Opinion by:
KAREN ANGELINI, Justice.
Harold Lloyd Shields1 petitioned the trial court to order the disclosure of grand jury proceedings pursuant to article 20.02(d) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.2 The trial court denied the petition, and Shields appeals. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shields’s petition, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Shields seeks the disclosure of state grand jury proceedings related to his indictment for aggravated sexual assault. Specifically, he hopes to use the grand jurors’ deposition testimony as evidence in his federal civil rights and malicious prosecution suit against Donnie Jeanne Coleman and Carol Twiss, the prosecutor and the investigator, respectively, who presented the case against Shields to the grand jury. Coleman, an assistant district attorney, and Twiss, an investigator with the Kerr County Sheriffs Office, allegedly failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.
The grand jury investigation arose from the report of K.S., a seven-year-old girl living in Kerr County, that two male relatives and two other men had repeatedly sexually assaulted her over a period of several years. K.S. described one of the other men as having the initials “M.B.,” owning a computer, living alone, driving a flatbed truck, and being physically capable of various sex acts. The investigation yielded strong evidence against K.S.’s grandfather, an acquaintance of Shields. K.S. was presented with a photo lineup, and she selected Shields’s photo as one of the other men. However, there was also [142]*142evidence tending to show that Shields was innocent. For example, Shields reported that he did not move to Kerr County until two years after the alleged assaults had begun. Also, Shields did not have the initials did not own a computer, did not live alone, did not drive a flatbed truck, and was not physically capable of performing the described sexual acts.
Coleman supervised Twiss’s presentation of the evidence regarding Shields to the grand jury. The presentation was not recorded or transcribed. After hearing the presentation, the grand jury indicted Shields on three counts of aggravated sexual assault. Later, K.S. recanted and the State dismissed its case against Shields.
After the case against him was dismissed, Shields sued Coleman and Twiss in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas alleging that their failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury violated his civil rights and constituted malicious prosecution. As elements of his malicious prosecution claim, Shields sought to prove that the indictment was not supported by probable cause and the presence of actual malice.3 During discovery, Shields’s attorneys subpoenaed several grand jurors in an attempt to take their videotaped depositions. In response, Coleman and Twiss moved to quash the subpoenas and moved for a protective order preventing Shields from contacting the grand jurors. The federal district court granted the motions.
After failing to get the federal district court’s permission to depose the grand jurors,4 Shields filed a petition in the 198th Judicial District Court to request disclosure of the grand jury proceedings.5 Specifically, Shields’s petition requested permission to depose several grand jurors regarding whether Coleman and Twiss had presented them with exculpatory evidence about Shields. Shields contended that he could show a “particularized need” for the deposition testimony as required by article 20.02(d). During the hearing, however, the trial court questioned whether Texas law imposes a duty on prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to grand juries. In fact, the trial court spent a good deal of time in the hearing focusing on the duty issue: “But if there’s no duty to present exculpatory evidence, then how can that [143]*143... be a need when it’s not even a duty of the prosecutor to present that?” The trial court later entered a judgment denying the petition. Shields appeals.
Standard of Review
A trial court’s decision regarding the disclosure of grand jury proceedings is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Euresti v. Valdez, 769 5.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ). The test for an abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles; in other words, whether the trial court’s action was arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). “The mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Id. at 242.
The Doty to PRESENT Exculpatory Evidence to the Grand Jury
Before examining whether Shields made a showing of a particularized need, we will first examine whether Texas law requires prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury. Initially, we note that the United States Supreme Court has squarely addressed the issue and has found that there is no duty to disclose exculpatory material to federal grand juries. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992). In Williams, the Supreme Court examined the historical functioning of the grand jury system and stated that “requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence would alter the grand jury’s historical role, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body.” Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that there is no duty on the part of the prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. See id.; accord United States v. Gross, 41 F.Supp.2d 1096, 1097 (C.D.Cal.1999); United States v. McCollough, 855 F.Supp. 882, 886 (W.D.La.1994).
Among the state courts there are essentially three views. See Sharon N. Humble, Annotation, Duty of Prosecutor to Present Exculpatory Evidence to State Grand Jury, 49 A.L.R.5th 639, 649 (1997). Some state courts hold that prosecutors have a broad duty to present exculpatory evidence to grand juries. See, e.g., Gummiskey v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.4th 1018, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 551, 839 P.2d 1059, 1068-69 (1992); Lay v. State, 110 Nev. 1189, 886 P.2d 448, 453 (1994). Others hold that prosecutors have no duty to present exculpatory evidence to grand juries. See, e.g., People v. Beu, 268 Ill.App.3d 93, 205 Ill. Dec. 811, 644 N.E.2d 27, 30 (1994); State v. Easter, 661 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Mo.Ct.App. 1983). The majority of the state courts that have addressed the issue have found that prosecutors have a limited duty to present exculpatory evidence to grand juries.6 See, e.g., State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 676 A.2d 533, 541 (1996);
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Opinion by:
KAREN ANGELINI, Justice.
Harold Lloyd Shields1 petitioned the trial court to order the disclosure of grand jury proceedings pursuant to article 20.02(d) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.2 The trial court denied the petition, and Shields appeals. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shields’s petition, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Shields seeks the disclosure of state grand jury proceedings related to his indictment for aggravated sexual assault. Specifically, he hopes to use the grand jurors’ deposition testimony as evidence in his federal civil rights and malicious prosecution suit against Donnie Jeanne Coleman and Carol Twiss, the prosecutor and the investigator, respectively, who presented the case against Shields to the grand jury. Coleman, an assistant district attorney, and Twiss, an investigator with the Kerr County Sheriffs Office, allegedly failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.
The grand jury investigation arose from the report of K.S., a seven-year-old girl living in Kerr County, that two male relatives and two other men had repeatedly sexually assaulted her over a period of several years. K.S. described one of the other men as having the initials “M.B.,” owning a computer, living alone, driving a flatbed truck, and being physically capable of various sex acts. The investigation yielded strong evidence against K.S.’s grandfather, an acquaintance of Shields. K.S. was presented with a photo lineup, and she selected Shields’s photo as one of the other men. However, there was also [142]*142evidence tending to show that Shields was innocent. For example, Shields reported that he did not move to Kerr County until two years after the alleged assaults had begun. Also, Shields did not have the initials did not own a computer, did not live alone, did not drive a flatbed truck, and was not physically capable of performing the described sexual acts.
Coleman supervised Twiss’s presentation of the evidence regarding Shields to the grand jury. The presentation was not recorded or transcribed. After hearing the presentation, the grand jury indicted Shields on three counts of aggravated sexual assault. Later, K.S. recanted and the State dismissed its case against Shields.
After the case against him was dismissed, Shields sued Coleman and Twiss in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas alleging that their failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury violated his civil rights and constituted malicious prosecution. As elements of his malicious prosecution claim, Shields sought to prove that the indictment was not supported by probable cause and the presence of actual malice.3 During discovery, Shields’s attorneys subpoenaed several grand jurors in an attempt to take their videotaped depositions. In response, Coleman and Twiss moved to quash the subpoenas and moved for a protective order preventing Shields from contacting the grand jurors. The federal district court granted the motions.
After failing to get the federal district court’s permission to depose the grand jurors,4 Shields filed a petition in the 198th Judicial District Court to request disclosure of the grand jury proceedings.5 Specifically, Shields’s petition requested permission to depose several grand jurors regarding whether Coleman and Twiss had presented them with exculpatory evidence about Shields. Shields contended that he could show a “particularized need” for the deposition testimony as required by article 20.02(d). During the hearing, however, the trial court questioned whether Texas law imposes a duty on prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to grand juries. In fact, the trial court spent a good deal of time in the hearing focusing on the duty issue: “But if there’s no duty to present exculpatory evidence, then how can that [143]*143... be a need when it’s not even a duty of the prosecutor to present that?” The trial court later entered a judgment denying the petition. Shields appeals.
Standard of Review
A trial court’s decision regarding the disclosure of grand jury proceedings is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Euresti v. Valdez, 769 5.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ). The test for an abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles; in other words, whether the trial court’s action was arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). “The mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Id. at 242.
The Doty to PRESENT Exculpatory Evidence to the Grand Jury
Before examining whether Shields made a showing of a particularized need, we will first examine whether Texas law requires prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury. Initially, we note that the United States Supreme Court has squarely addressed the issue and has found that there is no duty to disclose exculpatory material to federal grand juries. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992). In Williams, the Supreme Court examined the historical functioning of the grand jury system and stated that “requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence would alter the grand jury’s historical role, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body.” Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that there is no duty on the part of the prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. See id.; accord United States v. Gross, 41 F.Supp.2d 1096, 1097 (C.D.Cal.1999); United States v. McCollough, 855 F.Supp. 882, 886 (W.D.La.1994).
Among the state courts there are essentially three views. See Sharon N. Humble, Annotation, Duty of Prosecutor to Present Exculpatory Evidence to State Grand Jury, 49 A.L.R.5th 639, 649 (1997). Some state courts hold that prosecutors have a broad duty to present exculpatory evidence to grand juries. See, e.g., Gummiskey v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.4th 1018, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 551, 839 P.2d 1059, 1068-69 (1992); Lay v. State, 110 Nev. 1189, 886 P.2d 448, 453 (1994). Others hold that prosecutors have no duty to present exculpatory evidence to grand juries. See, e.g., People v. Beu, 268 Ill.App.3d 93, 205 Ill. Dec. 811, 644 N.E.2d 27, 30 (1994); State v. Easter, 661 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Mo.Ct.App. 1983). The majority of the state courts that have addressed the issue have found that prosecutors have a limited duty to present exculpatory evidence to grand juries.6 See, e.g., State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 676 A.2d 533, 541 (1996); People v. Mitchell, 82 N.Y.2d 509, 605 N.Y.S.2d 655, 626 N.E.2d 630, 633 (1993). This limited duty generally requires disclosure if the exculpatory value of the evidence is substantial. See Hogan, 676 A.2d at 541.
Only two Texas courts have addressed the issue. One court noted, in dicta, that “[jjustice, of course, would best be served by a prosecutor affirmatively presenting a grand jury with any information which could affect its decision to re[144]*144turn an indictment.” State v. Sandoval, 842 S.W.2d 782, 789 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, pet. refd). More recently, however, the First Court of Appeals, relying on Williams, noted that “generally, the State has no duty to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.” Matney v. State, 99 S.W.3d 626, 629 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet. h.). We agree with the Houston court and apply the federal rule that prosecutors have no duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Thus, Shields can show no particularized need to take the depositions of the grand jurors. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shields’s petition.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.