[451]*451Singley, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Smith and Digges, JJ., dissent and Smith, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Digges, J., concurs at page 478 infra.
This is the second occasion on which we are called upon to review a report and recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Disabilities (the Commission). The circumstances which led to the adoption of the two constitutional amendments, which first enacted and then amended Maryland Constitution art. IV, §§ 4A, 4B, creating the Commission, are set forth in the opinion of this Court in In re Diener & Broccolino, 268 Md. 659, 662-67, 304 A. 2d 587, 589-92 (1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1586 (1974).
Judge Dulany Foster is Chief Judge of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, which is comprised of 21 judges who preside in six courts having either general law, equity or criminal jurisdiction, see Constitution, art. IV, § 27; Maryland Code (1974), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 1-503 (b).
After widespread publicity in the news media relating to Judge Foster’s activity in connection with the purchase and sale of a property known as the Carroll I. Young Farm, located in the City of Westminster (Westminster or the City), Carroll County, Maryland, the Commission was requested by Chief Judge Murphy of this Court — a request in which Judge Foster joined — to conduct a preliminary investigation of the matter, to ascertain whether Judge Foster’s involvement in the transaction violated the Maryland Canons and Rules of Judicial Ethics.1
After a preliminary inquiry in which Judge Foster voluntarily participated, the Commission unanimously2 voted to institute formal proceedings, charging violations of:
Maryland Canons of Judicial Ethics IV, VII, VIII,
XXIII, and XXIV;
Maryland Rules of Judicial Ethics 6, 8, and 13; and [452]*452original American Bar Association Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canons 4, 7, 8, 24, and 25.
The factual background of the matter, developed at the hearing before the Commission, is essentially this. In January, 1965, the Carroll Young Farm of about 190 acres was purchased by Jerome J. Gebhart and John A. Luetkemeyer, Sr. for $150,000.00, apparently on the advice of Lawrence Lockwood, a Baltimore real estate broker, who was confident that if the property were held for four or five years, it could be sold at a profit. In August, 1967, Westminster annexed some 1,000 acres of land, including the Young Farm. In September, 1968, Gebhart sold his one-half interest in the Young Farm for approximately $152,000.00 to the trustees of a trust (the McLanahan Trust), created by the will of the late Austin McLanahan, the father of Mrs. Luetkemeyer, Sr., and the grandfather of John A. Luetkemeyer, Jr. In November, 1969, Mr. Luetkemeyer, Sr. conveyed his one-half interest in the Young Farm to the McLanahan Trust for a stated consideration of $152,000.00, or about $1,600.00 per acre.
John A. Luetkemeyer, Jr. testified that at the time the McLanahan Trust acquired title to the entire Young Farm, it had assets of about $1,600,000.00; that the income beneficiaries were his two sisters and himself; that distribution of corpus was about to commence in several years, when his younger sister became 30, and that the Farm, while a suitable investment, was the only non-liquid asset of the trust.
Late in 1969, a decision was reached by the McLanahan Trust to sell the property. By this time, the Farm was within the City limits, water was available and a sewer was planned. The property was brought to Judge Foster’s attention by Lockwood, one of the brokers who had participated in the original sale to Gebhart and Mr. Luetkemeyer, Sr. Judge and Mrs. Foster examined the property, reviewed the situation as regards zoning, and learned that the asking price was $2,500.00 per acre. In late December, 1969, the McLanahan Trust agreed to give Judge [453]*453Foster a one-year purchase option, for which Judge Foster personally paid $1,000.00. Although called an “agreement of sale,” the option agreement, which was actually signed on 16 February 1970, was entered into between the McLanahan Trust and Wheeler Holding, Inc., a nominee of a Baltimore title company, as agent for Judge Foster.
There was testimony that in October, 1969, prior to Judge Foster’s negotiations with the McLanahan Trust, a tract of 45 acres zoned agricultural owned by David Jones, and located across the road from the Young Farm, had been reclassified as R-10,000 from R-7500, except for four and one-half acres which were given commercial zoning.
It was in November or December that a significant conversation took place. Mr. Luetkemeyer, Jr. testified that his family had determined not to develop the property because of their lack of expertise and because of the notoriety which might be involved in an effort to obtain a change in zoning.3
When asked whether the issue of propriety had been raised with Judge Foster, Mr. Luetkemeyer, Jr. said:
“Well, when I initially met Judge Foster, I asked him why he wished to purchase the land and were there any ethical problems I had to be concerned about. I believe Judge Foster felt that this was outside of his jurisdiction and there were no ethical considerations to worry about.”
Before the option agreement was actually executed, Judge Foster had received a letter dated 21 January 1970 from Joseph H. Hahn, Jr., at the time the Mayor of Westminster. The gist of the letter was that the Planning and Zoning Commission for the City of Westminster (the Planning Commission) was expecting to receive from Judge Foster an application for the rezoning of the Young Farm in time for its regular meeting on 28 January. It would appear that this information may have come from Truman B. Cash, an [454]*454associate of Lockwood’s in Westminster, who had died prior to the hearing.
Judge Foster, who theretofore had not known Mayor Hahn, telephoned him, and asked to be introduced to the members of the Planning Commission by the Mayor. The Mayor did this, and left the meeting.4 At this meeting, Judge Foster, who was not then or thereafter represented by counsel, requested the reclassification of the Farm in order to permit a density of more than six dwelling units per acre, and a change in zoning boundary lines. Coupled with the request was a proposal to give a 10 acre parcel to the City for the erection of a civic center, a commitment which would seem to have been made earlier by Mr. Luetkemeyer, Sr.
Nearly a year elapsed before there was any significant development, apparently because a comprehensive master plan was being developed by the City until late in 1970. Carroll. R. Dell, the City’s Director of Planning and Public Works, and Robert E. Lakin, Judge Foster’s engineer, came to Judge Foster’s chambers in Baltimore with a petition for the rezoning to R-7500 of 76.95 acres of the Young Farm, then zoned agricultural. This was later revised, apparently because the remainder of the tract was already zoned R-10,000, and as filed on 8 December, Judge Foster as the petitioner sought a reclassification of the same area to R-10,000 (which permitted the same density as R-7500), or six dwelling units per acre. The proposal was approved by the Planning Commission on 10 December and was the subject of a public hearing before the Mayor and Common Council on 8 February 1971, which was attended by Judge Foster, who spoke in support of his proposal.
The rezoning was effected by an ordinance enacted on 8 March 1971. By that time the purchase option granted by the McLanahan Trust, which was for one year, if rezoning and installation of sewers had not been accomplished, had expired. Accordingly, Wheeler Holding and the McLanahan Trust entered into an extension agreement on 1 May 1971, [455]*455increasing the purchase price to $2,650.00 per acre and providing for the payment of taxes and other charges by Wheeler Holding. The agreement, as extended, was to expire 30 days following 1 May 1972.
Commencing in September, 1971, Judge Foster had a series of meetings with Harry L. Whitehead, vice president of Monumental Properties Acquisitions, Inc. (Monumental), looking toward a sale of his interest to Monumental. This culminated in an agreement of 6 December 1971, by which Wheeler Holding agreed to sell Monumental its option at a price of $1,150.00 per acre (this being in addition to the $2,650.00 per acre which Monumental would be required to pay the McLanahan Trust), after deducting 12 acres in computing the price to be paid to Wheeler Holding. Wheeler Holding, as agent for Judge Foster, was to secure the agreement of the McLanahan Trust to accept a five-year mortgage for approximately $357,500.00 as part of the purchase price. The agreement was subject to a number of conditions, among them approval of a planned unit development, permitting the construction of at least 1,130 dwelling units; the installation of permanent sewer facilities and an adequate treatment plant by the City, and a waiver by the City of its customary charge of $650.00 per unit for water and sewer connections.
A second agreement was entered into on the same date between Judge Foster, personally, and Monumental, which provided that upon final approval of the plan to build 1,130 dwelling units, Monumental would convey to Judge Foster 12 acres of the tract, upon payment by him of $31,800.00. As will be pointed out later, this 12 acre tract relates back to Judge Foster’s proposal at his first appearance before the Council to give the City 10 acres for the erection of a civic center.
We now turn to the series of developments which occurred after the appearance of Monumental on the scene, events which we regard as particularly significant, not only because they occurred after Maryland’s Canons and Rules of Judicial Ethics became effective on 1 July 1971, but because they have a direct bearing on what the Commission found Judge Foster’s role to have been.
[456]*456On 7 January 1972, Mr. Whitehead met with Mr. Dell, who had learned from Michael W. Riordan, Jr. of Monumental in November of 1971 of Monumental’s interest in the matter. On 24 January 1972, Judge Foster wrote to Mayor Hahn. The introductory paragraph of the letter said:
“I am delighted to report to you that we are now nearing a point where we shall be able to go forward with the development of the Young farm and the other plans which we have discussed. Construction can start within a few months, but first we must resolve several matters which underly the entire program. I shall briefly outline these below so that you, the members of your City Council, and the Planning and Zoning Commission will have them at hand for the earliest possible consideration and action. Our target date to conclude these steps is March 15, 1972.” (Emphasis supplied.)
What followed is described in the Commission’s opinion, which has been only minimally edited:
“This letter of January 24, 1972 then outlined four items. The first was for the approval of a planned unit development for 1,146 dwelling units, ten acres for a planned business center and twelve acres for a civic center and Maryland Jaycee" Headquarters. Request was also made, in connection with the ‘planned unit development’ that there be no limitations on any lot sizes except for those lots abutting Uniontown Road or ‘other restriction that will interfere with the development except the existing City zoning Ordinance.’ The second item dealt with a requirement for permanent sewer facilities to service the aforementioned 1,146 dwelling units, or the letting of contracts therefor by April 1, 1972. The third item requested permission for the selection of contractors for the public facilities, subject to City inspection, and that the City waive its standard [457]*457hook-up charges of $650.00 per dwelling unit. Item four sought an agreement from the City that the City would assume responsibility for all improvements or additions that might be legally required in connection with off-site storm drainage. In sum, this letter outlined Judge Foster’s requirements as set forth in his agreement with Monumental of December 6, 1971. The letter of January 24, 1972, said: ‘We are excited about proceeding with all haste with our development . . .’ and ‘If it is necessary to meet with you, the Council, or City Officers, to finalize our plans and agreement, we shall make ourselves immediately available.’ [Emphasis supplied.]
“Also on January 24, 1972, Mr. Dell wrote to Mayor Hahn stating: ‘Judge Foster has a contract with Monumental Properties that must be satisfied by April 1, 1972.’ [Emphasis supplied.] Mr. Dell then referred to the conditions and items set forth in Judge Foster’s letter of January 24, 1972. We can only conclude that there must have been an immediate hand-delivery of Judge Foster’s letter coupled with an immediate memo from Mr. Dell to the Mayor. From that time on matters seem to have proceeded with great dispatch. Thus on April 12, 1972, Mayor Plahn wrote to Judge Foster outlining the City’s position with respect to the various issues raised. Three other matters occurred in the interim, namely: on March 23, 1972 the Mayor and Common Council passed a resolution reducing the width requirements of townhouses constructed on interior lots — a crucial matter in Judge Foster’s view — and also reducing the minimum area therefor. Mayor Hahn’s letter of April 12, 1972, to Judge Foster, states that this resolution was introduced at ‘your’ request — referring to Judge Foster. On March 28, 1972, the Mayor and Common Council passed two ordinances which reduced the hook-up charges for sewer and water from $650.00 per unit [458]*458to $450.00 per unit and copies of these ordinances were sent to Judge Foster by Mr. Dell under a letter dated April 24, 1972. The ordinances produced substantial savings for Monumental; which changes, however, [applied] to any new developments and thus were not for the sole benefit of Judge Foster or of Monumental. However, the testimony is clear that the Young Farm was one of the first, if not the first, large scale developments to be considered by the City of Westminster and at the time there was only one other developer of substantial acreage. The significance of these matters can be seen from Judge Foster’s letter of April 19, 1972, to Mayor Hahn in which Judge Foster said:
'Through your special efforts, all of the details in connection with the initial stages of the development of the Young Farm in the City of Westminster as a planned unit development have now been crystalized. You and Mr. Dell have my sincere thanks, deep appreciation, and admiration for your effectiveness.’ [Emphasis supplied.]
On the same date, Judge Foster wrote to Mr. Whitehead saying:
'. . .In the main, I would say we have a ten-strike; everything we have requested, with the exception of the save-harmless provision relating to storm water, has been granted and we conclude there should be no problem in dealing with the storm water through the use of holding ponds. I am delighted that with your great assistance we have been able to accomplish such a remarkable feat.’ ” [Emphasis supplied.]
Settlement between Judge Foster and Monumental, and Monumental and the McLanahan Trust was scheduled for 28 [459]*459April 1972. At settlement, the first phase was the purchase of the Young Farm of 190.9857 acres at $2,650.00 per acre (the price stipulated in the extension agreement) by Monumental5 from the McLanahan Trust, adjusted for settlement charges. This was accomplished by the delivery of $143,027.44 in cash and a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $359,339.50.
Next, Wheeler Holding transferred to Monumental Judge Foster’s purchase option for a consideration of $1,150.00 per acre, less 12 acres, or $205,833.56, before adjustment for settlement costs. This was an amount made up of Monumental’s deposit of $5,000.00, an additional cash payment of $88,224.96 and a second mortgage on the Farm for $112,239.00.
Finally, Judge Foster purchased 12 acres of the Farm from Monumental for $31,800.00. The deed to the 12 acres was held in escrow by Monumental’s attorney under an agreement signed by Monumental and Judge Foster directing that the escrow should continue until Monumental’s development plan was finally approved.6 Mr. Whitehead testified that the purpose of this arrangement was to insure that the density permitted for the development would be computed on the basis of 190, and not 178, acres.
Later in 1972, after he had received the deed, Judge Foster made a gift of one acre of the 12 acre tract to the City and took an income tax deduction of $12,000.00 based on an appraisal of the property. He conceded that the balance of the tract might be used for commercial purposes, and if so utilized, had a potential value of $30,000.00 per acre.
Ultimately, Judge Foster paid a 10% real estate brokerage commission on the original option price of $2,500.00 per acre to Messrs. Lockwood and Cash in the total amount of $46,250.00, in accordance with the understanding they had reached at the time the option was negotiated. Neither the [460]*460McLanahan Trust nor Monumental paid any commission on the transaction.
After a three-day hearing at which 13 witnesses, including Judge Foster, testified, and some 60 exhibits were introduced, the Commission made the following findings of fact based upon what it found to be clear and convincing evidence, see In re Diener & Broccolino, supra, 268 Md. at 670, 304 A. 2d at 594:7
“1. By February 16, 1970, while a member of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, Judge Foster acquired an option in a valuable piece of property known as the Young Farm with no risk of any financial loss other than the possible forfeiture of a $1,000.00 deposit.
“2. At all times Judge Foster knew, or should have known, that the value of said property would be substantially enhanced if the property were rezoned, and if public utilities were made available to serve it.
“3. Judge Foster requested the Mayor of the City of Westminster, not previously known to him personally, to introduce him to the Planning and Zoning Commission of that City which the Mayor in fact did.
“4. The Director of Planning and Public Works of the City of Westminster was impressed with the fact of Judge Foster’s official position.
“5. The Mayor, Common Council, Director of Public Works and Planning and the Members of the Planning and Zoning Commission knew of the judicial position held by Judge Foster.
“6. The City officials initially, and for some months, believed that Judge Foster would personally develop the property.
“7. Judge Foster personally attended at least [461]*461three meetings with various City officials to discuss the proposed development, including discussions of utilities and the zoning that would be required.
“8. Throughout the period involved, Judge Foster engaged in extensive correspondence concerning the project including letters to City officials. All of his correspondence was typed by his official secretary during her regular work hours. In addition, he made a number of telephone calls to City officials and had several meetings in his court Chambers.
“9. On December 6, 1971, Judge Foster, through Wheeler Holding entered into an Agreement of Sale with Monumental. This Agreement included various specified conditions pertaining to approval of a ‘planned unit development’ for 1,130 dwelling units, conditions pertaining to utilities, the waiving of standard hook-up charges for utilities and other matters. In connection with this Agreement, Monumental believed that one or more said conditions were unlikely of fulfillment so that Monumental had no substantial risk involved.
“10. Also on December 6, 1971, Judge Foster entered into a second agreement with Monumental by which Judge Foster was to pay Monumental the sum of $31,800.00 in exchange for which Monumental would deliver its agreement that upon final grant to Monumental of authorization to build 1,130 or more dwelling units it would convey 12 acres of the subject property to Judge Foster.
“11. When Judge Foster appeared with Mr. Whitehead of Monumental and ‘presented him to the Planning and Zoning Commission’ in an effort to have Monumental’s conditions approved, he was undertaking to transfer to Mr. Whitehead the ‘good will’ that he had obtained through his introduction by Mayor Hahn to those members and from that time forward Judge Foster gave the appearance of acting as the ‘agent’ for Monumental Properties, and/or as a joint adventurer with it in the proposed [462]*462project. At this point Judge Foster definitely undertook to lend the influence of his name, and/or the prestige of his office, to advance the ‘welfare’ of Monumental Properties.
“12. At the request of Monumental Judge Foster wrote to Mayor Hahn requesting approval of the various conditions set forth in the Monumental contract.
“13. As a result of Judge Foster’s request, the City on March 28, 1972, reduced hook-up charges for utilities from $650.00 per unit to $450.00 per unit. Judge Foster thereafter inquired by phone as to the interpretation of the ordinances that accomplished the reduction and was advised by Mr. Dell that his office would determine the type of connections required, and Mr. Dell saw ‘no problem in being able to work out the proper methods for charging the appropriate fees.’
“14. On March 23, 1972, the City passed an ordinance reducing the minimum width and lot area for interior townhouses. Mayor Hahn’s letter of April 12,1972, states that this was done at Judge Foster’s request.
“15. The City of Westminster approved conditions sufficient to satisfy Monumental to proceed to settlement. Judge Foster described the fulfillment of these conditions as due at least in part to ‘special efforts’ by Mayor Hahn and further described this accomplishment as a ‘remarkable feat.’
“16. Settlement between the McLanahan Trust, Monumental and Judge Foster occurred on April 28, 1972. At that time the provisions of the contract between Judge Foster and Monumental were modified to the extent that Monumental executed a deed to Judge and Mrs. Foster for the 12 acres referred to above but this deed was delivered to Monumental’s attorney under a written agreement to be held by Monumental’s attorney in escrow [463]*463until Monumental’s development plan ‘has been finally ratified and approved by all required public authorities’ at which time it would be delivered for recording.
“17. By reason of the escrow arrangement Judge Foster permitted himself to be placed in a position where it was necessary in his best interest to continue to cooperate with Monumental to obtain final approval from the City authorities for Monumental’s plans even though all other aspects of the settlement between the parties have been consummated.
“18. All acts done by Judge Foster to advance his personal business interest of necessity benefited other interests as well, i.e., the McLanahan Trust by consummating a sale at $2,650.00 per acre for land previously valued at $1,600.00 per acre and by delivery to Monumental of a substantial tract of land ready for development under conditions satisfactory to it.
“19. The offer to convey 10 acres to the City was known by Judge Foster at the time to ‘sweeten’ the development proposals he submitted. Despite this, and despite his avowed intention to carry out that proposal, Judge Foster has not undertaken to bind himself in any legal manner to this promise which is conceded to be legally unenforceable. Accordingly, Judge and Mrs. Foster presently hold title to 11 acres of the subject property without any legal obligation to convey that property to either the City, to the Maryland Jaycees or for any other public use. The 11 acres have a present value of $12,000.00 per acre for a total value of $132,000.00 and a potential future value for commercial purposes of $30,000.00 an acre for a potential future total of $360,000.00. The acreage may be used for commercial purposes.
“20. The total minimum benefits flowing to Judge Foster as a result of the land transactions is [464]*464computed to be the sum of $261,239.00 which figure was arrived at as explained above.
“21. That Judge Foster as a judge of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City is subject to assignment by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals under Maryland Rule 1202 to preside as a trial judge in any of the counties of this State, or as an appellate judge; that a judge may be appointed or elected to serve in one of the Circuits or Counties of this State does not preclude his assignment to preside as a judge in Carroll County nor does it preclude the applicability of the Canons to his acts in any subdivision of this State.”
The Commission said in conclusion:
“Perhaps these general rules [proscribing an appearance of impropriety] were summarized as well as possible in Judge Smith’s dissenting opinion in In Re Diener and Broccolino, supra, [268 Md. at 698, 304 A. 2d at 607,] where he stated: ‘Courts, be they high or low, should and must be like Caesar’s wife, above suspicion. Any other standard is one which undermines the trust and confidence of the average citizen in his government.’
“Viewed in this light, we can only conclude that to the average person, Judge Foster’s activities created an appearance of impropriety. This appearance may be seen simply from such facts as the Mayor’s personal introduction of the Judge at the Judge’s request, the Judge’s introduction of Monumental’s representative (Mr. Whitehead) to the Planning and Zoning Commission, the correspondence addressed to Judge Foster using his official title, the hand delivery of the zoning petition for Judge Foster to sign, and the relative rapidity with which events seemed to move after Judge Foster’s request to the Mayor of January 24, 1972. We have concluded after a full evidentiary hearing that there was no actual [465]*465wrongdoing but we are compelled to the conclusion that there was the appearance of impropriety. To the average person inspecting the Land Records of Carroll County and the official records of its City Officials there emerges the picture of a judge engaging in a speculative land venture solely for economic gain, the success of which depended upon official action of the City in terms of zoning, utilities and other ‘concessions’ which were obtained and which resulted in substantial profits to the judge. It was inevitable that this would cause reasonable suspicion and distrust in the public view of the particular judge. We therefore conclude as follows with respect to the Canons and Rules set forth in the notice delivered to Judge Foster:
“1. Maryland Canon IV (original ABA Canon 4) — While this Canon deals with the avoidance of impropriety it is restricted to the area of a judge’s ‘official conduct.’ The matters involved did not relate to Judge Foster’s official actions or conduct and therefore there is no violation of this Canon.
“2. Maryland Canon VII (original ABA Canon 7) — This Canon relates to the prompt performance of a judge’s duties. While there is evidence, referred to above, of extensive correspondence, meetings and numerous telephone calls, as well as the transcription by the judge’s publicly-paid secretary of a great amount of correspondence, we find a lack of clear and convincing evidence that the time devoted to this project interfered with the prompt performance of the duties Judge Foster was performing and thus, find no violation of this Canon.
“3. Maryland Canon VIII (original ABA Canon 8) — This Canon deals with court organization and the prompt dispatch of the court’s business. There is no clear and convincing evidence of any violation of this Canon.
[466]*466“4. Maryland Canon XXIII (original ABA Canon 24) — This Canon deals with the acceptance of inconsistent duties or incurring obligations which interfere or appear to interfere with the judge’s official functions. Again, there is no clear and convincing evidence to conclude that this Canon was violated.
“5. Maryland Canon XXIV (original ABA Canon 25) — This Canon requires that a judge should avoid giving ground for any ‘reasonable suspicion’ that he is using the power or prestige of his office to persuade others to contribute to the success of private business ventures. The judge is enjoined from pursuing a course of conduct ‘as would justify such suspicion.’ For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that there was a violation of this Canon.
. “6. Maryland Rules of Judicial Ethics, Rule 6 — This Rule relates to holding an office in any business venture if the holding interferes with the performance of official duties. For' the reasons indicated in connection with Canon IV we find no violation of Rule 6.
“7. Maryland Rules of Judicial Ethics, Rule 8 [8] — This Rule provides that a judge shall not ‘directly or indirectly lend the influence of his name or the prestige of his office to aid or advance the welfare of a private business or permit others to do so . . . .’ We find that from the circumstances described in the evidence that Judge Foster’s conduct violated Rule 8.”
Immediately after stating these conclusions, the Committee made the following recommendation:
“Having found violations of Canon XXIV and Rule 8, it is apparent that this matter cannot be dismissed. Accordingly, we deny the Motion to Dismiss made on behalf of Judge Foster, and we [467]*467must recommend either to censure or to remove. We are concerned that Maryland Rule 13 [9] of the Rules of Judicial Ethics provides that a violation of any of the Rules ‘is conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.’ The majority opinion in In Re Diener and Broccolino, supra, held that a finding of conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice compelled removal of those judges under the facts there presented. As in many other areas, there are degrees of impropriety. The Commission is convinced that there is a substantial and qualitative difference between the conduct found in Diener and Broccolino [,supra,] and the present situation in that in the former, judges in their official capacity while presiding in the Traffic Court of Baltimore City improperly disposed of cases then pending in their courts.
“We have affirmatively found here that there was no official misconduct on the part of Judge Foster; if he were a real estate developer he might be congratulated on his success, but he is not; he is a judge and there is clear and convincing evidence that his conduct gave the appearance of impropriety. Judge Foster displayed an insensitivity to the judicial position he holds and the prestige thereof, particularly in view of the evidence that he was alerted to the ethical question involved by the inquiry raised by Mr. Luetkemeyer, Jr.; further he attempted to transfer unto Monumental Properties the ‘good will’ and his own prestige which had been established and engendered through his personal introduction by Mayor Hahn — at his specific request. Thus, he undertook to lend the influence of his name and the prestige of his office in furtherance of the private business of Monumental Properties.
“Because of the lack of evidence of any official [468]*468judicial misconduct on the part of Judge Foster and because of the very nature of the provisions of Canon XXIV — the avoidance of ‘giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing the power or prestige of his office,’ and the nature of Rule 8 of the Maryland Rules of Judicial Ethics — the ‘lending of the influence of his name or the prestige of his office to aid or advance the welfare of any private business’ — the majority of the Commission finds that any recommendations for his removal from office would be unwarranted and too drastic under all the circumstances surrounding this transaction and accordingly recommends his censure.”
The Commission concluded that while there was no actual wrongdoing there was an appearance of impropriety, see Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U. S. 145, 147-50 (1968), since it gave ground for a reasonable suspicion in violation of Canon XXIV 10 of our Canons of Judicial Ethics and of Rule 8 (now Rule 9) of our Rules of Judicial Ethics.11 The Commission noted that Rule 13 (now Rule 14) makes any violation of the Rules of Judicial Ethics conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. Five members of the Commission recommended that [469]*469Judge Foster be censured. One member recommended that he be removed. One member joined in the Commission’s recommendation but dissented from that portion of finding 11 which found that “Judge Foster gave the appearance of acting as the ‘agent’ for Monumental . . . .”
When the Commission’s report reached this Court, we set the matter for hearing. Exceptions filed in behalf of Judge Foster challenged the Commission’s findings (i) that his actions in the Carroll Young Farm transaction created an appearance of impropriety, and (ii) that he acted as an agent for Monumental Properties, Inc. After the original hearing in this Court, we set the matter for reargument, and directed that counsel address themselves to two questions: (i) the meaning of the term “reasonable suspicion” as used in Canon XXIV of the Maryland Canons; and, (ii) whether that which would be a violation of the Maryland Canons had it occurred subsequent to the effective date of those Canons but which occurred prior to 1 July 1971, but after the adoption of the Canons by the American Bar Association in 1924, 24 A.B.A. Rep. 65-71 (1924), and by the Maryland State Bar Association in 1953, 58 Transactions of Md. St. B. Ass’n 239-52 (1953), could be a valid basis for disciplinary action against a Maryland judge.
At the first argument, counsel for Judge Foster took the position that there could be no appearance of impropriety because there was no indication that the concessions granted Judge Foster would not have been accorded to any other responsible developer, particularly since there was evidence that an adjoining tract had been similarly rezoned sometime prior to the rezoning of the Young Farm. It seems to us, however, that this is a shaft which falls far short of the mark.
The test, of course, is not necessarily whether Judge Foster, by reason of his position and prestige, was able to achieve a result which another might not have accomplished, but rather whether a reasonable man would be justified in suspecting that the result which Judge Foster achieved was achieved because of his position and prestige.
A second point raised at the first hearing springs from [470]*470counsel’s reading of the Commission’s finding 11 as a finding that Judge Foster was the agent of Monumental Properties, Inc., despite Judge Foster’s and Monumental’s categorical assertions to the contrary. In point of fact, the Commission found that “Judge Foster gave the appearance of acting as the ‘agent’ for Monumental Properties, and/or as a joint adventurer with it in the proposed project.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on our independent review of the record, we think that the Commission’s finding in this regard was supported by clear and convincing evidence. From the moment that Monumental became interested in the transaction, and continuing until the conditions which it had imposed were met, Judge Foster first made possible the assumption that Monumental’s role was that of his financial backer, and later gave the impression that his undertaking was a joint one with Monumental. Such was clearly not the case, since once it became apparent to him that Monumental would exercise its option, Judge Foster’s interest was merely that of a mortgagee, and that of the owner of the 12 acres which he planned to give to the City.
At the second hearing, Judge Foster’s counsel took the position that the Canons and Rules adopted by our Rule 1231, effective 1 July 1971, were inapplicable to any conduct prior to the effective date of that Rule.
It seems to us that there are two answers to this argument. The first is that it has been possible to discipline a Maryland judge for “misconduct while in office” or “conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice” since November, 1966, when sections 4A and 4B were first added to Article IV of the Constitution.12 It is significant that the Supreme Court of California took this view in Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 281-84, 515 P. 2d 1, 8-9, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201, 208-09 (1973), [471]*471and that the same holding was at least implicit in this Court’s decision in In re Diener & Broccolino, supra. That Judge Foster was Chairman of the Judicial Conference in 1970, the year in which the American Bar Canons were adopted in principle, as well as a member of the first Commission on Judicial Disabilities, should not be overlooked.
While “conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice,” Constitution, art. IV, § 4B (b), is difficult of definition, In re Diener & Broccolino, supra, 268 Md. at 671, 304 A. 2d at 594, Judge Foster could have found objective standards in the Canons of Judicial Ethics which had been formulated by the American Bar Association as well as in the body of opinions of the Association’s Standing Committee on Professional Ethics, and could readily have assayed his plans against these standards. See In re Lombard, 242 Md. 202, 218 A. 2d 208 (1966); cf. Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R. E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 120, 208 A. 2d 74, 88, 699, cert. denied, 382 U. S. 843 (1965).
A similar point was made in In re Troy, Mass., 300 N.E.2d 159, 189-90 (1973), because the new American Bar Code of Judicial Conduct did not become effective in Massachusetts until 1 January 1973. The Supreme Judicial Court dealt with the contention in similar fashion:
“The conduct of Judge Troy is fairly to be assessed by reference to the Canons of Judicial Ethics which, in the period in which he served as a judge, stood as a generally accepted guide. These canons, adopted by the American Bar Association in 1924 . . . stated, ‘A judge should avoid giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing the power or prestige of his office to persuade or coerce others to patronize or contribute, either to the success of private business ventures, or to charitable enterprises. He should, therefore, not enter into such private business . . . nor . . . enter into any business relation which, in the normal course of events reasonably to be [472]*472expected, might bring his personal interest into conflict with the impartial performance of his official duties’ (Canon 25). These canons of long standing are echoed in the Code of Judicial Conduct effective in this Commonwealth under court rule on January 1,1973 . . . .”
Assuming, without deciding, that Judge Foster is right when, he says that his conduct was not regulated by our Canons and Rules before they became effective on 1 July 1971, there remains another hurdle to clear. It should have been apparent to him that his activity after that date must be circumspect. Rule 15 (formerly Rule 14) provides for the creation of a Judicial Ethics Committee, a committee authorized to issue advisory opinions which could be relied upon by any judge who took the precaution of seeking a protective cloak, if, indeed, one would be available.13
Judge Foster was no novice in this field. In addition to his service on the first Judicial Disabilities Commission, he had been active in the American Bar Association, and in the National Conference of Trial Judges, where he had served as president. Why he remained insensitive to his problem is [473]*473difficult to fathom, particularly after Mr. Luetkemeyer’s inquiry at the threshold of the negotiation.
By way of illustration, Canons 5C (1) and 5C (2) of the American Bar Association’s new Code of Judicial Conduct (adopted 16 August 1972) are addressed to financial and business dealings and the holding and management of investments by a judge:
“(1) A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on his impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties, exploit his judicial position, or involve him in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court on which he serves.
“(2) Subject to the requirements of subsection (1), a judge may hold and manage investments, including real estate, and engage in other remunerative activity, but should not serve as an officer, director, manager, advisor, or employee of any business.”
Professor E. Wayne Thode, who was the Reporter for the Special Committee which formulated the Code, makes the following comment in E. W. Thode, Reporter’s Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct 80-81 (1973):
“Old Canons 24 and 25, setting the standards for a judge’s business activities, do not forbid engaging in business activities; they merely caution against obligations that are inconsistent with judicial duties and against ‘such a course of conduct, as would justify such suspicion [that the judge was utilizing the power or prestige of his office to persuade or coerce others to patronize a private business].’ ”
“Despite having received some pleas for continuing the old standards, the Committee [474]*474remained steadfast in its opinion that the old standards are too permissive. Subsection C (1) of Canon 5 of the Code provides that a judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on his impartiality or that interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties. These two general standards are followed by two others that relate directly to the connection between the judicial office and a judge’s business activities. A judge should not exploit his judicial position to gain a business advantage, nor should he engage in business dealings that would involve him in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to appear in his court. The aim is to prevent the appearance to litigants, lawyers, and the public that patronizing the business in which a judge is actively involved will work to the advantage of the litigant, or that failure to patronize the business will work to his disadvantage. Canon 5C (2) states, furthermore, that a judge should not serve as an officer, director, manager, advisor, or employee of any business.”
It would seem that as regards investments in real estate, the critical question is whether a judge cap maintain a low profile. This is reflected in Advisory Opinion No. 30, 18 February 1974, issued by the- Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, which says in part:
“A judge may hold and manage investments, including real estate, subject to the limitations of Canon 5C (1). He should not, however, personally manage or operate any business, including a farm or ranch. This would not preclude his participation in decisions with respect to the purchase, sale and use of land, the purchase of equipment and supplies, or the sale of farm produce or livestock from a farm or ranch which he owns but is operated by a farm manager or hired man.” 42 U.S.L.W. 2495 (Mar. 26,1974).
[475]*475The suggestion that a judge may establish policy and participate in decisions, while actual management is left to others, would surely have an a fortiori application to any development of real estate for speculative purposes.
The anomaly in this case is that Judge Foster, although the American Bar Association’s Code of Judicial Conduct had not been adopted at the time, charted what would have been under the Code a proper course only to abandon it almost immediately. For whatever reason, he arranged for Wheeler Holding to acquire the option. Had he then arranged for Wheeler Holding to retain counsel or a real estate consultant who could have then employed engineers and planners, there would have been no infringement on time which might otherwise have been devoted to the performance of judicial duties. Moreover, there is every likelihood that the development plan could have been presented to the City officials and approved by them without his interest ever becoming known. When he personally and publicly assumed a command responsibility in the furtherance of the project, he embarked on a course likely to collide with the prohibition contained in Rule 8 (now Rule 9).
In almost every case of this sort, there is no litmus test, but rather an elastic standard based on questions of degree. Certainly, when a course of conduct persists over a period of two years and involves personal appearances, continuing correspondence and frequent telephone calls, an atmosphere is created where ground is given for the reasonable suspicion referred to in Maryland Canon XXIV.
The second issue raised at reargument was the meaning of the phrase “reasonable suspicion” as used in Maryland Canon XXIV. While the phrase was not imported into the new Code of Judicial Conduct,14 it had a long history in Canon 25 of the American Bar Association Canons of Judicial Ethics. A dictionary definition of “suspicion” includes the “imagination or apprehension of something wrong or [476]*476hurtful, without proof, or on slight evidence,” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2542 (2d ed. 1944). Many years ago, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin put it differently: “That state of mind which in a reasonable man would lead to inquiry is called mere ‘suspicion,’ ” Stuart v. Farmers Bank, 137 Wis. 66, 73, 117 N. W. 820, 822 (1908).
We do not find the phrase any more nebulous or less objective than the reasonable and prudent man test which has been a part of our negligence law for centuries.
[477]*477Given a certain set of facts, would a reasonable person be justified in suspecting that a judge might be “utilizing the power or prestige of his office to persuade . . . others to . . . contribute ... to the success of private business ventures . . .”? We do not look upon this as too evanescent to form the basis of a standard against which a course of conduct may be tested. Nor do we find the standard unconstitutionally vague, see Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608, 614-15 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (provision of Pennsylvania Constitution permitting removal of judges for, inter alia, “misconduct in office” not unconstitutionally vague), and Sarisohn v. Appellate Division, 265 F. Supp. 455, 458-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (reaching a result similar to that reached in Reiser where New York Constitution permitted removal of a judge “for cause”). In Sarisohn, Judge Bartels said in the course of his opinion:
[476]*476“The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard of behavior. Yet the infinite variety of situations which may arise makes it impossible to fix definite rules in advance for all conceivable human conduct. The utmost that can be done is to devise something in the nature of a formula, the application of which in each particular case must be left to the jury, or to the court. The standard of conduct which the community demands must be an external and objective one, rather than the individual judgment, good or bad, of the particular actor; and it must be, so far as possible, the same for all persons, since the law can have no favorites. At the same time, it must make proper allowance for the risk apparent to the actor, for his capacity to meet it, and for the circumstances under which he must act.
“The courts have dealt with this very difficult problem by creating a fictitious person, who never has existed on land or sea: the ‘reasonable man of ordinary prudence.’ Sometimes be is described as a reasonable man, or a prudent man, or a man of average prudence, or a man of ordinary sense using ordinary care and skill. It is evident that all such phrases are intended to mean very much the same thing. The actor is required to do what such an ideal individual would be supposed to do in his place.” W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 32, at 149-50 (4th ed. 1971).
[477]*477“The words ‘for cause’ mean for a cause to be enumerated and specified in each particular instance so that the defendant may be duly notified and adequately prepared to defend the charges. It does not mean that a judge may be removed for ‘cause’ without more and without an enumeration of the charges constituting the alleged ‘cause.’ It would be impossible to enumerate in any statute all the possible grounds and circumstances justifying the removal of a judicial officer. Guidelines may be found in the Canons of Ethics, applicable to both attorneys and judges, adopted by the American Bar Association and other bar associations, and also in the general moral and ethical standards expected of judicial officers by the community. ‘For cause’ has been defined in several cases involving the removal of judicial officers and they provide a reasonable person with a competent definition of this phrase.” 265 F. Supp. at 458 (footnotes omitted).
See also Napolitano v. Ward, 317 F. Supp. 79, 81 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Friedman v. State, 24 N.Y.2d 528, 249 N.E.2d 369, 301 N.Y.S.2d 484, modified, 25 N.Y.2d 905, 252 N.E.2d 131, 304 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1969), appeal dismissed, 397 U. S. 317 (1970); [478]*478cf. Lehmann v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 263 U. S. 394, 398 (1923); Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F. 2d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'g 317 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. Ill. 1970), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1037 (1972), rehearing denied, 410 U. S. 947 (1973).
While we have found all of the Commission’s findings to be supported by clear and convincing evidence, it is our view that only findings 3-7 and 11-12 are relevant to the Commission’s conclusion that there was a violation of Maryland Canon XXIV and Maryland Rule 8 (now Rule 9).
For the reasons set forth, it is this 29th day of April, 1971+ by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, ordered that the recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Disabilities be, and it is hereby, accepted; and it is further ordered that Judge Dulany Foster be, and he is hereby, censured.