NO. 4-06-0778 Filed 6/21/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re: the Estate of KENNETH STARK, ) Appeal from Deceased, ) Circuit Court of SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION ) Pike County and SHRINERS HOSPITAL FOR CHILDREN, ) No. 04P32 Petitioners and Legatees Under the Last ) Will of KENNETH STARK; and EVELYN ) KRUEGER, Executrix, ) Petitioners-Appellants, ) v. ) VESTA STARK, By and Through MARK A. ) REYNOLDS, Her Agent Under a Durable ) Honorable Power of Attorney, ) Michael R. Roseberry, Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:
Copetitioner-beneficiaries, Southern Illinois
University Foundation (SIU) and Shriners Hospital for Children
(Shriners), filed a motion to vacate the renunciation of Kenneth
Stark's will. The renunciation had been filed by respondent,
Kenneth's legally incompetent wife Vesta Stark, by and through
her agent, Mark Reynolds, under the Illinois Power of Attorney
Act (Power of Attorney Act) (755 ILCS 45/1-1 through 4-12 (West
2004)). The petition to vacate the renunciation alleged that (1)
the renunciation was not valid because Vesta was incompetent at
the time she signed the power of attorney; and (2) the
renunciation was not valid because Mark was not acting "for the
benefit of the principal," as defined under the Power of Attorney
Act, when he filed the renunciation (755 ILCS 45/2-7, 2-10 (West 2004)). Both parties filed motions for summary judgment on the
issue of whether Mark acted for the benefit of the principal.
The trial court denied petitioners' motion for summary judgment
and granted summary judgment in favor of respondent (Mark). The
trial court entered an order under Supreme Court Rule 304(a),
finding no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of the
judgment. 210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). Petitioners appealed. We
dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction under Rule
304(a).
I. BACKGROUND
Kenneth and Vesta Stark were married for 15 years prior
to Kenneth's death in 2004, at age 97. This was Kenneth's only
marriage, and Kenneth had no descendants. Vesta, who is
currently around 87 years old, had been married once before and
had two sons, Mark Reynolds, her agent under power of attorney,
and James Reynolds. Kenneth had been very generous to Mark and
James. In 1983, Kenneth loaned Mark and James substantial
amounts of money, which they would not otherwise have been able
to secure, in order for them each to move to Illinois and acquire
a bank. Mark and James were in their thirties at that time.
Fifteen years later, James sold his bank and retired on the
proceeds, which were in excess of $1 million. Mark currently has
an 80% interest in a bank with a fair market value of $3.2
million.
- 2 - In 1991, Vesta executed a will leaving everything to
Mark and James. In 1998, Vesta began to experience the early
stages of Alzheimer's disease. Vesta received treatment from
copetitioner SIU at the School of Medicine. On March 29, 2002,
Vesta signed a durable power of attorney with Mark as her agent.
The power of attorney signed by Vesta authorized Mark to perform
real estate transactions, including renouncing any property
interest. 755 ILCS 45/3-4(n) (West 2002). From the time Vesta
signed the power of attorney forward, Vesta received 24-hour care
for her Alzheimer's.
On June 14, 2004, Kenneth Stark signed a will that
bequeathed $100,000 to Illinois College of Jacksonville,
Illinois, and $100,000 to Kenneth's brother, Lyndle Stark. The
will named copetitioner Evelyn Krueger, Kenneth's sister, as
executrix. The will bequeathed the rest, residue, and remainder
equally to SIU and Shriners. The rest, residue, and remainder
was in excess of $4,600,000. The gift to SIU was to be used by
the Department of Neurology for Alzheimer's research. The will
did not make any bequest to Vesta. Instead, the will stated:
"My wife's name is Vesta Stark, and she is
herein referred to as 'my spouse.' I have
made adequate and suitable provisions for my
beloved spouse from my resources outside the
provision of my Last Will."
- 3 - Indeed, it was later disclosed that Vesta, who had been a school
teacher and not born into wealth, had assets valued in the
neighborhood of $1.5 million. Additionally, Kenneth had gifted
land to the University of Illinois that would pay a 9% return for
the term of Vesta's life, or approximately $180,000 annually.
Vesta's income exceeded her expenses by more than $100,000 per
year.
On June 26, 2004, Kenneth passed away. On June 29,
2004, the will was filed with the courts and, on June 30, 2004,
the will was admitted to probate. On October 5, 2004, Mark,
acting as Vesta's agent under the power of attorney, filed a
renunciation of Kenneth's will. See 755 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2004)
(a surviving spouse may renounce a will whether or not the will
contains any provision for the surviving spouse). That same day,
Vesta also filed a renunciation, purportedly on her own behalf,
but Mark later admitted that this renunciation was invalid as
Vesta was clearly incompetent by that time. Vesta would receive
nothing under the will as filed; however, if the will were
renounced, Vesta would receive her statutory one-half share worth
in excess of $2.3 million.
On October 18, 2004, Mark and James filed a petition
for the adjudication of disability and for the appointment of a
guardian for Vesta. On November 1, 2004, Mark and James moved to
dismiss their own petition, stating that the appointment of a
- 4 - guardian would be unnecessary as Mark already had authority under
the power of attorney. The trial court dismissed the petition
for guardianship. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to
discuss Vesta's legal competence.
Mark attached a doctor's report to the October 2004
petition for the adjudication of disability. The doctor's
report, signed by Dr. James A. Grote, stated that "[Vesta] is an
unfortunate lady who *** has been suffering from dementia and
Alzheimer's *** which was initially diagnosed and evaluated
extensively in 1998 ***. [Vesta], at this point [October 2004],
requires prompting and/or assistance with all activities of daily
living. [Vesta] has no capabilities for initiating self care or
adaptive behavior. [Vesta's] level of status is that she can
walk *** unsteadily when prompted and led. She requires
assistance with eating, dressing, toileting, [et cetera]. She
will eat with prompting and some assistance." As such, no one
disputes that Vesta was incompetent as of October 2004.
The depositions of Mark, James, and copetitioner Evelyn
Krueger present conflicting evidence as to exactly when Vesta
became incompetent. Everyone agrees that Kenneth, Vesta, and
Evelyn spent November 2001 to February 2002 in Kenneth's winter
home in Naples, Florida. Mark and James each made separate
visits down to Naples during that time.
Evelyn testified that, based on her experience with
- 5 - Vesta in Naples, Vesta would "absolutely not" be capable of
understanding the power of attorney that Vesta signed in March
2002. Kenneth had asked Evelyn to come to Naples to help him
keep an eye on Vesta. Evelyn testified that she and Kenneth had
to put new locks on the doors because they were worried about
Vesta getting outside. Evelyn once caught Vesta trying to go
outside, and Vesta said that she wanted to see her mother, even
though her mother had been dead for years. Evelyn testified that
during this time Vesta would often mistake Kenneth for her
grandfather, father, brother, or son.
On March 24, 2002, five days before Vesta ultimately
signed the power of attorney, Vesta was admitted to the hospital
following a fall. Kenneth was already in the hospital,
recovering from a stroke (apparently Kenneth recovered to the
point where he could supervise Vesta, until he died in 2004).
The medical report from Vesta's March 24, 2002, admission into
the hospital was alluded to in both Mark's and James' depositions
but is otherwise absent from the record. The medical report
stated that Vesta "had been demented for some time" as of March
24, 2002. The report stated that Vesta's verbal responses were
slow and that her answers were obtuse and not consistent with the
questions. Additionally, during her stay at the hospital, Vesta
became confused and started cleaning the hospital bathroom.
Vesta thought that she was at home and that it was her own
- 6 - bathroom. Mark and James did not dispute the statement that
Vesta "had been demented for some time." It was not their
experience, however, that Vesta answered questions
inappropriately. They were also surprised by the bathroom
incident. Mark stated that it was during this hospital stay that
a doctor asked Mark if Mark had a power of attorney for Vesta.
Mark did not but thought it was a good idea and promptly had a
family attorney, John McMillan, draw up the papers.
Five days later, back at her home, Mark had Vesta sign
the power of attorney. There is a fair amount of uncertainty as
to who else was present. However, it seems safe to say that
Mark, James, Mark's son, and McMillan were present. Kenneth and
Mark's wife, Jane, were also most likely present. Mark and James
asked Vesta if she wanted them to be the ones to look after her
after Kenneth was no longer able to do so, and Vesta said yes.
Mark explained the basic premise of the power of attorney before
Vesta signed it. Mark admits that Vesta did not read the power
of attorney before she signed it. However, Mark felt fairly
certain that Vesta understood that the power of attorney allowed
Mark to do "basically anything" on Vesta's behalf that Vesta
could no longer do for herself. According to Mark, while Vesta
might not have understood the minute details of the power of
attorney, she understood the general concept that Mark would be
able to look after her financial affairs. Mark never acted under
- 7 - power of attorney until after Kenneth died.
On December 23, 2004, Shriners and SIU filed a motion
to vacate the renunciation of the will. First, Shriners and SIU
alleged that Mark's power of attorney was invalid, and therefore
so was the renunciation, because Vesta was incompetent when she
executed the power of attorney in March 2002. Second, Shriners
and SIU alleged that the renunciation was not "for the benefit"
of the principal under section 2-7 (755 ILCS 45/2-7 (West 2004))
of the Power of Attorney Act.
On April 19, 2005, Mark moved for a protective order on
behalf of Vesta, requesting that any inquiries concerning Vesta's
assets, income, and expenses be prohibited. The motion cited
sections 2-7 and 2-10 of the Power of Attorney Act, which require
an agent to act for the benefit of the principal, and claimed
that the financial circumstances of Vesta were not relevant to
whether the renunciation was made for Vesta's benefit. On June
20, 2005, after a hearing on the motion, the trial court ordered
Vesta to disclose her financial circumstances.
That same day, Mark filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of whether Mark acted "for the benefit of
the principal" in renouncing the will. Mark concluded his motion
for summary judgment by arguing that "the result of the action
taken by the agent is that Vesta Stark will inherit one-half the
Estate of Kenneth Stark as opposed to nothing."
- 8 - On August 5, 2005, before Vesta had fully disclosed her
financial circumstances as ordered, the trial court denied Mark's
motion for summary judgment.
On October 28, 2005, Mark disclosed Vesta's financial
information. Vesta's estate was worth more than $1.5 million.
Vesta's total income in the 15 months since Kenneth's death,
based on interest from investments, social security, and other
annuities, exceeded $350,000. Vesta's total expenditures in the
15 months since Kenneth's death, including the cost of 24-hour
health care and supervision, did not exceed $192,000. Vesta,
through Mark, had recently gifted $182,500 to Mark and James,
their spouses, and their children.
On November 3, 2005, petitioners Shriners and SIU filed
a motion for summary judgment, which was later joined by
copetitioner Evelyn Krueger. Petitioners argued that in light of
Vesta's substantial assets provided by Kenneth outside the
resources of the will, Mark did not act "for the benefit of"
Vesta in renouncing the will. On January 16, 2006, Mark filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment.
In February 2006, the trial court denied petitioners'
motion for summary judgment. In denying petitioners' motion, the
court noted in a written order that petitioners had not met their
burden of showing that the action of Mark as the agent under
power of attorney was not for the benefit of Vesta.
- 9 - The trial court granted Mark's motion for summary
judgment based on (1) the assumption that the power of attorney
was valid, (2) the fact that the power of attorney signed by
Vesta did not limit Mark's authority to renounce the will, and
(3) the petitioners' failure to show that Mark was not acting for
the benefit of Vesta in renouncing the will.
The trial court entered an order under Rule 304(a),
finding no just reason for delaying the enforcement or appeal of
either the court's grant of Mark's summary judgment or denial of
petitioners' summary judgment. 210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). The issue
of whether Vesta was competent when she executed the power of
attorney was reserved for further proceedings before the trial
court.
The trial court also entered a statement pursuant to
Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)), identifying the question of
law presented by its order as follows:
"Whether the financial status of the
principal is relevant or material to a
[c]ourt's review of the acts of an agent
under an Illinois Statutory Power of Attorney
for [p]roperty, who renounces the [w]ill of
the principal's deceased spouse, pursuant to
such authorization in the Power of Attorney,
and the principal will receive a larger share
- 10 - of the estate of her deceased husband as a
result of the renunciation."
Though not evident from the record, petitioners state in their
brief that the Rule 308 appeal was dismissed. This appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The question before this court on a Rule 304(a) appeal
is twofold. First, did the trial court err in denying
petitioner's summary judgment on the issue of whether Mark was
"not acting for the benefit of" Vesta in renouncing the will?
Second, did the court err in granting summary judgment to Mark on
that same issue? Each of these matters speaks to the question of
what constitutes "not acting for the benefit of" under sections
2-7 and 2-10 of the Power of Attorney Act, which is a matter of
first impression for Illinois courts.
Section 2-7 states that whenever an agent acts under
power of attorney, the agent must use due care to act "for the
benefit of the principal" in accordance with the terms of the
agency and shall be liable for negligent exercise. 755 ILCS
45/2-7 (West 2004). Section 2-10 states that, upon petition by
any interested person and a finding by the court that the
principal lacks the capacity to control or revoke the agency, "if
the court finds that the agent is not acting for the benefit of
the principal in accordance with the terms of the agency or that
- 11 - the agent's action or inaction has caused or threatens [to cause]
substantial harm to the principal's person or property in a
manner not authorized or intended by the principal, the court may
order a guardian of the principal's person or estate to exercise
any powers of the principal under the agency, *** or may enter
such other orders without appointment of a guardian as the court
deems necessary to provide for the best interests of the
principal." 755 ILCS 45/2-10 (West 2004).
However, we decline to reach the issue on the merits.
As is our duty, we raise the issue of appellate jurisdiction
under Rule 304(a) sua sponte. See Geier v. Hamer Enterprises,
Inc., 226 Ill. App. 3d 372, 375, 589 N.E.2d 711, 713 (1992).
Rule 304(a) provides that if multiple claims for relief are
involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims if
the trial court has made an explicit written finding that no just
reason exists for delaying either enforcement or appeal. 210
Ill. 2d R. 304(a). Rule 304(a) does not allow for a trial court
to confer appellate jurisdiction merely by using the Rule 304(a)
language that "there is no just reason for delaying enforcement
or appeal." Grove v. Carle Foundation Hospital, 364 Ill. App. 3d
412, 416, 846 N.E.2d 153, 157 (2006), citing Rice v. Burnley, 230
Ill. App. 3d 987, 991, 596 N.E.2d 105, 107 (1992).
Illinois courts have looked to federal case law regarding
- 12 - Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b)), which is substantially similar to Rule 304(a) in
determining appellate jurisdiction. Geier, 226 Ill. App. 3d at
378, 589 N.E.2d at 715 (Rule 304(a)'s policy and language is
patterned after Rule 54(b)). Courts apply a two-step process for
determining whether appellate jurisdiction lies under Rule 54(b)
or Rule 304(a): first, the court makes a determination as to
whether the order at issue is "final"; second, the court must
determine whether there is any just reason for delaying the
appeal. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S.
1, 7-8, 64 L. Ed. 2d 1, 11, 100 S. Ct. 1460, 1464-65 (1980);
Geier, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 379, 589 N.E.2d at 715.
For a judgment to be "final," it must provide for the
ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course
of an action involving multiple claims. Geier, 226 Ill. App. 3d
at 379, 589 N.E.2d at 716. As under Rule 54(b) case law, the
definition of what constitutes an individual "claim" under Rule
304(a) is a somewhat amorphous concept. See General Acquisition,
Inc. v. GenCorp Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1028 (6th Cir. 1994) (there
is no "'generally acceptable test'" as to what constitutes an
individual claim). Illinois negligence cases have held that
stating a single claim, by way of multiple subparagraphs, does
not warrant separate appeal upon dismissal of less than all of
the subparagraphs. Hull v. City of Chicago, 165 Ill. App. 3d
- 13 - 732, 733, 520 N.E.2d 720, 721 (1987); see also Rice, 230 Ill.
App. 3d at 991, 596 N.E.2d at 107; Brown v. K.J.S. Co., 189 Ill.
App. 3d 768, 770, 545 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1989). In Rice and Hull,
the court reasoned that, though the dismissed and remaining
counts each dealt with separate acts and omissions, all the
counts advanced the same theory of recovery, i.e., negligence.
Rice, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 992, 596 N.E.2d at 108; Hull, 165 Ill.
App. 3d at 733, 520 N.E.2d at 721. The Rice and Hull courts held
that where each count advanced the same theory of recovery, the
separate counts were not separate claims. Rice, 230 Ill. App. 3d
at 992, 596 N.E.2d at 108; Hull, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 733, 520
N.E.2d at 721.
Other courts, however, have held that whether there are
separate, individual claims for purposes of finding a final order
is in some sense a matter of discretion for the trial court. See
Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Development Corp., 908 F.2d
1363, 1367 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that the res judicata status
of two claims is not conclusive under Rule 54(b)); see also River
Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 311, 703
N.E.2d 883, 893 (1998) (separate claims under Rule 304(a) may
still be considered the same cause of action for the purposes of
res judicata). In noting that the trial court should exercise
its discretion in determining whether a claim is separate for the
purposes of finding a final and appealable judgment, the Olympia
- 14 - Hotels court went on to cite Curtiss-Wright, stating that it is
appropriate for the trial judge "to consider such factors as...
'whether the nature of the claims already determined was such
that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more
than once.'" Olympia Hotels, 908 F.2d at 1367-68, quoting
Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 11, 100 S. Ct. at
1465. Likewise, a trial court may abuse its discretion where a
Rule 304(a) order forces the appellate court to decide matters
that may never need to be decided. Fleetwood Development Corp.
v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 172 Ill. App. 3d
83, 85-86, 526 N.E.2d 381, 383-84 (1988) (Rule 304(a) order
inappropriate as to a third-party claim where the third-party
complaint was conditioned on the primary complaint, which had not
yet been decided). These discretionary guidelines lead us to the
second prong in Curtiss-Wright, i.e., whether there is any just
reason for delaying the appeal.
In determining whether there is any just reason for
delaying the appeal, the courts consider the following factors:
"'(1) the relationship between the adjudicated
and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility
that the need for review might or might not
be mooted by future developments in the dis-
trict court; (3) the possibility that the re-
viewing court might be obliged to consider
- 15 - the same issue a second time; (4) the presence
or absence of a claim or counterclaim which
could result in set-off against the judgment
sought to be made final; [and] (5) miscellan-
eous factors such as delay, economic and
solvency considerations, shortening the time
of trial, frivolity of competing claims,
expense, and the like.'" Geier, 226 Ill. App.
3d at 383, 589 N.E.2d at 718, quoting Allis-
Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric Co.,
521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1975).
Depending on the facts of the case at hand, some or all of these
factors may come into play. Geier, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 383, 589
N.E.2d at 718 (ultimately applying federal factors to Rule 304(a)
appeals).
The first two factors enumerated above are especially
relevant to the instant case. Here, each count in petitioners'
motion to revoke seeks remedy against Mark for the depletion of
$2.3 million from the assets of the residuary under the single
theory that Mark's renunciation on behalf of Vesta was invalid.
The first allegation, still pending before the trial court,
states that Mark did not have the authority to renounce the will
because the power of attorney was not valid. The second
allegation, decided by the trial court on a motion for summary
- 16 - judgment in favor of Mark, states that Mark exceeded the scope of
his authority under power of attorney because the renunciation
was not for the benefit of Vesta. In part, the legitimacy of the
Rule 304(a) appeal before this court is conditioned on the
outcome of the claim that remains before the trial court. See
Fleetwood, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 85-86, 526 N.E.2d at 383-84.
Given the evidence available to this court of Vesta's
incompetence during the time she signed the power of attorney, it
is at least possible that the court below will find that the
power of attorney was never valid to begin with. Were the power
of attorney to be held invalid, the question of whether a
renunciation would have been for the benefit of Vesta would be
moot, making a resolution on the merits of this instant appeal
purely advisory. Advisory opinions are to be avoided. People v.
Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 269, 840 N.E.2d 1157, 1173 (2005). A
decision is advisory if "it cannot result in appropriate relief
to the prevailing party." Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 270, 840 N.E.2d
at 1173. Here, given that any sort of claim under sections 2-7
and 2-10 of the Power of Attorney Act is contingent upon whether
the power of attorney in the instant case is valid in the first
place, we find just reason to delay the appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
- 17 - APPLETON and TURNER, JJ., concur.
- 18 -