In re G.M. CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: April 8, 2026
• Docket: E087282
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 4/8/26 In re G.M. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re G.M. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E087282

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2300216)

v. OPINION

R.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun,

Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, and Julie Jarvi, Deputy County

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 I.

INTRODUCTION

R.M. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order summarily denying his

Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388 petition seeking to enforce the court’s

visitation order. On appeal, Father contends the juvenile court erred in not addressing his

section 388 petition because the court believed it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter.

We agree, and reverse and remand the matter.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In October 2025, the juvenile court terminated dependency proceedings and

ordered a guardianship with the paternal grandmother over Father’s children, G.M. and

L.M. When the court terminated dependency jurisdiction, the court ordered Father to

continue to have visitation with his children, and that visitation would be arranged by the

legal guardian.

On October 27, 2025, Father filed section 388 petitions as to his two children. He

checked the box stating, “I am asking the court to terminate its jurisdiction.” Father

noted that on October 15, 2025, the court denied his prior JV-180, Request to Change

Court Order, motion and “stated that ‘visitation is arranged with the legal guardian.’ ” He

explained that the order should be changed because the legal guardian “has refused to

arrange any visitation, effectively preventing all contact with my children despite the

1 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated, and all rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

2 court’s prior acknowledgment of my right to visitation.” In response to the query on the

form, “what has happened since that order,” Father stated: “The guardian has refused to

arrange any visitation or communication for over 8 months despite the court recognizing

my right to see my children. The Civil Rights Department confirmed false reports

labeling me ‘dangerous.’ The federal court has also acknowledged misconduct tied to

this case. These are new facts showing the need to move visitation to Family Court under

WIC §362. 4.” Father sought to “[t]erminate dependency jurisdiction and issue Family

Law custody and visitation orders under [section] 362.4. Order therapeutic visitation and

family reunification counseling for both parties under Family Code [sections] 3190-3192.

Transfer the case to Family Court for ongoing enforcement.” As to best interest of the

children, Father alleged that the change in court order would restore the children’s “right

to have a relationship with both parents, prevents further emotional harm from separation,

and provides professional therapeutic support to rebuild trust and stability.” In support,

Father filed a declaration with legal authority. Besides the above, in relevant part, Father

declared that since the court’s October 15, 2025, ruling, he had not seen or spoken to his

two children and that the legal guardian, his mother, “has refused all communication,

concealed their location, and isolated them completely.” He also attested that “County

agencies refuse to intervene, stating only that ‘the case is closed.’ The result is that my

parental rights have been frozen through administrative inaction and judicial silence,

contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment and the stated purpose of California dependency

law—to protect and reunify families, not dissolve them. [¶] Accordingly, I respectfully

3 request that this Court issue the required [section] 362. 4 ‘exit order’ and transfer

jurisdiction to the Family Law Division for custody and visitation enforcement.”

On October 29, 2025, the juvenile court summarily denied the section 388

petitions. When denying the petitions, the court checked the box stating “the request

does not state new evidence or a change of circumstances.” The court also checked the

box “Other” and wrote, “This case is now closed as to the juvenile court as children are in

legal guardianship. Family law orders are provided by family law court.” Father timely

appealed.

III.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue for this appeal is whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction to grant

Father’s section 388 petitions when ordering guardianship and terminating dependency

jurisdiction, in which case it should have considered the petitions on its merits. The issue

is a legal question subject to our de novo review. (Guardianship of Ariana K. (2004) 120

Cal.App.4th 690, 701; see In re Priscilla D. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1215

(Priscilla D.) [where juvenile court erred in deciding that it lacked authority under

section 388 to terminate legal guardianship, its error of law constituted an abuse of

discretion].)

Priscilla D. states the relevant rules. After denying the mother reunification

services due to her 30-year history of substance abuse, the juvenile court in Priscilla D.

ordered the children into a legal guardianship with the maternal uncle and aunt and

4 terminated its dependency jurisdiction. (Priscilla D., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 1210-1211.) Almost three years later, the mother filed a section 388 petition. She

asserted she had successfully completed substance abuse treatment and asked the juvenile

court to change its guardianship order. (Id. at pp. 1211-1212.) The juvenile court

initially reinstated its dependency jurisdiction to hold a hearing, but later reversed itself,

reasoning that section 388 did not authorize it “to reinstate jurisdiction to review the

status of the [kinship] guardianship.” (Id. at pp. 1211, 1214-1215.) The juvenile court

thus denied the petition. (Id. at p. 1215.) The Court of Appeal reversed.

Although guardianship is a more stable solution than foster care, the Priscilla D.

court explained that “it is not irrevocable” and “[c]ontinuity in a legal guardianship is not

equivalent to the security and stability of a permanent caretaker.” (Priscilla D., supra,

234 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1215-1216.) Thus, when a relative of a dependent child is

appointed legal guardian, the juvenile court “dismisses its [dependency] jurisdiction

under section 366.3 in recognition of the fact that the kinship guardianship is a permanent

plan for the child and there is no need for ongoing scheduled court and social services

supervision of the placement. [Citations.] However, the juvenile court still maintains

jurisdiction over the child as a ward of the legal guardianship and can vacate its order

dismissing its dependency jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 1216, citing §§ 366.3, subds. (a) & (b),

366.4, italics added.)2

2 Section 366.3 provides in relevant part: “Following establishment of a legal guardianship, the court may continue jurisdiction over the child as a dependent child of the juvenile court or may terminate its dependency jurisdiction and retain jurisdiction [footnote continued on next page]

5 As for the juvenile court’s authority to modify or terminate the legal guardianship,

the Priscilla D. court explained that “ ‘[a] parent has the continuing right to petition the

[juvenile] court for a modification of any of its orders based upon changed circumstances

or new evidence pursuant to section 388.’ [Citation.] This includes the right to petition

the court to terminate guardianship.” (Priscilla D., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216,

quoting In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308-309.) Having reinstated its

dependency jurisdiction as contemplated by section 366.3, the juvenile court had

authority to act on the mother’s petition to terminate the guardianship under section 388.

(Priscilla D., at p. 1216.) Hence, the Priscilla D. court reversed the order denying the

mother’s section 388 petition and directed the juvenile court to conduct a new hearing to

consider the petition on its merits. (Id. at p. 1219.)

The Priscilla D. court’s holding is pertinent to this case. According to the record,

the juvenile court here, like the juvenile court in Priscilla D., terminated its dependency

jurisdiction after establishing a kinship guardianship with the children’s paternal

grandmother. But the juvenile court “maintain[ed] jurisdiction over the child[ren] as . . .

ward[s] of the legal guardianship” under section 366.3, subdivision (a), and it had

over the child as a ward of the legal guardianship as authorized by Section 366.4. If, however, a relative of the child is appointed the legal guardian of the child and the child has been placed with the relative for at least six months, the court shall, except if the relative guardian objects, or upon a finding of exceptional circumstances, terminate its dependency jurisdiction and retain jurisdiction over the child as a ward of the guardianship, as authorized by Section 366.4.” (§ 366.3, subd. (a).) Section 366.4, subdivision (a) states that “[a]ny minor . . . for whom a related guardianship has been established pursuant to Section 360 . . . is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” For termination of a relative guardianship, section 360 provides, “Sections 366.4 and 388 shall apply to this order of guardianship.” (§ 360, subd. (a).)

6 authority to reinstate its dependency jurisdiction to act upon any motion or petition to

modify its orders. (Priscilla D., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216.) This includes the

authority to act upon Father’s petitions to reinstate dependency jurisdiction to act upon a

petition to modify its visitation order under section 388, which permits “[a]ny parent or

other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court

[to] . . . upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court . . .

for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to

terminate the jurisdiction of the court.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) In summarily denying

Father’s section 388 petitions without considering its merits, the juvenile court erred.

(See Priscilla D., at p. 1218; see also In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413-

1414.)

Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) argues that the

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s section 388 petitions and

that “[n]owhere in the record is there evidence to show that the [juvenile] [c]ourt believed

it had no jurisdiction over the guardianship.” DPSS believes the juvenile court addressed

the section 388 petition’s merits and denied them.

Although the juvenile court checked the form box noting the section 388 petitions

stated no new evidence or a change of circumstances, the court also denied the petitions

because the case “is now closed as to the juvenile court as children are in legal

guardianship” and “Family Law orders are provided by Family Law Court.” These

written findings suggest the court believed it had no jurisdiction to reinstate its

7 dependency jurisdiction to act upon any motion or petition to modify its visitation order

under section 388.

While acknowledging that he did not raise the issue in his opening brief or object

to the visitation order in the juvenile court as an improper visitation order when it was

first issued, in his reply brief, Father argues the juvenile court erred in delegating whether

visitation should occur to the legal guardian and requests that on remand the juvenile

court should make an appropriate exit order regarding visitation. Father believes that

because the facts are undisputed and raise a question of law, we should exercise our

discretion to consider its merits. Father, however, did not appeal from this issue and may

raise it on remand. We will nonetheless address it to provide guidance.

“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an

objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of

this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so they

may be corrected.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 (S.B.); accord, In re Malik T.

(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1127.) “[A]pplication of the forfeiture rule is not automatic.

[Citations.] But the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised

rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.” (S.B., at p. 1293; see In re

Anthony Q. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 336, 345 [“Although the forfeiture doctrine applies in

dependency cases . . . [citations], when the appeal involves an important and purely legal

issue subject to our independent review, as it does here, we have discretion to entertain

8 the challenge to the juvenile court’s order notwithstanding the parent’s failure to object

on that basis in the juvenile court.”].)

We agree with Father that the legal question whether the juvenile court may

delegate to the legal guardian the authority to determine the amount of Father’s visitation

is significant because it will impact whether his children have any in-person visitation

with Father, and further, ambiguity in the order could result in unnecessary conflict

between Father and the legal guardian over visitation. We therefore exercise our

discretion to consider the merits of Father’s contention despite his failure below to object

to the juvenile court’s visitation order. (See S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1294 [Court of

Appeal “did not abuse its discretion in entertaining the mother’s challenge to the

visitation order notwithstanding her failure to object to it in the juvenile court” where

determination of the validity of the juvenile court’s delegation of authority to the legal

guardians to determine allowable visitation “would add certainty and stability to child’s

visitation”]; In re Anthony Q., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 345 [Court of Appeal exercised

discretion to address merits of the father’s appeal of removal order “notwithstanding the

parent’s failure to object on that basis in the juvenile court”]; but see In re P.L. (2024) 100

Cal.App.5th 406, 409-410 [the father’s failure to object to visitation order forfeited his

contention “the juvenile court improperly delegated its authority at the detention hearing

when it ordered that the children could refuse visitation”].)

“When a juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a dependent child, it is

empowered to make exit orders regarding custody and visitation.” (In re Armando L.

9 (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 606, 616 (Armando L.).) “These orders become part of any family

court proceeding concerning the same child and will remain in effect until they are

modified or terminated by the family court.” (Armando L., at p. 616.)

The power to determine the right and extent of visitation in a dependency case

resides with the juvenile court and may not be delegated to nonjudicial officials or private

parties, including a legal guardian. (S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1295-1296; see In re

Armando L., supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 616; accord, In re Korbin Z. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th

511, 516 [“[T]he juvenile court cannot delegate the decision whether visitation will occur

to any third party, including the child, the social services agency, or the guardian.”].)

“ ‘This rule of nondelegation applies to exit orders issued when dependency jurisdiction

is terminated.’ ” (In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 799; accord, In re T.H. (2010)

190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123 (T.H.).) While “[a] visitation order may delegate to a third

party the responsibility for managing the details of visits, including their time, place and

manner,” the juvenile court has “ ‘the ultimate supervision and control over’ ” whether

visitation will occur. (T.H., at p. 1123; accord, Korbin Z., at p. 517.) “ ‘When the court

abdicates its discretion and permits a third party . . . to determine whether any visitation

will occur, the court impermissibly delegates its authority over visitation and abuses its

discretion.’ ” (Korbin Z., at p. 519.) “Where a juvenile court orders visitation, the court

shall specify the frequency and duration of visits.” (In re Grace C. (2010) 190

Cal.App.4th 1470, 1478.) Thus, for example, “[t]he time, place, and manner of visitation

10 may be left to the legal guardians, but the guardians shall not have discretion to decide

whether visitation actually occurs.” (Ibid.)

Here, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and ordered legal guardianship

with the paternal grandmother over the children with visitation to be arranged by the legal

guardian, without specifying the amount of visitation. By failing to specify the frequency

and duration of Father’s visits, the juvenile court abused its discretion by delegating to

the legal guardian the decision whether visitation will occur at all, and if allowed, in what

amount. (T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1123-1124 [juvenile court abused its

discretion by ordering supervised visitation “upon the ‘agreement of the parents’ ”

because order effectively gave custodial parent “veto power” over visitation]; In re

Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505 [order granting “monitored visitation ‘as

can be arranged’ ” impermissibly delegated to child “virtually complete discretion to veto

visitation”]; In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 319 [“[B]y failing to mandate any

minimum number of monitored visits per month or even to order that some visitation

must occur each month, the court’s abstract recognition of [the mother’s] right to

visitation is illusory, transforming the children’s ability to refuse ‘a visit’ into the practical

ability to forestall any visits at all.”].)

As explained in In re S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at page 317, while a visitation

order should provide “for flexibility in response to the changing needs of the child and to

dynamic family circumstances,” the juvenile court also must “ensure regular parent-child

visitation occurs.” The Court of Appeal emphasized that “the power to decide whether

11 any visitation occurs belongs to the court alone,” and the court cannot abdicate its

discretion by permitting a third party to determine whether visitation will occur. (Id. at

pp. 317-318.)

We note a parent’s “ability to seek a modification or enforcement of the order in

the family court does not solve the problem of [the juvenile court’s] unauthorized

delegation.” (T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.) Further, to modify the visitation

order in family court, Father must show (and the court must find) “that there has been a

significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order and

modification of the order is in the best interests of the child.” (§ 302, subd. (d); see Heidi

S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1164 [“[S]ection 302, subdivision (d), imposes

a greater burden when a family court modifies a juvenile court’s exit order, requiring that

for modifications to either a ‘custody or visitation order’ the family court must first find a

significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court’s issuance of the exit

order.”].)

12 IV.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Father’s section 388 petitions is reversed and the juvenile court

is directed to conduct a new hearing to consider the merits of the petitions under

section 388, including any evidence developed subsequent to the filing of his petition.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J. We concur:

RAMIREZ P. J.

MILLER J.