In re Eventbrite, Inc. Securities Litigation

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedApril 28, 2020
Docket5:19-cv-02019
StatusUnknown

This text of In re Eventbrite, Inc. Securities Litigation (In re Eventbrite, Inc. Securities Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Eventbrite, Inc. Securities Litigation, (N.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 SAN JOSE DIVISION 8 IN RE EVENTBRITE, INC. SECURITIES 9 LITIGATION Case No. 5:18-cv-02019-EJD 10 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE 1] TO AMEND %L Re: Dkt. No. 42

14 This class action arises out of Defendants’ alleged violations of Section 11 and 15 of the © 3 15 || Securities Act of 1933, Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K, and Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the 16 Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Lead Plaintiffs Michael Gomes, Melvin Pastores, Mohit Uppal,

17 || and Bruce Bones (“Plaintiffs”) purchased Eventbrite securities during Eventbrite’s September Z 18 || 2018 Initial Public Offering (“IPO”).' Plaintiffs contend that Defendants made misleading 19 || statements to and concealed known risks from investors. The Complaint names multiple 20 || defendants: (1) Eventbrite, (2) Individual Defendants Julia Hartz (the Chief Executive Officer 21 “CEO” and a director), Randy Befumo (the Chief Financial Officer “CFO”), Andrew Dreskin (a 22 || director), Katherine August-deWilde (a director), Roelof Botha (a director), Kevin Hartz (a 23 || director), Sean P. Moriarty (a director), Lorrie M. Norrington (a director), Helen Riley (a director), 24 || and Steffan C. Tomlinson (a director), and (3) Underwriter Defendants Goldman Sachs & Co. 25 || LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Allen & Company LLC, RBC Capital Markets, LLC, SunTrust 26 27 ' Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they purchased the securities between September 20, 2018 and May 1, 2019 (“the Class Period”). 28 Case No.: 5:19-cv-02019-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

1 Robinson Humphrey, Inc., and Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc. 2 Defendant Eventbrite and Individual Defendants” have filed a motion to dismiss the 3 || lawsuit arguing that Plaintiffs have not met the heightened pleading requirements applicable in 4 || securities fraud cases. Having considered the Parties’ papers, the Court agrees and GRANTS 5 || Defendants’ motion to dismiss.° 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 A. Factual Background 8 Eventbrite hosts a platform through which live event creators can plan for, market, and sell 9 || tickets to their events. Amended Class Action Complaint (“Compl.”) § 1, Dkt. No. 40. Unlike 10 || Eventbrite’s competitors, whose platforms are focused on a specific industry, Eventbrite serves 1] four core markets—festivals, music, registration events, and endurance events—tregardless of their 12 || subject-matter. See id. J§ 3, 46, 51-52, 54. 13 Pre-IPO. In September 2017, about one year before the IPO, Eventbrite acquired 14 || Ticketfly, LLC (“Ticketfly”), a competitor, from Pandora Media, Inc. for $201.1 million. Jd. § 4. 3 15 || Eventbrite financed the acquisition through a mixture of debt and equity. /d. J§ 147-61. The a 16 || financing was acquired using high interest rates (as high as 12%), stock options, and a $50 million 3 17 || note to Pandora. See J§ 151, 153, 161. Plaintiffs allege that this threatened to dilute investors 18 ownership interests. /d. 99 157-61. 19 Plaintiffs further argue that the Ticketfly acquisition was botched. According to Plaintiffs, 20 || there are several important differences between the Ticketfly and Eventbrite platforms. In contrast 21 to Eventbrite, which serves a diverse range of events across a range of countries, Ticketfly limits 22 || its services to independent music venues and festivals in North America. /d. This was 23 “Eventbrite’s largest ever acquisition” and a “substantial purpose” of the acquisition was to 24 || acquire Ticketfly’s customers and relationships. /d. 9 14, 48-49. 25 26 * Underwriter Defendants join Defendant Eventbrite and Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss and reply. See Dkt. Nos. 45, 55. 27 > Pursuant to N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), this Court found this motion suitable for consideration without oral argument. See Dkt. 58. 28 Case No.: 5:19-cv-02019-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

1 Plaintiffs allege that Eventbrite began experiencing problems after the Ticketfly 2 || acquisition. Specifically, because Eventbrite’s platform was so different from Ticketfly’s, 3 Eventbrite was unable to quickly integrate Ticketfly’s customers and relationships into the 4 || Eventbrite platform. Eventbrite’s platform operates as follows: a customer can use Eventbrite’s 5 || platform to sell or offer tickets for various events. See id. § 60. The tickets are sold or offered 6 || directly on Eventbrite’s platform. /d. § 56. This means that whenever an event-attendee RSVPs 7 || for an event (or buys tickets for that event), the event-attendee must use Eventbrite’s platform, 8 || which provides Eventbrite with free advertising. /d. 956. Eventbrite customers can plan their 9 || event for free, so long as they are not charging an admission fee. /d. § 57-58. If, however, 10 || customers want to charge for admission or if they want more services, they can purchase an 11 essential, professional, or premium package. /d. 959. While each package provides different 12 || features, customers may not customize the package. /d. This, Plaintiffs’ argue, shows that 13 || Eventbrite is not designed to reach professional event organizers. Jd. 58. 14 In most markets, Eventbrite is the only large-scale online ticketing solution. /d. □ 60. 3 15 || However, the independent music venue market, in which Ticketfly operates, is different—ain that a 16 || market, there are a number of independent music venue online ticketing options. For instance, 3 17 || TicketWeb, which operates under the Ticketmaster brand, is an online ticketing option for 18 independent music venues. /d. § 61. Other competitors include tickets.com, StubHub, VividSeats, 19 || and ShowClix. /d. Because the independent music venue market is more competitive and venues 20 || have more options to choose from, Ticketfly must work harder to attract and retain customers. □□□ 21 Thus, unlike Eventbrite, Ticketfly provides its customers with individual software solutions and 22 || individual assistance, including personalized account management. /d. 44 63, 65. Accordingly, 23 Ticketfly’s platform operates differently from Eventbrite’s. /d. § 65 (“Ticketfly had a different 24 || model where their sales reps were also account managers.”’). 25 26 27 28 Case No.: 5:19-cv-02019-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

1 Plaintiffs use two confidential, former employees (“FEs”)* to support their claim that 2 || Eventbrite knew, long before the IPO, that migrating Ticketfly customers to Eventbrite’s platform 3 || would be a “monumental task.” Jd. § 66. FE 1 was employed by Eventbrite between 2016 and 4 || June 2018, as a Marketing Operations/Revenue Operations Analyst, at the San Francisco office. 5 || Id. 43. FE 1’s responsibilities were to monitor Eventbrite’s sales pipeline and complete analysis 6 || on things like site traffic, forecasting, and open deals. /d. He allegedly interacted with a host of 7 || Ticketfly employees. /d. FE 2 was a Ticketfly Senior Festival Success Specialist from August 8 |} 2011 through November 2018. /d. 44. FE 2’s job was to sell Ticketfly’s services to new and 9 || existing clients and retain existing clients. /d. According to FE 2, Eventbrite began attempting to 10 || migrate customers immediately after the Ticketfly acquisition closed. /d. § 67. 11 To support the migration, Eventbrite allegedly attempted to determine which Ticketfly 12 || features customers used. /d. § 68. According to FE 2, all Ticketfly salespersons had to conduct a 13 “gap analysis” for each of their customers who contributed more than $10,000 in gross income. 14 || Id. The “gap analysis” aimed to rank Ticketfly functions that customers used and note any “gaps” 3 15 in the Eventbrite platform. /d.

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In re Eventbrite, Inc. Securities Litigation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-eventbrite-inc-securities-litigation-cand-2020.