In Re Foster

9 B.R. 482, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1032, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 4685, 7 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 521
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedMarch 17, 1981
Docket19-10067
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 9 B.R. 482 (In Re Foster) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Foster, 9 B.R. 482, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1032, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 4685, 7 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 521 (Tex. 1981).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN R. BLINN, Bankruptcy Judge;

On February 26, 1981, the Chapter 13 plan of John W. and Myrtha D. Foster came on for confirmation. The plan met all requirements for confirmation and was recommended for confirmation by the Trustee. However, on its own motion the Court noted the plan proposed to make post-confirmation payments on residential mortgages outside the plan. 1 After stating reasons in the record, the Court ruled from the bench confirmation would be denied because of the payments outside the plan. The Court indicated a written opinion detailing the reasoning would follow and this is that opinion.

While many other plans past and pending have specified similar treatment on secured claims, this Court has always questioned whether payments outside a plan do not in fact undermine fundamental Chapter 13 policies. Case law on the parallel issue of unsecured claims condemns outside-the-plan payments. In re Blevins, 1 B.R. 442 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio 1979); In re Tatum, 1 B.R. 445 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio 1979); In re Crago, 4 B.R. 483 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio 1980); In re Weeden, 7 B.R. 106, 6 B.C.D. 1309 (Bkrtcy.D.R.I.1980); In re Dziedzic, No. 80-00897-HS, 9 B.R. 424 (S.D.Tex. March 6, 1981). However, those courts were primarily addressing “classification of claims”; i. e., whether the debtor could pay certain unsecured claims at a higher rate than provided for other seemingly similar claims. While indicating a preference for inclusion of all creditors in the plan, those cases were not dispositive of secured claims, which are theoretically paid in full whether within or without the plan.

Secured and unsecured claim payments are treated similarly in the Bankruptcy *483 Code in one respect: nowhere in the Code is there any statement whether either can be handled outside the plan. Courts allowing such treatment have relied on the negative pregnant of § 1325(a)(5), which uses the language “each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan.” Judge Jennings in In re Wittenmeier, 4 B.R. 86, 6 B.C.D. 827 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Tenn.1980) deduced from this that there may be secured claims not provided for by the plan; he also interpreted the absence of any mandatory provision for inclusion to mean that no such requirement could be read into the Code. 4 B.R. 86, 6 B.C.D. 827 at 828. Collier on Bankruptcy reached the same result by reasoning that a Chapter 13 plan may, but need not modify secured claims; if a debtor does not modify an allowed secured claim, the debtor may deal with it outside the plan. 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 1325.01 at 1325-20 (15th Ed., 1980). However, Collier’s so concludes based on its reading of the legislative history, which this Court believes fails to support the Collier’s interpretation. All that the House Judiciary Committee noted 2 is that the trustee is designated as a disbursing agent unless the plan provides otherwise. A plan can specify means and amount of payments on secured claims (i. e. “in-plan payments”) while leaving the debt- or the responsibility as disbursing agent of physically paying the creditors. 3

Thus no clear authority exists on whether plans must extend to all claims, and a court’s interpretation of the Code must rely on policy analysis. Even courts that have held outside payments may be made have recognized the many problems that can be created. First and foremost is that the court’s supervision of the plan is jeopardized. In re Hines, 7 B.R. 415, 6 B.C.D. 1356 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D.1980). (See also In Matter of Berry, 5 B.R. 515 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio 1980) for a discussion on the necessity for supervision.) Second, in the event the debt- or defaults on outside payments, the creditor would have two options: proceeding against the debtor in state court, which could create havoc with the delicate balance of budget and plan payments that forms a plan, or seeking enforcement in the bankruptcy court on an obligation which is arguably no longer within that court’s jurisdiction. 4 Third, trustees may even be entitled to a fee on payments outside the plan. For example, Hines, supra, held that such payments are subject to the 10% fee, which appears to either be a windfall to the trustee or a recognition that the fee may be earned if difficulties occur. Finally, the court’s ability to assess and confirm a Chapter 13 plan is hampered if debtors are allowed not only to deal with creditors outside the plan, but effectively shield from the court’s scrutiny the status or even continued existence of the relationship. 5

In counterpoint to these court-recognized problems, attorneys for debtors have argued that requiring all payments within the plan will harm rather than help the debtor’s rehabilitation. They are especially concerned that the 10% payment to the trustee — necessarily subtracted from the amount paid on unsecured claims — will jeopardize confirmation of a plan in the case where the percentage to be paid on unsecured claims is reduced to insignificance. However, as reflected above, the trend in case law has been in favor of the trustee receiving a fee no matter how pay *484 ments are made, so creditors with unsecured claims are not uniquely disadvantaged by fees for payments outside the plan. 6 More importantly, a plan that is so borderline that the trustee’s surcharge eliminates a meaningful payment on the unsecured claims probably should not be confirmed at all. 7 Furthermore, it is the cases where confirmation is a question mark that are most likely to spawn defaults; thus, they should be closely monitored by the court through its officers.

Debtors also argue that outside payments on residential mortgages should be allowed as an exception to other secured claims since the obligation continues for many years after the plan expires, and it makes no sense for the trustee to serve as a temporary superintendent. This view fails to consider the purpose of a Chapter 13 proceeding. The bankruptcy court, through the standing trustee, is involved in a comprehensive restructuring of the debtor’s finances, not negotiations with select creditors. Before a plan is approved, both the court and trustee must examine the debt- or’s income, household and personal expenses, and motivation and ability to conform to the proposed plan. For the court to rehabilitate a debtor within a brief three-year period, the court must have complete control over all the obligations of the debtor for that time. A debtor who chooses to file a Chapter 13 plan should recognize that it is not a trivial matter or stop-gap measure to deal with one or two creditors, but an alternative to a Chapter 7 liquidation. The bankruptcy court must be permitted to rehabilitate the debtor as the court in- its experience finds is in the best interests of all parties. It does not have to risk the success of a plan on the gamble that the debtor has chosen the right financial problems to bring before the court.

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Bluebook (online)
9 B.R. 482, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1032, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 4685, 7 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 521, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-foster-txsb-1981.