In Re Blevins

50 A.L.R. Fed. 689, 1 B.R. 442, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 185, 1979 Bankr. LEXIS 683, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1054
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedDecember 7, 1979
DocketBankruptcy 2-79-02979
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 50 A.L.R. Fed. 689 (In Re Blevins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Blevins, 50 A.L.R. Fed. 689, 1 B.R. 442, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 185, 1979 Bankr. LEXIS 683, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1054 (Ohio 1979).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING CONFIRMATION

R. J. SIDMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the requested confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan proposed by Leroy Blevins. The plan as originally proposed called for payments of $16.00 weekly, the payment of holders of allowed secured claims in full to the value of their collateral, and the payment of unsecured claims at a dividend rate of 53%. City Loan and Savings, a partially secured creditor of Blevins, was to be paid, in full, outside the plan. Blevins’ plan was subsequently amended to provide for the payment of a 30% dividend to unsecured creditors, instead of the 53% originally proposed. *443 This reduction in dividend percentage was for the purpose of completing the plan within the thirty-six (36) month time period set forth in § 1322(c) of Title 11 of the United States Code.

According to the schedules filed by Blevins, City Loan and Savings is owed the sum of $1,179.32 and is secured in a 1974 Plymouth automobile. The Court, pursuant to provisions of § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code, valued the collateral held by City Loan at $1,000.00.

One of the tests required for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan is that “the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with other applicable provisions of this title.” See, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). Certain provisions of Chapter 13 deal with the subject of classification of claims. Specifically, § 1322 provides:

“§ 1322 Contents of Plan
(a) The plan shall—
3. . . . .
(3) if the plan classifies claims, provide the same treatment for each claim within a particular class.
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may—
(1) designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, as provided in section 1122 of this title, but may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated;” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) and (b)(1).

These provisions dealing with classification of claims in Chapter 13 cases are new. There was an apparent intent on the part of Congress to allow debtors in Chapter 13 proceedings, subject to a test of “fairness”, to classify claims to be paid in a Chapter 13 proceeding in accordance with the nature of the claim. The legislative history on the classification of claims issue is not particularly illuminating. It seems clear, however, that some latitude has been granted debtors to treat claims in varying classes, assuming some rational justification for such treatment.

It is important to analyze the effect of these new provisions dealing with the classification of claims. The old Chapter XIII statute, first of all, clearly eliminated from the definition of “claim” in a Chapter XIII proceeding any claim secured by estates in real property or chattels real. 11 U.S.C. § 1006(1) (now repealed). Thus, because a creditor in a Chapter XIII had to be the holder of a claim, as defined, any creditor holding any interest in real property was not within the ambit of Chapter XIII and could not be affected by, or included in, a Chapter XIII proceeding. Further, because of the provision in § 652 of Chapter XIII that “secured creditors whose claims are dealt with by the plan” had to accept such a plan, the practice developed in Chapter XIII that certain secured creditors were not dealt with by the terms of the plan, but rather were to be treated “outside” the provisions of the plan. This practice was intended to avoid the problem of a rejecting secured creditor being dealt with by the plan, and thus creating, in the view of some courts, a bar to confirmation. See, In the Matter of Tom O’Dell, 198 F.Supp. 389 (D. Kansas, 1961). As can be seen from a review of the provisions of the plan in this case, Blevins seeks to perpetuate this practice by proposing to treat City Loan, one of his partially secured creditors, “outside” the ambit of his plan. This Court has searched in vain for any legislative approval of the practice of excluding partially secured creditors from a Chapter 13 plan under the new Bankruptcy. Code. On the contrary, the new Code clearly gives debtors the full opportunity to deal with all creditors, and to modify the rights of all claim holders except a claim holder secured only in real estate that is the debtor’s principal residence, within the terms of a Chapter 13 plan [see, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)]. There is also now a clear legislative recognition of the concept of the partially secured creditor, that is, one creditor who possesses both a secured claim and an unsecured claim. See,-11 U.S.C. § 506. This statutory framework leads to an inquiry as to whether the new Chapter 13, in fact, prohibits the practice of excluding partially secured creditors from a Chapter 13 plan. While the legisla *444 tive history of the Chapter 13 provisions is largely silent on this issue, there was testimony by at least one acknowledged expert in the Chapter 13 field that the new Chapter 13 should authorize payment of all claims within its provisions. See, Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1427 (1976) (statement of Claude L. Rice). The final version of Chapter 13 expressly excludes no claims from the reach of its provisions and it is quite consistent with the overall concept of the new Bankruptcy Code that all matters affecting a bankruptcy proceeding (whether it be under Chapter 7, 9, 11 or 13) be within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. This analysis leads this Court to conclude that all claims should, and perhaps must, be treated within the terms of a proposed plan, unless substantial justification is provided for exclusion of a claim from the plan provisions.

Section 1322(a)(3) states that a Chapter 13 plan that classifies claims must provide for equal treatment of each claim in a particular class. The choice of a debtor to pay some claims “inside” the Chapter 13 plan and to pay others “outside” is a classification of claims. Thus, in passing upon confirmation of a plan that proposes payment of some claims “outside” the plan, the Court must apply this mandate of equal treatment.

This test acquires even more significance when the disenfranchisement of unsecured claimants in Chapter 13 is considered. A creditor, or class of creditors, dissatisfied with the classification of claims in a Chapter 11 proceeding may opt to vote to reject the provisions of the plan. This option is not available, however, in Chapter 13.

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50 A.L.R. Fed. 689, 1 B.R. 442, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 185, 1979 Bankr. LEXIS 683, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1054, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-blevins-ohsb-1979.