In re Gaubert

524 F.2d 1222, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 664, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 110
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals·Decided November 13, 1975·No. Patent Appeal No. 75-574·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

ALMOND, Senior Judge.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals affirming the rejections of claims 1 and 2, all of the claims in application serial No. 219,932 filed January 24, 1975, entitled “Rotors and Stators of Electric Generators and Motors.” The rejections were made under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112, first and second paragraphs. We reverse.

The Invention

Appellant’s invention is a rotor-stator structural combination for use in an electric generator or motor.

The rotor of the preferred embodiment is a pair of horseshoe magnets fastened together at their bases. Around the bases is wrapped a coil of wire with its ends connected to a conventional commutator or slip ring.

The stator member is a pair of oppositely disposed horseshoe magnets placed with the free ends facing and adjoining the free ends of the rotor magnets. Each stator magnet has a north pole facing the south pole of a rotor magnet and a south pole facing the north pole of the same rotor magnet. As the rotor turns, the north oriented arms of the rotor magnets are in the same plane with the south oriented arms of the stator magnets, and the south oriented arms of the rotor magnets are coplanar with the north oriented arms of the stator magnets. Additional coils may be wrapped around the stator magnets.

Claims 1 and 2, the only claims on appeal, are set forth below:

1. A rotor member made entirely or in part of one or several assembled pieces of iron, steel or any other magnetic material and to be used as a part of electric generators and motors and which comprises one or more horseshoe type or U shape type magnets or electromagnets with their magnetic poles placed side by side and parallel with the shaft of the rotor but separated from each other by one or more annular coils of wire made of electrical conducting material and wound on the cylindric root circumference of the rotor.
2. A stator member made entirely or in part of one or several assembled pieces of iron, steel or any other magnetic material and to be used as a part of electric generators or motors and which comprises one or more horseshoe type or U shape type magnets or electromagnets with their magnetic poles placed side by side and parallel with the shaft of the rotor but separated [1224] from each other by one or more annular coils of wire made of electrical conducting material.

The Rejections

The rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, were that the device lacks utility by virtue of being inoperative and that the disclosure is not enabling. In support of these rejections, the board cited a section of University Physics1 showing a generator of the type in which the rotor coil rotates about an axis perpendicular to and through a stationary magnetic field. The board explained that the specification failed to describe a device of the type shown in University Physics, raised some questions about construction details and operation, and concluded the device was inoperative and inadequately disclosed. The claims were further rejected as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.

OPINION

The Reasons of Appeal

The solicitor’s memorandum submits that the reasons of appeal fail to cover each ground of rejection expressly. The purpose of the reasons of appeal is to alert the parties to the issues before the court. In In re Castner, 518 F.2d 1234 (CCPA 1975), this court adopted the view of the concurring opinion of Judge Rich in In re LePage’s Inc., 312 F.2d 455, 467, 50 CCPA 852, 868 (1963), where he stated:

Looking upon the reasons of appeal as in essence a pleading, they should be considered sufficient if they get the parties and the issues and a sufficient record into court in such fashion that the court can deal with the issues. The business of modern courts is to decide issues and settle disputes and not to make life unnecessarily difficult for litigants with no gain to itself.

Although somewhat unconventional, due perhaps in part to the pro se nature of the case, the reasons of appeal are sufficient to alert the solicitor that appellant is appealing the rejection of claims 1 and 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 112, first and second paragraphs. There is no indication that the solicitor was misled.

The Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

Turning now to the merits, the Patent and Trademark Office has rejected both claims under 35 U.S.C. § 1012 asserting that appellant’s device lacks utility by reason of being inoperative.

In In re Langer, 503 F.2d 1380, 1391-92 (CCPA 1974), we set forth the test for a prima facie case of lack of utility saying:

As a matter of Patent Office practice, a specification which contains a disclosure of utility which corresponds in scope to the subject matter sought to be patented must be taken as sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement of § 101 for the entire claimed subject matter unless there is reason for one skilled in the art to question the objective truth of the statement of utility or its scope. Assuming that sufficient reason to question the statement of utility and its scope does exist, a rejection for lack of utility under § 101 will be proper on that basis; such a rejection can be overcome by suitable proofs indicating that the statement of utility and its scope as found in the specification are true. [Emphasis ours.]

Accordingly, the PTO must do more than merely question operability — it must set forth factual reasons which would lead [1225] one skilled in the art to question the objective truth of the statement of operability.

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In re Gaubert, 524 F.2d 1222, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 664, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 110 (ccpa 1975).

524 F.2d 1222 (In re Gaubert) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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