In re D.T.
Opinion
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE D.T. JR. Case No. 2025CA00186 Opinion And Judgment Entry
Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Family Court Division, Case No.
2024JCV00515
Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry: May 6, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Craig R. Baldwin; Kevin W. Popham, Judges
APPEARANCES: RICHARD D. HIXSON, for Appellant-Mother; BRANDON J. WALTENBAUGH, for Appellee-Agency.
King, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant mother, A.M., appeals the December 1, 2025 judgment entry of the Stark County Family Court terminating her parental rights and granting permanent custody of the child to appellee, Stark County Department of Job and Family Services ("SCJFS"). We affirm the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On May 15, 2024, SCJFS filed a complaint for the temporary custody of D.T.
Jr., born March 2024, alleging the child to be dependent, neglected, and/or abused. Mother of the child is A.M., appellant herein; father is D.T. and is not a part of this appeal. SCJFS has had extensive involvement with mother and her three other children who were placed in the legal custody of maternal grandmother. See Case Nos. 2019JCV01161, 2019JCV01162, and 2019JCV01163. The concerns with D.T. Jr. centered on allegations of mother's continued substance abuse, homelessness, and mental health issues. The child was placed in shelter care on May 15, 2024; case plans were filed.
{¶ 3} An adjudicatory and dispositional hearing was held on July 17, 2024, wherein mother stipulated to dependency; the allegations of neglect and abuse were dismissed. The trial court continued the child's temporary custody with SCJFS.
{¶ 4} Case reviews were held on November 14, 2024, and April 11, 2025. On September 23, 2025, SCJFS filed a motion for permanent custody of the child. An additional case review was conducted on October 9, 2025. A hearing on the permanent custody motion was held on November 24, 2025. By judgment entry filed December 1, 2025, the trial court terminated all parental rights and granted permanent custody of the child to SCJFS; findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed contemporaneously with the judgment entry.
{¶ 5} Mother filed an appeal with the following assignments of error:
I
{¶ 6} "THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE MINOR CHILD WAS IN THE TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF THE AGENCY FOR TWELVE OR MORE MONTHS OF A CONSECUTIVE TWENTY-TWO MONTH PERIOD VIOLATED MOTHER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, AS SHE WAS NOT GIVEN NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD."
II
{¶ 7} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE MINOR CHILD COULD NOT BE PLACED WITH MOTHER WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE SO PLACED."
III
{¶ 8} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT PERMANENT CUSTODY WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD."
I
{¶ 9} In her first assignment of error, mother claims her due process rights were violated because she was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of the child being in the temporary custody of the agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period. We disagree.
{¶ 10} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) states permanent custody may be granted if the trial court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child and "[t]he child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period . . . ." "For the purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home."
{¶ 11} In its December 1, 2025 judgment entry, the trial court found the child "has been in the temporary custody of the Agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22- month period." Mother argues the agency failed to include any allegations in the motion for permanent custody regarding R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) and therefore she was denied the opportunity to be heard on this issue. Appellant's Brief at 8. Mother does not cite to any cases that hold a trial court is precluded from finding the twelve of twenty-two factor if the motion for permanent custody is silent on the issue.
{¶ 12} Although the motion for permanent custody did not list R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(d) as a factor, the motion included the history and dates of the case, and testimony on the issue was presented during the hearing which was subject to cross- examination. T. at 10-11. As noted by mother, the trial court granted permanent custody "in part" on the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) factor. Appellant's Brief at 8. Notwithstanding the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) finding, the trial court also found mother failed continuously and repeatedly to comply with her case plan. If any error occurred, we find it to be harmless given the trial court's alternative determination on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), "reasonable time." Civ.R. 61.
{¶ 13} Assignment of Error I is denied.
II, III
{¶ 14} In her second and third assignments of error, mother claims the trial court erred in finding the child could not be placed with her within a reasonable time and permanent custody was in the best interest of the child. We disagree.
{¶ 15} Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion in this case. Appellant's Brief at 9, 13. Abuse of discretion is the incorrect standard. The proper standards of review to apply in permanent custody cases under R.C. 2151.414 are sufficiency of the evidence and/or manifest weight of the evidence. In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 18.
{¶ 16} Sufficiency of the evidence "is a test of adequacy. Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict [decision] is a question of law." State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).
{¶ 17} Under a manifest weight of the evidence standard, a reviewing court is to examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine "whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury [or finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction [decision] must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). In Thompkins at 387, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990), the Supreme Court of Ohio explained the following:
Weight of the evidence concerns "the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief." (Emphasis in original.)
{¶ 18} In weighing the evidence, we are always mindful of the presumption in favor of the trial court's factual findings. Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179.
{¶ 19} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) states permanent custody may be granted if the trial court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child and "the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents." Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must conduct when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.
{¶ 20} Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence "which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established."
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