In re Estate of Levert

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 18, 2026
• Docket: 1-25-1260
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 251260-U

FOURTH DIVISION Order filed: June 18, 2026

No. 1-25-1260

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

In re ESTATE OF ERNEST DAVID LEVERT, JR., an ) Appeal from the alleged Disabled Adult, now Deceased. ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. (Ivory Levert, ) ) Cross-Petitioner-Appellant, ) ) No. 2024 P 007613 v. ) ) Rhonda Hagey-Levert, ) Honorable ) Jesse Outlaw, Petitioner-Appellee.) ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE QUISH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Navarro and Justice Ocasio concurred in the judgment. Justice Ocasio also specially concurred.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Circuit court’s order requiring wife of now-deceased disabled adult ward to reimburse the ward’s former temporary guardian using funds in a GoFundMe campaign is reversed because the circuit court had no jurisdiction over the GoFundMe campaign funds. No. 1-25-1260

¶2 Cross-petitioner Ivory Levert (“Ivory”) appeals from the order of the circuit court of Cook

County granting the petition for reimbursement filed by petitioner Dr. Rhonda Hagey-Levert

(“Rhonda”) in this adult guardianship estate. The petition sought reimbursement for medical and

other expenses that Rhonda incurred after her adult son, Ernest David Levert Jr. (“Ernest”),

suffered a severe stroke. Rhonda requested that the reimbursement come from a GoFundMe

campaign opened by Ivory, Ernest’s wife. The court agreed. On appeal, Ivory argues that the circuit

court lacked authority to compel her to reimburse Rhonda from the GoFundMe campaign funds.

For the following reasons, we vacate that portion of the circuit court’s May 29, 2025 order and

remand for further proceedings.

¶3 Ernest suffered a severe stroke at the age of 33 in April 2024. In the months following,

Ernest required intensive medical care and multiple surgeries. Prior to his stroke, he lived in

Columbus, Ohio with his then-pregnant wife, Ivory, and their young child. In May 2024, Ernest’s

medical needs required him to be transferred to Chicago for treatment. Rhonda and Ernest Levert

Sr. (“Ernest Sr.”), his parents, moved from Texas to Illinois to help facilitate Ernest’s care and

contributed to expenses relating to Ernest’s medical care, transportation, and housing in Chicago.

¶4 In late October 2024, Rhonda filed a petition for appointment of a guardian of a person

with a disability and a separate petition to appoint a temporary guardian for Ernest in the circuit

court of Cook County. The petition for appointment of a guardian asserted that Ernest lacked

capacity to communicate and make decisions regarding his care and was unable to manage his

estate and financial affairs, and asked that Rhonda be appointed guardian of Ernest’s estate and

person. It listed the value of Ernest’s personal assets as “TBD” and his real assets as “$0.” The

petition for appointment of a temporary guardian added that Ernest was scheduled for surgery on

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October 31, 2024, and that temporary guardianship was needed to consent to medical treatment on

Ernest’s behalf.

¶5 The circuit court appointed Rhonda as temporary guardian of Ernest’s estate and person on

October 31, 2024. The order granted Rhonda authority to (1) act as a surrogate for Ernest pursuant

to the Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act; (2) consent to and contract for placement at a

rehabilitation facility; (3) execute releases and consents on Ernest’s behalf to access medical

records and information; and (4) “to investigate, collect, and safeguard any and all personal

belongings and assets,” including “the authority to collect and close any and all bank accounts held

in [Ernest’s] name.”

¶6 In November 2024, Ivory filed an appearance and a cross-petition for appointment as

guardian of Ernest’s estate and person. Ivory also filed an emergency motion to appoint a guardian

ad litem and to amend the October 31 order to appoint her as temporary guardian, not Rhonda. On

November 22, Ivory withdrew her emergency motion. The circuit court appointed a guardian ad

litem, extended Rhonda’s temporary guardianship and ordered the parties to submit a care plan for

Ernest.

¶7 Ernest died on January 8, 2025 due to complications from his stroke. Thereafter, the circuit

court discharged the guardian ad litem and set the matter for Rhonda to file a petition to spread his

death of record, a report in lieu of a final accounting and any fee petitions.

¶8 Rhonda then filed a petition for reimbursement seeking $119,442.93 for expenses she

incurred for Ernest’s caregiving, transportation, housing, parking and medical care from June to

December 2024. The petition stated that she was “unable to marshal any assets from [Ernest’s]

estate” to reimburse her for those expenses “[d]ue to Ivory’s lack of cooperation.” The petition

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asserted that Ernest had two bank accounts he jointly owned with Ivory that held approximately

$45,000, as well as a GoFundMe campaign opened by Ivory with a balance of $97,187. The only

authority cited in the petition was section 15 of the Rights of Married Persons Act, for the

proposition that Ivory, as Ernest’s wife, was responsible for Ernest’s medical bills and expenses.

See 750 ILCS 65/15 (West 2024). Rhonda asked the court to approve her petition for

reimbursement and order Ivory to reimburse her $119,442.93 for expenses paid on behalf of

¶9 She attached a screen shot of the GoFundMe campaign page taken on February 21, 2025.

The page was entitled “Support Ernest Levert Jr’s Healing Journey” and stated that donations

would help cover medical bills, medical equipment and supplies, a 24-hour home health aide,

wheelchair accessible home renovations, wheelchair accessible transportation expenses, and

“[a]ny additional unexpected family expenses.” The page noted that “Ivory Levert is organizing

this fundraiser” and that the campaign was created on August 22, 2024. Rhonda’s petition also

included a spreadsheet documenting expenses Rhonda paid while facilitating Ernest’s medical care

from June through December 2024. The spreadsheet referenced statements, invoices, and receipts

which may have been provided to the circuit court as exhibits, but are not part of the record on

appeal.

¶ 10 Rhonda also filed a report in lieu of final accounting. The report stated that Rhonda opened

a guardianship account, but the account was funded with her own assets because she was unable

to marshal any assets belonging to Ernest into the guardianship estate. She reported that no assets

were in Ernest’s estate, but listed what she “believe[d] Ernest Jr.’s assets to be.” Among those

assets was a “GoFundMe Campaign” with a listed value of $97,187, and a joint bank account

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owned by Ernest and Ivory valued at $44,957. She listed other “believe[d]” assets to include

Ernest’s pension and life insurance policy, the location and values of which were “under

investigation.” She listed “Social Security benefits for Ernest” but noted that the “application [was]

unable to be submitted.” Rhonda also listed Ivory’s monthly income in 2024 as $4,000 per month,

but noted that was “not a guardianship asset.” The report asserted that, on November 14, 2024,

nearly all of the funds in the joint bank account were withdrawn by Ivory. Rhonda asked the court

to accept and approve the report, discharge her as temporary guardian, cancel the surety bond and

close the estate.

¶ 11 The circuit court held a hearing on March 6, 2025 regarding Rhonda’s report in lieu of

accounting and petition for reimbursement. The court entered and continued the report, “the Court

having approved the Report in Lieu of Final Accounting, but counsel [for Ivory] having later

objected that the GoFundMe campaign created for” Ernest “(which is listed as an asset of [Ernest]

in the Report) is not a part of the Estate.” The court vacated its ruling approving the report and

allowed Ivory to file a written response to both the report and petition for reimbursement. Rhonda

also made an oral motion to freeze the GoFundMe campaign funds while the parties briefed the

petition for reimbursement, and the court heard arguments on whether it had jurisdiction over that

campaign. Rhonda asserted that the funds in the campaign “were raised for the benefit of Ernest”

and the description on the GoFundMe page included the types of expenses that she incurred on

Ernest’s behalf. Ivory argued that the funds were not intended only for medical expenses and but

also for Ernest’s family, the court never approved the expenses sought by Rhonda and the court

had no jurisdiction over the GoFundMe campaign funds as they were not part of the guardianship

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estate. The court stated: “I just don’t think I have jurisdiction with regard to freezing that

account… It was not a part of the estate, so … I just don’t see how I can make that leap.”

¶ 12 Ivory filed a response to the report in lieu of accounting in which she agreed that no assets

were marshaled into Ernest’s guardianship estate and stated that “any assets that [Ernest] owned

or maintained an interest in at the time of his death have either passed to any legal co-owners and

or his heirs at law.” Ivory’s response to the petition for reimbursement argued that Rhonda did not

seek leave of court to make any decision related to the care or treatment of Ernest and did not ask

the court to approve any expenses. She also argued that, because Ernest had died, there was no

guardianship estate from which the court could order reimbursement and there was no basis in law

for such a claim against a decedent’s estate.

¶ 13 In her written motion to freeze the GoFundMe campaign funds, Rhonda acknowledged

Ivory’s objection to including the GoFundMe funds as an asset of the estate and noted that

“[b]ecause there is a dispute as to whether the GoFundMe campaign is an asset of the estate, the

dispute should be resolved by this Court before Ivory is authorized to access the funds from the

GoFundMe account for her personal use.” In response, Ivory argued that the court lost jurisdiction

over the guardianship estate once Ernest died and lacked authority over the GoFundMe campaign

funds because they were never part of the estate. The record does not contain a ruling on this

motion.

¶ 14 After hearing additional argument, on May 29, 2025, the circuit court entered an order

approving the report in lieu of accounting, discharging Rhonda as temporary guardian and closing

the estate. In paragraph 2 of the order, the court granted the petition for reimbursement and directed

Ivory to reimburse Rhonda “the sum of $119,442.93 for expenses paid on behalf of Ernest Levert

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Jr., said funds to be paid from the GoFundMe campaign created for Ernest Levert Jr.” During its

oral ruling, the court stated that it felt it had “to be equitable in terms of how I decide this” because

Rhonda used her own money for Ernest’s care. The court found that Rhonda contributed to Ernest’s

medical and related expenses and stated it was “concerned” about Ivory’s action of opening the

GoFundMe campaign but failing to contribute to those expenses. The court concluded that Rhonda

was entitled to reimbursement. Upon a request for clarification from Rhonda’s counsel, the court

agreed that it was “directing the reimbursement come from the GoFundMe account.” Ivory now

appeals.

¶ 15 The Probate Act allows the court to adjudge a person to be a person with a disability and

in that situation, appoint a guardian to manage the estate and person of that individual. 755 ILCS

5/11a-3(a) (West 2024). A court may also appoint a temporary guardian “upon a showing of the

necessity therefor for the immediate welfare and protection of the alleged person with a disability.”

755 ILCS 5/11a-4(a) (West 2024). “The appointment of a guardian creates the relation of trustee

and beneficiary between the guardian and the ward. The estate becomes a trust fund for the ward’s

support. [Citation.] The guardian only acts as the hand of the court and is at all times subject to the

court’s direction in the manner in which the guardian provides for the care and support of the

disabled person.” In re Estate of Wellman, 174 Ill. 2d 335, 347 (1996).

¶ 16 A guardian is entitled to “reasonable compensation” for his or her services, which is to be

paid from the estate of the ward. 755 ILCS 5/27-1 (West 2024). A guardian may “petition the court

for an order directing the guardian of the estate to pay an amount periodically for the provision of

the services specified by the court order.” 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(a) (West 2024). The guardian need

not obtain a court order to pay for necessities of the ward, but “[t]he guardian should usually

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petition the court for permission to make large expenditures; otherwise, the guardian performs the

acts at his own risk.” In re Estate of Berger, 166 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1056 (1987). The guardian may

not be reimbursed from funds that are not part of the estate of the disabled person. In re Estate of

McInerny, 289 Ill. App. 3d 589, 597 (1997).

¶ 17 As the issue raised on appeal concerns the scope of the court’s authority under the Probate

Act, our review is de novo. See In re Estate of Pellico, 394 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1067 (2009) (citing

Alvarez v. Pappas, 229 Ill. 2d 217, 235 (2008)).

¶ 18 The Probate Act has multiple provisions that govern the guardian’s management of the

ward’s estate. First, the guardian is required to “manage the estate frugally” and apply assets of

the estate towards the best interest of the ward. 755 ILCS 5/11a-18 (West 2024). Second, the

guardian is required to file an accounting of assets of the estate. 755 ILCS 5/24-11 (West 2024).

Third, the guardian may file a citation to discover assets of the ward’s estate which are believed to

be in the possession of another. 755 ILCS 5/16-1 (West 2024).

¶ 19 Ivory argues that the GoFundMe campaign funds were never part of the guardianship

estate and that the circuit court lacked authority under the Probate Act to compel Ivory to reimburse

Rhonda from those funds.

¶ 20 Rhonda first responds that Ivory waived any objection to the inclusion of the GoFundMe

campaign funds in Ernest’s guardianship estate by failing to object to the report in lieu of

accounting which listed those GoFundMe campaign funds. This argument is contradicted by the

record. The record reflects that Ivory opposed the inclusion of the GoFundMe campaign funds as

part of Ernest’s estate at the March 6 hearing and argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over

those funds. She then filed a written response to the report in lieu of accounting which pointed out

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that Rhonda’s own petition confirmed that no assets were marshaled into Ernest’s estate and

asserted that any of Ernest’s assets had transferred to “any legal co-owners and or his heirs at law.”

The court’s March 6, 2025, order specifically recognized Ivory’s objection by noting the report in

lieu of final accounting was entered and continued, “the Court having approved the Report in Lieu

of Final Accounting, but counsel [for Ivory] having later objected that the GoFundMe account” is

not part of the estate. Ivory repeatedly argued that the court had no jurisdiction over the GoFundMe

campaign funds because they were not part of the guardianship estate. Further, in her written

motion to freeze the GoFundMe campaign funds, Rhonda acknowledged Ivory’s objection, noting

that “[b]ecause there is a dispute as to whether the GoFundMe account is an asset of the estate, the

dispute should be resolved by this Court before Ivory is authorized to access the funds from the

GoFundMe account for her personal use.” This is more than sufficient to preserve the argument

Ivory raises on appeal, that the circuit court lacked authority over the GoFundMe campaign funds

because they were not part of Ernest’s estate. We reject Rhonda’s argument.

¶ 21 We agree with Ivory that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the GoFundMe

campaign funds. There is no dispute that the campaign funds were possessed by Ivory only, who

opened the campaign and managed it. There was no indication that Ernest was involved in or had

access to the GoFundMe campaign funds at any time. Rather, the parties appear to agree that Ernest

was in no condition to do so. Rhonda took no steps under the Probate Act to bring these

GoFundMe campaign funds into Ernest’s guardianship estate or within the guardianship court’s

jurisdiction. Since the campaign funds were owned by Ivory, Rhonda could have followed the

citation procedure in section 16-1 of the Probate Act to seek a determination that it was part of

Ernest’s estate. See In re Estate of Elias, 408 Ill. App. 3d 301, 315 (2011). Section 16-1 allows a

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guardian of the estate to issue a citation to discover assets of the ward which are in the possession

of another. 755 ILCS 5/16-1 (West 2024). The purpose of a citation proceeding is “to obtain the

return of personal property belonging to the estate but in the possession of, or being concealed by,

others.” In re Estate of Elias, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 315. The representative of the estate must establish

a prima facie case that the property at issue belongs to the estate of the ward or the decedent, then

the burden shifts to the citation respondent to prove their right to possession by clear and

convincing evidence. Id. Rhonda did not follow this procedure.

¶ 22 Rather, Rhonda argues that the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Ivory and

therefore had authority to order reimbursement from her, regardless of whether the GoFundMe

campaign contained sufficient funds. We disagree. “The administration of an estate in the probate

court is not an action between or among parties, but is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, acting

directly on the res, which is the estate of the deceased or disabled person.” In re Estate of Denten,

2012 IL App (2d) 110814, ¶ 42. As such, Rhonda’s entitlement to reimbursement for expenses is

necessarily tied to the assets in Ernest’s estate. See 755 ILCS 5/27-1 (West 2024). If Rhonda sought

reimbursement from Ernest’s estate, and specifically from the funds in the GoFundMe campaign

created and managed by Ivory, she was required to make those funds part of Ernest’s guardianship

estate and she never did so.

¶ 23 Rhonda also argues, without citation to authority, that the circuit court found that the

GoFundMe campaign funds were part of Ernest’s estate when it approved her report in lieu of

accounting several months after Ernest died. However, in that report, Rhonda admitted that she

opened a guardianship account which was funded with her own assets and that “no assets were

able to be marshaled into” Ernest’s guardianship estate. Rhonda merely listed a variety of assets

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which she “believe[d]” to be Ernest’s, including the GoFundMe campaign. She also included

“Ivory’s monthly income in 2024: $4,000/month” in this list, but expressly acknowledged that this

was “not a guardianship asset.”

¶ 24 Further, in the report, Rhonda did not ask the court to find that the GoFundMe campaign,

or any of the other “believe[d]” assets, were actually part of Ernest’s estate. She cites no case law

or other authority to support her argument that merely listing a potential asset which was

established by someone other than the ward in a report in lieu of accounting was sufficient to bring

that asset within the jurisdiction of the guardianship court under the Probate Act, particularly

months after the ward died, and we are aware of none.

¶ 25 The circuit court never held that the GoFundMe campaign was part of Ernest’s estate in

either its written order or oral ruling. The court even questioned its jurisdiction over the campaign

funds. Instead, the court “accepted and approved” the report in lieu of final accounting and ordered

that Ivory reimburse Rhonda, with “said funds to be paid from the GoFundMe campaign.” Thus,

this was erroneous.

¶ 26 Although Rhonda argues that the trial court “made the factual determination that the

GoFundMe campaign funds were properly included as assets available to reimburse” her because

the “funds were raised for Ernest Jr.’s benefit,” she cites no court order or transcript where the

court so held. Rather, she cites only her own emergency motion to freeze the GoFundMe campaign

funds, which does not support her argument.

¶ 27 Rhonda next argues that, since the GoFundMe campaign was linked to a joint bank account

held by Ernest and Ivory, Ernest had an ownership interest in these funds. Rhonda did not raise

this argument before the circuit court, and thus, it is forfeited. See Andrews v. Carbon on 26th,

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LLC, 2024 IL App (1st) 231369, ¶ 24. Even if this argument was preserved, we would reject it.

Rhonda’s argument presumes that because the GoFundMe campaign was apparently linked to a

joint bank account, Ernest had an ownership interest in the GoFundMe campaign funds and they

were part of his estate. However, she cites no authority to suggest that a joint bank account held

by a disabled adult automatically becomes part of his guardianship estate, rather than passing to

the other joint account holder upon his death. See Konfrst v. Stehlik, 2014 IL App (1st) 132113, ¶

12 (“One of the essential characteristics of a joint tenancy is the right of survivorship or the right

of the last surviving joint tenant to take the whole.”). Nor does she cite any authority to suggest

that an account that is opened and operated by one joint account holder, such as the GoFundMe

campaign here, automatically becomes part of the estate of the other joint account holder merely

because it is linked to the joint bank account. Therefore, we reject this argument.

¶ 28 Rhonda’s remaining arguments rely heavily on principles of equity, asserting that since

Ivory created the GoFundMe campaign to cover the same expenses ultimately paid by Rhonda,

the circuit court properly ordered that Rhonda be reimbursed from that campaign. However, the

Probate Act limits Rhonda’s right to reimbursement to expenses from the estate’s assets, and

Rhonda did not follow the required procedure to obtain a determination that the GoFundMe

campaign funds were part of Ernest’s estate. 755 ILCS 5/16-1 (West 2024).

¶ 29 Lastly, Rhonda argues that Cook County Local Rules 12.7(b) and 12.9(g) support her

argument that the GoFundMe campaign was in Ernest’s estate. However, neither rule provides

such support. Rather, Rule 12.7 provides the procedure for filing a petition to expend funds from

a ward’s estate in Cook County, which is not at issue in this case as Rhonda never filed such a

petition. Cook County Cir. Ct. R. 12.7 (eff. Sept. 3, 1996). That rule also requires the guardian to

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list all payments “being received by the ward or by the petitioner.” Id. Here, Rhonda argues that

Ernest did not receive any payments from the GoFundMe campaign funds, making this rule

inapplicable. Rule 12.9 governs the contents of inventories to be filed with the court pursuant to

755 ILCS 5/14-1 of the Probate Act. Cook County Cir. Ct. R. 12.9 (eff. Sept. 3, 1996). Rhonda

never filed such an inventory in this case and thus, this rule does not apply.

¶ 30 Accordingly, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the GoFundMe campaign

because it was never properly determined to be part of Ernest’s guardianship estate. As the trial

court’s ruling in paragraph 2 of the May 29, 2025 order granting the petition for reimbursement

was based solely on its determination that Ivory failed to apply the GoFundMe proceeds towards

Ernest’s care, we vacate paragraph 2 of that order. The parties do not raise any arguments

regarding the other portions of the circuit court’s May 29, 2025 order, including the paragraph

closing the guardianship estate. Therefore, we will not disturb those portions of the court’s order.

¶ 31 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate paragraph 2 of the May 29, 2025 order of the circuit

court of Cook County and remand for further proceedings consistent with this order.

¶ 32 Vacated in part and remanded.

¶ 33 JUSTICE OCASIO, specially concurring:

¶ 34 I agree with the outcome of this appeal. I write specially only with respect to the issue

in this matter regarding equity.

¶ 35 Fundraising through platforms such as GoFundMe has become a common approach

for individuals seeking to cover medical expenses. This method is now so widespread that it has

become an important component of the health care system itself, influencing how people access

and afford needed treatment. See Isabelle Breier, Something Is Rotten in the State of Healthcare:

Accountability, Affordability, and the Court of Public Opinion, 25 Duke L. & Tech Rev. 88 (2024).

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¶ 36 Many families face challenges in obtaining necessary care for their children, spouse,

or loved ones. As a result, a significant number of Americans turn to social media platforms to

provide temporary solutions and fill gaps in the health care system. This reliance on online

fundraising highlights the absence of affordable and accessible health care options. Id.

¶ 37 Notwithstanding, there is a widely held belief that the government should be

responsible for ensuring access to affordable health care, possibly by establishing a Right to

Healthcare. Advocates argue for centralized and transparent mechanisms of accountability to

maintain equity in health care access. Accountability is seen as a vital prerequisite for achieving

equity and justice, as it motivates actions that uphold fairness and integrity within the system. Id.

¶ 38 Inevitably, the public is addressing a crucial gap in health care by using social media

to find affordable solutions. Online fundraising campaigns and platforms are valuable for

connecting people with resources that meet their medical needs. While these efforts benefit a few

high-profile cases, most individuals are still affected by existing market forces. In short, these tools

tend to assist those who are less in need. Id.

¶ 39 Generally, a GoFundMe page created for the benefit of a party is not considered part

of the ward’s estate. However, if the campaign was set up in their name but the funds are managed

by a third party or designated beneficiary, those funds typically do not become estate assets. In

terms of fair play, the specific circumstances and the intentions stated in the GoFundMe campaign

should affect how the funds are treated.

¶ 40 From an equity perspective, funds raised via GoFundMe campaigns for medical costs

could be (perhaps should be) considered assets within an individual's estate. Recognizing these

campaigns as an estate asset is essential for proper reimbursement, ensuring that any medical

expenses paid by a guardian are addressed during the settlement of the estate.

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¶ 41 While Judge Jesse Outlaw’s focus on equitable factors demonstrates positive intent,

such considerations are not permitted under the unique facts here. Nevertheless, acknowledging

individual circumstances and employing empathy during legal proceedings may lead to decisions

that more effectively address societal welfare and the needs of affected individuals.

¶ 42 Considering the legal constraints, I agree with the reasoning and outcome presented

by the majority.

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