In re Fisch

188 A.D. 525, 177 N.Y.S. 338, 1919 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7820
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 3, 1919
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 188 A.D. 525 (In re Fisch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Fisch, 188 A.D. 525, 177 N.Y.S. 338, 1919 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7820 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1919).

Opinion

Clarke, P. J.:

The respondent was admitted to the bar at a term of the Appellate Division, First Department, in November, 1912. He is charged with having been guilty of misconduct as an attorney at law as follows:

In 1915 the Workmen’s Compensation Commission made an award to one Philip Dreisner for personal injuries suffered by him. Thereafter the Commission upon the joint request of Dreisner and his employer’s insurance company directed a rehearing in the matter. Dreisner then retained the respondent to act as his attorney before the Commissioners and signed an agreement whereby he agreed to pay the respondent fifty per cent of any amount recovered in his behalf. While the case was pending before the Commission and after several hearings in the matter had been held the respondent learned that the Workmen’s Compensation Law contained the following provision: Claims for legal services in connection with any claim arising under this chapter, and claims for services or treatment rendered or supplies furnished pursuant to section thirteen of this chapter, shall not be enforceable unless, approved by the Commission. If so approved, such claim or claims shall become a lien upon the compensation awarded, but shall be paid therefrom only in the manner fixed by the Commission.” (Consol. Laws, chap. 67 [Laws of 1914, chap. 41], § 24.)*

The respondent then informed Dreisner that he would not [527]*527continue to act as his attorney unless he received some security or guaranty that he would receive fifty per cent of the recovery in accordance with the retainer above referred to. Finally Harry Dresiner, the brother of Philip Dreisner, having cash on deposit in the bank, was induced by the respondent to enter into an agreement of which the following is a copy:

“ Agreement made between Harry Dreisner and Abraham M. Fisch, party of the second part as follows:
“ I, Harry Dreisner hereby retain Mr. Fisch as a lawyer for my brother, Philip Dreisner, to represent him in the Compensation Commission and for services to be rendered, I hereby agree to personally pay the said Abraham M. Fisch a sum equivalent to one-half of any award that may be made to my brother. Mr. Fisch is to receive no pay unless my brother Philip Dreisner receives an award from the Compensation Commission. I personally agree to pay the said 50% to Mr. Fisch and to that end I have deposited in the German Savings Bank, this 14th day of May, 1917, the sum of Five hundred dollars, as evidence of my intention to pay Mr. Fisch, and that this five hundred dollars now in the said bank in my name is held in trust in my name for Mr. Fsch, should Mr. Fisch succeed in securing an award. If the award secured amounts to such a sum that the fee due Mr. Fisch will be more than $500 then and in that event I agree to pay personally in addition to the moneys in the bank the difference between what Mr. Fisch is to receive under this retainer and the amount deposited by me. If the award should be of such a sum that Mr. Fisch’s fee under this retainer is less than $500 then and in that event Mr. Fisch is not to receive the $500 on deposit and only such portion of the $500 on deposit as he is entitled to. The said money is held in the name of Mr. Dreisner in trust for Mr. Fisch and is not to be withdrawn from the bank by Mr. Harry Dreisner unless my brother has been unsuccessful in securing the award.
“ Dated, New York, May 17, 1917.”

The Commission subsequently awarded Philip Dreisner the sum of $864.90 and fixed his attorney’s fee at the sum of $150, which sum thereafter was paid to the respondent. The respondent credited this amount on account of the moneys due [528]*528him. pursuant to the terms of his agreement with Harry Dreisner and collected the balance due from Philip Dreisner under the terms of the contract without the approval of the Compensation Commission. It was understood between the Dreisners and the respondent that the fifty per cent of the recovery which the respondent was to receive would ultimately be paid by respondent’s client, Philip Dreisner, out of the money awarded him by the Compensation Commission.

It is charged that after the respondent had entered upon the performance of his duties as attorney for Philip Dreisner before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and after his client’s case had been partly tried, the respondent refused to continue to represent his client unless the agreement above set forth was executed and delivered to respondent by his client’s brother and that said agreement was prepared by the respondent with full knowledge of section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law solely for the purpose of evading the provisions of said section.

In his answer the respondent states that after the -fifty per cent retainer for appearing for Philip Dreisner before the Compensation Commission was signed, respondent first learned of the fact that there was a provision in the Workmen’s Compensation Law to the effect that any agreement for the payment of a fee by an injured person must be approved by the Compensation Commission; that he then sent for Philip Dreisner and told him that the Compensation Commission would not allow fifty per cent; that they would not allow an attorney to bind his client as to a certain fee to be received by said attorney, and respondent told Mr. Dreisner of a personal experience that he had in one or two cases where in one case he got nothing and in another case the Compensation Commission awarded him $40. He explained to Dreisner that the claim was an old one and that in view of the fact that he had been turned down by the Commission and that other lawyers had refused to take it, that the chances of recovery were not bright and that it would not pay respondent to attempt to collect money for the injured person if in the end he would only receive a certain sum of money from the Commission if he was successful and nothing if he was unsuccessful. Respondent further explained that the amount of money paid by the Compensation [529]*529Commission to an attorney does not represent a sufficient sum for the services rendered, and that he would have to secure a business man who would personally retain respondent and pay him fifty per cent of any money recovered for the injury. He further says that after some attempt to secure a business man who would personally retain the respondent he was notified by both brothers that they could not secure such a business man, whereupon respondent told them that he could not undertake the case. A few days thereafter both brothers called at the home of respondent and Harry Dreisner asked respondent if it would be acceptable to respondent for him to personally undertake to pay respondent, as he had about $2,000 in the bank and was not married and was making good wages, as he explained, and that he was willing to show his good faith by depositing a sum of money in the bank and letting respondent have the bank book. [Respondent replied that the arrangement would be satisfactory and that he would prepare a retainer and that he thereupon prepared the retainer set forth in the petition. He' further states: After the claim of Philip Dreisner was tried before the Compensation Commission the question of attorney’s fees came up for discussion and respondent stated to the Commission that he had been retained personally by Harry Dreisner, the brother of the injured man and that he did not intend to receive any moneys from Philip Dreisner.

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Bluebook (online)
188 A.D. 525, 177 N.Y.S. 338, 1919 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7820, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-fisch-nyappdiv-1919.