in Re F.N. Williams, Sr., and Jared Woodfill

470 S.W.3d 819, 58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1564, 2015 WL 4931372, 2015 Tex. LEXIS 749
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 19, 2015
DocketNO. 15-0581
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 470 S.W.3d 819 (in Re F.N. Williams, Sr., and Jared Woodfill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
in Re F.N. Williams, Sr., and Jared Woodfill, 470 S.W.3d 819, 58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1564, 2015 WL 4931372, 2015 Tex. LEXIS 749 (Tex. 2015).

Opinion

PER curiam:

This case involves yet another mandamus proceeding concerning the City of Houston’s equal rights ordinance, the referendum petition calling for its repeal, and the City Council’s duties in response. See In re Woodfill, 470 S.W.3d 473, 481, 2015 WL 4498229, at *7 (Tex.2015) (per curiam) (directing the City Council to comply with its ministerial duties and either repeal the ordinance or submit it to popular vote). Though the ordinance is controversial, the law governing the City Council’s duties is clear. Our decision rests not on our views on the ordinance — a political issue the citizens of Houston must decide — but on the clear dictates of the City Charter. The City Council must comply with its own laws regarding the handling of a referendum petition and any resulting election.

When the law imposes a ministerial duty on the City Council and the City Council does not comply, and there is no adequate remedy by appeal, mandamus may issue. Id. at 475-76, 2015 WL 4498229, at *1.

Pursuant to a citizen-initiated referendum petition, the Houston City Council ordered that the ordinance be submitted to voters in the upcoming November 2015 election. The City Council chose to describe the issue on the ballot as follows:

PROPOSITION NO. 1

[Relating to the Houston Equal Rights Ordinance.]

Shall the City of Houston repeal the Houston Equal Rights Ordinance, Ord. No.2014-530, which prohibits discrimination in city employment and city services, city contracts, public accommodations, private employment, and housing based on an individuals sex, race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, familial status, marital status, military status, religion, disability, sexual orientation, genetic information, gender identity, or pregnancy?

The ballot will allow voters to choose between “Yes” and “No” when voting on this proposition.

The Relators — two signers of the referendum petition — contest this wording. They urge that the City Charter requires an up or down vote on the ordinance itself rather than a vote on its “repeal.” They also assert that the phrase “Houston Equal Rights Ordinance” should not be on the ballot. The City responds that this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant mandamus relief and interfere with the ongoing election process or to enjoin the City from *821 using the phrase “Houston Equal Rights Ordinance” on the ballot. The City argues the Charter gives it discretion to submit the repeal of the ordinance — rather than the ordinance itself — to the voters, and the City may identify the ordinance as the “Houston Equal Rights Ordinance.”

The Texas Election Code confers jurisdiction on this Court to “issue a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of any duty imposed by law in connection with the holding of an election.” Tex. Elec. Code § 273.061. In Blum v. Lanier, we held that signers of a petition may seek injunctive relief to correct deficiencies in the ballot language “if the matter is one that can be judicially resolved ... without delaying the election.” 997 S.W.2d 259, 263-64 (Tex.1999). Although that case involved injunctive relief, the reasoning also applies to mandamus proceedings. See id. at 262 (relying on cases granting mandamus relief when holding the petition signers had standing to seek injunctive relief).

Although the Relators did not seek mandamus first in the court of appeals, we note “the imminence of the election places this case within the narrow class of cases in which resort to the court of appeals is excused.” Bird v. Rothstein, 930 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. 1996) (orig.proceeding); see also Tex. R. App. P. 52.3(e). Indeed, for the same compelling reason that we exercise jurisdiction even though mandamus relief was not first sought in the court of appeals, we also immediately grant relief without requesting additional briefs on the merits. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(b).

The City Council adopted the current ballot language on August 5, 2015. Two days later, the Relators petitioned for emergency and mandamus relief, averring that the Houston Voter Registrar requires final ballot language for printing no later than August 31, 2015, for the election on November 3, 2015, and that if this Court grants relief, the City Council should have time to meet and adopt revised language. The City Council filed a response but did not contest the deadlines identified by the Relators. In the past, we have granted relief without requesting additional briefing — especially in election cases — when time is critical, the issues are clear, and all parties have had a chance to respond. See, e.g., In re Palomo, 366 S.W.3d 193, 194 (Tex.2012) (per curiam) (noting that the Court granted mandamus relief “without opinion so as not to delay printing of the ballots”); In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 538, 543 (Tex. 2006) (conditionally granting mandamus relief fourteen days after petition was filed); In re Fitzgerald, 140 S.W.3d 380, 381 (Tex.2004) (per cu-riam) (conditionally granting mandamus relief three days after petition was filed); In re Sanchez, 81 S.W.3d 794, 795 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (noting that mandamus relief was conditionally granted with opinion to follow). Such situations are infrequent, but when prompt action is required, we may act accordingly.

Mandamus may issue to compel public officials to perform ministerial acts, as well as “to correct a clear abuse of discretion by a public official.” Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex.1991). “An act is ministerial when the law clearly spells out the duty to be performed by the official with sufficient certainty that nothing is left to the exercise of discretion.” Id.

Cities “generally have broad discretion in wording propositions” on the ballot. Dacus v. Parker, 466 S.W.3d 820, 826 (Tex.2015). State or local laws, how *822 ever, may limit this discretion. See id. at 828. The common law also limits it, demanding that the ballot “substantially submit the measure with definiteness and certainty” by identifying the measure’s chief features and character and purpose. Id. at 826.

In this case, the Houston Charter outlines the City Council’s duties. Once a referendum petition and certification properly invoke the City Council’s duties, then the City Council

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Manuel O. Moreno v. the State of Texas
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2024
In Re: David Landersman v. the State of Texas
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2024
in Re Reynaldo Gonzalez Jr.
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2022
in Re the Honorable Robert 'Bobby' Bell
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2021
in Re Cleo Petricek
Texas Supreme Court, 2021
in Re the Green Party of Texas
Texas Supreme Court, 2020
in Re Nelson Linder
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2019
in Re: Bruce Bishop
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2018
In re Dorn
471 S.W.3d 823 (Texas Supreme Court, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
470 S.W.3d 819, 58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1564, 2015 WL 4931372, 2015 Tex. LEXIS 749, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-fn-williams-sr-and-jared-woodfill-tex-2015.