[Cite as In re E.J., 2025-Ohio-5404.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: E.J. : APPEAL NO. C-250454 TRIAL NO. F/20/455 Z :
: JUDGMENT ENTRY
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 12/3/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as In re E.J., 2025-Ohio-5404.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
: OPINION
Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 3, 2025
Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Patsy Bradbury, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Megan E. Busam, Assistant Public Defender, for Appellee Guardian ad Litem,
Christopher P. Kapsal for Appellant Mother. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BOCK, Judge.
{¶1} This parental-termination case returns to us after our remand in In re
E.J., 2024-Ohio-2421 (1st Dist.). Appellant Mother challenges the juvenile court’s
judgment terminating her parental rights and granting the Hamilton County
Department of Job and Family Services (“HCJFS”) permanent custody of her son E.J.
Mother raises sufficiency and manifest-weight challenges to the juvenile court’s
determination that granting HCJFS permanent custody of E.J. is in his best interest.
{¶2} We acknowledge Mother’s significant progress in obtaining and
maintaining sobriety. But after reviewing the record, we cannot say that the juvenile
court’s best-interest findings were not supported by sufficient evidence or that its
decision was against the weight of the evidence.
{¶3} E.J., who has lived with the same foster parents for more than five years
and is bonded with them, reported that he wants to be adopted by his foster family.
His foster family wishes to adopt him as well. A recent psychological evaluation of E.J.
indicated that Mother’s prior neglect has caused, and continues to cause, psychological
harm to E.J. Further, Mother’s inconsistent presence in his life has caused E.J. anxiety
and stress. Finally, a significant period of time during the pendency of the case elapsed
without Mother contacting or visiting E.J.
{¶4} We overrule Mother’s assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History
A. Procedural history
{¶5} In April 2020, the juvenile court granted HCJFS emergency custody of
Mother’s son, E.J. The juvenile court adjudicated E.J. dependent in August 2020.
HCJFS moved for permanent custody in March 2022.
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{¶6} The magistrate granted HCJFS’s permanent-custody motion in
September 2023. Mother objected. The juvenile court overruled Mother’s objections,
adopted the magistrate’s decision, and granted HCJFS permanent custody of E.J.
{¶7} Mother appealed. This court sustained Mother’s first and second
assignments of error, holding that the juvenile court failed to independently review
the magistrate’s decision and improperly adopted the magistrate’s decision when the
magistrate shifted the burden of proof to Mother. In re E.J., 2024-Ohio-2421, at ¶ 25-
26, 33 (1st Dist.). We remanded the cause for the juvenile court to properly review the
magistrate’s decision in light of Mother’s objections. Id. at ¶ 37.
{¶8} On remand, the juvenile court heard additional evidence, overruled
Mother’s objection to the magistrate’s decision, and granted HCJFS permanent
custody of E.J. Mother appeals.
B. Facts
1. Pre-remand evidence
{¶9} In In re E.J., this court recounted the evidence at the previous hearing
in detail. See id. at ¶ 5-15. We briefly summarize that evidence here.
{¶10} Mother gave birth to E.J. in August 2018. (His father is unknown.)
Mother struggled with substance-abuse issues for most of her life, but she stopped
using drugs when she was six-weeks pregnant with E.J. In April 2020, after the onset
of the COVID-19 pandemic, Mother relapsed and HCJFS moved for emergency
custody of E.J.
{¶11} HCJFS placed E.J. with a foster family, where he has lived during the
entirety of this case. The foster parents placed E.J. in therapy to address his needs.
{¶12} Mother experienced mental-health issues during the pendency of the
case, including two psychiatric hospital admissions in which she showed signs of
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paranoia and psychosis. Mother testified that she was receiving mental-health
treatment at Mahajan Therapeutics (“Mahajan”) and that her Mahajan treatment
providers determined that Mother had been misdiagnosed and improperly prescribed
a medication that contributed to her mental-health episodes and hospital admissions
in 2021 and 2022.
{¶13} Mother went “missing for eight months” from May 2022 through
February 2023. She did not visit or contact E.J. during this period. In February 2023,
Mother resumed supervised visitation and Mother’s caseworker testified that the visits
went well.
{¶14} Mother testified that she had engaged in several drug-treatment
programs and was presently receiving treatment at Cardinal Treatment Facility
("Cardinal") in Ironton, Ohio, beginning in August 2022. Mother had successfully
completed an in-patient program and was in Cardinal’s “transitional” program, where
she lived in independent housing. She participated in alcohol and drug (“AOD”)
counseling. Mother’s AOD counselor testified that Mother was her most successful
client. Mother had passed multiple drug screens. And Mother obtained employment
at a local restaurant through Cardinal, where she worked 40-50 hours a week.
2. Post-remand testimony
{¶15} On remand, the juvenile court heard additional testimony from Mother,
her caseworker at Cardinal, E.J.’s therapist, Foster Mother, and E.J.’s guardian ad
litem (“GAL”).
a. Mother testified about her health, life, and more
Mother’s treatment and health
{¶16} Mother testified that she has “a disease, and it’s called addiction. It
would take an in-depth relapse prevention of what steps could be [taken] if I were to
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mess this up.” She had been clean for “close to three years.” Mother acknowledged that
she had been in several recovery programs before Cardinal, but she believed this time
was different because “I lost my youth. That’s one thing . . . I didn’t know for the first
few years how emotionally numb I was . . . I re-parented myself every day.” Mother
had attended individual counseling once a week while in independent living and
attended group meetings three times a week.
{¶17} Regarding her mental health, Mother believed that it was currently the
“[b]est its ever been.” She had become deeply involved in physical fitness and had lost
a significant amount of weight. Mother believed that diet and exercise sufficiently
addressed her mental-health needs. Mother regularly went to a gym where she had
“made healthy connections . . . I only see these people at the gym.”
{¶18} Mother had stopped attending therapy, but she resumed it after this
court’s remand because she “wanted to be able to prove my competency in case you
guys played the mental health card.” At the time of the hearing, Mother was attending
therapy once a month and paid out of pocket for the sessions.
Mother’s relationship with E.J.
{¶19} Mother agreed that if she received custody of E.J., “transitioning him
into that would be hard, but I’d be willing to do it.” Mother knew E.J. loved his foster
family and that they had “done right by him . . . He’s a wonderful child, and they’ve
helped with that.”
{¶20} Mother acknowledged that she had several extended periods where she
did not see E.J., stating that she “did it in his best interest. When my mental health
collapsed at the end of 2021 when I was misdiagnosed, it was in his best interest that
I do so, and [Mother’s caseworker] knew where I was at every stage of the way.”
{¶21} At the time of the hearing, Mother had not seen E.J. since April 2024,
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shortly after the juvenile court initially overruled her objections to the magistrate’s
decision. Mother was confused about whether she was able to resume visitation
following this court’s remand, but she testified that if she had the opportunity to visit
E.J., she would do it “[r]ight now.”
{¶22} Mother testified that E.J. received mental-health treatment and had a
PTSD diagnosis, which she believed originated from his removal from her care.
Mother agreed that she had not participated in E.J.’s mental-health treatment. She
stated that she would place E.J. in mental-health treatment through Mahajan if she
obtained custody of him. Mother was unaware that E.J. had been diagnosed with
ADHD or was recently placed on a 504 plan at school. Mother had never participated
in E.J.’s school meetings.
{¶23} Mother believed it was in E.J.’s best interest “long term” to live with her,
explaining,
I’m his mother . . . You tear me out of his life and he’ll come up with his
own ideas, you know, and then whatever experience or life decisions
that is being made around him and things he’s hearing about me will be
clouded because of other people’s judgment and not his own. I’m trying
to rise above that so he can see that I would never leave him.
{¶24} When pressed on whether she would prefer for E.J. to stay with his
foster family and have contact with Mother, she stated, “If it’s a relationship with them
first and then to [E.J.], I’m willing to do that.” She said, “Long term. I want to build a
bridge. I’m not going to take him from their lives, you know, I’m just trying to insert
myself in his life.” When asked if what she wanted was for E.J. to live with his foster
family but be permitted contact with her, Mother responded that if it were up to her,
“It would be that he stay with them and I’d be in his life.” Later, however, Mother
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confirmed that she was seeking custody of E.J.
Mother’s employment and home
{¶25} In August 2024, Mother moved into a two-story, three-bedroom home,
which she was renovating. Mother paid $900 a month in rent. Mother had a female
roommate, who would be moving out if Mother was granted custody of E.J. The
roommate was in recovery and was “a couple years clean.” Mother stated that there
was a room in her home for E.J., but she had no furnishings other than a dresser.
{¶26} Mother worked 27-to-35 hours each week at a restaurant and around 40
hours per week as an “RA” at Southern Hope Recovery Center, where she assisted
newly-admitted individuals. Mother also attended school at the “Collins Career
Center,” where she was working to achieve her high school diploma.
{¶27} Should Mother be awarded custody of E.J., she planned to hire a
babysitter while she was at work. Moreover, she planned to reduce her hours at the
restaurant. Mother hoped to become a drug therapist at Southern Hope after obtaining
her high school diploma, which would increase her income.
b. Caseworker described Mother’s successful sobriety journey
{¶28} Shelly Lambert, the transitional-living coordinator at Cardinal, testified
that she was Mother’s case manager at Cardinal when Mother began treatment there
in August 2022. Lambert is certified as a “chemical dependency counselor associate”
through the State of Ohio. Mother entered transitional housing in November 2022,
and Lambert was Mother’s counselor and case manager beginning in June 2023. In
addition to Mother’s five group counseling sessions each week, Mother attended
individual counseling sessions and case-management sessions with Lambert each
week.
{¶29} Lambert lauded Mother’s progress at Cardinal stating, “[S]he’s our
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success story.” In transitional housing, Cardinal works to help its patients address
mental-health struggles and develop coping skills, “relapse prevention,” and
emotional-regulation techniques. Lambert stated that Mother “has pretty much
accomplished all of them . . . She never failed a drug screen while she has been in
services . . . She gained employment . . . She started going to school in transitional.” In
transitional housing, Mother submitted to drug screens three times per week.
{¶30} When Mother entered independent living in August 2024, she was drug
screened weekly. Lambert testified that she continued to see Mother at least once a
week and that Mother had continued to attend group sessions at Cardinal despite “not
even hav[ing] to be here.”
{¶31} Mother completed care at Cardinal in November or December 2024 and
no longer received services there. Lambert testified that she did not have concerns
about Mother: “I think [Mother] is going to be very successful, and she knows what
she wants. We talk about it all the time. She wants to eventually, you know, to help
people. She wants to become a counselor. She wants to do case management.”
c. E.J.’s therapist described his behavior and needs
{¶32} E.J. had been attending therapy with Caitlyn McCandless for two years.
At the time of the hearing, E.J. attended therapy once a month. He had received a
psychological evaluation, which resulted in “an ADHD, Predominately Hyperactive-
Impulsive Presentation[,] and PTSD diagnoses.”
{¶33} E.J.’s therapy goals “surround behavior, emotional support, as well as
ADHD symptom management.” McCandless testified that E.J. described “anxious
behaviors at home, struggles with hyperactivity and inattentiveness at school and at
home, struggles with [] impulsive behaviors at school and at home, [and] reports of
nightmares.” She could not discern the cause of E.J.’s nightmares. And McCandless
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could not recall when E.J.’s nightmares began, but she stated that “what sticks out to
me the most was like the last nine months.”
{¶34} E.J.’s behaviors had improved over the course of his therapy.
McCandless testified that when Mother’s visitations stopped, “I noticed that the
anxious behaviors seemed to decrease in severity as evidenced in his presentation
coming to session and then reports given to me by Foster Mom.”
{¶35} McCandless stated that E.J. likely would need continued therapy to
address his anxiety and ADHD. And she testified that E.J. did not appear to remember
the time he was with Mother.
{¶36} McCandless treated E.J. during a period when Mother was visiting with
E.J. His sessions were immediately after Mother’s visits. McCandless did not have
“any major concerns” regarding E.J. during those sessions. She stated that E.J. is
generally “very avoidant when talking about his experiences” with Mother, “the
reported symptoms at home as well with the nightmare[,] and the reported behaviors
after visits.” E.J.’s therapist stated that E.J. refers to Foster Parents as “Mom” and
“Dad.”
d. Foster Mother testified that E.J. was part of their family
{¶37} Foster Mother testified that E.J. was bonded with her, her husband, and
their family dog. Further, E.J. “is very integrated with our extended family” and refers
to Foster Mother’s and Father’s parents as “Grandma” and “Grandpa,” their siblings
as “aunts” and “uncles,” and their nieces and nephews as his cousins. Foster Mother
testified that she and her husband want to adopt E.J.
{¶38} Foster Mother worked with E.J.’s school “to organize a 504 plan . . . for
him.” The 504 plan addresses E.J.’s “[i]mpulsive behaviors in the classroom and
sensory needs and emotional regulation needs.” E.J. had begun taking ADHD
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medication in February 2025. Foster Mother believed that the medication helped
improve some of E.J.’s behavior.
{¶39} Foster Mother testified that, after Mother’s visitations ended in April
2024, E.J. “went through about two months where some of his behaviors increased,
and then they started to decrease, specifically the defiance has significantly
decreased.” E.J. continued to have nightmares but not as frequently.
{¶40} Foster Mother believed it was in E.J.’s best interest to remain with her
because E.J. had been in their home for almost five years and “this is the only home
that he cognitively remembers. He is very integrated with our family and his local
community. He is at a school that supports him. . . He has his needs met.” She would
be open to maintaining contact between E.J. and Mother if the juvenile court granted
HCJFS permanent custody, as longs as “it is in [E.J.’s] best interest.”
e. E.J.’s GAL testified about E.J.’s desires and best interest
{¶41} E.J.’s GAL, Julie Harrison, had been E.J.’s GAL since July 2023.
Harrison visited Mother’s home and stated that “we actually had quite a nice visit.”
She described Mother’s home as “a rehab in progress. . . . She had it very well
organized, things in place,” but the home was not ready to be lived in “today if you
went there right now.” The room that would be E.J.’s had been “fully rehabbed . . . it
would just be moving in the necessities.”
{¶42} Harrison was “very, very proud of Mom for where she is today, but she’s
in the beginning of setting up her own sober life.” Harrison had no evidence that
Mother was not sober, but testified that “historically [Mother] has not faired very well
in the community outside of treatment, but she’s also never got this far.” Harrison
wanted to see Mother sober for a longer period before being comfortable
recommending custody to Mother and, “unfortunately, we’re five years in.”
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{¶43} E.J. discussed his wishes with Harrison and was “pretty adamant about
his desire of wanting to stay with the foster parents . . . He is ready to stay there and
be adopted.”
3. The juvenile court granted permanent custody to HCJFS
{¶44} In July 2025, the juvenile court overruled Mother’s objections to the
magistrate’s decision. It found that E.J. had been in temporary custody “for twelve or
more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period” at the time HCJFS filed its
motion. Further, after considering the statutory factors, the juvenile court found that
permanent custody was in E.J.’s best interest.
{¶45} The juvenile court awarded HCJFS permanent custody of E.J.
II. Analysis
{¶46} In her sole assignment of error, Mother asserts that the juvenile court’s
finding that permanent custody was in E.J.’s best interest was not supported by
sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence.
A. Standard of review
{¶47} In reviewing a juvenile court’s decision terminating parental rights
under R.C. 2151.414, this court applies a sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or a
manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review, depending upon the nature of
the arguments raised. In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 11. “Sufficiency of the evidence
and manifest weight of the evidence are distinct concepts.” Id. at ¶ 13.
{¶48} When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the
court’s role is to independently review the evidence to determine if the juvenile court’s
decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re S.D., 2020-Ohio-3379,
¶ 12 (1st Dist.). Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that “‘will produce in the
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
established.’” In re K.H., 2008-Ohio-4825, ¶ 42, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio
St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. Sufficient evidence exists where the
evidence in support of the juvenile court’s permanent-custody findings satisfies this
clear-and-convincing standard. In re S.D. at ¶ 12.
{¶49} When reviewing a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence, we
“weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the
witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [juvenile]
court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” In re A.B., 2015-Ohio-3247, ¶ 16
(1st Dist.), citing Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12.
B. Discussion
{¶50} Before the juvenile court may grant HCJFS’s motion for permanent
custody of a child, it must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) granting
permanent custody to the agency is in the child’s best interest, and (2) any one of the
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) factors apply. In re E.J., 2024-Ohio-2421, at ¶ 28 (1st Dist.),
citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).
{¶51} Mother’s challenge is limited to the juvenile court’s best-interest
determination.
1. Best-interest analysis
{¶52} In considering the best interest of a child, the juvenile court must
consider “all relevant factors,” including,
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers,
and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
13 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
child;
(c) The custodial history of the child . . . ;
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in [R.C. 2151.414](E)(7) to (11) . . . apply
in relation to the parents and child.
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e).
{¶53} Courts should not give more weight to any single factor over another
factor. In re S.H. and Y.H., 2025-Ohio-2338, ¶ 53 (1st Dist.).
a. Child’s relationships
{¶54} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) directs a court to consider the child’s
relationships with others.
{¶55} Mother asserts that this factor weighed in her favor and against granting
HCJFS permanent custody because her visits with E.J. went well, E.J. was “always
excited to see” her, and she is bonded with E.J. Mother additionally asserts that even
though she “has a three to four hour drive to and from the visits from her treatment
center, she has not missed a visit.”
{¶56} It is clear that Mother loves and cares about E.J., and that the two share
a bond. But significant periods of time elapsed over the course of the case in which
Mother had no contact with E.J. The testimony at the hearings established that these
extended absences caused E.J. anxiety and led to an increase in his disruptive
behaviors.
{¶57} Further, E.J.’s psychological evaluation conducted in late 2024
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determined that E.J. exhibited symptoms related to Mother’s neglecting him when he
was in her care. For example, E.J. experienced emotional distress as a result of his
trauma, such as nightmares, trauma-related negative feelings and thoughts, irritability
after visits with Mother, and “hypervigilance towards potentially trauma-related
stimuli.” The psychological report determined that E.J.’s symptoms were consistent
with posttraumatic stress disorder and that Mother’s past neglect of E.J., coupled with
her inconsistent visitation, caused E.J.’s ongoing emotional issues.
{¶58} Moreover, E.J. is indisputably bonded with his foster family. The
juvenile court removed E.J. from Mother’s custody when he was 18 months old and he
has been placed with his foster family for more than five years. E.J. refers to his foster
parents as “Mom” and “Dad,” and uses similar familiar terms for his extended foster
family. And E.J.’s foster family has connected E.J. with appropriate providers to
address his physical, behavioral, and emotional needs.
{¶59} Mother acknowledged that E.J.’s foster family deserved significant
recognition for the care they had provided him. Mother testified that she wanted E.J.
to live with his foster family, while continuing to be part of each other’s lives. Though
Mother later clarified that she wanted permanent custody of E.J., her testimony shows
that she believed that E.J.’s placement with the foster family was in his best interest.
{¶60} The juvenile court correctly determined that this factor weighed in favor
of granting HCJFS’s permanent-custody motion.
b. E.J.’s wishes
{¶61} Next, courts consider the “wishes of the child, as expressed directly by
the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of
the child.” R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). The juvenile court’s decision stated that at the “time
of the trial in 2023, E.J. was too young to express his wishes” and noted that Harrison
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supported permanent custody to HCJFS.
{¶62} Initially, Mother argues that Harrison’s recommendation, “although
referenced by the trial court, is irrelevant to determining the child’s wishes.” But the
plain language of the statute requires the juvenile court to consider a GAL’s
recommendation. Further, Harrison testified that in conversations with E.J. before
her April 2025 testimony, he told her that he wanted to stay with his foster family and
be adopted by them.
{¶63} This factor weighed in favor of permanent custody.
c. Custodial history
{¶64} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) requires courts to consider the child’s custodial
history. As the juvenile court found, HCJFS received interim custody of E.J. in April
2020 and E.J. was placed in temporary custody in August 2020. He has remained with
the same foster family for five years.
{¶65} Mother acknowledges this case history but asserts that the time children
spend in temporary custody “does not weigh against the parents when they are using
the time, as mother here, to complete case plan goals.” While Mother engaged in
treatment programs addressing her mental health and drug addiction during the
pendency of the case, the case was pending for five years. Mother’s progress in her
sobriety journey is commendable. But in the end, a child’s best interest is the
paramount consideration, rather than a parent’s efforts. This factor weighs in favor of
granting HCJFS permanent custody.
d. Legally secure placement
{¶66} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) looks at a “child’s need for a legally secure
permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a
grant of permanent custody to the agency.” A legally secure permanent placement
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means “‘“more than a house with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a stable
environment where a child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults who
will provide for the child’s needs.”’” In re S.H. and Y.H., 2025-Ohio-2338, at ¶ 63 (1st
Dist.), quoting In re P. & H., 2019-Ohio-3637, ¶ 42 (1st Dist.), quoting In re K.W.,
2018-Ohio-1933, ¶ 87 (4th Dist.).
{¶67} The juvenile court found that Mother could not provide a legally secure
placement based on mother’s history of drug addiction and mental illness, and the
effects Mother’s past neglect had on E.J.’s mental health.
Mother addressed her drug addiction
{¶68} The juvenile court stated that “Mother has excelled in her journey to
sobriety,” and further noted that Mother had consistently tested negative for drugs
and continued to attend group sessions at Cardinal despite having completed the
program. But the juvenile court observed that Mother’s sober support system “are all
recovering addicts” and that Mother conceded that “relapse is a common occurrence
in the recovery community.”
{¶69} Other than a generalized acknowledgment that those suffering from
drug addiction may relapse, the juvenile court cited no evidence that Mother was likely
to relapse. While Mother had attended other drug-treatment programs and relapsed,
the evidence shows that Mother had been sober for an extended period of time and
continued to engage in sobriety efforts. Indeed, faced with the presumably
considerable stress of the juvenile court’s previous termination of her parental rights,
Mother maintained her sobriety and continued to better herself. While relapse is
always possible, there was no evidence in the record that Mother is likely to relapse.
17 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Mental-health concerns
{¶70} Next, the juvenile court stated that it was “unclear” whether Mother had
“fully engaged in mental health services,” noting that after the juvenile court’s initial
permanent-custody determination in 2024, Mother had stopped attending therapy
and taking mental-health medication.
{¶71} Mother’s medical records indicate that she has been diagnosed with
PTSD and generalized anxiety disorder. She had two hospital admissions in late 2021
and early 2022 related to her experiencing psychotic symptoms. But since Mother’s
admission to Cardinal in August 2022, there is no evidence that these psychotic
symptoms persisted. Mother’s testimony on remand was that her mental health was
the “[b]est its ever been.” She regularly attends group sessions in the recovery
community. Moreover, Mother returned to her mental-health treatment provider after
this court’s remand. She engages in monthly individual therapy sessions, but no longer
takes medication.
{¶72} Neither HCJFS nor Harrison presented evidence that Mother would not
be able to manage her PTSD and anxiety without medication. There is no clear and
convincing evidence that Mother’s choice to manage her anxiety through behavioral
and lifestyle changes, rather than with medication, is sufficient to justify a finding that
she cannot provide E.J. a legally secure permanent placement. Without evidence to
the contrary, the only things to which HCJFS and Harrison can point are generalized
“concern” and speculation about what Mother may do, which is not clear and
convincing evidence.
E.J.’s needs
{¶73} The juvenile court observed that E.J.’s psychological report connected
E.J.’s anxiety and PTSD to Mother’s behavior when E.J. was younger. Further, Mother
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did not participate in E.J.’s mental-health and school-based services.
{¶74} Mother testified that she supported E.J.’s participation in therapy and
if she obtained custody of him, E.J. would attend therapy at Mahajan. But Mother was
unaware of recent developments in E.J.’s mental health and educational needs,
including his ADHD diagnosis and 504 plan at school.
Mother had obtained stable housing
{¶75} Mother had been renting a home since August 2024 and had completed
substantial renovations to the home. Harrison testified that the house was organized,
though E.J.’s room needed to be furnished.
{¶76} Ultimately, the juvenile court’s finding that Mother could not provide a
legally secure placement likely was not supported by the record. Mother was three
years sober, managed her mental health through lifestyle and behavioral changes, and
lived in a home currently under renovation. These factors alone do not lead to a finding
that a parent cannot provide a child a secure placement. And E.J.’s mental-health
concerns caused by Mother’s previous behavior are appropriately weighed under R.C.
2151.414(D)(1)(a)’s focus on E.J.’s relationships.
{¶77} But we need not definitively resolve this issue because even if we held
that this factor weighed in Mother’s favor, the other best-interest factors support the
juvenile court’s decision granting permanent custody to HCJFS.
e. Any other factor
{¶78} Finally, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) considers if “any of the factors in [R.C.
2151.414](E)(7) to (11) . . . apply in relation to the parents and child.” Mother
challenges the juvenile court’s determination that R.C. 2151.414(E)(10) applied due to
Mother’s abandoning E.J. The juvenile court stated that Mother went “multiple
periods of not visiting with E.J. for over 90 days.”
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{¶79} R.C. 2151.011(C) carries a rebuttable presumption that a parent
abandons a child when the parent does not visit or contact a child for more than 90
days, even if the parent resumes contact after this timeframe. In re S.H. and Y.H.,
2025-Ohio-2338, at ¶ 68 (1st Dist.); see In re L.L., 2020-Ohio-1565, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.)
(“Numerous courts, including this one, have determined that R.C. 2151.011(C) creates
a presumption of abandonment, which may be rebutted by the parents.”); see also In
re Custody of C.E., 2005-Ohio-5913, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.) (“Because the presumption set
forth in R.C. 2151.011(C) is in derogation of the natural rights of parents, we construe
it narrowly as a rebuttable presumption, rather than expansively, as an irrebuttable
presumption.”).
{¶80} Ohio courts have offered varying explanations about what is required to
rebut the abandonment presumption. For example, the Second District held that
“abandonment, as used in Chapter 2151, requires proof of intent to relinquish parental
rights of custody permanently, not just temporarily.” In re Custody of C.E. at ¶ 2. But
the Tenth District disagreed with this approach: “‘R.C. 2151.011(C) does not contain a
requirement of any particular “intent” on behalf of the parent; rather, the provision
defines “abandonment” solely in terms of the time between contacts.’” In re B.B.H.,
2015-Ohio-2347, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.), quoting In re D.P., 2007-Ohio-1703, ¶ 26 (10th
Dist.). Notably, however, the Tenth District recently held that a father successfully
rebutted the abandonment presumption where “he took steps to resume visits but was
precluded from seeing [the child] due to reasons that were not his fault.” In re A.M.,
2025-Ohio-4435, ¶ 62 (10th Dist.).
{¶81} The Tenth District’s holding in In re B.B.H. is incompatible with a long
line of cases—including cases from this court—holding that the presumption of
abandonment is rebuttable. If the reason for a parent’s lack of contact with a child is
20 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
irrelevant to rebutting the presumption of abandonment, and a court must
mechanically focus on the length of the lack of contact, then there is nothing relevant
to the child’s best interest that could rebut the presumption. Because a parent can
rebut the presumption of abandonment, the focus must be on the reason for the lack
of contact between the child and parent during the period of abandonment itself.
Compare In re Custody of C.E., 2005-Ohio-5913, at ¶ 15 (2d Dist.) (holding that
Mother rebutted the presumption of abandonment where she avoided contact with her
children for the purpose of avoiding an abusive partner), with In re C/S Children,
2025-Ohio-1639, ¶ 40 (1st Dist.) (presumption of abandonment was not rebutted
where “[n]either Mother nor F.C.S. introduced evidence to justify their absence.”).
May 2022 through February 2023
{¶82} The juvenile court’s decision noted that Mother went from May 2022 to
February 2023 without visiting or having contact with E.J.
{¶83} Mother had unsupervised visitation with E.J. in 2021. After Mother’s
two psychiatric hospital admissions, her visits changed to being supervised, and the
visits were ultimately terminated when Mother entered inpatient treatment at
Woodhaven in May 2022. Mother was discharged from Woodhaven in July 2022. She
then entered inpatient treatment at Cardinal in August 2022. Mother testified that she
intentionally avoided contact with E.J. during this period because she believed that
due to her unstable mental health, it was in E.J.’s best interest for her to not have
contact with him. In October 2022, Mother requested to resume visitations, but
HCJFS opposed her request because it reported that E.J.’s therapist believed visitation
was not in E.J.’s best interest. In December 2022, the juvenile court ruled that Mother
could resume visitation if Mother’s therapist and E.J.’s therapist met and determined
Mother and E.J. were “psychologically ready” to resume visitation. In January 2023,
21 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the juvenile court reported that the therapists had agreed that visitation would be
appropriate and the juvenile court ordered HCJFS to resume visits.
{¶84} HCJFS and Harrison assert that the entire May-2022-to-February-
2023 period should be held against Mother. But because Mother filed a formal request
for visitation in October 2022 and visitation was delayed only because of HCJFS’s
opposition, that entire period will not be held against Mother. See In re Cravens,
2004-Ohio-2356, ¶ 22 (3d Dist.) (“if [Father] attempted to visit [child], but was
prevented from doing so by Family Services, it would be difficult to conclude that his
actions were the equivalent of abandonment.”); see also In re Adoptions of Groh,
2003-Ohio-3087, ¶ 49 (7th Dist.) (“Appellant was justified in not visiting the children
in the year before the adoption petitions were filed, [] because Appellees deliberately
made it difficult for Appellant to contact them or find where they were living.”);
compare In re L.D., 2004-Ohio-4000, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.) (parents abandoned their child
where they did not visit or contact child for 15 months despite parents having “stopped
by the agency once” and called a handful of times “but did not inquire or arrange any
visits”); In re Katrina T., 2004-Ohio-3164, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.) (“While . . . appellant would
call the caseworker and leave a message that she wanted to visit her daughters . . . she
would not leave a telephone number where she could be reached, and she did not
appear for scheduled visitations.”).
{¶85} But because May 2022 through October 2022 is greater than 90 days,
the rebuttable presumption of abandonment applies.
{¶86} Mother asserts that she rebutted the presumption because “the lack of
visitation for a period was due to her residential treatment stays and the issues with
mental health.” Under the circumstances of this case, we find that Mother did not
rebut the presumption. The case plan required Mother to address her mental-health
22 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
and substance-abuse issues while remaining in contact with E.J. At least one court has
found that a parent cannot stop pursuing one case-plan objective to address another
objective. In re D.P., 2007-Ohio-1703, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.) (“[T]he goals in the case plan
neither suggest the pursuance of the case plan objectives at the cost of contact with
child nor promote such a result.”).
{¶87} We hold that the juvenile court did not err in finding that Mother
abandoned E.J. from May 2022 through October 2022.
2. The best-interest factors supported permanent custody
{¶88} Our observation in In re E.J., 2024-Ohio-2421, at ¶ 35 (1st Dist.)—“this
case is not as clear cut as many other parental-termination cases”—remains true. But
we hold that clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination
that awarding HCJFS permanent custody of E.J. is in his best interest. E.J. is bonded
with his foster family, with whom he spent more than five years of his life beginning
when he was 18 months old. E.J. wishes to be adopted by his foster family and his
foster parents want to adopt him. Mother’s previous neglect of E.J. caused him lasting
psychological harm. And Mother’s inconsistent presence in his life has caused E.J.
anxiety and stress.
{¶89} The evidence establishes that Mother has “excelled in her journey to
sobriety,” and her efforts to better herself and help others on their journeys to sobriety
are admirable. It is abundantly clear that Mother loves E.J. But although Mother may
be able to provide a legally secure placement for E.J., the Supreme Court of Ohio has
made clear that R.C. 2151.414 “does not make the availability of a placement that
would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor. The statute
does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.”
In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 64. We hold that the juvenile court’s decision
23 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
granting HCJFS permanent custody of E.J. was supported by sufficient evidence and
not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
III. Conclusion
{¶90} We overrule Mother’s assignment of error and affirm the juvenile
court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
ZAYAS, P.J., and NESTOR, J., concur.