In re: Estavan Capital LLC

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 1, 2015
• Docket: CC-15-1084-KiKuF
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED DEC 01 2015 SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK 1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 2 3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5 In re: ) BAP No. CC-15-1084-KiKuF ) 6 ESTAVAN CAPITAL LLC, ) Bk. No. 14-17882-RK ) 7 Debtor. ) ) 8 ) ESTAVAN CAPITAL LLC, ) 9 ) Appellant, ) 10 ) v. ) M E M O R A N D U M1 11 ) U.S. BANK NATIONAL ) 12 ASSOCIATION, Trustee for ) Lehman XS Trust, ) 13 Series 2007-15N, ) ) 14 Appellee. ) ______________________________) 15 Argued and Submitted on October 22, 2015, 16 at Los Angeles, California 17 Filed - December 1, 2015 18 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California 19 Honorable Robert N. Kwan, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 20 21 Appearances: Stanley D. Bowman argued for appellant Estavan Capital LLC; Leslie Marie Klott of the Law Offices 22 of Les Zieve argued for appellee U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for Lehman XS Trust, Series 23 2007-15N. 24 Before: KIRSCHER, KURTZ and FARIS, Bankruptcy Judges. 25 26 1 This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 27 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. See 9th 28 Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 Chapter 7 debtor Estavan Capital LLC appeals an order 2 granting the motion of U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee 3 for Lehman XS Trust, for annulment of the automatic stay under 4 § 362(d)(1)2 and in rem relief under § 362(d)(4). We AFFIRM. 5 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3 6 Estavan is a Wyoming limited liability company that was 7 formed for estate purposes and Nevine Carmelle is its managing 8 member. In 2005, Carmelle transferred her property located at 9 52 Via Brida, Rancho Santa Margarita, California (“Property”) to 10 Estavan. Two years later, Estavan transferred the Property back 11 to Carmelle so that she could use it as collateral for a $600,000 12 loan from Ocwen. 13 At some point, U.S. Bank acquired the loan from Ocwen and 14 held a first lien position on the Property based on a note secured 15 by a deed of trust. The servicer/trustee for the debt was Sage 16 Point Lender Services, LLC. On or about August 10, 2012, Carmelle 17 transferred title to the Property back to Estavan by Grant Deed. 18 Carmelle testified that she lived at the Property on and off 19 20 2 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section 21 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 22 Procedure. 23 3 The parties failed to include in the record on appeal some of the relevant documents; we have exercised our discretion to 24 reach the merits of the appeal by independently reviewing the bankruptcy court’s electronic docket and the imaged documents 25 attached thereto. See O’Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 955, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1988); Atwood v. 26 Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). Under Rule 201, Fed. R. Evid., courts may 27 take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file in federal or state courts. Harris v. 28 City of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2012).

-2- 1 between 1997 and 2014. In June 2014, a tenant moved in with 2 Carmelle. Estavan made the loan payments on the Property from 3 2005 until sometime in 2012, when Estavan defaulted on the loan 4 payments and the lender began refusing to accept payments. While 5 not in the record, the parties referenced both a notice of default 6 as well as a notice of a trustee’s sale. Estavan filed a 7 voluntary chapter 7 petition on August 21, 2013. “Ocwen loan 8 services LLC” was the only creditor listed on the creditor matrix. 9 That case was dismissed on September 11, 2013, for Estavan’s 10 failure to file all the documents required under Rules 1007 and 11 3015(b). Estavan was barred from filing another bankruptcy 12 petition for 180 days. 13 On April 24, 2014, Estavan’s attorney of record, Stanley 14 Bowman (“Bowman”) electronically filed another voluntary chapter 7 15 petition on behalf of Estavan. Just prior to filing the petition, 16 Bowman had his assistant telephone Sage Point to advise Sage Point 17 of Estavan’s imminent chapter 7 bankruptcy filing. Bowman and 18 Carmelle stood by the assistant’s desk when the assistant 19 allegedly telephoned Sage Point. 20 Estavan’s April 24, 2014, petition was signed by Carmelle as 21 Estavan’s authorized manager, declaring under penalty of perjury 22 that the information provided in the petition was true and 23 correct. After receiving a bankruptcy case number, Bowman had his 24 assistant again telephone Sage Point on April 24, 2014, but the 25 assistant was put on hold and the call was eventually 26 disconnected. 27 Bowman’s assistant then sent an email to Sage Point at an 28 email address allegedly obtained during the assistant’s first

-3- 1 telephone call to Sage Point. The email included Estavan’s name 2 and chapter 7 bankruptcy case number, but it did not include a 3 “TS number,”4 did not list Carmelle’s name and did not list the 4 address of the Property. Bowman did not receive a reply to the 5 email. Sage Point’s default assistant Stephanie Vasquez 6 (“Vasquez”) testified that she did not receive the email from 7 Bowman’s assistant and could not find it in Sage Point’s system 8 and further testified that Sage Point would not have given out her 9 email address but instead would have given a borrower Sage Point’s 10 fax number. 11 The creditor matrix filed with the petition lists three 12 creditors, including Sage Point with an address of “400 Exchange 13 Suite [blank]5, Irvine, CA 92602[,]” and the original lender, 14 “Ocwen loan services LLC, PO box 780, Waterloo,, LA 50704.”6 On 15 April 27, 2014, a notice of commencement of case was mailed to 16 creditors, setting forth deadlines and warnings against violating 17 the automatic stay. The notice was sent to Sage Point at “400 18 Exchange Suite [blank], Irvine, CA 92602-1340,” and was sent to 19 Ocwen at the address in Louisiana. Sage Point’s attorney, Ryan 20 Paul Spitalnick, who oversees and manages Sage Point’s day-to-day 21 operations, testified that Sage Point’s address is 400 Exchange, 22 Suite #110, Irvine, CA 92602, that Sage Point’s name is not on the 23 24 4 During oral argument, counsel explained that a “TS number” 25 is the trustee’s notice of sale number. 26 5 There is no suite number listed. 27 6 The zip code 50704 pertains to Waterloo, Iowa, the abbreviation for which is “IA.” “LA” is the abbreviation for the 28 State of Louisiana.

-4- 1 door of its suite,7 that it has no separate mailbox, and that Sage 2 Point’s mail must be delivered to the front desk inside 3 Suite #110. 4 In its chapter 7 petition, Estavan lists its street address 5 as “700 N. Pacific Coast Hwy, Suite 202A, Redondo Beach, CA 6 90277,” which is the same address listed for Bowman. Estavan did 7 not list its prior bankruptcy case on the petition, instead 8 stating “None” where required to disclose all prior bankruptcy 9 cases filed within the last 8 years.8 10 Estavan filed its schedules on May 8, 2014, listing the 11 Property as its sole asset. Estavan listed the current value of 12 Estavan’s interest in the Property as $456,000 and the amount of 13 secured claim thereon as $0.00. Estavan did not file schedules I 14 and J and disclosed no income or expenses on its statement of 15 financial affairs. 16 Estavan’s Schedule D listed two creditors holding secured 17 claims: Sage Point at an address of 400 Exchange, Suite [blank], 18 Irvine, CA 92602; and SBS Lien Services. Both secured claims were 19 listed at $0 and no detail was provided as to the nature of the 20 lien or value of the property subject to the lien. Ocwen was 21 listed on Schedule F as a creditor holding an unsecured 22 nonpriority claim in the amount of $0.00. U.S. Bank was not 23 24 7 The door to Suite 110 says “Trustee” on it. 25 8 Notice of Estavan’s prior bankruptcy was entered on the bankruptcy court’s docket on April 25, 2014. Carmelle had also 26 previously filed an individual chapter 13 bankruptcy case in 2009 under the name “Nezine Tadrous.” That case was converted to a 27 chapter 7 bankruptcy shortly after it was filed. Bowman was Carmelle’s attorney of record in her 2009 bankruptcy and was 28 Estavan’s attorney of record in its 2013 bankruptcy.

-5- 1 listed as a creditor on Estavan’s schedules. 2 On May 23, 2014, twenty nine days after Estavan filed its 3 second chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, Sage Point, as foreclosure 4 trustee, conducted a foreclosure sale of the Property. Following 5 the foreclosure sale, a trustee’s deed was recorded on June 3, 6 2014, in which Sage Point conveyed title of the Property to 7 U.S. Bank. On June 18, 2014, U.S. Bank served a notice to quit 8 addressed to “Nevine Carmelle and all unknown occupants” of the 9 Property. On July 15, 2014, U.S. Bank initiated an unlawful 10 detainer action in the state superior court of California against 11 “Nevine Carmelle, and Does 1 through 5.” 12 Thereafter, on August 22, 2014, U.S. Bank filed a motion 13 seeking relief from the automatic stay. The motion explains that 14 U.S. Bank acquired title to the Property by foreclosure sale 15 after Estavan’s second bankruptcy petition was filed and recorded 16 the deed as provided under state law, but before U.S. Bank knew of 17 the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Estavan opposed 18 U.S. Bank’s motion. 19 On September 29, 2014, at the case trustee’s request, 20 Estavan’s chapter 7 case was dismissed for its failure to appear 21 at a continued § 341 meeting of creditors.9 The order dismissing 22 the case vacated the stay and provided that pending motions were 23 moot and dismissed. However, in that order of dismissal, the 24 bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction on all issues under § 362. 25 9 Carmelle testified that neither she nor any of the other 26 members of Estavan attended the first meeting of creditors because one of the members was in surgery on that date. Carmelle attended 27 the next meeting of creditors, but did not attend the continued meeting of creditors because the foreclosure sale had already 28 occurred by that time.

-6- 1 On October 27, 2014, U.S. Bank filed an amended motion to 2 modify stay seeking relief from the automatic stay or, in the 3 alternative, an order confirming that the stay did not apply. 4 After repeating the allegations and requests for relief of its 5 original motion, U.S. Bank requested annulment of the stay 6 retroactive to the petition date in order to validate the 7 foreclosure sale. U.S. Bank similarly requested that its 8 postpetition acts to enforce its remedies not be deemed a 9 violation of the stay. Debtor opposed U.S. Bank’s amended motion. 10 A hearing on the amended motion was held on December 9, 2014, 11 January 13, 2015, and February 11, 2015. 12 On February 25, 2015, the bankruptcy court entered its 13 memorandum decision. After analyzing the twelve factors 14 identified in In re Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. 12, 25 (9th Cir. BAP 15 2003), the court concluded that relief for cause with retroactive 16 annulment of the stay should be granted under § 362(d)(1) and that 17 in rem relief should be granted under § 362(d)(4) “because of the 18 multiple bankruptcy case filings affecting the Property and the 19 petition in this case was intended to delay or hinder creditors.” 20 The court made specific findings regarding the telephone 21 calls allegedly made by Bowman’s assistant on April 24, 2014, the 22 email sent to Vasquez and the mailing to Sage Point, which lacked 23 a complete address. The court concluded that the testimony of 24 Bowman and Carmelle regarding the telephone calls was not credible 25 because both Bowman and Carmelle lacked personal knowledge as to 26 what number Bowman’s assistant dialed or with whom she spoke. The 27 court found it more likely than not that the email was delivered 28 to Vasquez at Sage Point, but further found that the email did not

-7- 1 contain sufficient context to connect Estavan with Carmelle’s 2 loan, which it was servicing for U.S. Bank. As for the mail 3 delivery of the bankruptcy notice, the court found an expert 4 witness’s testimony credible and concluded that Sage Point likely 5 received notice of Estavan’s bankruptcy filing, but that Estavan’s 6 initial filings failed to provide Sage Point with notice that its 7 enforcement actions regarding Carmelle’s loan and the Property 8 would have been affected by Estavan’s bankruptcy filing or the 9 automatic stay. 10 On March 6, 2015, the court entered its order granting 11 U.S. Bank’s amended motion for relief from stay under §§ 362(d)(1) 12 and § 362(d)(4) and retroactively terminated and annulled the stay 13 of § 362(a) to Estavan’s bankruptcy petition date. Estavan timely 14 appealed. 15 II. JURISDICTION 16 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 17 and 157(b)(2)(G). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158. 18 III. ISSUE 19 Did the bankruptcy court misapply the equitable factors 20 articulated in In re Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. 12 (9th Cir. 2003), when 21 it granted U.S. Bank retroactive relief from the automatic stay? 22 IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 23 Findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous 24 standard. Rule 8013. A factual finding is clearly erroneous if 25 the appellate court, after reviewing the record, has a firm and 26 definite conviction that a mistake has been committed. Anderson 27 v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). If two 28 views of the evidence are possible, the trial judge’s choice

-8- 1 between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Id. at 574. A trial 2 court’s finding that a witness is not credible is entitled to 3 special deference. Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 1078 n.8 (9th 4 Cir. 2002); Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573; In re Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. 5 at 18 (“The reviewing court must give due regard to the 6 opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of 7 the witnesses.”) 8 A decision to lift the automatic stay for cause under 9 § 362(d) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Groshong v. Sapp 10 (In re Mila, Inc.), 423 B.R. 537, 542 (9th Cir. BAP 2010); 11 In re Leisure Corp., 234 B.R. 916, 920 (9th Cir. BAP 1999); Mataya 12 v. Kissinger (In re Kissinger), 72 F.3d 107, 108-09 (9th Cir. 13 1995). A bankruptcy court's decision to grant retroactive relief 14 from the automatic stay is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 15 In re Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. at 18. A bankruptcy court abuses its 16 discretion if it applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the 17 correct legal standard, or if its factual findings are illogical, 18 implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn 19 from the facts in the record. In re First Yorkshire Holdings, 20 Inc., 470 B.R. 864, 868 (9th Cir. BAP 2012) (citing United States 21 v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc)); see 22 also TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 832 23 (9th Cir. 2011). 24 V. DISCUSSION 25 In its statement of issues, Estavan contends three issues 26 exist on appeal: 27 “1. Did the Trial Court err in granting Motion for Relief 28 From Stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1)?

-9- 1 2. Did the Trial Court err in granting Motion for Relief 2 From Stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4)? 3 3. Did the Trial Court err in annulling Debtor’s automatic 4 stay retroactive to the bankruptcy petition date?” 5 Estavan’s brief restates the issue as: “Did the Court abused 6 [sic] its discretion in granting Respondent’s motion requesting 7 retroactive annulment of the automatic stay Debtor obtained upon 8 the filing of its Chapter 7 bankruptcy?” Estavan’s brief on 9 appeal does not specifically address §§ 362(d)(1) or (4). We 10 therefore consider the first two issues raised in Estavan’s 11 statement of issues abandoned. See City of Emeryville v. 12 Robinson, 621 F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th Cir. 2010) (appellate courts in 13 this circuit “will not review issues which are not argued 14 specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief”); Branam 15 v. Crowder (In re Branam), 226 B.R. 45, 55 (9th Cir. BAP 1998), 16 aff’d, 205 F.3d 1350 (9th Cir. 1999) (an issue not adequately 17 addressed by appellant in his opening brief is deemed abandoned). 18 Estavan instead complains that the bankruptcy court erred because 19 it kept a scorecard rather than balancing the equities. 20 As a threshold matter, the burden of proof under § 362(d) on 21 the issue of the debtor’s equity in property rests with the moving 22 party, while the party opposing such relief has the burden of 23 proof on all other issues. § 362(g). Although Estavan alleged in 24 its opposition to U.S. Bank’s amended motion that equity existed 25 in the Property, equity was never an issue. Carmelle testified 26 that the loan debt was approximately $600,000 and Estavan listed 27 the current value of the Property as $456,000 on its Schedule A. 28 The record establishes that Estavan had no equity in the Property.

-10- 1 Once U.S. Bank established a prima facie case that cause existed 2 for relief under § 362(d)(1), the burden shifted to Estavan to 3 show that relief from the stay was not warranted. United States 4 v. Gould (In re Gould), 401 B.R. 415, 426 (9th Cir. BAP 2009); 5 Duvar Apt., Inc. v. FDIC (In re Duvar Apt., Inc.), 205 B.R. 196, 6 200 (9th Cir. BAP 1996). 7 Acts done in violation of the automatic stay are void, not 8 simply voidable. See Schwartz v. United States (In re Schwartz), 9 954 F.2d 569, 571, 575 (9th Cir. 1992). Section 362(d), however, 10 authorizes annulment of the automatic stay in order to validate 11 otherwise void acts. Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. Gurrola 12 (In re Gurrola), 328 B.R. 158, 172 (9th Cir. BAP 2005). 13 Determining whether cause exists to annul the stay is a 14 case-by-case inquiry based on a balance of the equities. Nat’l 15 Envtl. Waste Corp. v. City of Riverside (In re Nat’l Envtl. Waste 16 Corp.), 129 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 17 524 U.S. 952 (1998). In conducting this inquiry the bankruptcy 18 court, among other factors, should consider whether the creditor 19 knew of the bankruptcy when violating the stay and whether the 20 debtor’s conduct was unreasonable, inequitable or prejudicial to 21 the creditor. Nat’l Envtl. Waste Corp., 129 F.3d at 1055. 22 In Fjeldsted, we approved additional factors for 23 consideration in assessing the equities. The twelve nonexclusive 24 factors are: (1) number of filings; (2) whether, in a repeat 25 filing case, the circumstances indicate an intention to delay and 26 hinder creditors; (3) a weighing of the extent of prejudice to 27 creditors or third parties if the stay relief is not made 28 retroactive, including whether harm exists to a bona fide

-11- 1 purchaser; (4) the debtor’s overall good faith (totality of 2 circumstances test); (5) whether creditors knew of stay but 3 nonetheless took action, thus compounding the problem; (6) whether 4 the debtor has complied, and is otherwise complying, with the 5 Bankruptcy Code and Rules; (7) the relative ease of restoring 6 parties to the status quo ante; (8) the costs of annulment to 7 debtors and creditors; (9) how quickly creditors moved for 8 annulment, or how quickly debtor moved to set aside the sale or 9 violative conduct; (10) whether, after learning of the bankruptcy, 10 creditors proceeded to take steps in continued violation of the 11 stay, or whether they moved expeditiously to gain relief; 12 (11) whether annulment of the stay will cause irreparable injury 13 to the debtor; and (12) whether stay relief will promote judicial 14 economy or other efficiencies. Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. at 25. The 15 Panel in Fjeldsted cautioned that the twelve factors “are merely a 16 framework for analysis and not a scorecard,” and that “[i]n any 17 given case, one factor may so outweigh the others as to be 18 dispositive.” Id. 19 As noted earlier, Debtor argues that the bankruptcy court 20 ignored the Panel’s caution in Fjeldsted by keeping a scorecard 21 rather than balancing the equities. Debtor mischaracterizes the 22 bankruptcy court’s analysis under Fjeldsted. When reviewing for 23 abuse of discretion, as here, we will reverse only if we hold a 24 “definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a 25 clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a 26 weighing of the relevant factors.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 27 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 1996). We have no such conviction here. 28 The bankruptcy court’s detailed findings, as set forth in its

-12- 1 memorandum decision, show that the bankruptcy court thoughtfully 2 and thoroughly considered all the Fjeldsted factors. We will not 3 find an abuse of discretion when a court considers all twelve 4 factors listed in Fjeldsted when deciding to annul the stay, for 5 the obvious reason that we meant for courts to use the twelve 6 factors as a framework for analysis. Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. at 25. 7 In Gasprom, Inc. v Fateh (In re Gasprom, Inc.), 500 B.R. 598, 8 607-08 (9th Cir. BAP 2013), we vacated a bankruptcy court’s 9 annulment of the stay when the court justified annulment of the 10 stay after identifying only a single Fjeldsted factor. We 11 concluded the bankruptcy court abused its discretion because it 12 “did not actually attempt to weigh anything” and thus did not 13 utilize the appropriate legal framework “because there was no 14 indication that it attempted to balance the equities.” 15 In re Gasprom, 500 B.R. at 608. 16 In the instant case, the bankruptcy court acknowledged in its 17 memorandum decision that the factors are a framework not a 18 scorecard. If the court had meant to use them as a scorecard it 19 would have stopped its analysis after its discussion of the twelve 20 factors and decided the issue eleven to one. However, it 21 continued its analysis by noting that factors one, two, three, 22 four and six were “particularly influential in its analysis” of 23 U.S. Bank’s request for annulment. 24 The bankruptcy court discussed all twelve Fjeldsted factors 25 in varying detail and concluded that all, except number seven, 26 weighed in favor of annulment. Estavan’s brief contests each of 27 the eleven factors in favor of annulment, but fails to persuade 28 either individually or together that the bankruptcy court abused

-13- 1 its discretion. 2 Estavan also argues: “The filing of the bankruptcy gave the 3 Debtor belief that the property would not be foreclosed on by the 4 creditor” and that it “will unjustly suffer a harm in the loss of 5 its only asset” if the stay is annulled. These arguments reflect 6 a misconception of bankruptcy law governing a creditor’s right to 7 relief from the stay, Carmelle’s loan and deed of trust documents, 8 and principles of equity. 9 A fundamental maxim of equity jurisprudence is: “One who 10 seeks equity must do equity.” Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. 11 Pole, 83 Cal. App. 4th 436, 445 (2000) (quoting 2 Pomeroy, Equity 12 Jurisprudence (5th ed. 1941) § 385, pp. 51–53). This maxim means 13 that “a court will not grant equitable relief unless the plaintiff 14 acknowledges or provides for the defendant’s equitable rights 15 arising from the same subject matter.” Miller v. Wash. Mut. Bank 16 FA, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Pole, 17 83 Cal. App. 4th at 445-46). 18 Estavan does not dispute that no payments have been made to 19 U.S. Bank since 2012, while meanwhile Debtor enjoys free use of 20 the Property where Carmelle lives, plus income from rent paid by 21 Carmelle’s roommate. Estavan cannot expect equitable relief in 22 such circumstances. 23 The note and deed of trust are not in evidence, which weighs 24 against Estavan, as the party with the burden of proof, but it is 25 reasonable to assume that Estavan had the right under 26 nonbankruptcy law to cure the default or pay off the loan in full, 27 or attend the foreclosure sale and bid. Estavan failed to show 28 that it had any intent to cure the default on the note or pay it

-14- 1 off in full. Another foreclosure would likely occur in due course 2 if the stay is not annulled and, thus, annulment of the stay will 3 not cause irreparable injury to the Debtor. 4 In sum, we conclude that the bankruptcy court’s findings on 5 the eleven Fjeldsted factors it analyzed were not illogical, 6 implausible or without support from inferences that may be drawn 7 from the record. In re First Yorkshire Holdings, 470 B.R. at 868. 8 The record shows that the bankruptcy court correctly applied the 9 balancing of equities test under Fjeldsted, without affording 10 undue weight to any one factor. Therefore, we conclude the 11 bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 12 cause existed for retroactive annulment of the stay to validate 13 the foreclosure sale. 14 VI. CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the 16 bankruptcy court. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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