application.

Ms. Sexton’s statement reflects the date of the first service performed for Mrs. McGehee was “12/30/03”. 2 The Court file reflects that on February 18, 2003, Ms. Sexton appeared in this case on behalf of Barbara Griffin. On March 12, 2003, Ms. Sexton entered her appearance on behalf of Highway 71 South Liquors, Inc. On March 21, 2003, Ms. Sexton entered her appearance on behalf of the Chapter 7 Debtor, Stephen Griffin, but was later removed as attorney for the Debtor on motion of the Trustee. Ms. Sexton also represents Douglas Payne, a certified public accountant, who has a claim for administrative expenses.

The Bankruptcy Code provides in relevant part as follows:

To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property, the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim ... any reasonable fees ... provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.

11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2000).

Section 506(b) allows the award of attorneys’ fees to an oversecured creditor to the extent that its security agreement expressly provides for such fees. Dalessio v. Pauehon (In re Dalessio), 74 B.R. 721, 723 (9th Cir. BAP 1987); In re Mills, 77 B.R. 413, 417 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1987) (citing In re Elmwood Farm, Inc., 19 B.R. 338, 341 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982)). However, entitlement is limited to reasonable fees. In re Dalessio, 74 B.R. at 723; In re Brunel, 54 B.R. 462, 464 (Bankr. D.Colo.1985) (citations omitted).

The applicant has the burden of proving entitlement to fees and the reasonableness of requested compensation. Brake v. Tavormina (In re Beverly Mfg. Corp.), 841 F.2d 365, 371 (11th Cir.1988) *4 (quoting In re U.S. Golf Corp., 639 F.2d 1197, 1201 (5th Cir.1981)); In re Meade Land & Dev. Co., 577 F.2d 858, 860 (3d Cir.1978); In re Villa Capri Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 141 B.R. 257, 260 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1992) (citing Norman v. Housing Authority, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.1988); In re Greenwich Showboat Ltd. Partnership, 117 B.R. 54, 60 (Bankr.D.Conn.1990)).

In determining reasonableness, bankruptcy law, rather than state law, governs. Bla ckburn-Bliss Trust v. Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc. (In re Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc.), 794 F.2d 1051, 1058 (5th Cir.1986); Pasatiempo Properties v. Le Marquis Assocs. (In re Le Marquis Assocs.), 81 B.R. 576, 578 (9th Cir. BAP 1987) (citing In re 268 Ltd., 789 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir.1986)). Reasonable fees allowable under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) are those necessary to the collection and protection of a creditor’s claim. In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 105 B.R. 515, 521 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1989) (citing In re Reposa, 94 B.R. 257, 261 (Bankr.D.R.I.1988)). Under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b), fees are reasonable only if they are incurred in protecting a secured creditor’s rights in its collateral or in an effort to collect the debt. In re Brunel, 54 B.R. at 464.

As previously stated, the burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the fees is upon the applicant. In addition to any objection voiced by a party in interest, the Court has an independent duty to investigate the reasonableness of compensation. In re Pettibone Corp., 74 B.R. 293, 299-300 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1987) (citing In re NRG Resources, Inc., 64 B.R. 643, 650 (W.D.La.1986); In re Esar Ventures, 62 B.R.

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Bluebook (online)
302 B.R. 1, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1550, 2003 WL 22861597, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-griffin-arwb-2003.