In re G.F.

2024 Ohio 5366

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 12, 2024
• Docket: 13-24-01, 13-24-02
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re G.F., 2024-Ohio-5366.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT SENECA COUNTY

IN RE: CASE NO. 13-24-01

G.F.,

ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT CHILD. OPINION

IN RE: CASE NO. 13-24-02

Appeals from Seneca County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division Trial Court Nos. 22320312 and 22320369

Judgments Affirmed

Date of Decision: November 12, 2024

APPEARANCES:

Timothy J. Hoover for Appellant

Eleanor J. Anderson for Appellee Case Nos. 13-24-01 and 13-24-02

ZIMMERMAN, J.

{¶1} Appellant, G.F., appeals the December 20, 2023 judgment entries of the

Seneca County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, adjudicating G.F. to be

a delinquent child. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

{¶2} On September 20, 2023, a complaint was filed in the Seneca County

Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, alleging G.F., a 15-year-old minor, to be

a delinquent child for his commission of domestic violence in violation of R.C.

2919.25(A), a first-degree misdemeanor if committed by an adult.

{¶3} On November 17, 2023, a second complaint was filed in the juvenile

court alleging G.F. to be a delinquent child for his commission of disorderly conduct

at his school in violation of R.C. 2917.11(A)(1)(E)(3)(b), a fourth-degree

misdemeanor if committed by an adult.

{¶4} Both cases proceeded to adjudication on December 6, 2023.1

Thereafter, on December 20, 2023, the juvenile court rendered its decisions. In the

domestic-violence case, the juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt that

G.F. committed domestic violence and adjudicated him a delinquent child.

Similarly, in the disorderly-conduct case, the juvenile court found beyond a

1 A third case involving G.F. was before the juvenile court on December 6, 2023. In the third case, G.F. entered an admission to a charge of assault that took place on June 27, 2023. The juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt that G.F. committed assault and adjudicated him a delinquent child. The assault adjudication is not part of this appeal.

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reasonable doubt that G.F. committed disorderly conduct and adjudicated him a

delinquent child.

{¶5} Both cases proceeded to disposition on January 10, 2024. In both cases,

the juvenile court ordered G.F. to serve 90 days in the Seneca County Youth Center,

suspended upon various conditions.2

{¶6} On January 19, 2024, G.F. filed a notice of appeal in each case. G.F.

raises two assignments of error for our review. We will address the assignments of

error together.

First Assignment of Error

The trial court’s adjudication for disorderly conduct was not supported by sufficient evidence.

Second Assignment of Error

The trial court’s adjudications for disorderly conduct and domestic violence were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶7} In his first and second assignments of error, G.F. argues that his

adjudication for disorderly conduct is based on insufficient evidence and is against

the manifest weight of the evidence. In particular, G.F. argues that the State

presented insufficient evidence to show that he used “fighting words” or

“threatening” conduct necessary to commit the offense of disorderly conduct.

(Appellant’s Brief at 11). G.F. further argues that his disorderly-conduct

2 The dispositional orders were entered on January 16, 2024.

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adjudication is against the manifest weight of the evidence because the “more

persuasive” evidence demonstrated his “peaceful character.” (Id. at 12, 13).

{¶8} Additionally, in his second assignment of error, G.F. argues that his

domestic-violence adjudication is against the manifest weight of the evidence

because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in

self-defense when he punched his father.

Standard of Review

{¶9} Initially, we note that the “‘standards for evaluating the weight and

sufficiency of the evidence in juvenile adjudications are the same as the standards

used in adult criminal cases.’” In re J.D., 2023-Ohio-250, ¶ 57 (3d Dist.), quoting

In re A.K., 2021-Ohio-4199, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.). Moreover, manifest “weight of the

evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are clearly different legal concepts.” State

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389 (1997). Thus, we address each legal concept

separate.

{¶10} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average

mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional

amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102

(1997), fn. 4. Accordingly, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the

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evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶11} “In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve

evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions

reserved for the trier of fact.” State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.). See

also State v. Berry, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19 (3d Dist.) (“Sufficiency of the evidence is

a test of adequacy rather than credibility or weight of the evidence.”).

{¶12} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the

manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record,

“‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of

witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier

of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that

the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A

reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on

matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.

State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967).

{¶13} When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly

in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’

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should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 2012-

Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.

Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Analysis

{¶14} G.F. was adjudicated a delinquent child for committing disorderly

conduct at his school in violation of R.C. 2917.11(A)(1)(E)(3)(b). In relevant part,

the disorderly-conduct statute provides that “[n]o person shall recklessly cause

inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another by . . . [e]ngaging in fighting, in

threatening harm to persons or property, or in violent or turbulent behavior.” R.C.

2917.11(A)(1). Moreover, when disorderly conduct “is committed in the vicinity

of a school,” the offense is a fourth-degree misdemeanor if committed by an adult.

R.C. 2917.11(E)(3)(b).

{¶15} On appeal, G.F. argues that his disorderly-conduct adjudication is

based on insufficient evidence because he did not use “fighting words” or engage in

“threatening” conduct at the school. (Appellant’s Brief at 11). G.F. concedes that

he “used profanity in the presence of [a school] administrator” and “did not initially

follow directions.” (Id. at 8). Nevertheless, G.F. asserts that the school

administrator escalated the situation by contacting law enforcement for assistance.

(Id.).

{¶16} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the State

presented sufficient evidence to show that G.F. recklessly caused inconvenience,

annoyance, or alarm by engaging in violent or turbulent behavior at the school.

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Specifically, the State presented the testimony of a school administrator. The school

administrator testified that, on the day of the incident, he was covering the last

period of the day for a teacher who had to leave school early. G.F. was in the

classroom and had his sweatshirt hood up over his head in violation of school policy.

The administrator told G.F. to put his hood down. G.F. yelled, “No.” Ultimately,

G.F. put his hood down and the administrator asked G.F. to step out into the hallway.

{¶17} While in the hallway, the administrator attempted to talk with G.F.

about following school policy and directives. The administrator testified that G.F.

seemed very upset. G.F. told the administrator that he did not like his tone and that

the administrator was making him mad. G.F. also used profane language directed

at the administrator. The administrator testified that G.F.’s aggressive demeanor

made him nervous and fear for his safety.

{¶18} Due to G.F.’s conduct, the administrator radioed the school resource

officer—who is also a deputy sheriff with the Seneca County Sheriff’s

Department—for assistance. G.F. again told the administrator that he was making

him mad. G.F. stated he was going to tell his mom.

{¶19} At this point, the end-of-the-day bell rang and students started to exit

the school building. While walking out of the building, G.F. turned around and said

to the administrator, “[B]ig fucking mistake, sir. Big fucking mistake.” (Dec. 6,

2023 Tr. at 70). The administrator headed to his office to find the school resource

officer. The administrator heard someone coming down the hall and turned to see

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G.F. running at him. As G.F. was running, G.F. asked the administrator his name.

After the administrator gave his name and stated that he was the school’s assistant

director, G.F. reiterated, “[B]ig fucking mistake.” (Id.). G.F. added, “[Y]ou don’t

know what I can do.” (Id.). The administrator testified that G.F.’s parting words to

him were, “[Y]ou’re done.” (Id. at 79).

{¶20} G.F. then exited the school building and boarded a bus. Shortly

thereafter, the school resource officer arrived at the school. The resource officer

located G.F. on the bus and directed him to exit the bus for a discussion. The

resource officer testified that G.F. appeared very distraught and nervous. G.F. told

the resource officer that he had a verbal altercation with the school administrator

and that G.F. felt disrespected.

{¶21} After several minutes of talking, the school administrator approached

G.F. and the resource officer and G.F.’s demeanor changed. G.F. became very

aggressive and started yelling profanities at the administrator. The resource officer

testified that G.F. started yelling, “[Y]ou don’t know who the ‘F’ I am. Get away

from me. Get this guy away from me.” (Dec. 6, 2023 Tr. at 33). The resource

officer further testified that G.F. displayed “[a]lmost an attack stance” by “clenching

his fists” and “rubbing his fists together.” (Id.). The resource officer expressed

concern regarding G.F. “potentially going into a violent manner.” (Id. at 34). G.F.’s

conduct made the resource officer “a little uneasy that day.” (Id. at 44).

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{¶22} In addition to the testimonial evidence, the State played a school

surveillance video of the interactions between G.F. and the administrator while

inside the school building. In particular, the video footage shows G.F.’s conduct in

the hallway before the end-of-the-day bell rang, as well as his conduct in running

back into the building to ask the administrator his name. Even though the video

footage lacks audio, G.F.’s heightened demeanor throughout both interactions is

evident.

{¶23} Furthermore, the school administrator testified that G.F.’s conduct

caused inconvenience, annoyance, and alarm because the situation occurred at the

end of the day while students were exiting the school building. Moreover, the

administrator testified that, in his 25 years of working in education, he had never

seen a student’s demeanor heighten so quickly such that it caused him to be nervous

and fear for his safety and for the safety of the other students.

{¶24} Accordingly, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that G.F. recklessly caused inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm

by engaging in violent or turbulent behavior at the school. Therefore, G.F.’s

disorderly-conduct adjudication is based on sufficient evidence.

Manifest-Weight-of-the-Evidence Analysis

{¶25} Having concluded that G.F.’s disorderly-conduct adjudication is based

on sufficient evidence, we next review whether G.F.’s adjudications are against the

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manifest weight of the evidence. We will begin our manifest-weight review by

addressing G.F.’s disorderly-conduct adjudication first, followed by his domestic-

violence adjudication.

Disorderly-Conduct Adjudication

{¶26} On appeal, G.F. argues that his disorderly-conduct adjudication is

against the manifest weight of the evidence because he and other witnesses testified

to his “peaceful character.” (Appellant’s Brief at 13). G.F. further argues that the

evidence showed that he is a special-needs student “who was historically well-

behaved.” (Id. at 12). According to G.F., the administrator’s testimony is “suspect

and unpersuasive.” (Id. at 13). G.F. contends that “there are too many motives for

the administrator to lie (like losing his job or teaching credentials altogether).” (Id.).

Thus, G.F. asserts that the administrator’s testimony should be disregarded as

lacking credibility.

{¶27} When considering the credibility of witnesses in a manifest-weight

challenge, we have acknowledged that “‘“the determination regarding witness

credibility rests primarily with the trier of fact because the trier of fact is in the best

position to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice

inflections—observations that are critical to determining a witness’s credibility.”’”

State v. Sheldon, 2019-Ohio-4123, ¶ 45 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Bentz, 2017-

Ohio-5483, ¶ 98 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Williams, 2013-Ohio-573, ¶ 31 (8th

Dist.). Moreover, “nonverbal information, incapable of being transcribed into the

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record by the court stenographer, significantly influences the fact finder’s

determinations.” State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 411 (1993). “‘Thus, the

decision whether, and to what extent, to believe the testimony of each witness is

within the province of the factfinder.’” Sheldon at ¶ 45, quoting In re D.L., 2012-

Ohio-1796, ¶ 32 (3d Dist.). Therefore, we will not second guess a “‘witness-

credibility determination unless it is clear that the [factfinder] lost its way and a

miscarriage of justice occurred.’” Sheldon at ¶ 45, quoting State v. Thompson, 2018-

Ohio-637, ¶ 109 (3d Dist.).

{¶28} Here, the juvenile court considered the testimony of all the witnesses

and found each witness to be credible—with the exception of G.F. In particular, the

juvenile court believed the school administrator’s testimony that G.F. engaged in

turbulent behavior by acting angrily, aggressively, and in a threatening manner that

caused inconvenience, annoyance, and alarm. Moreover, the juvenile court

determined that the video evidence of the interactions between G.F. and the

administrator inside the school building confirmed the administrator’s testimony

regarding G.F.’s heightened demeanor.

{¶29} It was well within the province of the juvenile court to determine

G.F.’s credibility in recounting his interactions with the school administrator,

including the prerogative to find G.F.’s testimony not to be credible. See Sheldon,

2019-Ohio-4123, at ¶ 45 (3d Dist.). After reviewing the entire record, we conclude

that G.F. presents no compelling reason for this court to reject the juvenile court’s

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witness-credibility determination. Consequently, we conclude that G.F.’s

disorderly-conduct adjudication is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Domestic-Violence Adjudication

{¶30} G.F. was adjudicated a delinquent child for committing domestic

violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), which provides that “[n]o person shall

knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household

member.” At trial, G.F. admitted to punching his father two or three times and

causing his father’s face to bleed.

{¶31} On appeal, G.F. argues that his domestic-violence adjudication is

against the manifest weight of the evidence because he acted in self-defense when

he punched his father. G.F. points out that only he and his father were in the car

when the altercation took place. G.F.’s father was not able to testify as to what

transpired due to his untimely death. Because G.F. testified that his father was the

initial aggressor, G.F. contends that the State failed to meet its burden to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that G.F. did not act in self-defense.

{¶32} To establish a self-defense claim, a defendant must introduce evidence

showing:

“(1) that the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) that the defendant had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force; and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger.”

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State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d

21, 24 (2002). Moreover, if evidence is presented that tends to support that the

defendant used force in self-defense, “the prosecution must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the accused person did not use the force in self-defense.” R.C.

2901.05(B)(1). Thus, the State has the burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant was not acting in self-defense. See Messenger at ¶ 27 (concluding

that the prosecution’s burden of disproving the defendant’s self-defense claim

beyond a reasonable doubt is subject to manifest-weight review on appeal).

{¶33} Here, G.F. testified that the altercation took place while his father was

driving and G.F. was in the passenger seat. G.F. testified that his father started

“acting crazy” and grabbed G.F.’s hair with one hand—yanking him back and

forth—and hitting G.F. on the top of the head and neck with the other hand. (Dec.

6, 2023 Tr. at 253). G.F. testified that his father continued driving while pulling

G.F.’s hair and hitting him.

{¶34} At some point, G.F. started to punch his father. G.F. testified, “I

didn’t stop punching him until he let go of me.” (Id. at 256). G.F. further testified

that he hit his father two or three times and that the punches caused his father’s face

to bleed. After the father let go of G.F., “the car came to a stop” and both G.F. and

his father got out of the car. (Id. at 257). G.F. testified that he and his father yelled

at each other outside of the car. Eventually, they both got back into the car and

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continued to yell. G.F. testified that he did not hit his father after they got back into

the car.

{¶35} In contrast to G.F.’s testimony, the State presented the testimony of an

eye witness to the altercation. Notably, the eye witness testified that she saw G.F.

hit his father several times over a period of three to four minutes. The eye witness

was able to view the altercation through an open window in her home, about 20 feet

away from the parked car. The eye witness testified that she never saw the father

hit G.F. According to the eye witness, “[A]ll I seen was [the father] getting his butt

handed to him. He was getting beat very badly.” (Dec. 6, 2023 Tr. at 210). The

eye witness called the police to report the altercation.

{¶36} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the juvenile court

did not lose its way in rejecting G.F.’s self-defense claim. Indeed, it was well within

the province of the juvenile court to determine the eye witness’s credibility in

recounting what she saw on the day of the altercation, including the prerogative to

find the eye witness’s testimony to be credible. See Sheldon, 2019-Ohio-4123, at ¶

45 (3d Dist.). Moreover, it was within the juvenile court’s prerogative to find G.F’s

version of events—including his self-defense claim—not to be truthful.

Accordingly, G.F.’s domestic-violence adjudication is not against the manifest

weight of the evidence.

{¶37} G.F.’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.

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{¶38} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

WALDICK and MILLER, J.J., concur.

/hls

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