NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
No. 130,126
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
In the Interest of E.H., a Minor Child.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JACQUELINE KELLY, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed September 11, 2026. Affirmed.
Jordan E. Kieffer, of Jordan Kieffer, P.A., of Maize, for appellant mother.
Kristi D. Allen, assistant district attorney, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, for appellee.
Before BRUNS, P.J., ATCHESON, J., and RICHARD B. WALKER, Senior Judge.
PER CURIAM: Mother appeals from the district court's order adjudicating E.H.
(YOB 2022) to be a child in need of care (CINC) under K.S.A. 38-2202. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that E.H. was in need of care and continued out-of-home placement. On appeal, Mother alleges that there was not clear and convincing evidence to support the district court's decision, that the district court's findings of fact or reasons for the ruling were deficient, that the State failed to satisfy the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), that the State failed to show "active efforts" were made to prevent the breakup of the family under ICWA, and that the State failed to comply with ICWA and Kansas law requiring preference for placement with family members. Based on our review of the record on appeal, we affirm the district court's decision that E.H. is in need of care.
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FACTS
On the evening of December 1, 2024, Wichita police received a 911 call from Mother reporting that E.H.'s Father took her without permission. However, when the police arrived at Mother's home, she changed her story. She told the responding officers that she had been drinking and needed a break from E.H. So, she allowed E.H.'s Father to take her to his residence in McPherson even though she knew that he was only allowed supervised parenting time. Evidently, Mother subsequently became concerned because Father had pending child molestation charges filed against him. At the time, E.H. was two years old.
The responding officers noted in their reports that Mother appeared to be intoxicated and "was not making a lot of sense." Mother admitted to the officers that she had given permission to Father to take E.H. to his home. Mother showed the officers a court order confirming that Father was not allowed to have contact with E.H. without supervision. After speaking with Mother, the officers arrested her for making a false report that Father had taken E.H. without permission when, in fact, she had asked Father to take the child for the night.
On the way to the jail, Mother stated that she needed to be taken to the hospital because she was going into heroin withdrawal. She told the officers that she might be having a seizure, and the officers pulled over to request medical assistance from paramedics. When the officers asked Mother about the last time she had used heroin, she changed her story and indicated that she had never used heroin but was going through alcohol withdrawal. Mother then told officers that she did not want assistance from paramedics and simply wanted to be taken to the hospital. When the paramedics arrived, Mother was uncooperative and refused to be examined by them. Afterward, the officers transported Mother to jail.
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Law enforcement officers in McPherson were notified about the situation and were asked to perform a welfare check on E.H. When questioned by the officers, Father showed them a video of Mother asking him to take E.H. because she was too impaired to care for her. Because Father was allowed only supervised parenting time with E.H., the officers placed her in protective custody. In turn, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) received an intake report, and Child Protection Specialist Savanna Osthoff was assigned to E.H.'s case.
After Mother bonded out of jail at around 2 a.m. the following morning, Osthoff spoke with her regarding the events that had led to E.H. being placed in protective custody. Mother indicated that she did not believe that E.H. was in danger, but she called law enforcement to make a report because Father did not have permission to take E.H. According to Mother, she had not reported that Father had abducted E.H.
Mother also told Osthoff that there was no set parenting time schedule for Father to see E.H. and, due to a no-contact order between Mother and Father, a third party was supposed to be present during exchanges. Mother said there was not a third party present when she allowed Father to take E.H. to his home. Mother also reported that she and Father had got into an argument the previous night, but she could not remember what the argument was about. Mother told Osthoff that Father had pending child molestation charges against him relating to allegations involving his stepdaughters.
A review of the record reflects that Mother and Father have a history of domestic violence, parenting disputes, and multiple contacts with law enforcement. Additional information contained in Osthoff's report included: (1) Mother has an older child that was with his own father during the incident; (2) E.H.'s father was on probation for domestic violence against Mother; (3) Mother did not want to discuss her mental health without an attorney present; (4) Mother stated she would not comment on her or Father's history of substance abuse; (5) although Osthoff could smell the odor of alcohol, Mother
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denied that she was under the influence; (6) Mother's eyelids were red and appeared to possibly be swollen; (7) Mother admitted to using marijuana; (8) Mother admitted to drinking beer the night before but claimed she had not been intoxicated; and (9) Mother said she did not drink when E.H. was in her care.
After speaking with Mother's older child, the father of her older child, and the Father of E.H., Osthoff noted the following concerns: Mother's substance use; the no- contact order between Mother and Father; Father going to Mother's home despite the court order; Father's parenting time occurring unsupervised; Mother's dishonesty; and Mother's hesitation to cooperate with DCF. Osthoff recommended that E.H. be released to another caregiver for the day and then released to Mother if she signed a safety plan and agreed to receive family preservation services.
Later that afternoon, Osthoff went to Mother's home to complete the safety plan.
She asked Mother where the alcohol in the home went, and Mother said she drank it all. Osthoff observed a can of beer on the kitchen counter. Otherwise, Osthoff found the home to be appropriate for children. When it was time to sign the safety plan, Mother hesitated and said she did not know what she was signing. Osthoff had Mother read the plan again and attempted to answer her questions. Ultimately, Mother signed the safety plan, and Osthoff let her know DCF would be in contact with her.
In its CINC petition filed on December 3, 2024, the State alleged that placement was not appropriate with Mother at that time. Among other things, the State alleged that Mother had a substance abuse problem which interfered with her ability to provide appropriate care for E.H. The State noted Mother's arrest two days earlier for making a false police report. Additionally, the State alleged that Father had a pending investigation for suspicion of child molestation and was allowed only supervised parenting time with E.H.
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The day before, Mother completed a urinalysis that was positive for marijuana and alcohol. The State alleged that Mother had poor insight and failed to exercise proper judgment, which interfered with her parenting skills and her ability to meet E.H.'s needs on a consistent basis. The State further alleged that Mother failed to address her instability, poor judgment, and substance abuse issues. As a result, the State asserted that court intervention was necessary to ensure E.H.'s safety and well-being.
On December 3, 2024, the district court ordered that E.H. be placed in the temporary custody of DCF in an out-of-home placement. Based on information provided to the district court that E.H. was a member of or eligible member of the Osage Nation, notice was sent to the Nation as required by ICWA. Subsequently, the Osage Nation identified E.H. as an "Indian child" and filed a notice of intervention on January 23, 2025.
About a month later, the district court signed an agreed order approving a supervision agreement in which E.H. would be returned to Mother's care. The agreement was for a period of six months, but it could be extended for an additional six months. The agreement set forth that E.H. would remain in the temporary custody of DCF, that Mother would be required to subscribe to an alcohol monitoring system, that Mother would sign releases of information so that DCF would be immediately notified if she tested positive for alcohol use, and that E.H. would then be placed with Mother following the implementation of the terms of the agreement.
The agreement included additional conditions, such as: (1) Mother would contact DCF immediately if any contact with law enforcement was made, even if the law enforcement contact was not directly for Mother; (2) Mother would provide a list of prescribed medications to DCF, and she would continue with medication management and checks as needed; (3) Mother must abstain from use of illegal drugs, alcohol, and prescription medication without a valid prescription; (4) Mother was to complete random
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urinalysis and breathalyzer testing within 24 hours as required by the agency; (5) Mother must follow the aftercare recommendations of her treatment provider; (6) if Mother tested positive for alcohol or illegal drugs, she was to obtain a new substance abuse evaluation; and (7) Mother agreed to allow agency employees into her home for unannounced visits. If Mother failed to fulfill any condition of the agreement or failed to make adequate progress, the State could request modification of the conditions, request a change in the time period of the informal supervision, or ask that the agreement be revoked and the case reinstated on the court's active calendar for further proceedings on the CINC petition.
Under the terms of the agreed order approving the agreement, E.H. was returned to Mother's care on March 3, 2025. However, approximately three months later, the State filed a motion to revoke the agreement. In support of its motion, the State alleged that Mother had been issued a municipal criminal notice to appear on a charge of unlawful inhalation. Specifically, the State alleged that on April 29, 2025, police were notified about a female being unresponsive in her residence. Upon responding to the scene, an officer found Mother inside her residence and observed her to be "in a daze." The officer then observed Mother grabbing a can of "Spray-X Electronics Duster-Compressed Gas" and attempting to inhale the contents. The officer then placed Mother under arrest, and she was transported to the hospital.
In its motion to revoke, the State also alleged that on May 2, 2025, Mother had been arrested by the Wichita Police Department for driving under the influence, transporting an open container, and unlawful possession of a non-narcotic drug. The motion alleged that law enforcement officers responded to a parking lot in front of a liquor store where they observed Mother asleep at the wheel of her vehicle. Inside the vehicle, officers found an open bottle of whiskey and a second unopened bottle.
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An officer also found two sandwich baggies containing white pills in the center console of Mother's vehicle. One bag contained 14 whole and 3 half pills with the inscription G13—which the officer was able to identify as the prescription drug gabapentin. The other bag contained 10 pills with "H502" printed on them, which the officer identified as the prescription drug hydroxyzine. Mother was unable to provide prescriptions for either of these medications.
On July 7, 2025, the State filed an amended CINC petition to include the information regarding the events that had occurred since the original petition was filed. An evidentiary hearing was held over the course of two days—August 19, 2025, and September 3, 2025. The State's witnesses included Mother; Bailey Williams, an ICWA expert from the Osage Nation; and Celeri Jones, a reintegration specialist case manager with EmberHope. The State also offered 12 exhibits that were admitted into evidence. In addition, Mother presented the testimony of Osthoff, David Harold—who is E.H.'s maternal grandfather, and E.H.'s Father. Mother also testified and offered 11 exhibits that were admitted into evidence.
Mother testified that she believed E.H. was placed in DCF's custody due to a "misunderstanding," and she could not think of anything she did that would have led to her daughter being placed in DCF's custody. Mother also testified that her substance use was not an issue because E.H. was never with her when she used substances. Still, Mother admitted that she had a 25-year history of problems with alcohol use which has caused legal problems for her throughout the course of her life. Mother further acknowledged that she was arrested for DUI just a few months prior to the CINC hearing and that she had three previous DUI arrests.
During her testimony, Mother agreed that alcohol could lead to domestic violence.
Moreover, Mother admitted that in 2023 both she and E.H.'s Father were arrested for a domestic violence incident during which E.H. was present in the home. Mother agreed
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that a parent who is actively drinking and abusing alcohol could not provide a safe, stable, or nurturing home for a 2-year-old child. In addition, Mother admitted that she had been actively drinking to the point that she could not care for E.H. on the night that E.H was placed in protective custody. Mother acknowledged that she was aware of the child molestation allegation against Father at the time she allowed E.H. to go to his residence.
Furthermore, Mother acknowledged that E.H. was again removed from her care less than two months after the agreed order was entered allowing her daughter to return to her home. She also agreed that she bore the responsibility for the second removal. Mother admitted that she had been charged with unlawful inhalation of a toxic substance in municipal court and that she was arrested for DUI just three days later.
Mother testified about her participation in multiple substance abuse treatment programs over the years. She indicated that she had received education regarding the dangers of inhaling toxic substances and regarding how it impairs a person's ability to function normally. Likewise, she agreed that it would not be appropriate to leave children in a home where somebody was abusing toxic vapors. Mother testified that she completed a detox program before E.H. was initially removed from her care and stated that Father took care of E.H. while she was in detox. She also testified that Father had pending charges for multiple sex crimes in another jurisdiction.
According to Mother, she completed inpatient treatment for substance and alcohol abuse with Holland Pathways in February 2025. Yet she admitted to relapsing on the day that E.H. was returned to protective custody. Mother returned to Holland Pathways for treatment in June 2025, but she was unsuccessfully discharged. She then attempted to get into a treatment program in Missouri, but they did not accept her. Mother admitted that she had been drinking when she arrived at the facility in Missouri.
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Also in June 2025, Mother was admitted into a substance abuse treatment program with Bel Aire Recovery. She testified that she was successfully discharged from that program in July 2025. Mother also testified that she was participating in an intensive outpatient treatment program at the time of the CINC hearing. In addition, she testified that her most recent urinalysis tests were negative.
Bailey Williams, an ICWA specialist for Osage Nation, testified regarding her experience and her familiarity with the child-rearing practices within the Nation. She also testified regarding her qualifications and about her previous service as an ICWA expert. According to Williams, she became involved in E.H.'s case approximately eight months prior to the CINC hearing. Based on her investigation, Williams was familiar with the facts of the case. Accordingly, Williams testified that it was the position of the Osage Nation that E.H. should stay in DCF custody until Mother demonstrated a longer period of sobriety.
Williams explained her concerns regarding E.H. being returned to Mother at that time because she had not been sober for a significant period of time. In Williams' opinion, Mother needed extra support with stressful events—such as beginning a new job—before E.H. could be returned home. Significantly, the State asked Williams the following question: "And the standard question we always ask ICWA workers are: Do you think it's likely that [E.H.] could sustain serious physical or emotional damage if she were to be returned home right now?" To which Williams responded: "I think she could."
Jones—a case manager with EmberHope—also testified that she would not be comfortable with E.H. returning to Mother's home at that time because of her sobriety issues. In particular, Jones testified that Mother should first demonstrate that she could maintain sobriety for a significant length of time. According to Jones, Mother's most recent sobriety was only around one month in duration.
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The district court resumed the CINC hearing a few weeks later. At that time, Osthoff—who had originally investigated the case for DCF—testified that Mother was "somewhat" cooperative during her investigation. Osthoff acknowledged that she originally recommended that E.H. be placed with Mother. This recommendation was based on Mother signing—and agreeing to follow—a safety plan. However, Osthoff acknowledged that she presented the CINC application to the district court and testified that she did not feel pressured to do so. Furthermore, Osthoff testified that Mother used substances after E.H. was originally returned to her home and had done so when another one of her children was present. Moreover, Osthoff acknowledged that Mother's actions violated the terms of the safety plan.
Harold—who is E.H.'s maternal grandfather—testified on his daughter's behalf.
He testified regarding various instances of Mother drinking or using other substances. He also testified that Mother had a pattern of making progress toward recovery and then relapsing over the past 25 years. He also acknowledged that Mother had participated in three different treatment programs over the past year. Harold was aware that she was unsuccessfully discharged from one program and was drunk when she arrived at another facility.
Mother was recalled as a witness on the second day of the evidentiary hearing.
During this part of her testimony, she indicated that her home was appropriate for E.H. She admitted to drinking the night that E.H. was originally placed in protective custody. According to Mother, E.H. was always in a safe place when she was consuming alcohol. Mother also testified that she had been sober for 80 days. Mother suggested that she had completed every court order that she was required to complete and that she believed E.H. should never have been placed in state custody because she was never unsafe, neglected, or abused.
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On cross-examination, Mother admitted that she allowed E.H. to go stay with Father without supervision because she was consuming alcohol. She claimed that the parenting plan restricting Father's contact with E.H. was only in case something happened in the future and that she trusted Father with E.H. Regarding the incident in which she had been huffing a toxic substance, Mother testified that she did not feel like her minor child who was home at the time was unsafe. Although Mother testified that she knew she could relapse, she expressed her belief that E.H. would be safe if returned to her care.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court took a recess to consider the testimony and review the exhibits admitted into evidence. The district court then returned to the courtroom and issued an oral ruling finding E.H. to be in need of care. In reaching this decision, the district court noted that it had weighed the evidence—including the testimony regarding the concerns expressed on behalf of the Osage Nation—regarding Mother having a consistent period of sobriety before E.H. could be safely returned to Mother's care. The district court also referred to Jones' testimony regarding the need for Mother to show that she could maintain her sobriety for a significant period of time before returning E.H. to her care.
The district court also reviewed the other evidence submitted in concluding that that Mother's substance abuse issues "are very dramatic and severe." The district court acknowledged that Mother had recently been sober and appeared to have a support system in place. The district court also found that there appeared to be a disconnect between Mother's version of the events and the other evidence presented. Ultimately, the district court determined that Mother was not yet far enough along in her journey to recovery to fully understand the potential risk of returning E.H. to her care at that time.
Subsequently, the district court entered a written ICWA journal entry and order of evidentiary adjudication as to Mother. In the journal entry, the district court made
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findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with its bench ruling. Thereafter, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Mother contends that the district court erred in its determination that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that E.H. was without adequate parental care. She also contends that the district court's adjudication order was insufficient and failed to satisfy the requirements of ICWA. In particular, Mother argues that the State failed to establish that "active efforts" were made to prevent the breakup of her Native American family and that the State failed to give a preference for placement to members of E.H.'s family.
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of the parent's child and is entitled to due process before the parent can be deprived of these rights. In re P.R., 312 Kan. 767, 778, 480 P.3d 778 (2021). Because child welfare is a matter of state concern, however, the State may assert its interest "through state processes designed to protect children in need of care." In re A.A.- F., 310 Kan. 125, 146, 444 P.3d 938 (2019).
Under K.S.A. 38-2250, the State "must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child is a child in need of care." Clear and convincing evidence is evidence which shows that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable. In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, 697, 187 P.3d 594 (2008). In other words, in reviewing the district court's determination, an appellant court must "'consider whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found it highly probable, i.e., by clear and convincing evidence, that the child was a [child in need of care].'" In re F.C., 313 Kan. 31, 40, 482 P.3d 1137 (2021).
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In making this determination, an appellate court will not "weigh conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or redetermine questions of fact." In re Adoption of Baby Girl G., 311 Kan. 798, 806, 466 P.3d 1207 (2020).
At the outset, we note that there is no dispute that E.H. is either a member of the Osage Nation or eligible for membership. Furthermore, it is undisputed that appropriate notice of this CINC action was provided to the Osage Nation and that it intervened as authorized by ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). See K.S.A. 38-2203; see also In re S.M.H., 33 Kan. App. 2d 424, 428, 103 P.3d 976 (2005). Likewise, it is undisputed that the Osage Nation participated in this CINC action and designated an expert witness who testified at the evidentiary hearing.
Consequently, the district court was required to determine whether the requirements of ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., have been met. See In re M.F., 290 Kan. 142, 149, 225 P.3d 1177 (2010). In order to find that an Indian child is in need of care and order custody with DCF, the district court must apply a higher standard than that required under Kansas law. Specifically, the district court must find: (1) that the child meets the Kansas statutory definition of a CINC under K.S.A. 38-2202(d), proven by the State by clear and convincing evidence; and (2) that continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child, as supported by the testimony of an expert meeting ICWA's standards. In re S.M.H., 33 Kan. App. 2d at 431.
This court employs a two-step process to determine whether a district court appropriately found an Indian child to be in need of care. First, we apply the test for a CINC determination under Kansas law. Next, we apply the heightened standards under ICWA. In re S.M.H., 33 Kan. App. 2d at 431.
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So, we first must determine if there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to establish that E.H. meets the Kansas statutory definition of being a child in need of care under K.S.A. 38-2202(d). In Kansas, children may be found to be in need of care if they lack adequate parental care, control, or subsistence, and the condition is not due solely to the lack of financial means of the parents or custodian. K.S.A. 38-2202(d)(1).
Here, the district court found clear and convincing evidence that E.H. is "without adequate parental care, control or subsistence and the condition is not due solely to the lack of financial means of the child's parents or other custodian." See K.S.A. 38- 2202(d)(1). The determination of whether a child is in need of care depends on the child's circumstances as they existed on the day of the adjudication hearing. See In re F.C., 313 Kan. at 37-39.
Although Mother suggests that the State's evidence to prove that E.H. was in need of care under Kansas law was insufficient, she acknowledges that the State relied on her history of substance use—both before and after the CINC petition was filed—and the concerns expressed by the witnesses regarding the potential for relapse.
In finding that E.H. was without the necessary parental care and control, the district court pointed to evidence of several serious incidents. Based on this evidence, the district court concluded that Mother's substance abuse issues are "very dramatic and severe"—which created safety issues for E.H. if she was returned to Mother's home at the time of the CINC hearing. The district found it significant that although Mother was currently sober at the time of the hearing, she failed to recognize that she had placed E.H. at risk by her actions. Significantly, the district court pointed to the testimony of Williams—the ICWA expert from the Osage Nation—who opined that Mother should have a significant and consistent period of sobriety before E.H. could be placed safely back into her care. The district court also found the testimony of Jones—the EmberHope
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reintegration specialist—to be persuasive regarding Mother showing that she could maintain sobriety before returning E.H. in her care.
Although we will not repeat the evidence summarized in the previous section of this opinion, we find that the record on appeal details Mother's continuing struggle with alcohol and substance abuse as well as her repeated relapses. Like the district court, we find this evidence to be both clear and convincing. Even though E.H. was returned to Mother's care on March 3, 2025, under an informal supervision agreement approved by the district court, Mother failed to remain alcohol and drug free.
Not even two months after the agreed order was entered, Mother came into contact with law enforcement on two separate occasions—on April 29, 2025, and again on May 2, 2025. The first of these incidents involved huffing a toxic substance while another one of her children was present and required her to seek medical treatment at a hospital. The other incident involved a DUI arrest. As a result, E.H. was again removed from Mother's home and she continued in out-of-home placement at the time of the adjudication hearing.
Mother's argument focuses on the fact that the investigator initially recommended a safety plan so that E.H. could be returned to Mother's care. However, Mother's argument fails to consider the incidents that occurred after E.H. was removed from her care, which demonstrated that Mother was failing to comply with the informal supervision agreement and remain sober during reintegration. As the district court noted, Mother had made some progress toward sobriety at the time of the adjudication hearing. However, the evidence showed a previous cycle of sobriety followed by relapse. As a result, both Jones and Williams testified that Mother should be required to show a consistent and sustained period of sobriety before E.H. could be safely returned to her care.
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As indicated above, we do not reweigh the evidence, substitute our evaluation of the evidence for that of the trial court, or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. In re Adoption of Baby Girl G., 311 Kan. at 806. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find substantial competent evidence in the record—that is both clear and convincing—to support the district court's finding that E.H. was without the care and control necessary for her physical, mental, or emotional health at the time of the adjudication hearing.
We will next turn to whether the district court met the requirements of ICWA in reaching its CINC determination. Under ICWA, it is necessary that the testimony of a qualified expert witness support the conclusion that continued parental custody would be likely to result in serious emotional or physical harm to the child. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). Federal regulations further require that it be established by the evidence that there is a causal relationship between the conditions in the home and the likelihood of serious harm. 25 C.F.R. § 23.121(c) (2016).
Mother does not dispute that Williams was a qualified expert witness under ICWA and the record reflects that she is an ICWA specialist for Osage Nation. In addition, Mother does not challenge the evidence presented. Instead, Mother argues that Williams' testimony was conclusory in nature.
At the evidentiary hearing, the State asked Williams the following question: "And the standard question we always ask ICWA workers are: Do you think it's likely that [E.H.] could sustain serious physical or emotional damage if she were to be returned home right now?" To which Williams opined: "I think she could." On appeal, Mother argues that "I think she could" does not meet the standard that it is likely that E.H. could sustain serious physical or emotional damage if returned home. But Mother's argument isolates one statement and ignores the context of Williams' testimony.
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During her testimony, Williams expressly testified that it is the position of the Osage Nation "that for now [E.H.] should remain in DCF custody until [Mother] can show that she can stay sober for a longer period of time." Williams also testified that the Osage Nation wants E.H. to return to her Mother's care when it is safe for her to do so. Williams further testified regarding her concerns about the short amount of time since Mother's last relapse, and Mother's need for extra support while she starts a new job and pursues recovery.
We have previously found that an ICWA expert's testimony should support the district court's conclusion that it is likely that the Indian child could sustain serious physical or emotional damage if returned home. See In re L.M.B., 54 Kan. App. 2d 285, 302, 398 P.3d 207 (2017); In re A.P., 25 Kan. App. 2d 268, 274, 961 P.2d 706 (1998). So, Williams did not need to testify that it is likely E.H. would sustain serious physical or emotional damage if she returned home at the time of the CINC hearing so long as her testimony supports the district court's conclusion to that effect.
Here, Williams clearly expressed the concerns of the Osage Nation if E.H. had been returned home at the time of the CINC hearing. These concerns were supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record regarding Mother's cycle of attempted recovery and relapse. In addition, Williams rendered the opinion that she did not believe it would be safe for E.H. to return home until Mother could demonstrate a longer term of sobriety and receive support for her life changes.
In its journal entry, the district court specifically found that "there is clear and convincing evidence that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in the serious emotional or physical damage to the child." Our review of the record shows that this finding is supported by the testimony of Williams— in her capacity as an ICWA expert—and is also supported by additional evidence in the record on appeal.
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Mother also argues that the district court's findings of fact were somehow insufficient. But she failed to object to the findings before the district court. Generally, a party bears the responsibility to object to alleged inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law to give the district court an opportunity to correct any inadequacies. See In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of B.H., 309 Kan. 1097, 1107-08, 442 P.3d 457 (2019). Because no objection was raised below, we presume the district court found all facts necessary to support its judgment. Bicknell v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 315 Kan. 451, 510, 509 P.3d 1211 (2022).
Here, the record shows that the district court recognized E.H. as an Indian child under ICWA, notified the Osage Nation in a timely manner, and found the testimony of the ICWA expert to be persuasive. Furthermore, we find that the record supports the district court's finding—consistent with the requirements of ICWA—that E.H. was likely to sustain physical or emotional harm if returned to Mother's care before Mother could show a longer period of sobriety. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's finding that E.H. is a CINC under the heightened requirements of ICWA.
Finally, Mother makes a conclusory allegation that the State failed to show that active efforts were made to prevent E.H.'s removal and to follow ICWA and Kansas kinship placement requirements. But Mother fails to provide any meaningful argument— supported by facts—on this issue or show where the district court ruled on the issue. Moreover, in its journal entry, the district court ordered that efforts continue to be made "to locate an ICWA preferred placement." Because this is a CINC action and not a termination proceeding, the efforts to prevent the breakup of the family are ongoing.
We also note that Williams raised the concern that efforts should be made to place E.H. in an ICWA compliant placement. In addition, the district court acknowledged this concern at the conclusion of the CINC hearing and instructed the parties—specifically the agency—to continue working to find an acceptable placement for E.H. In turn, as
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indicated above, this was included as part of the orders set forth by the district court in the journal entry. Because this is a CINC proceeding, any concerns about E.H.'s permanent placement consistent with ICWA requirements can be addressed—if necessary—at the appropriate time in the future. Finding no error, we affirm the district court.
Affirmed.