[Cite as In re Estate of Distelhorst, 2016-Ohio-413.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF : Case No. 14CA3472 THE ESTATE OF : MARJORIE C. DISTELHORST : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY : : Released: 01/29/16 _____________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES:
James L. Mann, Mann and Preston LLP, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellants.1
James K. Cutright, Cutright & Cutright LLC, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellee.2 _____________________________________________________________
McFarland, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a decision by the Probate Court of Ross
County, Ohio, overruling exceptions to the inventory and appraisal filed in
the estate of Marjorie C. Distelhorst. On appeal, Appellants, Robert M.
Miller and Nancy Lallier, co-executors of the estate of Robert B. Miller,
contend that: 1) the probate court erred by approving an inventory without
notice to known creditors; 2) the probate court erred by approving an
inventory that contained items of tangible personal property, which were not
1 James Mann represents Appellants Robert M. Miller and Nancy Lallier in their capacities as co-executors of the estate of Robert B. Miller. 2 James Cutright represents Appellee Ralph Hempfling, the son of Marjorie C. Distelhorst, deceased, in his capacity as executor of the estate of Marjorie C. Distelhorst. Distelhorst was former executor of the estate of Robert B. Miller. Ross App. No. 14CA3472 2
of readily ascertainable value, without an appraisal; 3) the probate court
erred in permitting the fiduciary to utilize an appraisal that was five years
old; 4) the probate court erred in not rejecting an inventory, which on the
uncontroverted testimony of the fiduciary, was not accurate; and 5) the
probate court erred in overruling the exceptions to the inventory.
{¶2} Because Appellants were ultimately made aware of the filing of
the inventory and were permitted a hearing on their exceptions, we find any
error associated with the lack of notice was rendered moot. Accordingly,
Appellants’ first assignment of error is overruled. Likewise, we find
Appellants’ second and third assignments of error to be without merit, as we
find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in accepting property
values from a prior appraisal in approving the inventory, and thus, they are
overruled. However, because we conclude the trial court abused its
discretion in overruling the exceptions to the inventory, in part, and in
further approving the inventory, Appellants’ fourth and fifth assignments of
error are sustained.
{¶3} Accordingly, having found some merit in Appellants’ fourth and
fifth assignments of error, the decision of the probate court overruling
Appellants’ exceptions to the inventory is reversed, in part, as is the probate Ross App. No. 14CA3472 3
court’s decision approving the inventory. Thus, this matter is remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings.
FACTS
{¶4} Appellee, Ralph Hempfling, is the executor of his mother’s,
Marjorie C. Distelhorst's, estate. Marjorie C. Distelhorst was the former
executor of Robert B. Miller's estate. Robert B. Miller and Marjorie
Distelhorst, though never married, co-habitated for several years prior to
Miller's death in 2008. Distelhorst was the beneficiary of Miller's personal
property as well as a life estate in Miller's residence. After Distelhorst's
death, Appellants herein, Robert M. Miller and Nancy Lallier, Robert B.
Miller's children, petitioned the probate court to reopen Robert M. Miller's
estate and appoint them co-executors.
{¶5} Although Marjorie Distelhorst died on June 1, 2011, an estate
was not initially opened. However, Distelhorst's will was admitted to
probate on July 25, 2014, and Appellee Hempfling was appointed as
executor. Appellee filed an estate inventory on August 21, 2014. The
inventory was approved by the probate court the same day. In their
capacities as co-executors of Robert M. Miller's estate, Appellants filed
exceptions to the Distelhorst estate inventory on September 22, 2014,
claiming to be creditors of the estate, and as such, interested persons entitled Ross App. No. 14CA3472 4
to have received notice of the hearing on the inventory.3 Appellants claimed
in their exceptions that the inventory was not accurate, that the assets listed
had not been appraised, that assets had been omitted from the inventory, and
that no hearing was held on the inventory as required by R.C. 2115.16.
{¶6} As a result, the probate court scheduled an exceptions hearing.
Appellants and their counsel as well as Appellee and his counsel participated
in the hearing. Appellee testified in his capacity as the executor and Robert
M. Miller also testified. After hearing the evidence and testimony presented
by the parties, and after considering subsequently submitted written briefs,
the probate court overruled the exceptions to the inventory. It is from the
probate court's entry overruling the exceptions that Appellants now bring
their appeal, setting forth the following assignments of error for our review.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
“I. THE PROBATE COURT ERRED BY APPROVING AN INVENTORY WITHOUT NOTICE TO KNOWN CREDITORS.
II. THE PROBATE COURT ERRED BY APPROVING AN INVENTORY THAT CONTAINED ITEMS OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY, WHICH WERE NOT OF READILY ASCERTAINABLE VALUE, WITHOUT AN APPRAISAL.
III. THE PROBATE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE FIDUCIARY TO UTILIZE AN APPRAISAL THAT WAS FIVE YEARS OLD. 3 Although Appellants had not filed a claim in the Distelhorst estate, the record indicates that a separate civil suit had been brought against the Distelhorst estate, of which Appellee was aware of at the time he filed the estate inventory. Ross App. No. 14CA3472 5
IV. THE PROBATE COURT ERRED IN NOT REJECTING AN INVENTORY, WHICH ON THE UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONY OF THE FIDUCIARY, WAS NOT ACCURATE.
V. THE PROBATE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE INVENTORY.”
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
{¶7} In their first assignment of error, Appellants, co-executors of the
estate of Robert B. Miller, contend that the probate court erred in approving
an inventory without notice to known creditors. Appellee Ralph Hempfling,
executor of the estate of Marjorie Distelhorst, contends that Appellants were
not entitled to notice because they were not beneficiaries, next of kin or
creditors of Distelhorst. Appellee further argues, as a result, Appellants
have no standing to bring the current appeal. Finally, Appellee contends that
this Court lacks jurisdiction to review this matter because Appellants failed
to appeal from the order approving the inventory within time limits. Based
upon the following, however, we reject the arguments of both parties and
overrule Appellants’ first assignment of error.
{¶8} A review of the record indicates that Appellee, Ralph Hempfling,
filed an estate inventory and appraisal in the Distelhorst estate on August 21,
2014. Attached to the inventory was a schedule of assets with values listed
for each item or category, and indicated no appraisal had been performed. Ross App. No. 14CA3472 6
An order approving the inventory was filed the same day, indicating that
notice had been given to or waived by all interested parties and that a
hearing was held. It does not appear from the record that any notice of the
filing of the inventory or scheduled hearing thereon was provided to anyone,
as there was no surviving spouse, no other next of kin aside from Hempfling
and no known creditors of the estate.4
{¶9} Appellants, however, became aware of the fact that an inventory
had been filed and approved by the probate court and thereafter, on
September 22, 2014, filed exceptions to the inventory. The matter was set
for a hearing, which took place on October 21, 2014. Appellants were
permitted to question Hempfling regarding the assets contained in and also
allegedly omitted from the inventory. Robert M. Miller also testified and the
court itself questioned him at length. After hearing the testimony and
considering written briefs submitted by the parties thereafter, the probate
court ultimately overruled the exceptions.
{¶10} The probate court, in its entry overruling the exceptions to the
inventory, held that Appellants’ claim that they had not been provided with
notice of the hearing on the inventory was rendered moot upon the court’s
subsequent holding of a hearing and Appellants’ participation therein. We 4 Although it is suggested that Hempfling was aware of claims being made against the Distelhorst estate, and that the Distelhorst estate had been added as a defendant in a separate civil suit, there is no record of any claim being filed in the estate itself. Ross App. No. 14CA3472 7
agree. Any argument by Appellants that they were prejudiced by lack of
notice of the filing of the inventory or approval thereof became moot once
they were permitted to file exceptions to the inventory and were permitted a
hearing on their exceptions. Further, implicit in the probate court’s decision
to hold a hearing on Appellants’ exceptions is the fact that the court found
Appellants to be interested parties. The record reflects that although
Appellants had not filed a formal claim in the estate itself, Appellants had
brought claims against the estate in a separate civil proceeding that was
currently pending at the time the estate inventory was filed. In light of these
circumstances, we find no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the
probate court in allowing Appellants to file exceptions after the inventory
had already been approved, and affording them a hearing on those
exceptions, as interested parties.
{¶11} With regard to Appellee’s assertions regarding lack of standing
and jurisdiction, we note that R.C. 2115.16 permits any person interested in
the estate or any property included in the inventory to file exceptions to the
inventory. As set forth above, we have already concluded that no error
exists with respect to the probate court’s implicit determination that
Appellants were interested parties. As interested parties that had their
exceptions to the inventory overruled, it follows that Appellants have Ross App. No. 14CA3472 8
standing to pursue an appeal from the probate court’s decision overruling
their exceptions.
{¶12} However, as set forth above, Appellee also argues that this
Court lacks jurisdiction to review this matter on appeal as Appellants failed
to appeal from the probate court’s earlier decision approving the inventory,
which was issued more than thirty days prior to the filing of the exceptions
to the inventory. In support of this argument, Appellee contends that an
order approving an estate inventory is a final appealable order and that
Appellants should have appealed from that order. Because of the procedural
history of this case, however, we disagree.
{¶13} As referenced above, the Ohio Revised Code requires that the
executor of an estate file an inventory and appraisal of the estate of the
decedent in the probate court, and permits any interested person to file
exceptions to the assets the executor included in the inventory. See R.C.
2115.02 and 2115.16. A hearing on exceptions to inventory under R.C.
2115.16 is a summary proceeding conducted by the probate court to
determine whether an executor has included in a decedent's estate the assets
that the decedent owned at the time of his or her death. In re Estate of
Gottwald, 164 Ohio St. 405, 131 N.E.2d 586, paragraph one of the syllabus
(1956). Ross App. No. 14CA3472 9
{¶14} In In re Estate of Workman, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 07CA39,
2008-Ohio-3351, ¶ 13, this Court set forth the following standard of review
when dealing with an appeal from a ruling on exceptions to an inventory:
“ ‘An “exceptions” hearing is a special proceeding. An entry
overruling or sustaining objections to an account is a final
appealable order.’ ” In re Estate of Counts (Sept. 18, 2000),
Ross App. No. 99CA2507, 2000 WL 1572710, citing Sheets v.
Antes (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 278, 470 N.E.2d 931. The
standard of review on appeal from a ruling on exceptions to an
inventory is abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Scott, 164 Ohio
App.3d 464, 2005-Ohio-5917, 842 N.E.2d 1071, at ¶ 2; In re
Estate of Shelton, 154 Ohio App.3d 188, 2003-Ohio-4593, 796
N.E.2d 955, at ¶ 8; In re Estate of Platt, 148 Ohio App.3d 132,
2002-Ohio-3382, 772 N.E.2d 198, at ¶ 13; Counts, supra. An
abuse of discretion involves far more than a difference in
opinion. The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice,
of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between
competing considerations. In order to have an ‘abuse’ in
reaching such a determination, the result must be so palpably
and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the Ross App. No. 14CA3472 10
exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of
judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but
rather of passion or bias. State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d
164, 222, 473 N.E.2d 264, 313, certiorari denied (1985), 472
U.S. 1031; Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc. (1985), 19 Ohio
St.3d 83, 87, 482 N.E.2d 1248, 1252.’ ”
{¶15} As we already indicated, an estate inventory was filed and
approved on the same day without notice being provided to Appellants. As
correctly noted by the probate court in its entry overruling Appellants’
exceptions, R.C. 2115.16 provides that a trial court “may” serve notice of
the hearing on the inventory upon any person interested in the estate. Thus,
the notice requirements, even as to interested parties, appear to be
discretionary. Nonetheless, the court agreed to consider Appellants’
exceptions and set the matter for a hearing. Again, we see no need to disturb
this decision, which appears to be in the discretion of the probate court.
Because Appellants were not provided with notice of the initial filing or
hearing held on the inventory, they could not have timely appealed from the
decision. Further, there is some disagreement among the districts on what
exactly constitutes a final appealable order in the context of estate
inventories and exceptions filed therefrom. Ross App. No. 14CA3472 11
{¶16} As discussed in In re Estate of Sickmiller, 3rd Dist. Paulding
No. 11-13-01, 2013-Ohio-3788, ¶ 7, the court noted that the general view in
the Third District Court of Appeals is that “ ‘[w]hile an entry denying
exceptions does not affect the substantial rights of a party [and thus is not a
final appealable order], an order approving an inventory is a final appealable
order.’ ” Citing, In re Estate of Messenger, 3rd Dist. Hancock No. 5-08-07,
2008-Ohio-5193, ¶ 6. The Sickmiller court noted that their position on this
issue was in line with the views of cases from the Eleventh District, but
noted that there was “some variety among Ohio courts regarding the issue.”
Id. at ¶ 7-8. In particular, the Sickmiller court also noted that “[t]he Fourth
District has also produced language suggesting that judgment entries
overruling exceptions to an inventory are final and appealable orders.” Id. at
¶ 10; citing In re Estate of Workman, supra, at ¶ 13. Sickmiller went on to
explain, however, that in Workman, this Court qualified our language by
finding that “judgment entries overruling exceptions but failing to approve a
final inventory are not final, appealable orders.” Id. at ¶ 10.
{¶17} Here, the entry approving the inventory was filed prior to the
filing of the exceptions to the inventory. Further, once the entry overruling
the exceptions to the inventory was filed, a substantial right of Appellants, as
interested parties in the estate, was affected as their exceptions were Ross App. No. 14CA3472 12
overruled and the inventory had already been approved. Under these
circumstances and based upon the foregoing case law, we conclude that
Appellants were interested parties with standing to appeal the probate court's
entry denying their exceptions to the Distelhorst inventory, which was issued
after the inventory had already been approved, without providing notice to
them. We further conclude that in light of the circumstances in which these
entries were issued, the entry overruling the exceptions to the inventory was
a final appealable order over which we have jurisdiction to review.
{¶18} In any event, because we find no merit to the stated argument
under Appellants' first assignment of error, that the trial court erred in
approving the inventory without notice to known creditors, Appellants' first
assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR II , III, IV and V
{¶19} As Appellants’ second, third, fourth and fifth assignments of
error all address the question of whether the trial court erred in overruling
exceptions to the estate inventory of assets and appraisal (or lack thereof),
we address them together. We initially note, however, that although
Appellants set forth five concise assignments of error at the outset, the body
of their brief fails to separately argue the assignments of error as initially Ross App. No. 14CA3472 13
presented. Nonetheless, in the interests of justice, we will attempt to address
all of the issues raised by Appellants.
{¶20} As noted above, the standard of review on appeal from a ruling
on exceptions to an inventory is abuse of discretion. In the Matter of the
Estate of Workman, supra, at ¶ 13 (internal citations omitted). Generally,
the party disputing the inventory has the burden of going forward with
evidence that challenges the estate’s inventory. Id. at ¶ 14; citing In re
Estate of Hass, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-512, 2007-Ohio-7011, ¶ 43;
Napier v. Watkins, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 20122, 2004-Ohio-4685, ¶ 15.
Further, in determining whether the trial court’s decision on an exception to
inventory is against the manifest weight of the evidence, this Court
explained in Workman as follows:
“This court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of
the trial court. As a reviewing court, we are guided by the
presumption that the findings of the trial court are correct. The
trial court is in the best position to view witnesses and their
demeanor and to use its observations in weighing the credibility
of the proffered testimony. Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland,
10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273, 1276 (1984). Under
this standard, judgments supported by some competent, credible Ross App. No. 14CA3472 14
evidence, going to all the essential elements of the case, will not
be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest
weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co.,
54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578, syllabus (1978).
In the event that the evidence is susceptible to more than one
interpretation, the appellate court must construe it consistently
with the trial court's judgment. Gerijo, Inc. v. City of Fairfield,
70 Ohio St.3d 223, 226, 638 N.E.2d 533, 536 (1994).”
Workman at ¶ 15; quoting Counts, supra.
{¶21} First, Appellants argue that the probate court erred in approving
an inventory which contained items whose value was not readily
ascertainable and which had not been appraised. Appellants further contend
that the trial court erred in permitting the estate fiduciary to utilize an
appraisal that was five years old. Appellee does not address this argument in
his brief.
{¶22} R.C. 2115.02 states that “[t]he inventory shall set forth values
as of the date of death of the decedent[,]” and that “[a]ny asset, the value of
which is readily ascertainable, is not required to be appraised but shall be
included in the inventory.” A review of the record indicates that the assets
listed in the inventory of Distelhorst's estate were in fact, not appraised. The Ross App. No. 14CA3472 15
probate court specifically addressed this issue in its entry overruling the
exceptions to the inventory. In its entry, the probate court stated as follows:
“From the testimony presented, it appears that the assets set
forth in the inventory herein were assets decedent inherited
from the Estate of Robert B. Miller. The Court notes that
Exceptors have filed these exceptions in their capacity as
Successor Co-Executors of the Estate of Robert B. Miller. The
list of assets and their valuation in both estates are identical.
The Court finds it appropriate for the Executor to utilize the
same valuations approved by this Court in the prior estate.
Additionally, Exceptors failed to offer any evidence of the
value of the assets.”
{¶23} In light of our abuse of discretion standard of review, we
conclude that here, where the items at issue had been appraised by an
approved appraiser as part of Robert B. Miller's estate five years earlier and
approved by the probate court without exceptions by Appellants at that time,
the trial court did not err in permitting the prior appraised amounts to be
utilized in the Distelhorst estate. We conclude this is the correct view,
especially in light of the fact that the burden was upon Appellants to
challenge the estate's inventory. Appellants offered no evidence of different Ross App. No. 14CA3472 16
values than were listed in the inventory. Although Robert M. Miller testified
that a particular tractor listed in the inventory was rare and unique, he
offered no alternative value and did not attempt to introduce testimony or
evidence indicating the tractor had been appraised for a different amount.
{¶24} As noted by Appellee, Appellants have been in possession of
the assets at issue. Thus, they could have readily had the assets appraised
and introduced evidence that they were valued differently than the values
listed in the inventory. However, they did not. Based upon these facts, we
cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the
fiduciary to utilize the appraisal from the Miller estate. As such, Appellants'
second and third assignments of error are overruled.
{¶25} In their fourth assignment of error, Appellants contend that the
probate court erred in not rejecting an inventory, which they allege was not
accurate based upon the uncontroverted testimony of the fiduciary. In their
fifth assignment of error, they contend that the probate court erred in
overruling the exceptions to the inventory. Again, we are guided by an
abuse of discretion standard of review and in that context must determine
whether the trial court's decision in overruling the exceptions and approving
the inventory was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Ross App. No. 14CA3472 17
{¶26} “ ‘The representative of an estate has an obligation and
mandatory duty to seek out and collect every asset belonging to the decedent
at the time of [her] death and include it in the estate.’ ” In re Estate of Kemp,
189 Ohio App.3d 232, 2010-Ohio-4073, 937 N.E.2d 1102, ¶ 5; quoting In re
Estate of Ewing, 3rd Dist. Hancock No. 5-03-03, 2003-Ohio-4734, ¶ 12. As
noted in Kemp, this duty exists from the time the executor is appointed and
continues until the final account is filed and the executor is discharged. Id.
Importantly, if the record indicates that the inventory is inaccurate and is
lacking assets that should have been included, the trial court errs in
approving it. Id. Additionally, items to be included in an inventory are not
limited to only the items in an estate's actual possession. Id.; citing In re
Estate of Kelsey, 165 Ohio App.3d 680, 2006-Ohio-1171, 847 N.E.2d 1277.
{¶27} In the proceedings below, and especially apparent at the hearing
on the exceptions to the inventory, the trial court struggled to discern from
Appellants what exactly they were claiming was inaccurate with respect to
the inventory filed by Appellee. There was testimony that Appellee
Hempfling essentially drafted the inventory based upon his memory of what
assets of his mother's remained on the property, as he had not been permitted
access to the residence. Appellants introduced evidence in the form of
answers to interrogatories that were filed in a separate civil lawsuit, in which Ross App. No. 14CA3472 18
Appellee admitted to disposing of several items owned by Distelhorst after
her death, items which were not included on the inventory that was filed.
{¶28} The inventory filed by Appellee listed the following items:
Misc. household goods and personal property, Ford tractor, Allis-Chalmers
Truck Farm Tractor, Shop Tools and a Tractor Part. The interrogatories
propounded in the separate civil actions asked whether Appellee, following
his mother's death, had taken possession of or transferred to any other person
any of the personal property located at her residence. Appellee responded in
the affirmative, stating that he had either taken possession or removed the
following: “Clothes drier, riding lawnmower, bed, 5 quilts, refrigerator, pots
and pans, family pictures, rototiller, desk and china.” While it is reasonable
that the clothes drier, bed, quilts, refrigerator, pots and pans, family pictures,
desk and china were likely contained in the general category of “Misc.
household goods” listed in the inventory, Appellants' main focus in filing the
exceptions seemed to be that there was a zero-turn lawnmower and rototiller
that had been owned by Distelhorst, that had not been listed in the
inventory.5
5 Although Robert M. Miller claimed that several other assets were omitted from the inventory, upon closer questioning by the trial court during the hearing, it was clear that most of the assets he was alleging were omitted, while present on the property at the time of his father's death, were not necessarily present on the property at the time Distelhorst died, or at least he had no evidence that Distelhorst actually was still in possession of them at the time of her death. Ross App. No. 14CA3472 19
{¶29} Thus, Appellants primarily argued that Appellee had disposed
of a “zero-turn lawnmower” and a rototiller, items which Appellants contend
should have been included in the inventory, and claimed that the mower was
purchased just two years prior for over $4,000.00.6 Appellee admitted in the
answers to interrogatories that he had disposed of a “riding lawnmower” and
a rototiller and specified that he had sold them to a neighbor for $1,500.00.
Further, at the hearing on the exceptions to the inventory, Hempfling
admitted that he disposed of several items at Distelhorst's residence “after”
Distelhorst died. Appellee's testimony was clear that the “riding
lawnmower” he disposed of was a “zero-turn mower” that was two years
old.
{¶30} In overruling the exceptions to the inventory, the probate court
stated that “the testimony about the sale of the zero turn mower did not
identify the owner of that mower. It merely established that a zero turn
mower was sold.” The court stated, with respect to the rototiller, that “[n]o
direct evidence was offered relative to the decedent's ownership of a
rototiller at the time of her death. The testimony about the sale of the
rototiller did not identify the owner of the rototiller.” The Court further
6 When the probate court questioned Appellant Robert M. Miller during the hearing, Miller at first listed several other items he believed were omitted from the inventory. However, upon further clarification and questioning by the trial court, Miller testified he believed those items were present at the residence upon his father’s death, but not necessarily at Distelhorst’s death. Thus, we limit our analysis to the zero-turn mower and rototiller. Ross App. No. 14CA3472 20
premised its ruling on the fact that when the probate court interjected itself
into the proceedings and questioned Robert M. Miller about specific items
allegedly omitted from the inventory, Miller failed to name a zero-turn
mower or a rototiller. However, a full reading of the transcript indicates that
the testimony about the zero-turn mower and the rototiller were already
clearly part of the record prior to the probate court’s questioning, and
indicates that Hempfling had taken possession of them from the residence
after Distelhorst’s death and transferred them to a neighbor for $1,500.00.
{¶31} Based upon Appellee's answers to interrogatories and his
testimony at the exceptions hearing, which taken together indicate that he
took possession of both the zero-turn mower and rototiller from Distelhorst's
residence after her death and sold them to a neighbor, we conclude that the
probate court erred in overruling the exceptions to the inventory as to these
two items. Contrary to the probate court's findings that there was no
evidence Distelhorst owned these items at the time of her death, we conclude
that the record demonstrates otherwise and the court's decision was against
the manifest weight of the evidence and, as such, was an abuse of discretion.
Thus, Appellants’ fourth and fifth assignments of error are sustained, in part.
{¶32} Before concluding, however, we take this opportunity to briefly
address Appellee's argument on appeal that an agreed order filed in the Ross App. No. 14CA3472 21
separate civil action has rendered this appeal moot. Appellee contends that
since this appeal was filed, the parties worked together to devise a list of
property currently remaining at the residence in which Distelhorst lived at
the time of her death. In support of his argument, Appellee directs our
attention to an entry in the separate civil suit, dated January 28, 2015.7
Attached to the January 28, 2015 entry is a document titled “Exhibit A”
which purports to list the personal property of Marjorie Distelhorst's estate.
The entry indicates that the items listed on Exhibit A constitute “[t]he
Distelhorst property remaining in the Residence.”
{¶33} As set forth above, the items or assets properly included in an
estate inventory include all assets owned by a decedent at the time of his or
her death, even items that were transferred or disposed of after his or her
death but prior to the administration of the estate. As such, the fact that the
parties now agree on the items now “remaining” at the residence does not
moot Appellants’ claims that items owned by Distelhorst at the time of her
death were disposed of and then omitted from the estate inventory. In re
Estate of Kemp, supra, at ¶ 7 (stating, in response to the fiduciary's claim
that certain items had already been dispersed and should not, therefore, be
included in the inventory, that “[t]he possession of the items or eventual title
7 This entry is attached as an exhibit to a memorandum filed by Appellee in support of his motion for an extension of time to file his appellate brief. Ross App. No. 14CA3472 22
of ownership to the items is irrelevant to whether the items should be
included in the inventory”); citing In re Estate of Kelsey, supra. Thus, we
find no merit to this argument raised by Appellee.
{¶34} Accordingly, having found some merit in Appellants’ fourth
and fifth assignments of error, the decision of the probate court overruling
the exceptions to the inventory is reversed, in part, and this matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. Ross App. No. 14CA3472 23
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS and that the Appellants recover of Appellee any costs herein.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Harsha, J. and Hoover, J.: Concur in Judgment Only.
For the Court,
BY: _____________________________ Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.