ACCEPTED 01-14-00820-CV FIRST COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 2/19/2015 5:15:07 PM CHRISTOPHER PRINE CLERK No. 01-14-00820-CV _____________________________________________________________ FILED IN IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 1st COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON, TEXAS 2/19/2015 5:15:07 PM _____________________________________________________________ CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk IN RE GALVESTON COUNTY JUDGE MARK HENRY, GALVESTON COUNTY COMMISSIONER RYAN DENNARD, GALVESTON COUNTY COMMISSIONER JOE GIUSTI, GALVESTON COUNTY COMMISSIONER STEPHEN HOLMES, AND GALVESTON COUNTY COMMISSIONER KEN CLARK, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS THE GALVESTON COUNTY COMMISSIONERS COURT, Relators.
_____________________________________________________________
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus _____________________________________________________________
RELATORS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING AND EN BANC RECONSIDERATION _____________________________________________________________
James P. Allison SBN: 01090000 J. Eric Magee SBN: 24007585 Phillip Ledbetter SBN: 24041316 ALLISON BASS, & MAGEE, L.L.P. A.O. Watson House 402 W. 12th Street Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 482-0701 telephone (512) 480-0902 facsimile Attorneys for Appellants IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL
Relators certify that the following is a complete list of the parties, the
attorneys, and any other person who has any interest in the outcome of this lawsuit:
Relators: Respondent: Galveston County Commissioners Court: Honorable Lonnie Cox Judge, Mark Henry 56th Judicial District Court Commissioner Ryan Dennard, 600 59th, Suite 3302 Commissioner Joe Giusti, Galveston, TX 77551 Commissioner Stephen Holmes, Commissioner Ken Clark, in their official capacities.
Counsel for Relators: Counsel for Respondent:
James P. Allison Mark W. Stevens SBN: 01090000 Attorney at Law J. Eric Magee SBN: 19184300 SBN: 24007585 P.O. Box 8118 Phillip Ledbetter Galveston, TX 77553 SBN: 24041316 (409) 765-6306 telephone ALLISON, BASS & MAGEE, LLP (409) 765-6469 facsimile A.O. Watson House markwandstev@sbcglobal.net 402 W. 12th Street Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 482-0701 telephone (512) 480-0902 facsimile No. 01-14-00820-CV _____________________________________________________________
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS _____________________________________________________________
IN RE GALVESTON COUNTY JUDGE MARK HENRY, GALVESTON COUNTY COMMISSIONER RYAN DENNARD, GALVESTON COUNTY COMMISSIONER JOE GIUSTI, GALVESTON COUNTY COMMISSIONER STEPHEN HOLMES, AND GALVESTON COUNTY COMMISSIONER KEN CLARK, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS THE GALVESTON COUNTY COMMISSIONERS COURT, RELATORS. _____________________________________________________________
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus _____________________________________________________________
RELATORS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING AND EN BANC RECONSIDERATION _____________________________________________________________
COME NOW, Relators Galveston County Judge Mark Henry,
Commissioner Ryan Dennard, Commissioner Joe Giusti, Commissioner Stephen
Holmes, and Commissioner Ken Clark, in their official capacities as the Galveston
County Commissioners Court, and file this, their Motion for Rehearing and En
Banc Reconsideration pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 49 and 52.
In support thereof, Appellants would show the court as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
Relators are the duly elected officials comprising the Galveston County Page -2- Commissioners Court (“Relators” or “Commissioners Court”). The Honorable
Lonnie Cox, presiding judge of the 56th Judicial District Court of Galveston
County and Administrative Judge of the Galveston County District Courts is the
Respondent (“Respondent”).
On September 24, 2014, Respondent entered an ex parte order (the “Order”)
sua sponte without any notice or hearing. There was no underlying legal
proceeding or lawsuit. The Order purports to nullify the actions of the Galveston
County Commissioners Court terminating the employment of an individual from
the position of Director of Galveston County’s Justice Administration Department.
The Respondent’s Order further purports to order the Relators to cease and desist
the process of “attempting to hire” a new Director of Galveston County’s Justice
Administration Department.
On October 7, 2014, 1 the Relators initiated this original proceeding,
petitioning for a writ of mandamus directing the Respondent to vacate his Order
because the Respondent lacked jurisdiction to exercise a district court’s inherent or
supervisory authority under the Texas Constitution and; therefore, the Order is
void. The Relators concurrently filed an Emergency Motion for Stay Pending
Review of their Petition for Writ of Mandamus. The next day, the Honorable
1 Relators originally filed their Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Emergency Motion on October 7, 2014. Pursuant to the application rules governing the assignment of cases between the Houston Courts of Appeals, the Petition and Motion were electronically filed with the Clerk of the14th Court of Appeals. The matter was assigned a cause number and returned on October 8th be re-filed on with the 1st Court of Appeals. Page -3- Justice Terry Jennings entered an order requesting a response to the Relators’
petition for mandamus from the Respondent and authorizing the Relators to file a
reply.
Approximately four months later, on February 4, 2015, a three-Justice panel
of this Court consisting of the Honorable Justices Terry Jennings, Laura Carter
Higley, and Rebeca A. Huddle issued a memorandum opinion denying the
Relators’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus (“Petition”) and dismissing motions for
interim relief filed by both parties as moot. The memorandum opinion did not
explain the basic reason(s) for the panel’s decision.
The three-Justice panel erred in issuing this decision, in that Texas
jurisprudential precedent holds that the Respondent could not exercise the inherent
or supervisory authority of a district court under the Texas Constitution without
initiating a lawsuit, and could not enter the Order without affording the Relators
due process of law. Further, the three-Justice panel erred in issuing a
memorandum opinion. These errors require review and reversal by the full Court
of Appeals. Therefore, Respondents timely file this motion for rehearing; and
further, respectfully requests that a majority of this Court en banc grant this motion
for reconsideration and that the case be submitted to the Court for en banc review
and disposition.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED Page -4- Issue 1: The Court’s three-Justice panel erroneously denied the Relators’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
Issue 2: The Court’s three-Justice panel erroneously issued a memorandum opinion.
III. ARGUMENT
1. The Court’s three-Justice panel erroneously denied the Relators’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus
A. Ex Parte Order was not a valid exercise of the district court’s supervisory authority over the Commissioners Court.
The Texas Constitution provides that “[t]he District Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the County
Commissioners Court, with such exceptions and under such regulations as may be
prescribed by law.” Tex. Const. art. V, § 8; see also Tex. Gov't Code § 24.020
(“The district court has appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over
the commissioners court, with the exceptions and regulations prescribed by law.”).
The scope of the district court’s supervisory jurisdiction has been defined by case
law. In re El Paso County Com'rs Court, 281 S.W.3d 16, 24 (Tex. App. – El Paso
2005, not pet.); Ector County v. Stringer, 843 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Tex. 1992). A
district court's constitutional supervisory control over a commissioners court’s
judgment can generally only be invoked when the commissioners court acts
beyond its jurisdiction or clearly abuses the discretion conferred upon the
Page -5- commissioners court by law. Commissioners Court of Titus County v. Agan, 940
S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex. 1997); Ector County, 843 S.W.2d at 479; In re El Paso
County Com'rs Court, 281 S.W.3d at 24.
The Texas rules of law generally require that a lawsuit be filed in the district
court in order to invoke the district court’s supervisory control over the
commissioners court. See, e.g., Scott v. Graham, 156 Tex. 97, 292 S.W.2d 324,
328 (1956)(holding that a direct equitable proceeding filed in the district court
comes within the power granted by Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 and the predecessor of
Section 24.020); In re In re El Paso County Com'rs Court, 281 S.W.3d at 27;
Hooten, 863 S.W.2d at 528 n. 7 (noting that a formal action or suit must be filed in
order for district court to exercise its supervisory control over the commissioners
court); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Liberty-Danville Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. One of
Gregg County, 506 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(holding that a plenary suit is required to invoke the district court's
supervisory control over the commissioners court); J. R. Phillips Inv. Co. v. Rd.
Dist. No. 18 of Limestone County, 172 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco
1943, writ ref'd)(holding that the supervisory control of the district court may be
exercised through its equitable jurisdiction); Harris County v. Bassett, 139 S.W.2d
180, 182 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1940, writ ref'd)(one aggrieved by an order
of a county commissioners court may have the order reviewed by bringing a direct
Page -6- proceeding in the district court for that purpose); Bird v. Alexander, 288 S.W. 606,
608 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1926, no writ)(stating that it is the settled law of this
state that the district court's supervisory control may be exercised through the
equitable jurisdiction of the district courts); Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. JM–708 (1987)
(concluding that a district court may exercise “general supervisory control” over
the actions of a commissioners court only when a lawsuit is brought in district
court seeking review of the commissioners court's actions). As such, the El Paso
Court of Appeals has held that a district court cannot invoke its own jurisdiction to
exercise supervisory control over the commissioners court under Article V, Section
8 of the Texas Constitution or Section 24.020 of the Texas Government Code. In
re El Paso County Com'rs Court, 281 S.W.3d at 26.
The sole exception where a district court may invoke the its supervisory
control over the commissioners court without filing a lawsuit was identified by the
Texas Supreme Court in Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 755 S.W.2d 78 (Tex.
1988). The Court in Mays held that “[t]he performance of a clear statutory duty
which is ministerial and nondiscretionary may be directed by the District Court
without notice and hearing in the absence of a statutory requirement to the
contrary.” Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 755 S.W.2d at 79. The facts and
holding in Mays are not applicable to the Respondent’s ex parte Order. In Mays,
the district judges were authorized by the legislature to set their court reporters'
Page -7- salary raises as long as they did not exceed ten percent. The judges ordered a raise
of five percent, and the commissioners refused to comply to the letter of the orders.
The Supreme Court concluded that the legislative grant of authority to the district
judges and the subsequent judicial order imposed a statutory duty not subject to
any residual discretion on the commissioners. See id. The facts in Mays establish
that its holding applies only to a narrow set of circumstances where a party
intentionally violates a clear statutory mandate, thereby negating any question
whether the action was an abuse of discretion. See Matter of El Paso Cnty.
Courthouse, 765 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1989, no writ) (“This type
of judicial intervention (Mays) or review (Vondy) necessitates that the statutory
obligation be free of any discretion accorded the commissioners. The two
examples clearly bracket the scope of judicial action in such a situation…The
specificity and degree of judicial intervention in the commissioners' court function
was consequently tailored in each case to coincide with, but not exceed, that aspect
of the duty which was non-discretionary”). Such was not the case here.
The underlying issue which the Respondent’s ex parte Order presumes to
have resolved is whether the Director of Galveston County Justice Administration
Department was a County employee subject to supervision and control of the
Galveston County Commissioners Court or whether the Director was court
personnel subject to the appointment and termination by a Galveston County or
Page -8- District Court Judge. The parties’ briefs and motions in this original proceeding
make clear that this is a disputed issue of fact and law. The Relators took action
within their authority, to terminate the employment of a County employee and to
fill the subsequent vacancy. In response, the Respondent: (1) initially participated
in the process for selecting a replacement; (2) later terminated his participation in
that process; (3) solicited the Administrative Director for the State Office of Court
Administration to request that the attorney general issue an opinion regarding the
authority of Commissioners Court to appoint and terminate the Director of the
County’s Justice Administration Department (i.e., Request No. 1222-GA); and (4)
shortly after that request was made, issued the Order without filing a lawsuit or
providing the Relators with any notice or due process. The Respondent’s
claims asserting that the Commissioners Court lack authority to terminate the
Director depend solely on his own self-serving factual claims and legal theories,
both of which were obviously disputed by the Relators before the entry of the
Order and the initiation of this original proceeding. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court’s holding in Mays provides that the Respondent was required to file a
lawsuit in a district court to invoke the district court’s supervisory jurisdiction over
the commissioners court. Therefore, the Respondent’s ex parte Order was issued
without jurisdiction, and it was error for the three-Justice panel of this Court to
deny the Relators’ petition for mandamus relief.
Page -9- B. Ex Parte Order was not a valid exercise of the district court’s inherent authority.
The Respondent’s ex parte Order includes claims that the County Judge’s
termination of Director of the County’s Justice Administration Department and the
Commissioners Court’s proposed selection of a replacement “violates the
separation of powers doctrine and infringes on the court’s inherent powers.” The
inherent powers of a court are those which it may call upon to aid in the exercise of
its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, and in the preservation of its
independence and integrity.” Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398
(Tex. 1979). Texas Courts have recognized that the judicial branch possesses
inherent power to require the legislative and executive branches to provide
essential staffing and facilities for it to properly perform its judicial functions. See
In re El Paso County Com’rs Court, 281 S.W.3d at 27; Dist. Judges of 188th
Judicial Dist. V. County Judge Gregg County, Tex., 657 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Vondy v. Commissioners Court of
Uvalde County, 620 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1981); Commissioners Court of Lubbock
County v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 110 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1971, writ
ref’d n.r.e.). However, the inherent power to require such staffing is not unlimited.
In re El Paso County Com’rs Court, 281 S.W.3d at 27; Dist. Judges of 188th
Judicial Dist., 657 S.W.2d at 909. It does not excuse judicial officers from
establishing the necessity of staffing or from seeking approval for the appointment Page -10- of specific staffing positions in accordance with applicable statutes. See Dist.
Judges of 188th Judicial Dist., 657 S.W.2d 908(where judges failed to establish the
required essentiality, there was no basis for exercise of judges’ inherent power to
compel county judge and commissioners’ court to fund increased salaries for court
personnel and to implement a court administration system for the county). Nor
does such power excuse a judicial officer’s failure to afford the legislative and
executive branches with due process of law.
When the judiciary seeks to use its inherent power to overcome the legislative
prerogative, it must be held to a high standard and must assume the burden of
showing that the action to be compelled is essential for the holding of court, the
efficient administration of justice, or the performance of its constitutional and
statutory duties. In re In re El Paso County Com’rs Court, 281 S.W.3d at 28
(emphasis added). The court generally must afford procedural due process
including notice and hearing. See Matter of El Paso County Courthouse, 765
S.W.2d at 882. A court’s own administrative findings cannot be enforced unless
those findings are established by a fact finding process that shows the court acted
fairly and without bias. Dist. Judges of 188th Judicial Dist., 657 S.W.2d at 910.
The court also must meet a high burden of proof. See In re In re El Paso County
Com’rs Court, 281 S.W.3d at 28; Dist. Judges of 188th Judicial Dist., 657 S.W.2d
at 910(where the commissioners court has statutory authority and discretion, then,
Page -11- it is the county’s actions which have a presumption of validity, and they are subject
to being abrogated only upon a showing of essentiality) (emphasis added). In the
absence of a procedurally established basis for an ex parte order, it is
unenforceable, i.e., void. Id.; Matter of El Paso County Courthouse, 765 S.W.2d
876. The Respondent’s Order does not contain any allegation or claims that the
Galveston County Commissioners Court has failed to fulfill its responsibility to
provide administrative support to the judiciary. It is undisputed that there were
statutory procedures available for the Respondent and other Galveston County
judges to seek the appointment of court coordinators and support staff. The
Respondent makes no claim that the County has refused to approve any judge’s
application to hire a staff position that he or she claimed was needed to properly
perform any court’s judicial functions. Likewise, the Respondent makes no claim
that the Relators refused to provide any court with adequate funding. Further, the
Respondent makes no claim that he or any other judge issued an order appointing
or re-appointing any individual to the Director position pursuant to any court’s
inherent authority. Rather, the Respondent makes spurious allegations that
Commissioners Court are seeking to hire a new Director from a pool of
“unqualified individuals whose only attraction may be their willingness to become
subservient factotums to the Commissioners.” See Respondents’ Reply to Petition
for Mandamus at pg. 7-8. The Order was issued sua sponte, without any notice,
Page -12- hearing or other due process. Meanwhile, the Order is premised upon
administrative findings that are both erroneous and were established without any
fact finding process. Further, the Order seeks to compel action that goes far
beyond the Court’s jurisdiction concerning adequate court staffing and improperly
attempts to exercise supervisory control over the County Judge’s and
Commissioners Court’s authority to hire and fire County administrative
employees. As such, the Order was issued without any adequate basis or due
process and is an invalid, overreaching exercise of the district’s court’s inherent
authority. Consequently, the Order is unenforceable and void. Accordingly, it was
error for the three-Justice panel of this Court to deny the Relators’ petition for
mandamus relief. This error requires review and reversal by the full Court of
Appeals. Therefore, Relators respectfully request rehearing and en banc
consideration.
2. The Court’s three-Justice panel erroneously issued a memorandum opinion.
A. The three-Justice panel issued a memorandum opinion that fails to advise the parties of reason for its decision.
In original proceedings, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 is applicable
to an order or opinion by a court of appeals. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(d). Rule
47.4 provides as follows:
If the issues are settled, the court should write a brief memorandum opinion no longer than necessary to advise the parties of the court's Page -13- decision and the basic reasons for it. An opinion may not be designated a memorandum opinion if the author of a concurrence or dissent opposes that designation. An opinion must be designated a memorandum opinion unless it does any of the following:
(a) establishes a new rule of law, alters or modifies an existing rule, or applies an existing rule to a novel fact situation likely to recur in future cases;
(b) involves issues of constitutional law or other legal issues important to the jurisprudence of Texas;
(c) criticizes existing law; or
(d) resolves an apparent conflict of authority.
Tex. R App. Rule 47.4 (emphasis added).
The three-Justice panel’s opinion is two sentences long and fails to explain any
reasons for their decision to deny Relators’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus. As
such, the opinion fails to comport with the requirements of Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure 47.4 and 52.8(d). Accordingly, the issuance of a
memorandum opinion was inappropriate.
B. Memorandum Opinion inappropriate to dispose of issues presented by Relators’ petition.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 prescribes when a memorandum
opinion may be issued. As noted above, the Rule provides that a memorandum
opinion must not establish a new rule of law, alter or modify an existing rule, or
apply an existing rule to a novel fact situation likely to recur in future cases. See
id. R. 47.4(a). Further, the Rule provides that a memorandum opinion must not Page -14- involve issues of constitutional law. See id. R. 47.4(b). The three-Justice panel,
meanwhile, issued a memorandum opinion that violates these prescriptions. It also
failed to explain any reasons for the panel’s decision. Accordingly, Relators are
now compelled to request rehearing and en banc consideration.
As explained above, the established rules of law provide that the Respondent
could not invoke a district court’s supervisory or inherent jurisdiction over the
Galveston County Commissioners Court without initiating a lawsuit, and could not
issue his ex parte Order without affording the Relators procedural due process
including notice, hearing, and a fact finding process that was conducted fairly and
without bias. See Matter of El Paso County Courthouse, 765 S.W.2d at 882; Dist.
Judges of 188th Judicial Dist., 657 S.W.2d at 910. It is undisputed that the
Respondent issued his Order without initiating a lawsuit, providing the Relators
any notice, or conducting any hearing. Nevertheless, the thee-Justice panel’s
memorandum opinion denied the Relator’s petition for mandamus relief vacating
the Order. As such, the three-Justice panel’s decision alters or modifies the
existing rules of law regarding the scope of district court’s inherent and
supervisory jurisdiction, and does so without discussion. Accordingly, the
issuance of a memorandum opinion was inappropriate.
The panel’s decision also involved a novel fact situation likely to recur in
future cases. As explained more thoroughly in the Relators’ Petition for Writ of
Page -15- Mandamus and supporting reply brief, there are statutes authorizing county courts
at law and district courts in certain counties to establish a court administration
system, however, they are inapplicable to Galveston County. See Relators’ Reply
Supporting Their Petition for Writ of Mandamus at pgs. 11- 18 (discussing Tex.
Gov’t Code Chapters74-75). Further, Relators maintain that none of the elected
judges in Galveston County obtained approval to appoint the County’s Justice
Administration Department’s Directors under Chapter 151 of the Local
Government Code, which generally regulates the process by which elected district,
county and precinct officers may appoint deputies, assistants and clerks and other
employees that are required in the performance of such officer’s duties. See id. at
pgs. 11-20. As such, this original proceeding involves issues regarding whether
district courts possess the constitutional authority to unilaterally decree that
employees of non-elective county offices established to support the administration
of justice are court personnel and/or that such offices are part of the judiciary. The
three-Justice’s panel decision left the Respondent’s ex parte Order in place,
without addressing why they determined the Relators were not entitled to
mandamus relief. As such, the same issues are likely to recur in a future cases,
including ones related to the Respondent’s potential efforts to enforce the terms of
his Order or to challenge the authority of the Galveston County Commissioners
Court to exercise control over the County’s Justice Administration Department.
Page -16- See e.g., Respondent’s Motion for Emergency Order Under T.R.A.P. 52.10(b).
More generally, such issues are also likely to recur in any future cases where
district judges to challenge the authority of commissioners courts to terminate or
appoint county employees who have been assigned to support court functions.
Accordingly, the issuance of a memorandum opinion was inappropriate.
The three-Justice panel’s decision also involves issues of constitutional law.
Relators’ Petition seeks mandamus directing the Respondent to vacate his Order
because the Respondent lacked jurisdiction to exercise a district court’s inherent or
supervisory authority under the Texas Constitution, and; therefore, the Order is
void. Accordingly, this original proceeding clearly involves issues regarding the
separation of powers under Article II, Section 1 and district court jurisdiction
under Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution. Nevertheless, the panel
issued a memorandum opinion that did not acknowledge the existence of any
constitutional issues or provide any reasons to support their decision. Accordingly,
the issuance of a memorandum opinion was inappropriate.
For the above explained reasons, the three-Justice panel’s opinion fails to
comport with the requirements of Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 47.4 and
52.8(d). This error requires review and reversal by the full Court of Appeals.
Therefore, Relators respectfully request rehearing and en banc consideration.
Page -17- IV. PRAYER
A three-Justice panel of this Court issued a memorandum opinion denying
Relators’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus. This decision was erroneous. The
issuance of a memorandum opinion was also improper. These errors require
review. As such, Relators respectfully request rehearing. Further, Relators
respectfully requests that a majority of this court en banc grant this motion for
reconsideration, and that the case be resubmitted to the court for en banc review
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ James P. Allison James P. Allison SBN: 01090000 j.allison@allison-bass.com
J. Eric Magee SBN: 24007585 e.magee@allison-bass.com
Phillip Ledbetter SBN: 24041316 p.ledbetter@allison-bass.com
ALLISON, BASS & MAGEE, L.L.P. A.O. Watson House 402 W. 12th Street Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 482-0701 telephone (512) 480-0902 facsimile
Page -18- CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this computer-generated motion for rehearing and en banc reconsideration in the Court of Appeals contains 3,719 which is less than 4,500 words and complies with TEX. R. APP. P 9.4.
/s/ James P. Allison James P. Allison
Page -19- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of Relators’ Motion for Rehearing and En Banc Reconsideration was served via e-service, certified mail, return receipt requested, facsimile, and/or electronically on this 19th day of February, 2015, to the following:
Mark W. Stevens Attorney at Law SBN: 19184300 P.O. Box 8118 Galveston, TX 77553 (409) 765-6306 telephone (409) 765-6469 facsimile markwandstev@sbcglobal.net
Attorney for Respondent, Hon. Lonnie Cox
/s/ James P. Allison
Page -20-