In re E.C.

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: November 20, 2020
• Docket: 413A19
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 413A19

Filed 20 November 2020

IN THE MATTER OF: E.C., C.C., N.C.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 8

August 2019 by Judge David H. Strickland in District Court, Mecklenburg County.

This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 7 October 2020

but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f)

of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Keith S. Smith, Senior Associate County Attorney, for petitioner-appellee Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth and Family Services Division.

Ward and Smith, P.A., by Mary V. Cavanagh, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant mother.

HUDSON, Justice.

Respondent, the mother of minor children E.C. (Ellen)1, C.C. (Cathy), and N.C.

(Nancy), appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights. Because

we hold that the unchallenged findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusion that

grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1111(a)(2) for willfully leaving her children in foster care or a placement outside of

1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the juveniles’ identities and for ease of reading. IN RE E.C., C.C., N.C.

Opinion of the Court

the home for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct

the conditions that led to their removal, we affirm.

On 29 October 2015, the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services,

Youth and Family Services Division (YFS), obtained nonsecure custody of Ellen, and

Cathy and filed a juvenile petition alleging that they were dependent juveniles.2 The

juvenile petition alleged that respondent was incarcerated in August 2015 and had a

scheduled release date of February or March 2016. At the time of respondent’s

incarceration, respondent requested that her adult daughter stay with the juveniles

and provide care for them. The adult daughter did not make enough money to

continue providing care for the juveniles or to maintain the home. Also at the time of

her incarceration, respondent was behind on several bills, including electricity, gas,

and rent. In early October 2015, the electricity in the family’s home was turned off,

and an eviction notice was served on the family demanding that they vacate the home

by 30 October 2015. In December 2015, while respondent was incarcerated, she gave

birth to Nancy. YFS obtained nonsecure custody of Nancy on 7 December 2015 and

filed a juvenile petition alleging that she was a dependent juvenile.

Following a hearing on 22 February 2016, the trial court entered an

adjudication and disposition order on 8 April 2016. The trial court concluded that

2 The juvenile petition and nonsecure custody order also concerned four of respondent’s other children, but they are not the subjects of this appeal.

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Ellen, Cathy, and Nancy (collectively, the children) were dependent juveniles and

continued custody with YFS.

Following her release from prison in March 2016, respondent entered into a

Family Services Agreement (FSA) with YFS on 15 March 2016. The FSA required

respondent to: (1) complete a Families in Recovery to Stay Together (FIRST)

assessment; (2) complete a Love and Logic Parenting course; (3) obtain employment;

and (4) obtain safe and stable housing. Respondent had already completed a FIRST

assessment on 14 March 2016 and it was recommended that she undergo a mental

health assessment at Amara Wellness. She started the parenting course on 9 April

2016. Respondent completed a mental health assessment and the Love and Logic

Parenting course in May 2016.

Following a hearing on 25 October 2016, the trial court entered a permanency

planning order on 15 November 2016 finding that respondent was making limited

progress on her case plan. She was taking temporary work assignments through a

labor agency and was living with the children’s father in a motel room. The trial court

set the primary permanent plan as reunification and the secondary permanent plan

as adoption and guardianship.

Following a hearing on 27 January 2017, the trial court entered a subsequent

permanency planning order finding that respondent needed to participate in mental

health services on a consistent basis. Although it was recommended that she

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participate in outpatient therapy two times per week, respondent had last seen her

therapist on 6 January 2017.

The trial court held a hearing on 14 June 2017 and entered a subsequent

permanency planning order on 15 August 2017 finding that respondent was not

making adequate progress on her case plan within a reasonable time. She continued

to live in a motel room with the children’s father and acknowledged that it did not

provide sufficient space to house her, the children’s father, and all of her children.

Respondent had last seen her therapist in May 2017. She had reported that she was

working full time at Jack in the Box, but YFS was not able to confirm her

employment. The trial court changed the primary permanent plan to adoption and

the secondary permanent plan to reunification, guardianship, or custody with a

relative or other suitable person.

Following a hearing on 1 November 2017, the trial court entered a subsequent

permanency planning order on 9 November 2017 finding that respondent failed to

attend therapy sessions. Respondent had not seen her therapist at Amara Wellness

since May 2017. She claimed to be receiving therapy at a different agency but could

not provide confirmation. Respondent had failed to attend several medical

appointments for the children.

The trial court held a permanency planning hearing that began on 22 March

2018 but was continued to 3 May 2018 and then again to 13 July 2018. The trial court

entered an order on 29 August 2018 finding that respondent had last participated in

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therapy in March 2018 and still lived in a motel room with the children’s father.

Respondent had left her employment at Jack in the Box and was working at

McDonald’s. The trial court concluded that termination of respondent’s parental

rights was in the best interests of the children and ordered YFS to file a petition to

terminate respondent’s parental rights within sixty days.

On 27 November 2018, YFS filed petitions to terminate respondent’s parental

rights to the children. YFS alleged grounds of neglect, willfully leaving the children

in foster care or placement outside the home for more than twelve months without

making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their removal, and

dependency. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (6) (2019).

A hearing on YFS’s petition for termination took place on 22 May 2019, 23 May

2019, and 11 June 2019. On 8 August 2019, the trial court entered an order

terminating respondent’s parental rights. The trial court concluded that grounds

existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights and that it was in the children’s

best interests that respondent’s parental rights be terminated. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1110(a) (2019). Respondent appealed.

Respondent contends that the trial court erred by adjudicating grounds for

termination of her parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (6).

Because only one ground is needed to terminate parental rights, we only address

respondent’s arguments regarding the ground of willfully leaving the children in

foster care or a placement outside of the home for more than twelve months without

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making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their removal. See In

re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404 (1982) (“[T]he trial court is authorized to terminate

parental rights ‘upon a finding of one or more’ of the six grounds . . . .”).

We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 “to determine

whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the

findings support the conclusions of law.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984).

Here, respondent does not challenge any findings of fact, and thus, they are binding

on appeal. In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 330 (2020). “The trial court’s conclusions of law

are reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019) (citing In re

S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 146 (2008), aff’d per curiam, 363 N.C. 368 (2009)).

Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), a trial court may terminate parental

rights if “[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside

the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court

that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those

conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). “[T]he

willfulness of a parent’s failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the

conditions that led to a child’s removal from the family home ‘is established when the

[parent] had the ability to show reasonable progress, but was unwilling to make the

effort.’ ” In re L.E.W., 846 S.E.2d 460, 469 (N.C. 2020) (second alteration in original)

(quoting In re Fletcher, 148 N.C. App. 228, 235 (2002)).

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“[P]arental compliance with a judicially adopted case plan is relevant in

determining whether grounds for termination exist pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1111(a)(2) . . . .” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 384 (2019). A trial court should refrain

from finding that a parent has failed to make reasonable progress in correcting the

conditions that led to the children’s removal “simply because of his or her ‘failure to

fully satisfy all elements of the case plan goals.” Id. at 385 (citation omitted).

However, “a trial court has ample authority to determine that a parent’s ‘extremely

limited progress’ in correcting the conditions leading to removal adequately supports

a determination that a parent’s parental rights in a particular child are subject to

termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).” Id. (citation omitted).

Respondent argues that the trial court’s findings of fact do not support its

conclusion that she failed to correct the removal conditions by the time of the

termination hearing. She argues that the conditions that must be corrected “are

limited to those set forth in the underlying petition” and that “[i]ssues which arise

after the child’s removal are irrelevant to the analysis.” Respondent asserts that by

the time of the termination hearing, she had addressed the single issue that led to

the removal of her children—“the need for stable and appropriate housing.” Her

argument is without merit.

In In re B.O.A., this Court rejected a similar argument, stating that

nothing in the relevant statutory language suggests that the only ‘conditions of removal’ that are relevant to a determination of whether a particular parent’s parental

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rights in a particular child are subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) are limited to those which are explicitly set out in a petition seeking the entry of a nonsecure custody order or a determination that a particular child is an abused, neglected, or dependent juvenile.

372 N.C. at 381. The trial court in an abuse, neglect, and dependency proceeding “has

the authority to order a parent to take any step reasonably required to alleviate any

condition that directly or indirectly contributed to causing the juvenile’s removal from

the parental home.” Id. This Court concluded that:

as long as a particular case plan provision addresses an issue that, directly or indirectly, contributed to causing the juvenile’s removal from the parental home, the extent to which a parent has reasonably complied with that case plan provision is, at minimum, relevant to the determination of whether that parent’s parental rights in his or her child are subject to termination for failure to make reasonable progress pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B- 1111(a)(2).

Id. at 385.

In the initial adjudication and disposition order, the trial court found that the

children were placed in YFS custody due to respondent’s incarceration, “which led to

financial disruption and the eviction of the family[,]” and because no relative or

caretaker could provide for them. In addition, the trial court made unchallenged

findings of fact in its termination order that respondent’s issues “revolve and have

revolved around parenting, mental health concerns, and housing instability.” These

findings of fact establish the necessary “nexus” between the components of

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respondent’s court-approved case plan with which she failed to comply and the

conditions which led to the children’s removal. See In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 385.

Respondent next argues that the trial court’s findings of fact fail to support its

conclusion that she willfully left the children in foster care. She contends that the

findings fail to reflect her efforts to make a “positive and sustained response toward

achieving reunification with her children.” We disagree.

In its termination order, the trial court found that a case plan was developed

for respondent in February 2016 to “address issues of parenting concerns, mental

health concerns[,] and housing instability.” Respondent only addressed the housing

component of her case plan by moving into a four-bedroom house, and she did not

address that component until April 2019.

Regarding parenting concerns, the trial court found that respondent adopted

some stray cats and refused to get rid of them after Ellen and Cathy experienced

allergic reactions during visitations. The trial court found that respondent had shown

up for very few of the children’s medical, dental, and therapy appointments, that

respondent lacked the ability to understand and meet the needs of her children, and

that respondent lacked a plan to understand and meet the children’s needs. The trial

court also found that on or about 29 August 2018, another child (Amy) of respondent

who was also in YFS custody, had been placed with respondent for several months.

Respondent became upset in response to a hearing during which the trial court

ordered YFS to proceed with terminating respondent’s parental rights to the children

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and demanded that YFS pick up Amy and place her back into foster care because she

did not want to take care of her.

With respect to the mental health component of respondent’s case plan, the

trial court found that respondent was diagnosed, inter alia, with unspecified

personality disorder with narcissistic, antisocial, and borderline traits, bipolar I

disorder, and unspecified anxiety disorder. In March 2016, it was recommended that

respondent engage in mental health services with Amara Wellness. Respondent

attended sessions at Amara Wellness from March 2016 until spring 2017, but was

inconsistent with attending her appointments. She began receiving mental health

services again in the spring of 2018 until October 2018, but she had not received any

mental health treatment from October 2018 until the date of the termination hearing

in May and June of 2019.

These unchallenged findings of fact establish that respondent failed to comply

with the components of her case plan addressing her parenting and mental health

concerns. While respondent addressed the housing component of her case plan by

moving from a motel room into a house, she did so only a month before the

termination hearing. This limited and delayed progress does not amount to

reasonable progress in light of the fact that the children had been in YFS custody for

over three years. See, e.g., In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C. App. 540, 546 (2004) (holding that

when the respondent had not followed through on her obligation to seek therapy, only

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seeing a counselor three weeks prior to the termination hearing, such a delayed effort

was deemed to be insufficient progress.).

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court’s findings of fact support

its conclusion that grounds exist to terminate respondent’s parental rights to the

children under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). The trial court’s conclusion on this ground

is “sufficient in and of itself to support termination of respondent’s parental rights.”

In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 413 (2019). Respondent does not challenge the trial court’s

conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating

respondent’s parental rights to the children.

AFFIRMED.

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