NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 200002-U FILED This order was filed under Supreme October 14, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender NO. 4-20-0002 th 4 District Appellate the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re ESTATE OF JOHN RODERICK McLAUGHLIN, ) Appeal from the Deceased ) Circuit Court of ) Piatt County (National Alliance, a Virginia Nonstock Corporation, ) No. 17P17 Petitioner-Appellant, ) v. ) Michael J. McLaughlin and Robert P. McLaughlin, ) Honorable Co-Administrators, ) Wm. Hugh Finson, Respondents-Appellees). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err by barring petitioner’s claim against decedent’s estate.
¶2 In October 2018, petitioner, National Alliance, a Virginia nonstock corporation,
filed a claim for $850,000 against the estate of John Roderick McLaughlin, deceased.
Respondents, Michael J. McLaughlin and Robert P. McLaughlin, the co-administrators of
decedent’s estate, filed a motion to bar petitioner’s claim pursuant to section 18-12 of the Probate
Act of 1975 (Act) (755 ILCS 5/18-12 (West 2016)). After a March 2019 hearing, the Piatt
County circuit court granted the co-administrators’ motion to bar petitioner’s claim. Petitioner
filed a motion to vacate the court’s judgment barring petitioner’s claim, which the court granted
in August 2019. After a second hearing on the co-administrators’ motion to bar petitioner’s
claim, the court again barred petitioner’s claim. Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied.
¶3 Petitioner appeals, asserting (1) the circuit court erred by finding Michael’s
testimony overcame an admission, (2) the court erred in applying the “reasonably ascertainable”
requirement of section 18-12(a)(3) of the Act (755 ILCS 5/18-12(a)(3) (West 2016)), and (3) the
court’s finding respondents could not have reasonably ascertained petitioner’s claim was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 Decedent died on February 22, 2017. At the time of his death, decedent was a
farmer and lived in Monticello, Illinois. The co-administrators of decedent’s estate are
decedent’s brothers. Michael lived in Cerro Gordo, Illinois, and assisted decedent with his
farming. Robert lived in Seattle, Washington.
¶6 Before his death, decedent was represented by Douglas Bywater in Hanover
County, Virginia, circuit court case No. CL-16002090-00, in which decedent filed a suit against
petitioner. In a July 2019 written evidence deposition, Bywater stated he filed a motion to
withdraw as decedent’s attorney in the Virginia case, and the court granted his motion by a
written order entered on March 3, 2017. Bywater mailed a copy of the March 3, 2017, order to
decedent’s home address in Monticello, Illinois. Bywater did not have a record showing he
mailed the written order. The March 3, 2017, order noted a counterclaim had been filed against
decedent by serving decedent’s counsel. In the March 3, 2017, order, the court also granted
decedent 21 days to (1) file responsive pleadings to the counterclaim and (2) respond to the
discovery propounded to him.
¶7 In April 2017, the co-administrators filed a petition for letters of administration,
which the circuit court granted. The court also entered an order declaring the co-administrators
-2- were decedent’s only heirs. The co-administrators published a death and claim notice in the Piatt
County Journal Republican on (1) April 26, 2017; (2) May 3, 2017; and (3) May 10, 2017. The
notices listed the deadline for filing a claim against the estate as November 1, 2017.
¶8 On October 25, 2018, petitioner filed a statement of claim against decedent’s
estate. The claim sought $850,000 and asserted it arose from decedent’s tortious breach of his
fiduciary duties owed to petitioner when decedent served as a director on petitioner’s board of
directors. The claim referenced Hanover County, Virginia case No. CL-16002090-01. In
January 2019, the co-administrators filed a motion to bar petitioner’s claim under section 18-12
of the Act (755 ILCS 5/18-12 (West 2016)), asserting petitioner’s claim was untimely and not
known or reasonably ascertainable by the co-administrators.
¶9 On March 20, 2019, the circuit court held a hearing on the co-administrators’
motion to bar petitioner’s claim. Petitioner did not appear at the hearing but had filed a motion
to continue. The court denied the motion to continue and heard argument from the
co-administrators’ counsel. The court barred petitioner’s claim on the basis it was not timely
filed. The court filed its written order on March 22, 2019. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion
to vacate the March 22, 2019, order, asserting petitioner’s claim was known or reasonably
ascertainable by the co-administrators.
¶ 10 At an August 7, 2019, hearing, the circuit court granted petitioner’s oral motion to
admit Bywater’s evidence deposition. The court also reserved ruling on petitioner’s oral motion
to show an admission of facts and allowed the co-administrators to file Michael’s response to
petitioner’s request for admission of facts within three days. On August 30, 2019, the court first
held a hearing on petitioner’s motion to show an admission of facts. The court recognized the
co-administrators filed Michael’s response to the request within the three days given at the last
-3- hearing but still found Michael’s response untimely. Thus, the court granted petitioner’s motion
and deemed the facts admitted. It specified the admission as follows: “In that, Mr. McLaughlin,
Michael, acknowledges receiving mail from Mr. Bywater, the lawyer in Virginia who was
representing the decedent.” At the hearing, the court also addressed petitioner’s motion to
vacate. In addition to Bywater’s deposition and the deemed admitted fact, petitioner presented
the following two documents from the Virginia case: (1) the March 3, 2017, order allowing
Bywater to withdraw as decedent’s counsel and (2) a February 21, 2017, motion for extension of
time to answer and respond to discovery, which was signed by decedent. The co-administrators
presented Michael’s testimony. After considering the evidence, the court granted petitioner’s
motion to vacate, noting it was giving petitioner “the benefit of the doubt.”
¶ 11 On October 4, 2019, the circuit court held another hearing on the
co-administrators’ motion to bar petitioner’s claim. The co-administrators again presented
Michael’s testimony. Michael testified he began helping decedent with the farming after their
father died. Michael explained decedent was in charge of the farming and made all the
decisions. Michael did not discuss decedent’s finances with him. When he visited decedent’s
home, which was about once a month, decedent did not show Michael any documents pertaining
to his personal business. Decedent never discussed with Michael a lawsuit with petitioner. At
the time of his death, decedent appeared to be preparing his 2016 income taxes. Decedent had
paperwork spread out all over his living room floor. In decedent’s home, Michael also found
large plastic storage bins labeled by the year, which contained documents related to prior years
income taxes. Michael did not find any paperwork related to petitioner; petitioner’s president,
Will Williams; Bywater; or the Virginia lawsuit. Michael testified decedent did not keep
extensive records of his bills at his home. Michael explained he was also unaware the IRS had a
-4- lien on decedent’s farmland until he was in the process of selling the land. Michael did find a
big stack of farm-related receipts in the glove box of decedent’s pickup truck. None of the
materials were related to petitioner.
¶ 12 Michael also testified about decedent’s mail. He and Robert decided to keep
decedent’s mail going to decedent’s home. Michael checked decedent’s mailbox five to six
times a week. Michael would review every piece of mail and take the bills back to his home.
Michael contacted every entity that sent a bill. He also contacted farm implement companies
that he knew decedent conducted business with to see if decedent owed money. Michael would
pay all the bills as funds became available. Before its October 2018 claim, Michael did not
receive any mail from petitioner or Williams. Michael also did not see the order mailed by
Bywater, and he did not receive any court documents from Virginia. Michael testified he had no
knowledge of any claim outside of Illinois. He did admit Robert opened the mail when Robert
was in the area for decedent’s funeral. During that time, Robert gave Michael all the mail. Thus,
Michael saw all the mail decedent received after his death. He estimated he reviewed around
100 pieces of mail, most of which came within the first 10 weeks after the death notice went out.
¶ 13 Additionally, Michael testified that, with his second answer to interrogatories, he
was attempting to explain how he handled paperwork related to the estate. If Michael received a
bill, he contacted the creditor and provided the creditor with any necessary documents. Michael
also explained he did not know anyone in Virginia, but decedent’s friends knew people in
Virginia. Michael further testified decedent’s friends did not mention decedent’s lawsuit with
petitioner and did not mention decedent might owe petitioner money.
¶ 14 Petitioner did not present any testimony. Instead, it asked the circuit court to take
judicial notice of the documents it presented at the August 30, 2019, hearing. In addition to the
-5- four documents it presented at the August 2019 hearing, petitioner also presented Michael’s
second answer to the August 2019 interrogatories. In the second answer, Michael stated he did
not specifically recall a letter from Bywater. If Michael did get a letter, then he contacted him
and informed him of decedent’s death. Michael also stated he was generally aware through
decedent’s friends and associates that people in Virginia including petitioner were aware of
decedent’s death at the time of decedent’s funeral. Michael made sure everyone who needed a
death certificate received one.
¶ 15 After hearing the parties’ arguments, the circuit court granted the
co-administrators’ motion to bar petitioner’s claim. The court found Michael did not have
knowledge of petitioner and its claim. It noted Michael did not receive any mail about petitioner
or find any document about it in decedent’s records. The court noted Bywater may have mailed
a copy of the withdrawal order in the Virginia case. Even if he did, Michael was not aware he
received it and the document was not enough to put the estate or Michael on notice decedent
owed money to petitioner. Additionally, the court also found Michael’s testimony overcame the
legal effect of not responding to petitioner’s request for admission of facts.
¶ 16 Petitioner filed a timely motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied after
a December 13, 2019, hearing. On December 30, 2019, petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal
in sufficient compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017), and thus this
court has jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 A. Judicial Admission
¶ 19 Petitioner first asserts the circuit court erred as a matter of law by finding
Michael’s testimony overcame his judicial admission. The co-administrators disagree with
-6- petitioner’s characterization of the circuit court’s statement and contend petitioner waived the
deemed admissions. Petitioner denies it waived the judicial admission. We review de novo a
matter of law. See People v. Johnson, 206 Ill. 2d 348, 360, 794 N.E.2d 294, 303 (2002).
¶ 20 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216(a) (eff. July 1, 2014) provides, in pertinent part,
“[a] party may serve on any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the
truth of any specified relevant fact set forth in the request.” Rule 216(c) further states, in
pertinent part, the following:
“Each of the matters of fact and the genuineness of each document of
which admission is requested is admitted unless, within 28 days after service
thereof, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting
the admission either (1) a sworn statement denying specifically the matters of
which admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why the party
cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters or (2) written objections on the
ground that some or all of the requested admissions are privileged or irrelevant or
that the request is otherwise improper in whole or in part.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 216(c)
(eff. July 1, 2014).
The “failure to comply with Rule 216 will result in a judicial admission that is considered
incontrovertible, withdrawing that fact from contention.” In re Application of the County
Treasurer & ex officio County Collector, 2012 IL App (1st) 112897, ¶ 37, 977 N.E.2d 189; see
also Mt. Zion State Bank & Trust v. Consolidated Communications, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 110, 125,
660 N.E.2d 863, 872 (1995) (noting admissions made under Rule 216 a tantamount to judicial
admissions and are to be taken as true).
¶ 21 At the August 2019 hearing, the circuit court deemed admitted under Rule 216 the
-7- following fact: “Michael[ ] acknowledges receiving mail from Mr. Bywater, the lawyer in
Virginia who was representing the decedent.” In granting the co-administrators’ motion to bar
petitioner’s claim at the October 2019 hearing, the court found the following:
“Michael McLaughlin has testified today that he had no knowledge of
anything about National Alliance, didn’t receive any mail about them, didn’t find
any papers amongst the decedent’s records, either in the house or in the glove
box.
Mr. Bywater, the decedent’s former attorney in Virginia, may have mailed
a copy of the withdrawal order, order of the Virginia Court authorizing him to
withdraw, to John McLaughlin. Even if he did, Mr. Michael McLaughlin has
testified he wasn’t aware he received it. Even if Mr. Bywater did mail a copy of
that, under the Lane case, in the Court’s mind, that’s not enough to put the estate
or Michael McLaughlin on any kind of notice that National Alliance was owed
money. So I don’t think there’s any knowledge on Mr. McLaughlin, Michael
McLaughlin’s part. Now the Court did discuss the request to admit at the last
hearing, and the Court indicated it would regard the facts requested as admitted
because no response was filed within 28 days. The Court did grant Mr.
Jankowicz however an extension of time to reply, and he filed a reply within time,
but he didn’t file it within 28 days. The testimony today, I think, overcomes the
legal effect of not admitting—or denying, not responding to the request to admit
within the 28 days. So I’m going to deny the request to vacate the bar. The claim
is still barred.”
¶ 22 Petitioner contends the circuit court’s aforementioned statements indicate the
-8- court made an error of law because judicial admissions under Rule 216 are “ ‘incontrovertible.’ ”
However, the judicial admission was only Michael received mail from Bywater. Despite
petitioner’s numerous assertions to the contrary, Michael was not deemed to have admitted he
received the March 3, 2017, withdrawal order or any other Virginia court documents. As
asserted by the co-administrators, both the admission Michael received a mailing from Bywater
and Michael’s testimony he did not receive a copy of the March 3, 2017, withdrawal order could
be true. Thus, the court was free to conclude Michael did not have knowledge of the Virginia
lawsuit even if Bywater’s written deposition indicated he mailed a copy of the withdrawal order
to decedent’s home address in Monticello, Illinois. Accordingly, we do not find the circuit court
erred as a matter of law.
¶ 23 B. Reasonably Ascertainable
¶ 24 Petitioner also asserts (1) the circuit court erred as a matter of law by
misinterpreting or misapplying the reasonably ascertainable requirement of section 18-12(a)(3)
of the Act (755 ILCS 5/18-12(a)(3) (West 2016)) and (2) the court’s finding the
co-administrators could not have reasonably ascertained the existence of petitioner’s claim was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. The co-administrators contend the court properly
determined petitioner’s claim was not reasonably ascertainable. As previously stated, we review
de novo a question of law. See Johnson, 206 Ill. 2d at 360, 794 N.E.2d at 303. As to questions
of fact, we apply the manifest-weight standard of review. Franz v. Calaco Development Corp.,
352 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 1139, 818 N.E.2d 357, 368 (2004). “A decision is against the manifest
weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear
to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228,
252, 779 N.E.2d 1115, 1130 (2002).
-9- ¶ 25 Section 18-12 of the Act places limitations on the payment of claims against an
estate and provides, in pertinent part, the following:
“(a) Every claim against the estate of a decedent, except expenses of
administration and surviving spouse’s or child’s award, is barred as to all of the
decedent’s estate if:
(1) Notice is given to the claimant as provided in Section 18-3 and
the claimant does not file a claim with the representative or the court on or
before the date stated in the notice; or
(2) Notice of disallowance is given to the claimant as provided in
Section 18-11 and the claimant does not file a claim with the court on or
(3) The claimant or the claimant’s address is not known to or
reasonably ascertainable by the representative and the claimant does not
file a claim with the representative or the court on or before the date stated
in the published notice as provided in Section 18-3.
(b) Unless sooner barred under subsection (a) of this Section, all claims
which could have been barred under this Section are, in any event, barred 2 years
after decedent’s death, whether or not letters of office are issued upon the estate
of the decedent.” 755 ILCS 5/18-12(a), (b) (West 2016).
¶ 26 1. Misinterpretation
¶ 27 In support of its argument the circuit court misinterpreted the “reasonably
ascertainable” language of section 18-12(a)(3), petitioner cites the circuit court’s comments
about Bywater’s mailing at the hearing on petitioner’s motion to reconsider. There, the court
- 10 - stated the following:
“The Court felt at the end of that hearing, that last hearing, that the estate had met
its burden of proof, that Mr. McLaughlin, Michael McLaughlin, and his brother
who were the co-administrators, didn’t have any notice that [petitioner] was or
possibly could be a creditor. The Court still thinks that way.
With regard to the Bywater mailing, Mr. McLaughlin testified he didn’t
see it. But the Court feels even if he did see it, that by itself isn’t enough to put
Mr. McLaughlin on notice that [petitioner] might be a creditor. So the motion to
reconsider is denied.”
Petitioner contends that, if the circuit court barred the claim because Bywater’s mailing did not
give Michael sufficient knowledge petitioner had filed a counterclaim in decedent’s lawsuit
against plaintiff, the court’s ruling could not have been based on a correct understanding of the
“reasonably ascertainable” language. However, the court barred petitioner’s claim based on the
co-administrators not having any notice petitioner was or could possibly be a creditor. The
court’s comments about the Bywater mailing at the hearing on the motion to reconsider was an
alternative finding. Thus, we find the circuit court did not err as a matter of law because its
ruling was not based on Michael receiving the withdrawal order from Bywater.
¶ 28 2. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
¶ 29 Petitioner further contends the circuit court’s finding petitioner’s claim was not
reasonably ascertainable by the co-administrators was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. In support of its claim, petitioner emphasized Michael was an “interested witness” and
notes the Virginia court documents, one filed before decedent’s death and one after.
¶ 30 Additionally, petitioner cites the following language from Effler v. Metzger, 29
- 11 - Ill. App. 3d 55, 58-59, 329 N.E.2d 327, 329 (1975): “In weighing testimony of witnesses who
are otherwise equally credible, one of whom has testified positively to a fact while the other’s
evidence is negative, the jury is entitled to give greater weight to the positive testimony than to
the negative.” We note the aforementioned language merely permits a trier of fact to give more
weight to positive testimony about a fact where the credibility is otherwise equal but does not
require it to do so. The Effler court also noted the weight of the evidence does not depend on the
number of witnesses testifying or the amount of evidence compiled. Effler, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 59,
329 N.E.2d at 329. Thus, the amount of petitioner’s evidence does not mean it is entitled to
greater weight than Michael’s testimony. Additionally, in Effler, the reviewing court concluded
the trial court abused its discretion because it substituted its judgment for that of the jury’s in
granting the defendants’ a new trial where sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict and
the circuit court gave no reason for its ruling. Effler, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 59, 329 N.E.2d at 329-30.
In this case, petitioner is essentially asking this court to substitute our judgment for that of the
circuit court.
¶ 31 This court has explained section 18-12(a) of the Act (755 ILCS 5/18-12(a) (West
2016) as follows:
“[C]laimants who file a claim more than six months from the issuance of letters
bear the initial burden of producing evidence sufficient to establish their failure to
receive written notice by mail or delivery under section 18-3 of the Act. Upon
such a showing, the burden then shifts to the estate representative to show either
that the statutory notice was given, which will automatically bar the claim, or, in
the absence of notice, that the existence of the claim was not reasonably
ascertainable upon reasonably diligent efforts. If the estate representative is able
- 12 - to prove this latter proposition by a preponderance of the evidence, then the claim
will be barred.
In determining whether the estate representative has met her burden on
this latter proposition, the focus should not be on the actual knowledge of the
claim by the executrix nor upon what she subjectively understood legal
documents to mean had she looked for them and discovered them. Rather, the
focus is on the efforts expended by the executrix in attempting to discover claims
against the estate.
Minimum standards of diligent inquiry would necessitate a good-faith
search of decedent’s personal and business financial records to disclose debts of
the estate, a search comparable to that required to marshal assets and compile a
complete inventory of the estate. Since decedent ran his own business, reasonably
diligent efforts might include inquiry of those persons and concerns with whom
Anderson Trucking had continuing business (e.g., Central) as to what debts, if
any, decedent had outstanding.” In re Estate of Anderson, 246 Ill. App. 3d 116,
129-30, 615 N.E.2d 1197, 1206 (1993).
There, the circuit court had granted a directed finding in favor of the estate noting the debts were
not reasonably ascertainable by the executrix and thus time barred. Anderson, 246 Ill. App. 3d at
128, 615 N.E.2d at 1205. Specifically, it found the executrix did not have knowledge of the
debts and it would take a “ ‘pretty sophisticated inquiry’ ” to determine the debts existed from
business papers of the decedent’s trucking business. Anderson, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 128, 615
N.E.2d at 1205. Since the circuit court did not undertake the analysis this court set forth above,
we vacated the circuit court’s ruling holding the claims time barred and remanded for further
- 13 - proceedings for the estate to present evidence of its “ ‘reasonably diligent efforts.’ ” Anderson,
246 Ill. App. 3d at 130, 132, 615 N.E.2d at 1206-08.
¶ 32 In this case, the facts are undisputed petitioner did not receive notice, and thus the
co-administrators had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence “the existence of the claim
was not reasonably ascertainable upon reasonably diligent efforts.” Anderson, 246 Ill. App. 3d at
129, 615 N.E.2d at 1206. Like Anderson, decedent in this case was a farmer and thus ran his
own business. As to the efforts expended by the co-administrators in attempting to discover
claims against decedent’s estate (Anderson, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 130, 615 N.E.2d at 1206),
Michael testified he went through decedent’s home looking for financial documents and
observed decedent did not keep extensive financial records. The materials Michael did find were
plastic bins containing documents related to past year’s income taxes. Michael also located a
plastic bin containing some documents related to the 2016 income tax year, and other documents
related to that year’s taxes were spread out on decedent’s living room floor. He did not find
other financial documents in decedent’s home. Michael did find some receipts related to
purchases made for the farm in the glove box of decedent’s pickup truck.
¶ 33 Additionally, Michael testified he and Robert kept decedent’s mail going to
decedent’s home address. Michael looked through every piece of mail to see if it was a bill that
needed to be paid, except for after decedent’s funeral when Robert looked through the mail for a
few days. During that period, Robert brought the mail to Michael. When Michael received a
bill, Michael contacted the individual or company to see what information it needed from
Michael. Michael also paid the bills as money became available. In addition to looking through
the house and mail, Michael contacted local businesses that he knew decedent dealt with to see if
decedent owed money. Michael explained he contacted implement companies to see how much
- 14 - money decedent still owed on farming equipment.
¶ 34 As to petitioner’s claim, Michael testified he did not discover any documents
from Bywater or petitioner. Michael also explained decedent did not discuss his finances with
Michael and never revealed any documents relating to his personal business or finance. Michael
further testified he had no idea any entity outside of Illinois had a claim against decedent’s
estate.
¶ 35 Petitioner notes decedent signed on February 17, 2017, a document in the Virginia
case, which listed decedent as the plaintiff/counterclaim defendant. Petitioner contends the
document alerts the reader to petitioner’s claim. Petitioner asserts it is difficult to believe
decedent did not keep a copy of the document, and the document should have been found.
Petitioner then notes the March 3, 2017, order allowing Bywater to withdraw as counsel and
Bywater’s written deposition, in which Bywater stated he mailed a copy of the order to
decedent’s home address in Monticello, Illinois. Bywater did not state decedent’s full address
and admitted he did not have a record showing he mailed a copy of the order to decedent’s home
address. Next, petitioner notes the fact admitted under Rule 261 and Michael’s answers to
interrogatories, in which Michael stated he did not recall a letter from Bywater, and if he did get
a letter from Bywater, he would have contacted Bywater to inform him of decedent’s death. In
his answers, Michael also stated he was generally aware through decedent’s friends and
associates that people in Virginia and petitioner were aware of decedent’s death at the time of his
funeral. During his testimony, Michael explained decedent’s friends mentioned people in
Virginia and petitioner, but those friends neither mentioned a lawsuit between decedent and
petitioner nor noted decedent owed petitioner money. Michael testified he did not really have
any knowledge of petitioner until the passing of the claim date.
- 15 - ¶ 36 We find the co-administrators presented sufficient evidence for the circuit court to
find by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of petitioner’s claim was not reasonably
ascertainable upon the co-administrators’ reasonably diligent efforts. As stated, Michael not
only went through decedent’s home and mail looking for documents showing potential claims
but also went to businesses decedent was known to patronize to see if decedent owed the
businesses money. Michael testified he was unaware of (1) the lawsuit between decedent and his
brother until petitioner’s claim and (2) any potential claims outside of Illinois. While petitioner
presented some evidence Michael should have learned of petitioner and its claim, the court as the
trier of fact could have found the co-administrators’ evidence more credible than petitioner’s. “It
is well established that when applying a manifest weight of the evidence standard, a reviewing
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on such matters as witness
credibility, the weight to be given evidence, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence
***.” Dore v. Quezada, 2017 IL App (1st) 162142, ¶ 25, 77 N.E.3d 764. Accordingly, we find
the circuit court’s determination petitioner’s claim was not reasonably ascertainable by the
co-administrators was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Piatt County circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 39 Affirmed.
- 16 -