In Re Gingerella

148 B.R. 157, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1983, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1310, 1992 WL 378743
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Rhode Island
DecidedDecember 11, 1992
DocketBankruptcy 91-11413
StatusPublished

This text of 148 B.R. 157 (In Re Gingerella) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Gingerella, 148 B.R. 157, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1983, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1310, 1992 WL 378743 (R.I. 1992).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

ARTHUR N. VOTOLATO, Bankruptcy Judge.

Heard on August 20, 1992 on the approval of the Debtor’s Disclosure Statement. Although there are no objections to the Disclosure Statement as filed, the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) and Washington Trust Co., both secured creditors, urge us to also consider the question of Plan confirmability at this juncture.

The Debtor’s plan would modify his present financing arrangement with FmHA on 22 units of rental housing, to allow the phased conversion of those units into condominiums, even though the 1983 loan documents provide that the subject property remain “rental” until the year 2003. In response to FmHA’s rejection of his proposal, the Debtor argues that FmHA has sufficient programmatic discretion to allow the modification, that development of these units into condominiums makes great economic sense, and is also consistent with a national policy of home ownership for lower income families.

We note initially, that while disclosure statement hearings are typically limited to the adequacy of the information being furnished to creditors, it is appropriate to consider other issues as well at this stage, where the proposed plan is arguably unconfirmable on its face. See In re Main Road Properties, Inc., 144 B.R. 217, 219 (Bankr.D.R.1.1992); In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000, 1002 (Bankr.D.Mass. 1991), appeal docketed, No. 92-1417 (1st Cir. Apr. 10, 1992); In re Eastern Maine Electric Coop., Inc., 125 B.R. 329, 333 (Bankr.D.Me.1991).

After hearing arguments, we requested memoranda addressing the right of FmHA borrowers to obtain modifications of loan documents, and took the matter under advisement.

BACKGROUND

In 1983 the Debtor obtained a Rural Rental Housing Loan through FmHA in the amount of $860,700, to finance the development and construction of 22 units of family rental housing in Westerly, Rhode *159 Island. The project was completed as proposed, has been operating according to plan since its inception, and the present balance of the loan is approximately $725,000. Schedule A of the mortgage deed to FmHA contains a provision limiting the use of the property to “housing people eligible for occupancy as provided in Section 515 of Title V of the Housing Act of 1949, and FmHA regulations then extant during this 20-year period beginning May 17, 1983.... ” The project is currently being operated by a consulting and management group, in accordance with FmHA' Rural Rental Housing regulations. Although the subject loan has never been in default, due to the depressed real estate market the Debtor is having cash flow and other problems with several other real estate holdings and obligations, threatening the loss of this “healthy” property.

The Debtor filed this Chapter 11 case on May 29, 1991, and several months later, on August 8, 1991, he submitted a proposal to FmHA under the agency’s Section 502 Demonstration Program, outlining a condominium conversion plan. Section 502 is intended to provide financing for the development and construction of innovative housing units that do not meet existing published standards and regulations. The broad goal of the program is to increase the availability of affordable housing to low income families by developing housing units which incorporate innovative designs and ideas to keep costs low, enhance living standards, and improve living environments. FmHA AN No. 2200 (1944). On October 22, 1991, FmHA rejected the Debt- ■ or’s proposal, without elaboration, and, also without explanation, indicated that said rejection was not an appealable decision. (See Appendix A)

The Debtor filed his Disclosure Statement and Plan on March 31, 1992. The plan provides, inter alia, for a phased condominium conversion similar to the one earlier rejected by FmHA, and contemplates the use of some of the proceeds generated from the sale of individual condominium units to fund the Plan. The scheduled disclosure hearing was continued, at the request of the parties, to explore the possibility of obtaining an agency equity loan. That request was also turned down by FmHA, notwithstanding the Debtor’s potential equity in the project, 1 on the ground that such loans are available only for restrictive use projects which had been implemented prior to 1979.

At the July 16 hearing, the Debtor requested a second continuance to solicit purchase agreements from qualified non-profit organizations. Those discussions bore no fruit either, and on August 20, the parties pressed the Court for a ruling on the feasibility of the present Plan. We have been pondering this problem ever since.

DISCUSSION

The Debtor advances four arguments in support of his position.

First, the FmHA Director’s rejection of the Debtor’s proposal does not state the basis for his decision, but arbitrarily rejects the proposal, giving no reasons for reaching that conclusion. The Debtor argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1480 gives the Secretary of Agriculture broad authority to compromise claims and obligations, including the ability to “adjust, [or] modify ... the terms of security instruments, leases, contracts, and agreements entered into or administered by the Secretary ... as circumstances may require_” 42 U.S.C. § 1480(c). This language clearly appears to vest discretion in FmHA to modify agreements, where appropriate.

Second, because the Debtor has significant potential equity in the property, he would like to protect that potential asset through the vehicle of an FmHA equity loan. 42 U.S.C. § 1485(c). But here, be *160 cause the loan post-dates the 1979 incentive period deadline, FmHA, in standard bureaucratic fashion, summarily denied the availability of such a loan. (See Appendix B) Again, however, the Debtor points to the agency’s discretion to modify the contract in a manner that would even benefit FmHA, by increasing its equity cushion, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1472 and 1480, and that because of the undisputed benefit that would accrue to all parties via the enhancement in value as a condominium conversion, FmHA’s arbitrary refusal to exercise its discretion is an abuse of its statutory and equitable authority. It would seem that in the absence of a clear prohibition against modification of this contract, FmHA is obligated to either: (1) allow the proposed modification, or, at a minimum, (2) state very compelling reasons for not doing so.

Third, the Debtor argues that he can successfully “cram down” this Plan, over FmHA’s objection, under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).

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Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
260 U.S. 393 (Supreme Court, 1922)
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
483 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
505 U.S. 1003 (Supreme Court, 1992)
In Re Bjolmes Realty Trust
134 B.R. 1000 (D. Massachusetts, 1991)
In Re Main Road Properties, Inc.
144 B.R. 217 (D. Rhode Island, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
148 B.R. 157, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1983, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1310, 1992 WL 378743, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-gingerella-rib-1992.