In Re Fleming

349 B.R. 444, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1185, 2006 WL 2529587
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedJune 30, 2006
Docket14-05777
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 349 B.R. 444 (In Re Fleming) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Fleming, 349 B.R. 444, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1185, 2006 WL 2529587 (S.C. 2006).

Opinion

ORDER

JOHN E. WAITES, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter comes before the Court for confirmation of a proposed Chapter 13 plan filed by Yvonne Jefferson Fleming and Kirt Levern Fleming (“Debtors”) and the objection of Debtors’ Chapter 13 Trustee (“Trustee”). Based upon the facts of the case and applicable law, this Court makes the following Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. 1

*446 FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Debtors were debtors in a prior bankruptcy case that was pending within the year before the filing of this case and which was dismissed on December 15, 2005.

2. Debtors filed this case under Chapter 18 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 5, 2006. According to 11 U.S.C. § 862(c)(3)(A), 2 the automatic stay in Debtors’ case was scheduled to expire thirty days after the petition date unless extended pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(B). See In re Jupiter (Jupiter I), 344 B.R. 754, 761-62 (Bankr.D.S.C.2006) (interpreting § 362(c)(3)(A) as providing for a complete termination of the automatic stay); In re Jumpp, 344 B.R. 21 (Bankr.D.Mass.2006) (finding the automatic stay terminates with respect to property of the estate under § 362(c)(3)(A)).

3. Debtors timely moved to extend the automatic stay; however, they failed to prosecute the motion and the motion was therefore denied.

4. The automatic stay terminated on April 4, 2006 pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(A).

5. Due to the termination of the automatic stay, the Trustee opposes the confirmation of Debtors’ proposed Chapter 13 plan. In stating his objection at the confirmation hearing, the Trustee acknowledged that Debtors’ proposed plan met the requirements of § 1325; however, he is concerned that the absence of the automatic stay would expose property of the estate to collection efforts during the administration of the plan and thus disrupt the order of distributions set forth in the plan. In addition, the Trustee cites language in Debtors’ plan, modeled after the form plan required in this District by SC LBR 3015-1, which may effect distribution in light of the absence of the automatic stay. 3

6. The following language is included in Debtors’ proposed plan and the form plan required in this District:

Any creditor holding a claim secured by property which is removed from the protection of the automatic stay, whether by judicial action, voluntary surrender, or through operation of the plan, will receive no further distribution from the chapter 13 trustee, unless an itemized proof of claim for any deficiency is filed within a reasonable time after the removal of the property from the protection of the automatic stay.

See SC LBR 3015-1, Exhibit A.

7. Debtors’ creditors did not object to confirmation.

8. Debtors argue that the lack of the automatic stay is not sufficient grounds to deny confirmation.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A review of the Bankruptcy Code indicates that the existence of the automatic stay is not a prerequisite to the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (the protection of automatic stay is not listed as a requirement for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan). The plain language of § 1325(a) mandates confirmation if Debtors meet the nine requirements set forth therein. Congress did not mandate the dismissal of a case or the *447 denial of confirmation if the automatic stay terminated prior to confirmation pursuant to § 362(c)(3) or (4) and therefore the Court finds that the termination of the automatic stay does not necessarily deprive a debtor of the right to continue under Chapter 13, obtain confirmation of a plan, and ultimately obtain a discharge if the debtor complies with the terms of the plan. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (holding that when the language of a statute is clear, courts should not substitute their judgment for that of Congress and should enforce the statute according to its terms).

In addition to the ability of a debt- or to confirm a plan in the absence of a stay, confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan may prevent a creditor, who obtained relief from the automatic stay prior to confirmation, from exercising state law rights after confirmation to the extent that the provisions of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan conflict with and/or replace the creditor’s pre-confirmation rights. See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (“The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.”). See also, In re Kurtzahn, 342 B.R. 581, 585-87 (Bankr.D.Minn.2006) (holding, in a post Reform Act case where the automatic stay terminated pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(A) but the debtor obtained confirmation, that “[cjonfirmation thus bound [creditor] to its due under the plan’s terms, and not according to its pre-petition contractual expectancies-and any previously-effective termination of the stay as it had applied to [creditor] did not affect that.”); In re Sullivan, 321 B.R. 306, 308 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2005) (holding “[i]n the instant case, although [creditor] obtained relief from the automatic stay, it failed to object or appeal from the Confirmation Order. Accordingly, [creditor] is bound by the Confirmation Order.”).

Finally, regarding the plan provisions directing the Trustee to pay secured creditors and the language limiting his ability to pay absent a stay, the Court finds no inconsistency. The form plan language was initially designed only to provide direction to the Trustee and other parties in the event that a secured creditor’s collateral is removed from the stay “by judicial action, voluntary surrender, or through operation of the plan” after a plan is confirmed because such an event materially alters the distribution to creditors. This language is intended to allow the Trustee to adjust distributions without a formal post-confirmation plan amendment. The initial inclusion of this language in the form plan neither anticipated the changes by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 nor was intended to address the termination of the stay under § 362(c)(3) or (4) prior to confirmation. Therefore, the plan language referenced herein does not prevent distributions to secured creditors, despite the termination of the stay prior to confirmation pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(A).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
349 B.R. 444, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1185, 2006 WL 2529587, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-fleming-scb-2006.