In re Gillespie

263 A.D. 175, 32 N.Y.S.2d 96, 1942 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6838
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJanuary 7, 1942
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 263 A.D. 175 (In re Gillespie) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Gillespie, 263 A.D. 175, 32 N.Y.S.2d 96, 1942 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6838 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1942).

Opinions

Bliss, J.

Title K of chapter 41 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (Laws of 1937, chap. 929) creates a board of water supply for the city of New York and makes it the duty of such board upon appropriate action by the board of estimate of such city to procure the necessary water supply for the city. This title authorizes the board of water supply to acquire the needed lands by condemnation through appropriate proceedings in the Supreme Court and the appraisal and payment of damages to the owners thereof. Pursuant to the authority contained in this statute, the board of water supply proceeded to acquire the real property in Ulster and Sullivan counties necessary for the construction of the Rondout Reservoir. It filed maps and took action to obtain title to a large area of land lying in the upper Rondout Valley for this project. The instant proceeding, known as the Rondout Highway Section Map proceeding, was instituted by the board for the purpose of acquiring all highways, telephone lines and electric light and power lines serving the public within this reservoir basin, and the claimant was the owner of an electric light and power line running through the reservoir area and with appropriate branch and service lines. Under the provisions of the statute a substitute route has been provided by the city and the company has constructed a new line over this substituted route. The lines taken by the city for the larger part ran through flat, open country. Substantial' portions of the substituted lines are along hills and through wooded terrain so that the cost of their maintenance will be substantially higher down through the years. The company filed a claim for the damages caused by the change of its routes and locations and the relocation of its lines, consisting of three items:

A. Expense of construction of electric light and power lines on the substituted routes and locations.

B. Net loss on branch and service lines which formerly served customers within the reservoir area and must necessarily be abandoned.

C. Damage consisting of the excess of the cost of operating and maintaining claimant’s electric light and power lines on the substituted routes and locations over the cost of operating and maintaining claimant’s lines acquired by the city within the reservoir area.

The commissioners of appraisal awarded claimant $15,740.97 for item A, $3,738.74 for item B, and $5,340.50 for item C. The [177]*177Special Term confirmed the report of the commissioners as to items A and B but refused confirmation as to item C and dismissed this item upon the ground that there was no basis in law for such an award. The awards for items A and B are not questioned here.

The claimant bases item C of its claim upon both the State and Federal Constitutions (State Const, art. 1, § 7, subd. [a]; U. S. Const. Fifth Amendment) and the appropriate provisions of certain sections of title K of chapter 41 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York. The constitutional provisions are the familiar ones that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation. The real estate which may be acquired by the board of water supply under title K is defined by section K41-26.0 as including “ all real estate * * * heretofore or hereafter required or used for * * * public purposes, providing the persons or corporations owning such real estate or claiming interest therein, shall be allowed the perpetual use for such purposes of the same or of such other real estate to be acquired for the purposes of this article as will afford practicable route or location for such * * * public purpose, * * *; and provided also that such persons' or corporations shall not directly or indirectly be subject to expense, loss or damage by reason of changing such route or location, but that such expense, loss or damage shall be borne by the city.”

Section K41-13.0, subdivision b, provides: “Whereloss, damage or expense, direct or consequential, has resulted to * * * any electric corporation * * *, the board of estimate is hereby authorized and empowered to agree with such * * * electric corporation * * * upon the compensation which shall be made to it for such loss, damage or expense * * *. In the event of no agreement being reached between such board and * * * such electric corporation * * * the commissioners of appraisal * ■ * * are hereby * * * directed to pass upon such claim and to make awards therefor as provided in this article. * * * ”

Section K41-12.0 makes it the duty of the commissioners of appraisal to “ ascertain and determine the just and equitable compensation which ought justly to be made by the city to the owners or the persons interested in the real estate sought to be acquired or affected * * *.”

The claimant proved that the annual maintenance cost of the substituted line above the annual maintenance cost of the old line within the area acquired by the city was $479 per year, and on that testimony the commission made its award of $5,340.50 for this item. The parties have stipulated that no question is raised by the appeal as to the amount of such item C, if such item was properly allowed by the commission as matter of law.

[178]*178Item C was properly allowed by the commission and it should have been confirmed by the Special Term. This conclusion is based upon both the constitutional provisions and the statutes above mentioned. These electric light and power lines which ran through the reservoir area were part of the physical plant of the claimant .and were privately owned although they had been dedicated to the use of providing electricity to the public. Thus the claimant, under the State Constitution, was entitled to just compensation when they were taken. The substituted lines concededly would cost more to maintain. This cost of maintenance is an expense which must be paid by the utility in the first instance, but which is ultimately charged back to the consuming public in its rates. Thus this increased cost of maintenance will have to be paid by the company and of course will be included by it in its rates, unless the claim therefor is paid by the city. The increased cost of maintenance has been caused by the city’s appropriation of the old lines so it is only just that the city, rather than either the company or the consumers, should pay this increase in the cost of maintenance and the claim therefor is well within the constitutional mandate of just compensation and it was the obvious intent of the Legislature that the city should do exactly this. Section K41-26.0 of the Administrative Code above quoted permits the board of water supply to acquire these lines which were being used for public purposes, only upon the provision that a substituted route should be provided by it and that the utility should not directly or indirectly be subject to expense, loss or damage by reason of changing such route or location and that such expense, loss or damage should be borne by the city. This is a broad provision and indicates a clear purpose to include all items of expense or damage that might reasonably be charged to the change. This increased cost of maintenance which the utility will have to pay is well within the scope of the statute. It is practically undisputed that such expense and damage have been caused by the city’s construction of this reservoir and we see no reason whatsoever why it should not be held to be within the statutory provision.

Then there are the additional provisions of sections K41-12.0 and K41-13.0 above quoted.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
263 A.D. 175, 32 N.Y.S.2d 96, 1942 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6838, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-gillespie-nyappdiv-1942.