In re D.T.

2025 Ohio 3149

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 4, 2025
• Docket: 114745 & 114747
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re D.T., 2025-Ohio-3149.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE D.T., JR., ET AL. : Nos. 114745 and 114747 Minor Children :

[Appeal by D.T., Father] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 4, 2025

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. FA18107850 and FA18107851

Appearances:

Fanger & Davidson LLC, Jeffrey J. Fanger, and Gerry Davidson, for appellant D.T.

I.P., pro se.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

This case involves the custody of two minor children, D.T., Jr., and

I.D.T. The children’s father D.T. (“Father”) appeals from the juvenile court’s

December 30, 2024 judgment, which states that the court reviewed the decision of

a magistrate denying Father’s motion to modify custody/shared parenting/and

parenting, and leaving I.P., the children’s mother (“Mother”), as their legal custodian and residential parent. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and

remand with instructions for the juvenile court to conduct an independent review of

the matter that includes a review of the transcript of the July 31, 2024 hearing held

on Father’s motion.

Factual and Procedural History

The record demonstrates that in February 2019, Mother and Father

entered into a shared parenting plan. In April 2021, Mother filed a motion to modify

custody, the shared parenting plan, and Father’s parenting time. Mother’s motion

was based on Father’s living situation at the time. In June 2021, the juvenile court

held a hearing on Mother’s motion. Mother and Father appeared at the hearing;

both were unrepresented. Mother and Father agreed that Mother would be the sole

legal custodian and residential parent of the children and Father would have

parenting time. At the hearing, the magistrate stated the following regarding the

change:

So what you guys need to understand is I’ll be happy to adopt this; but when things change; the only way you can change things is for the Court to change it. So if you [want to] go back to a shared parenting plan or something like that, you need to file something to come back into Court. Okay. Does everybody understand that?

Both Mother and Father indicated that they understood the

magistrate’s statement. The change was memorialized in a July 2021 magistrate’s

decision. The decision stated that the “Court finds that the parties have knowingly,

intelligently and voluntarily entered into an agreement regarding modification to

their existing shared parenting agreement and legal custody which is incorporated herein.” (Emphasis added.) The decision designated Mother as the children’s

residential parent and legal custodian and ordered that Father’s visitation would be

by agreement of the parties. Neither party objected to or appealed the decision, and

it was subsequently affirmed, approved, and adopted by the juvenile court.

Sometime after the July 2021 order, Mother and the children moved

from Cuyahoga County, Ohio to California.

In October 2023, Father, pro se, filed the subject motion to modify

custody/shared parenting/and parenting. In his motion, Father indicated that the

status of custody of the children at that time was shared parenting. In November

2023, an attorney for Mother filed a notice of appearance, and in February 2024,

an attorney for Father filed a notice of appearance.

In March 2024, a magistrate held a hearing and found that the parties

had competing positions on the status of custody of the children at that time. The

court requested that the parties brief the status of custody, which they did.

According to Father, for the July 2021 judgment to have effectuated a

termination of the shared parenting plan it would have needed to specifically state

that instead of using the word “modification.” Mother, on the other hand, contended

that the July 2021 judgment was a termination of the parties’ shared parenting plan.

The court also obtained and reviewed the transcript from the June 2021 hearing that

resulted in the July 2021 order.

After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the transcript from the June

2021 hearing, the juvenile court stated the following: [F]or purposes of clarity, this Court finds that the Shared Parenting Plan previously ordered on February 21, 2019 was terminated by post- decree on July 12, 2021. This Court will proceeded [sic] operating under the view that Mother has sole legal custody and is the residential parent of the children without a shared parenting plan in effect.

On July 31, 2024, a hearing before a magistrate was held on Father’s

motion to modify custody/shared parenting/and parenting. On December 9, 2024,

the magistrate issued a decision denying Father’s motion. On December 13, 2024,

Father filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. On December 17, 2024, Father

filed a request for the transcript of the July 2024 hearing, which the juvenile court

granted. On December 20, 2024, Mother also requested the transcript and the

juvenile court granted her request. On December 30, 2024, prior to the transcript

being filed — which occurred in February 2025 — the juvenile court reviewed the

magistrate’s decision and entered judgment in accord with the decision.

In its December 30, 2024 judgment, the juvenile court found that

there was no change in circumstances that would warrant a modification in the

custody of the children. The juvenile court modified Father’s parenting time with

specific orders. On January 10, 2025, Father filed his notice of appeal. On January

29, 2025, the juvenile court issued another judgment in which it overruled Father’s

objections and upheld the magistrate’s decision.

Father’s appeal is from the juvenile court’s December 30, 2024

judgment, and he has assigned seven assignments of error for our review. The first

assignment of error is dispositive; the remaining assignments of error are set forth

in the appendix. The first assignment of error reads: I. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion by ruling on the Magistrate’s Decision despite objections being timely filed but before the transcript was filed as the Trial Court was required to conduct an independent review.

Law and Analysis

In his first assignment of error, Father contends that the juvenile

court erred in issuing its December 30, 2024 decision prior to the transcript being

filed with the court. According to Father, it would have been impossible for the court

to conduct an independent review without the transcript, which is over 250 pages.

Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b) provides in relevant part as follows:

(b) Objections to magistrate’s decision.

(i) Time for filing. A party may file written objections to a magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision during that fourteen-day period as permitted by Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(e)(i).

...

(iii) Objection to magistrate’s factual finding, transcript or affidavit. An objection to a factual finding . . . shall be supported by a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding or an affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not available . . . . The objecting party shall file the transcript or affidavit with the court within thirty days after filing objections unless the court extends the time in writing for preparation of the transcript or other good cause. If a party files timely objections prior to the date on which a transcript is prepared, the party may seek leave of court to supplement the objections.

Further, Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d) provides that in ruling on timely

objections to a magistrate’s decision, “the court shall undertake an independent

review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” The independent

review requires the juvenile court to conduct a de novo review of the facts and to

reach its own conclusions about the issues in the case. In re Y.H., 2023-Ohio-2272,

¶ 32 (1st Dist.), citing In re A.S., 2019-Ohio-2359, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.). This court has

held that “‘it is an abuse of discretion to adopt a magistrate’s decision over an

objection to factual findings prior to its receipt of a timely requested transcript or

other materials necessary to conduct an independent review of the matter.’” In re

A.C., 2019-Ohio-5127, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), quoting In re H.R.K., 2012-Ohio-4054, ¶ 12

(8th Dist.); see also In re I.R.Q., 2018-Ohio-292, ¶ 24-25 (8th Dist.).

Here, Father timely filed his objections to the magistrate’s decision

within the 14-day period under Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b). Father also requested a

transcript, and the juvenile court granted the request. Before the 30 days allowed

for filing the transcript lapsed, the court issued the subject judgment; thus, the

juvenile court did not afford Father the opportunity to request an extension for the

filing of the transcript.

We note that the juvenile court did not rule on Father’s objections

until January 29, 2025; the court overruled the objections and affirmed, approved,

and adopted the magistrate’s decision. In its judgment, the court noted that no

transcript had been filed as required under Juv.R. 40. Nonetheless, the juvenile

court’s December 30, 2024 entry — in which the court stated that it had undertaken

an independent review of the matter and issued a judgment in accordance with the

magistrate’s decision — stood. Although the December 30 judgment did not make specific mention of Father’s objections to the magistrate’s decision, it effectively

overruled them. Apparently believing that the trial court had overruled his

objections, Father filed his notice of appeal with this court on January 10, 2025.

We further note that the juvenile court’s December 30, 2024

judgment was a verbatim recitation of the magistrate’s December 9, 2024 decision.

In his decision, the magistrate ordered that “Mother shall provide her address and

contact information to Mother in order to discuss setting up parenting time.” The

magistrate obviously meant that Mother was to provide her contact information to

Father. However, the juvenile court approved, affirmed, and adopted the

magistrate’s order that Mother provide her contact information to herself — a clear

indication that the court did not conduct an independent review as contemplated

under Juv.R. 40.

Given this posturing, the juvenile court abused its discretion by

prematurely adopting the magistrate’s decision without waiting for the transcript to

be submitted in order to conduct the independent review required by

Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d). In re A.C. at ¶ 28; In re Y.H. at ¶ 36-37. “[A] juvenile court

cannot ‘purport to conduct an independent review of the evidence when it [knows]

that there [is] a transcript of the trial being prepared.’” In re Y.H. at ¶ 34, citing In re

R.C., 2010-Ohio-4690, ¶ 7, fn. 1 (8th Dist.)

Accordingly, Father’s first assignment of error is sustained. The

remaining assignments of error are rendered moot, and we are unable to address

the issue of legal custody in this appeal. Judgment reversed and case remanded for the juvenile court to

conduct an independent review that includes review of the transcript of July 31,

2024 hearing.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCURS AND CONCURS WITH THE SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION; EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., CONCURS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., CONCURRING:

I concur with my learned colleagues but write separately to point out

the nonsensical orders set forth by the trial court and in the decision of the

magistrate.

The order requires that father, an Ohio resident, exercise his

parenting time with the children in their current home state of California. That

parenting time is for a period of eight weeks during the children’s summer break, “one-half of winter break” and “every spring break from 5:00 p.m. on the last day of

school before the break until 8:00 p.m. the day before school resumes.”

Further, the trial court’s order and decision of the magistrate state

“FATHER SHALL EXERCISE PARENTING TIME IN A PUBLIC SETTING IN THE

COMMUNITY IN WHICH THE CHILDREN RESIDE IN CALIFORNIA FOR THE

AFOREMENTIONED TIMES” (Emphasis added). What in the world does this

mean?

Here is where the nonsensical enters the picture.

Father lives and works in the Cleveland, Ohio area. In order to

exercise his court ordered parenting time, he must travel to the state of California –

something with which he takes no issue – but he must remain there during the

parenting time frames including an 8-week period in the summer, in a public

setting, with the children. Does this mean that Father and two children live and

sleep in a public park, under the stars? Perhaps that would be necessary as, unless

father is able to work remotely, he most likely will not be able to maintain stable

employment in that he would be gone for 8 weeks each summer.

With the order of remand that the trial court conduct an independent

review that includes review of the transcript of the July 31, 2024 hearing, I would

encourage and suggest that the trial court enter practical, non-nonsensical orders

with respect to parenting time for Father. Appendix: Assignments of Error II through VII

II. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in finding that “the argument before the court is whether the parties currently have a shared parenting plan in effect or not.”

III. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in finding that a change in circumstances had not occurred and said decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

IV. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion by ordering Father to have visitation with his children in the state of California ruling “Father’s parenting time should occur in California, and if Mother visits Cleveland/Cuyahoga County, Ohio that Father should be able to exercise parenting time with the children in Cuyahoga County, Ohio if /when mother visits.”

V. The Trial Court’s finding that it was “the children’s wishes” that the Father exercise parenting time in California is directly contrary to the evidence presented and an abuse of discretion.

VI. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion when it ordered that Father must exercise his parenting time in the State of California absent Mother coming to Ohio and by ordering Father to exercise his parenting time in a public setting in the state of California and said Order is unconstitutional and contrary to Father’s rights under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause Article IV, §2, cl. 1 and Father’s due process rights as it is an unconstitutional restriction of Father’s fundamental right to interstate travel and residency in Ohio.

VII. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion by not ruling at trial on Father’s cross examination question asking Mother’s address which impeded Father’s cross examination and impinged his rights to due process and by ultimately ordering “Mother shall provide her address and contact information to Mother in order to discuss setting up parenting time” in the court’s final decision six months later.