In re D.S.

2025 IL App (1st) 241635-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 31, 2025
• Docket: 1-24-1635
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 241635-U

SECOND DIVISION March 31, 2025

Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Consolidated)

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

In re D.S., Minor, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. (The People of the State of Illinois, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 22JA928 v. ) ) Imelda G. and Angel S., ) ) Honorable Respondents-Appellants). ) Shannon P. O’Malley, ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: (1) The trial court’s finding of neglect based on an injurious environment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) Angel S.’s individual claims of error lack merit and he failed to establish cumulative error; and (3) Angel S.’s argument regarding the trial court’s dispositional order is moot.

¶2 Respondent Imelda G. is the natural mother and respondent Angel S. is the natural father

of the minor D.S., a boy born June 4, 2020. The trial court adjudicated D.S. to be neglected

based on an injurious environment and a lack of care. Following a disposition hearing, the trial Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

court adjudged D.S. a ward of the court. Specifically, the trial court found Imelda G. was fit,

able, and willing to care for D.S. and returned custody of the minor to Imelda G. with an order of

protective supervision entered. Angel S. was found unable to care for D.S.

¶3 In this consolidated appeal, Imelda G. argues that the trial court’s findings of neglect

were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Angel S. contends that: (1) the neglect findings

were against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) multiple errors occurred during the

adjudication hearing; and (3) the trial court’s finding that it was in the best interest of D.S. to be

adjudged a ward of the court was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶4 On December 20, 2022, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship and alleged

the following supporting facts:

“On December 15, 2022, the police responded to a well being check

request and found this minor’s home to be uninhabitable. This minor’s cousin

who resided in the same home reported that this minor’s mother and putative

father use illegal substances, including in the presence of this minor. This minor’s

cousin took photos of the illegal substances in mother and putative father’s

bedroom. This minor’s cousin and family members report that there are multiple

weapons in the home, including a gun, tazers [sic], knives, and a bow and arrows.

The police removed this minor from the home on December 15, 2022. On or

about December 9, 2022, this minor was observed to be altered after being alone

with mother and putative father in their bedroom. When this minor’s cousin asked

mother regarding minor’s presentation, mother stated that this minor must have

taken a THC gummy. Mother refused to take minor to the emergency room. On

December 16, 2022, this minor tested positive for marijuana. Family members

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state that when putative father is under the influence of illegal substances, he is

violent. Putative father threatened to put a gun to this minor’s head and has bit,

punched, pushed down the stairs, and attempted to gauge out a family member’s

eyes. Mother and putative father have been uncooperative with DCFS during this

investigation. Mother and putative father reside together.”

¶5 An adjudication hearing was conducted over multiple dates with testimony from several

witnesses. Dil.S. testified that respondents are her parents, and she is the older sister of D.S. She

was 19 years old when D.S. was born and was living with her parents and teenage brother Di.S.

at that time.

¶6 She moved out of the home in October 2020 because her parents were consuming drugs

and had “an addiction problem.” Her parents’ behavior made her suspect that they were

consuming drugs. Respondents “would become very paranoid, looking out all the windows,”

their speech was “very impaired,” such that Dil.S. could not understand them, and they were

aggressive. Imelda G.’s eyes “would be open wide without her blinking.” Angel S. “would walk

on his tiptoes” and he had a “loose jaw.” This behavior was different from what Dil.S.

considered their normal behavior. She witnessed her parents consume marijuana edibles and

Angel S. roll “blunts” with marijuana in the presence of D.S. The drug use occurred in the

basement of the house and Dil.S. described the space as “very smoky,” and smelling “very

dingy, like the drug substance smells.”

¶7 In October 2022, Imelda G. told Dil.S. that a cousin, Taylor T., would be moving into the

home because Taylor T.’s living situation “wasn’t appropriate for her at the time.” Taylor T.’s

mother and Imelda G. are sisters. Taylor T. was 17 years old when she moved in with her aunt

and uncle . Dil.S. talked and texted with Taylor T. regularly. In November 2022, Taylor T.

3 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

contacted Dil.S. about her concerns that respondents were using drugs with D.S. in the room.

Dil.S. went to respondents’ home that day with her fiancé, her aunt, and her uncle. Dil.S.

observed respondents in an upstairs bedroom with D.S. present on the bed. When Dil.S. entered

the kitchen, it was “covered in dishes, roaches.”

¶8 At Thanksgiving, Angel S. admitted his drug use to family members, including Dil.S. He

told them that he knew the drugs they were using were bad, “but it’s gotten a lot worse” and they

had been “experimenting with a lot more things now.” In response, Imelda G. told Angel S. “not

to be putting their business out for everybody to hear, that nobody wants to know everything

that’s going on in the home.” Following Thanksgiving, D.S., Di.S., and Taylor T. stayed with

their grandparents for two weeks and returned home on December 3, 2022.

¶9 Later on December 3, 2022, Taylor T. called Dil.S. through Facebook Messenger and

told Dil.S. that Angel S. and Di.S. had been in a physical altercation. Taylor T. described the

physical altercation between Angel S. and Di.S. during which Angel S. tried to “gouge out”

Di.S.’s eyes. Taylor T. further detailed that Di.S. had called the police, but before the police

arrived Angel S. told Di.S. that if Di.S. spoke to the police about what happened, then Angel S.

would go outside with a gun to D.S.’s head to “make the officers go away.” Angel S. also stated

that he “was not going to get sent to prison again.” When the officers arrived, only Angel S.

spoke to them.

¶ 10 On December 9, 2022, Taylor T. called Dil.S. to tell her that D.S. had ingested one of

respondents’ THC gummies and appeared high. Taylor T. told her that D.S.’s head was rolling

back, he had tears “streaming down his face,” and he “was just out of it.” Taylor T. stated that

both respondents knew “what state” D.S. was in, but did not want to take him to the hospital.

4 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

They gave him milk and had him take a bath or shower. Dil.S. did not go to respondents’ home

that day.

¶ 11 On December 14, 2022, Taylor T. contacted Dil.S. and said that she had “obtained some

evidence,” to which Dil.S. responded that Taylor T. should not be “putting herself at risk.”

Taylor T. also told Dil.S. that she was sending photos of respondents’ nightstand via text

message. Dil.S. received photographs of a “burnt dresser along with the contents within the

dresser, which [was] a baggie that had a white substance in it.” She recognized the nightstand

from respondents’ bedroom which she had observed during her November 2022 visit to the

home. Dil.S. also recognized the photographs of the contents to be the same dresser. Taylor T.

also sent a third photograph the next day, December 15, 2022, showing what Dil.S. believed to

be a gun in a lower drawer of a wardrobe. Dil.S. recognized the wardrobe from when she lived

with respondents. It was located in the dining room, and she observed it during her November

visit.

¶ 12 Later that day, Dil.S. went over to respondents’ home after work because Taylor T. and

Di.S. called her that evening and were concerned. They became concerned about what

respondents were doing after hearing a lighter clicking and seeing cloudy smoke in the house.

Dil.S. and her fiancé went to respondents’ home. They then called the police because Dil.S. was

scared that Taylor T. and D.S. were in the home, and she did not want there to be another

physical altercation. Dil.S. did not go into the home and instead she parked at the end of the

block. Taylor T. and Di.S. were inside the home while Dil.S. and her fiancé waited in the car for

the police to arrive.

¶ 13 After the police arrived, Dil.S. spoke to them outside of respondents’ home and remained

there while the police entered the house. Shortly thereafter, she saw Taylor T., Di.S., and D.S.

5 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

speak to the police on the front steps of the home. Then, she watched them all get into a police

car. Dil.S. did not see either of the respondents speak to the police outside of the home that night.

Dil.S. was allowed to take Taylor T. and D.S. to her home that evening. At around 2 a.m. on

December 16, 2022, Imelda G. tried to call Dil.S. and later sent her a text message indicating that

Imelda G. “wanted her baby back.”

¶ 14 Later on December 16, 2022, Dil.S. contacted the Department of Children and Family

Services (DCFS) through their hotline. She, Taylor T., and D.S. met with a DCFS worker in

Dil.S.’s home. Dil.S. signed a safety plan and agreed to keep D.S. and Taylor T. in her home and

in her care. Respondents did not come to Dil.S.’ home to visit with D.S. while he was in her care.

¶ 15 Marissa Panzarella testified that she was employed as a child protection investigator with

DCFS. She was assigned to D.S.’s case on or about December 16, 2022. She assessed both D.S.

and Taylor T. at Dil.S.’s home. She examined D.S. and did not see any visible marks or bruises.

Panzarella spoke with Taylor T. about living with Imelda G. and Angel S. Taylor T. told her that

she and D.S. were not safe with Imelda G. and Angel S. because there were concerns about drug

use in the home. According to Taylor T., respondents would “barricade” themselves in a

bedroom and use drugs with D.S. present. Panzarella described a video shown to her by Taylor

T. The recording was made by Taylor T. while she lived at respondents’ home when Taylor T.

noticed D.S. appeared “off.” In the video, Taylor T. approached respondents about D.S. and

Imelda G. said that D.S. “must have taken a gummy.” Taylor T. responded that D.S. needed to

go to the hospital, but was told by Imelda G. that they did not “want to go to jail.”

¶ 16 Also on December 16, 2022, Panzarella administered an oral toxicology swab on D.S.

She explained that the test is given any time there is a concern of substance use. She had

administered the test in prior investigations involving substance abuse and had been specifically

6 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

trained how to properly administer the test. A new, fresh kit was used to acquire a saliva sample

from D.S. via a cotton swab. Panzarella took a photograph of the results of the test administered

to D.S. The photograph of the result was presented during the hearing and indicated a

presumptive positive result for marijuana/THC. Panzarella testified that the drug test loses

effectiveness if the test gets too hot or too cold. She carried the test outside on December 16,

2022, when she traveled from her office to Dil.S.’s home. Based on the positive result,

Panzarella implemented a safety plan with her supervisor for D.S. and Taylor T. to stay with

Dil.S. Panzarella called and texted respondents multiple times but was unable to contact them.

¶ 17 Panzarella sent a text message to each of the respondents on December 19, 2022,

requesting that they complete a toxicology screen, which they subsequently completed. The

substance screens indicated one respondent tested positive for cocaine and the other respondent

tested positive for THC and cocaine. Panzarella was never able to interview either parent, nor did

she ever enter respondents’ home. The allegations for the investigation included concerns of

possible substance use by both respondents. 1

¶ 18 Evidence presented at the hearing disclosed that a hair follicle toxicology test was

administered to D.S. on January 19, 2023. Hair from D.S.’s head was collected in person at the

Fastest Labs of Northwest Chicago in Elk Grove Village, Illinois. The specimen was received at

the United States Drug Testing Laboratories in Des Plaines, Illinois, on January 21, 2023. The

January 26, 2023 report indicated a positive result from D.S.’s hair follicle sample for cocaine

and cannabinoids, including THC.

1 Although Panzarella did not identify which respondent tested positive for only cocaine or cocaine and

THC, neither has contested the positive test results for his or her drug use.

7 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

¶ 19 A forensic victim sensitive interview was conducted with Taylor T. on December 23,

2022. Panzarella was present as a witness. A recording of the interview was introduced at the

hearing in which Taylor T. detailed the following. She lived with respondents, who are her aunt

and uncle, and cousin D.S. from early or mid-October 2022 until December 2022 when she was

“taken from them” because “of the things they do, like drugs.” She described incidents where

respondents would take D.S. into the room with them when they were getting high and she

“hate[d] that” and tried to “get D.S. out” when that happened. Taylor T. also detailed an incident

while living with respondents when D.S. “took edibles” that respondents “had laying around”

and respondents refused to take D.S. to the hospital because Angel S. did not want to go to jail.

Angel S. then turned off the Wi-Fi in the home so Taylor T. could not call or text anyone for

help. Taylor T. described Angel S. as “difficult to get along with.” She stated that she got in

trouble one time living with respondents because she told her family that respondents were doing

drugs and Angel S. told Taylor T. that if she did that again then she would get kicked out of the

house. The State rested its case following the admission of this evidence.

¶ 20 Imelda G. called Dr. David Gummin to testify as a toxicology expert. He reviewed

discovery documents related to both the saliva and hair follicle drug testing performed on D.S.,

as well as documents related to the investigation of the household. A Premiere Biotech oral

toxicology saliva test was administered on D.S. on December 16, 2022. This test is performed by

“having an individual essentially place a cotton pledget into his or her mouth and to suck on that

pledget until sufficient saliva has come from the mouth” and has been observed on the “pledget.”

The “pledget” is then placed into an analyzer to perform an amino acid test on the saliva for

specific drugs or “toxicants.” Dr. Gummin did not identify any problems with the reliability of

this “at home” saliva test. The test result indicated positive for marijuana, but Dr. Gummin had

8 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

an issue “with the ability to adequately interpret” the result. He noted that the result was reported

as a “presumptive positive,” which would need to be confirmed by a testing laboratory to give a

true positive result.

¶ 21 Dr. Gummin testified that temperature could affect the reliability of the test. The court

took judicial notice that the temperature indicated by the National Weather Service on December

16, 2022, was between 26 and 31 degrees Fahrenheit. When asked if it was fair to say that the

temperature that day was not “optimal temperature” for this test, the doctor responded, “Not if it

were at that temperature at the time.” Dr. Gummin noted that there was “not adequate

documentation” indicating the environment in which this test was administered to D.S., nor did

he know the temperature at which the specimen and analyzer were held at the time of analysis.

He observed that these tests are “ideally created to work at room temperature.” The “presumptive

positive” result would need to be confirmed at a laboratory.

¶ 22 Dr. Gummin also reviewed the lab results from the hair follicle test collected from D.S.

on January 19, 2023. He noted that “there was some confusion on the chain of custody form” he

was provided as far as getting the specimen to the United Stated drug testing labs. He testified

that it was not obvious from the form who had collected the specimen and where it was

collected. He also observed that it was not clear how much time elapsed between the collection

from D.S. and when it was received by the laboratory. Dr. Gummin did not suspect that the test

was conducted on the wrong specimen. The laboratory test results showed that the specimen was

positive for both marijuana derivatives/cannabis and cocaine. He conceded that he did not find

any problems with the methodology used to test D.S.’s hair specimen.

¶ 23 According to Dr. Gummin, the two most likely ways to receive a positive test would

either be from someone ingesting the substance or contamination from the environment, such as

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aerosol contamination from smoke or drugs in the air or a care giver stroking the hair of a child

and conveying the substances from their sweat into the hair. He testified that it could not be

determined if the source of D.S.’s exposure was ingestion or external contamination. After

reviewing D.S.’s test result levels, Dr. Gummin believed that it was more likely that D.S. was

externally exposed to cocaine and cannabinoids.

¶ 24 Given the fact that D.S.’s hair sample was 1.5 inches long and hair grows approximately

half-an-inch per month, Dr. Gummin found the likely time frame for D.S.’s exposure to these

substances was a maximum of three months before the sample was taken. This time frame for

D.S.’s exposure was likely between late October or November 2022 and January 2023. The hair

follicle testing does not provide the ability to determine the exact date or dates D.S. was exposed

to each substance. Dr. Gummin admitted that the hair follicle test provided a confirmatory test to

the initial presumptive positive from the saliva test.

¶ 25 Angel S. called two witnesses on his behalf. Yolanda Melendez testified that she was

D.S.’s grandmother and had spent two weeks at respondents’ home in July 2022. During her

stay, Melendez did not have any concerns over the state of the family’s home or respondents’

interactions with D.S. She did not see any signs of drug use or drug paraphernalia. She saw a

collection of knives but stated that they were stored in a cabinet out of reach for D.S. Anthony T.

testified that he was Taylor T.’s older brother and Imelda G. and Angel S. were his aunt and

uncle. He was frequently in respondents’ home growing up and considered them to be his second

parents. He never saw any drug use in the house. He last saw D.S. in April 2022 and found D.S.

to be healthy, fed, and well taken care of. Nothing he saw made him think respondents’ home

was unsafe. He further testified that Taylor T. had a reputation for dishonesty, and he was told

that she called DCFS because she was not getting her way.

10 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

¶ 26 Following arguments, the trial court found by a preponderance of evidence that D.S. had

been neglected due to an injurious environment and due to a lack of appropriate care as defined

in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act). See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a), (1)(b)

(West 2022). First, the trial court discussed that D.S. tested positive for drugs in two different

tests, including a hair follicle test with corroborating information from Taylor T.s’ forensic

interview. Next, regarding respondents’ respective arguments, the court noted that Dr. Gummin

did not “have a problem” with the way the test was done. Testimony showed respondents in a

room with an odor and D.S. “ingesting something, not acting right.” The court further pointed to

the cocaine test results, the presence of weapons in the home, and entered the above findings of

neglect. However, the court declined to find D.S. abused due to substantial risk of injury.

¶ 27 At the disposition hearing on July 30, 2024, Kimberly Graham testified that she was

employed as a child welfare specialist with Lutheran Child and Family Services. She was

assigned to D.S.’s case in July 2023. At the time of the hearing, D.S. was four years old and

placed in a licensed foster home. Following an integrated assessment, both respondents were

recommended to participate in multiple services.

¶ 28 Imelda G. was recommended for individual therapy, a substance abuse evaluation,

parenting education and coaching, domestic violence assistance, and housing assistance. Graham

testified that Imelda G. had completed these services. Imelda G. was on the wait list for housing

assistance and was to start a nurturing parent program in August 2024. Imelda G. had also been

subject to random toxicology screenings and all tests were negative. Imelda G. had been granted

overnight unsupervised visitation with D.S. for the previous three months. She initially had two-

night visitation and later increased to three nights, but Graham’s supervisor reduced it to one

night because Angel S. was present in the home and had not completed his services. Graham was

11 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

informed later that Angel S. was no longer residing in the home. The visits were going well for

Imelda G. and D.S.

¶ 29 Angel S. was recommended to participate in individual therapy, parenting classes,

substance abuse assessment, domestic violence assistance, a sexual abuse assessment, and

random toxicology tests. Angel S. had started therapy and completed the parenting education

service, the substance abuse assessment, and domestic violence assessment. Graham indicated

that Angel S. would be recommended for parenting coaching soon. Angel S. declined to

participate in the sexual abuse assessment. Angel S. had tested negative for all random

toxicology tests. He was having weekly supervised visitation with D.S. The visits have gone well

and there is a bond between D.S. and his father. Angel S. had at least one, but possibly up to

three criminal cases pending. Graham testified that one of the cases was for sexual assault

involving a minor.

¶ 30 Graham recommended that D.S. be adjudged a ward of the Court with a permanency goal

of returning home within five months. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found it

was in the best interest of D.S. to be made a ward of court. Regarding Imelda G., the court found

her to be fit, willing, and able, and returned D.S. to her custody under an order of protection. The

order of protection provided that the Angel S. could not be present at any time in the home. The

court further found that family reunification with Angel S. had been unsuccessful and Angel S.

was unable to care for, protect, train or discipline D.S. The court noted that Angel S. had not

completed the offered services, had not yet been recommended for parenting coaching, and was

refusing to participate in the sexual abuse assessment. Finally, the court further ordered that

Angel S. was not to visit the home with Imelda G. and D.S., but he could continue to have

supervised visitation.

12 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

¶ 31 This appeal followed.

¶ 32 Respondents first argue that the findings of neglect at the adjudication hearing were

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Imelda G. contends that the neglect

findings were not supported by sufficient evidence and were not proven by a preponderance of

the evidence. Similarly, Angel S. asserts that the State failed to provide credible and admissible

evidence of neglect.

¶ 33 The Juvenile Court Act provides a two-step process the trial court must utilize to decide

whether a minor child should become a ward of the court. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 18. The

first step is the adjudicatory hearing, at which the court considers only whether the minor child is

abused, neglected, or dependent. Id. ¶ 19; See 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2022). If the circuit

court determines the minor child is abused, neglected, or dependent at that hearing, then the court

holds a dispositional hearing, in which the court determines whether it is consistent with the

health, safety, and best interests of the minor child and the public for the minor child to be made

a ward of the court. Id. ¶ 21; See 705 ILCS 405/2-22 (West 2020). In any proceeding brought

under the Juvenile Court Act, including an adjudication of wardship, the paramount

consideration is the best interest of the child. Id. ¶ 18.

¶ 34 Section 2-3(1) of the Act defines the circumstances under which a minor can be found

“neglected.” 705 ILCS 405/2-3 (West 2022). Here, the trial court found the minor to be

neglected under two grounds of the Juvenile Court Act: section 2-3(1)(b) (“environment is

injurious to the minor’s welfare,”), and section 2-3(1)(a) (minor is not receiving the necessary

care for his well-being). Id. Cases involving allegations of neglect are fact-specific and must be

decided based on the unique circumstances of the individual case. In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d

441, 463 (2004). It is the State’s burden to prove allegations of neglect by a preponderance of the

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evidence, i.e., that the allegations of neglect are more probably true than not. Id. at 463-64. We

will not reverse a trial court’s finding of neglect unless it is against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Id. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite

conclusion is clearly evident. Id. In general, the trial court is vested with this wide discretion

because it has the best opportunity to observe the witnesses’ testimony, assess credibility, and

weigh the evidence. In re M.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 210595, ¶ 25. Since the grounds for unfitness

are independent, evidence supporting any one of the alleged statutory grounds is sufficient to

affirm a finding of unfitness. In re M.W., 2019 IL App (1st) 191002, ¶ 56.

¶ 35 We first consider whether the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that D.S. was

neglected due to an injurious environment. “Neglect” has generally been defined as the failure of

a responsible adult to exercise the care that circumstances justly demand. M.D., 2021 IL App

(1st) 210595, ¶ 24. Neglect is not limited to a narrow definition and encompasses both the willful

and the unintentional disregard of duty. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 22. Neglect does not have

a fixed and measured meaning, but rather, “[i]t takes its content always from specific

circumstances, and its meaning varies as the context of surrounding circumstances changes.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The term “injurious environment” is an amorphous

concept that cannot be defined with particularity but has been interpreted to include the breach of

a parent’s duty to ensure a safe nurturing shelter for his or her children. M.D., 2021 IL App (1st)

210595, ¶ 24.

¶ 36 The evidence presented at the adjudication hearing firmly established that D.S. had been

neglected due to an injurious environment. Significantly, D.S. tested positive for exposure to

both cocaine and THC. Panzarella administered an oral toxicology test which had a presumptive

positive for THC result. Dr. Gummin attempted to diminish this result by noting that the air

14 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

temperature on December 16, 2022, was approximately 26 to 31 degrees Fahrenheit. However,

Panzarella rebutted any suggestion that the test was improperly administered. She testified that

test was outside when she traveled from her office to Dil.S.’s home. There is no suggestion from

her testimony that it was administered outside in the cold temperature or kept in the cold for an

extended period of time. Moreover, the extensive hair follicle test administered on D.S.’s hair

showed positive test results for THC and cocaine. Additionally, the results indicated that D.S.’s

exposure occurred at any time between late October 2022 and January 2023. Respondents both

contend that D.S. could have been exposed to drugs after he was placed in foster care since that

time frame fell within the exposure window. However, respondents both ignore their own

positive drug tests. As Panzarella testified, one parent tested positive for cocaine and the other

tested positive for cocaine and THC. Further, Angel S. admitted to their drug use to other family

members at a Thanksgiving gathering and Imelda G. attributed the THC to D.S.’s ingestion of a

marijuana gummy.

¶ 37 We flatly reject respondents’ claim that D.S. was exposed to drugs after he was removed

from their care. Neither respondent offers any support for this contention and there was

overwhelming witness testimony that corroborated respondents’ use of drugs at the time of

exposure. Dil.S. moved out of her parents’ home in October 2020 due to their drug use. She

observed her parents consume marijuana edibles and Angel S. roll marijuana “blunts” with D.S.

present. She stated that the drug use occurred in the basement of the house and she described the

space as “very smoky,” and smelling “very dingy, like the drug substance smells.” Dil.S. also

recounted Angel S.’s admission of drug use to family members, including Dil.S., at

Thanksgiving. According to Dil.S., Angel S. told family members he knew the drugs they were

doing were bad, “but it’s gotten a lot worse” and they had been “experimenting with a lot more

15 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

things now.” Imelda G. responded for Angel S. “not to be putting their business out for

everybody to hear, that nobody wants to know everything that’s going on in the home.”

¶ 38 Later, Dil.S. spoke with her cousin Taylor T., who was living in respondents’ home.

Taylor T. recounted her concerns about respondents’ drug use. On December 9, 2022, Taylor T.

told Dil.S. that D.S. had ingested one of respondents’ THC gummies and appeared high. Taylor

T. described that D.S.’s head was rolling back, tears were “streaming down his face,” and he

“was just out of it.” According to Taylor T., both respondents knew “what state” D.S. was in, but

did not want to take him to the hospital. Taylor T. also told Panzarella about this incident with

the marijuana gummy. Panzarella viewed a video recording made by Taylor T. while she lived at

respondents’ home and Taylor T. noticed D.S. appeared “off.” In the video, Taylor T.

approached respondents about D.S. and Imelda G. said that D.S. “must have taken a gummy.”

Taylor T. responded that D.S. needed to go to the hospital, but was told by Imelda G. that they

did not “want to go to jail.”

¶ 39 Section 2-18(2)(g) of the Juvenile Court Act provides that in any hearing, “proof that a

parent, custodian, or guardian of a minor repeatedly used a controlled substance in the presence

of the minor or a sibling of the minor is prima facie evidence of neglect.” 705 ILCS 405/2-

18(2)(g) (West 2022); see 720 ILCS 570/102(f) (West 2022) (defining a “Controlled Substance”

as “a drug, substance, immediate precursor, or synthetic drug in the Schedules of Article II” of

the Illinois Controlled Substances Act); 720 ILCS 570/206(b)(4) (West 2022) (identifying

cocaine as a Schedule II controlled substance). Thus, the State presented prima facie evidence of

D.S.’s neglect due to an injurious environment based on the positive result for cocaine for D.S.,

and both respondents, as well as the testimony regarding drug use from Dil.S. and Panzarella,

including Angel S.’s own admissions.

16 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

¶ 40 Imelda G. asserts that D.S.’s ingestion of a marijuana edible was at most an isolated

incident. We disagree with her characterization of the evidence as an isolated incident and find

the cases she relies upon to be irrelevant to the facts of this case. See In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338,

353 (2000) (finding that isolated instances of the mother’s anger directed at others did not

demonstrate “anger of a frequency, duration or quality that would indicate that the children lived

in an environment that exposed them to, or threatened them with, emotional or physical injury”);

Slater v. Department of Children and Family Services, 2011 IL App (1st) 102914, ¶¶ 37-39

(finding that a minor’s injury with a colored pencil was an isolated incident that did not establish

neglect). In contrast, there was significant evidence of an ongoing issue with drug use by both

Imelda G. and Angel S. in which D.S. was exposed to marijuana and cocaine. While Imelda G.

objects to the weight the trial court gave to pieces of evidence, the trial court acted well within its

authority to make such determinations. See M.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 210595, ¶ 25 (trial court has

been vested with wide discretion because it has the best opportunity to observe the witnesses’

testimony, assess credibility, and weigh the evidence). Further, while marijuana use is legal in

Illinois, the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act provides that a person is not permitted “to engage

in, and does not prevent the imposition of any civil, criminal, or other penalties for engaging in,”

knowingly using cannabis “in close physical proximity to anyone under 21 years of age who is

not a registered medical cannabis patient.” 410 ILCS 705/10-35(a)(3)(G) (West 2022).

¶ 41 As detailed above, the evidence established that both respondents used drugs in the home

with D.S. A hair follicle test of D.S. showed his exposure to both marijuana and cocaine. This

test was further supported by Dil.S.’s testimony about her observations and the admission by

Angel S., as well as testimony from Panzarella and Taylor T.’s forensic interview. Accordingly,

we conclude that the trial court’s finding that D.S. was neglected based on an injurious

17 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

environment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 42 Since we have found that the finding of neglect was supported under one basis, an

injurious environment, we need not consider whether D.S. was neglected due to a lack of care.

See M.W., 2019 IL App (1st) 191002, ¶ 56 (evidence supporting any one of the alleged statutory

grounds is sufficient to affirm a finding of unfitness).

¶ 43 Next, we consider additional arguments raised solely by Angel S. He contends that

multiple errors occurred at the adjudication hearing which culminated in cumulative error.

Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting Taylor T.’s statements into

evidence; (2) prohibiting him from impeaching Taylor T.s’ credibility during his cross-

examination of Panzarella; (3) preventing him from introducing specific acts of dishonesty by

Taylor T.; (4) admitting photographs of his home taken by Taylor T. where the judge

erroneously indicated that respondent had made no objection; (5) admitting the photographs

without proper foundation; and (6) admitting the results of both the oral toxicology and hair

follicle test administered to D.S.

¶ 44 Regarding his claims related to Taylor T., Angel S. asserts that the case rested “almost

exclusively” on Taylor T.’s hearsay statements. He points to Dil.S.’s testimony recounting what

Taylor T. told her was occurring in Angel S.’s home, including photographs taken by Taylor T.

He argues that the court erred when it overruled his objections during Dil.S.’s testimony and

allowed Taylor T.’s statements into evidence. According to Angel S., the statements were

inadmissible hearsay because at the time of the adjudication hearing, Taylor T. was 18 years old

and only lived in his home temporarily. The court admitted the statements, noting that she was

17 when the statements were made and residing in the home.

¶ 45 The trial court did not err in admitting these statements by Taylor T. Section 2-18(4)(c) of

18 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

the Juvenile Court Act provides: “Previous statements made by the minor relating to any

allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence. However, no such statement, if

uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a

finding of abuse or neglect.” 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(c) (West 2022). Contrary to Angel S.’s

arguments, the allegations of D.S.’s neglect did not rest “almost exclusively” on Taylor T.’s

statements. Testimony from both Dil.S. and Panzarella corroborated Taylor T.’s statements, as

well as the positive drug tests which showed D.S.’s exposure to marijuana and cocaine.

¶ 46 Further, the Fourth Division of this court has already rejected a similar argument. In that

case, the minors’ older half-sister, K.S., made an outcry that the respondent had sexually abused

her multiple times over several years. The respondent confessed to sexually abusing K.S. to the

police in a video recorded statement. In re D.M., 2016 IL App (1st) 152608, ¶ 1. K.S. was the

respondent’s stepdaughter and was not a party to the petition to adjudicate wardship. Id. ¶ 2. At

the adjudication hearing, a recording of K.S.’s victim sensitive interview was introduced through

the testimony of a police detective who had observed the interview. Id. ¶ 6. The trial court

admitted the recording of the interview over the respondent’s objection based on the lack of a

proper foundation. Id. ¶ 8. The trial court subsequently found the minors were abused and

dependent by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. ¶ 11.

¶ 47 On appeal, the respondent argued that the trial court erred in admitting the recording of

K.S.’s statement because her statements were not admissible under section 2-18(4)(c) since she

was not “the minor” named in the petition for adjudication. Id. ¶ 21. The State contended that the

hearsay exception applies to a statement made by any minor and argued that there was no

requirement in section 2-18(4)(c) that the minor be named in the petition before his or her

statements could be admitted into evidence. Id. ¶ 22. Additionally, the public guardian asserted

19 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

that the Act provides that evidence of abuse and neglect of one minor is relevant to the abuse and

neglect of another minor, regardless of whether the minor is named in the petition. Id.

¶ 48 The reviewing court concluded that K.S.’s statements were “encompassed” within the

hearsay exception. The court found that section 2-18(4)(c)

“does not limit the use of ‘statements made by the minor’ to only those allegations

of abuse or neglect directly implicating the minor making the statements or the

minor named in the petition, [therefore,] it follows that a minor not named in the

petition can offer statements relating to neglect or abuse of another minor, so long

as those statements are either corroborated or subject to cross-examination.” Id. ¶

26.

The appellate court also reasoned that construing the term “the minor” in section 2-18(4)(c) as

limited to only those minors named in the petition would render other portions of the Juvenile

Court Act superfluous. Id. ¶ 28; see 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2012) (“In any hearing under

this Act, proof of the abuse, neglect or dependency of one minor shall be admissible evidence on

the issue of the abuse, neglect or dependency of any other minor for whom the respondent is

responsible.”). Further, the D.M. court observed its holding, i.e., that the admission a nonparty

minor’s statements relating to abuse or neglect of another minor, supported the court’s duty to

liberally construe the Juvenile Court Act. Id. ¶ 30 (citing 705 ILCS 405/1-2(4) (West 2012)).

¶ 49 We find this interpretation of section 2-18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act to be well

reasoned and applicable in this case. As a minor residing in Angel S.’s home during the

timeframe at issue, Taylor T.’s fully corroborated statements from her victim sensitive interview

fall within the hearsay exception of section 2-18(4)(c). No error occurred and the trial court

properly admitted her statements.

20 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

¶ 50 Angel S. also contends that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from impeaching

Taylor T.’s credibility during his cross-examination of Panzarella. However, his only citation to

the record for this claim occurred during Imelda G.’s cross-examination of Taylor T., not his

cross-examination. He further alleges that the trial court prohibited his questioning of Anthony

T. about Taylor T’s reputation for dishonesty. His only citation to the record does not involve

Anthony T.’s testimony and concerned another matter entirely. Moreover, he failed to cite any

relevant authority for these claims. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) requires appellant’s

brief to include an “[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the

reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct.

R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). It is well-settled that a contention that is supported by some

argument but does not cite any authority does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 341(h)(7), and

bare contentions that fail to cite any authority do not merit consideration on appeal. Wasleff v.

Dever, 194 Ill. App. 3d 147, 155-56 (1990). Thus, defendant has forfeited this argument.

¶ 51 Angel S. next asserts errors related to the admission of the State’s group exhibit 3. He

initially challenges the admission of the State’s “group exhibit 1” but his citation to the record

related only to group exhibit 3. He contends that the trial court erred by stating there was “no

objection” when the exhibit was admitted, but our reading of the record does not support this

contention.

¶ 52 Group exhibit 3 was the set of three photographs taken by Taylor T. and sent to Dil.S.

During Dil.S.’s testimony, the prosecutor asked Dil.S. to describe the photographs. Angel S.’s

attorney objected based on speculation and foundation, arguing: “There is no possible way in the

world that [Dil.S.] could know what was in the dresser or not. She didn’t open the dresser. She

has no idea what’s in the dresser.” The trial court then sustained the objection and instructed the

21 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

prosecutor to rephrase her question. The prosecutor proceeded to ask the witness several more

questions to lay a foundation for the admission of the photographs.

¶ 53 In his argument, Angel S. cites to the page in the record where the following exchange

took place.

“THE PROSECUTOR: Judge, at this point I believe that enough

foundation has been laid, and I would seek to admit -- well, actually, before I do

that, I have marked these as a group exhibit.

The first two photos have been testified to that were taken December 14,

2022. There is a third photo taken the next day. So if I could take some testimony

about that photo before I move to admit?

THE COURT: Well, no objection. It’s allowed.”

¶ 54 After asking several additional questions, the prosecutor asked the court to admit the

photographs, “I would seek to admit what I have previously marked as People’s Group Exhibit 3,

which includes three PDF photos, the first two dated December 14, 2022.” Angel S.’s attorney

then objected to their admission and argued that Dil.S.’s testimony did not lay an appropriate

foundation. After arguments from the parties, the trial court admitted the group exhibit, “giving it

what legal weight I deem just.”

¶ 55 It is clear that the record fails to support Angel S.’s argument. The State was not asking

to admit the exhibit at that time asserted by Angel S. The trial court explicitly considered the

objections raised to this group exhibit multiple times. Thus, this claim lacks merit.

¶ 56 Angel S. also contends that the admission of group exhibit 3 was error because a proper

foundation was not laid for the photographs. The three photographs in this exhibit showed: (1) a

dresser with burn marks, (2) a clear plastic bag showing white powder, and (3) a handgun in

22 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

what appeared to be a drawer.

¶ 57 “The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to

admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is

what its proponent claims.” Ill. R. Evid. 901(a) (eff. Sep. 17, 2019). A proper foundation may be

laid by someone having personal knowledge of the photographed object, who can testify that the

image is an accurate portrayal of what it purports to show. In re D.Q., 2016 IL App (1st) 160680,

¶ 25. The decision to admit a photograph into evidence is left to the trial court’s discretion.

People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 263 (1992). The trial court has discretion over the admissibility

of evidence, and its decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. In re L.S.,

2014 IL App (4th) 131119, ¶ 44. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is

fanciful, unreasonable or when no reasonable person would adopt the trial court’s view. Id.

¶ 58 All three photographs at issue were taken by Taylor T. and sent to Dil.S. Dil.S. testified

to her personal knowledge of the furniture in the photographs. Dil.S. recognized the dresser as a

nightstand in respondents’ bedroom and saw this nightstand in the bedroom in November 2022.

Dil.S. also recognized the second photograph as contents of the same dresser. In the third

photograph, Dil.S. identified what she believed to be a gun in a lower drawer of a wardrobe.

Dil.S. identified the wardrobe which was located in the dining room from when she lived with

respondents, and she observed it during her November visit. Following the parties’ argument on

the admission of these photographs, the trial court admitted the exhibit, “giving it what legal

weight I deem just.” Since Dil.S. identified the objects in the photographs as being what the State

purported, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs. Moreover, the

evidence of cocaine use was clearly established by respondents’ own drug test, Angel S.’s

admission to the use of other drugs, and D.S.’s hair follicle test showing cocaine exposure.

23 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

¶ 59 Angel S.’s final claim of error challenges the admission of both the oral toxicology and

hair follicle tests administered to D.S. Specifically, he argues that: (1) the oral toxicology

showed an invalid result, (2) Dr. Gummin testified that the oral toxicology test showed a “clear

negative,” (3) the chain of custody of the hair follicle test was called into question by Dr.

Gummin, and (4) it was unclear if the source of D.S.’s exposure was internal consumption or

environmental contamination. As previously stated, the admission of evidence is with the

discretion of the trial court. L.S., 2014 IL App (4th) 131119, ¶ 44.

¶ 60 Angel S. does not cite any relevant authority to support his argument that both of the

toxicology tests were improperly admitted. Again, Rule 341(h)(7) requires an appellant to

include in its brief an “[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the

reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct.

R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). As pointed out above, it is well-settled that a contention that is

supported by some argument but does not cite any authority does not satisfy the requirements of

Rule 341(h)(7), and bare contentions that fail to cite any authority do not merit consideration on

appeal. Wasleff, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 155-56. Accordingly, these claims are forfeited.

¶ 61 Forfeiture aside, no abuse of discretion occurred in the admission of these toxicology

tests. Although Dr. Gummin noted some concerns in the chain of custody, he had no reason to

“suspect” that the testing was performed on the wrong specimen. He also conceded that he

believed the lab “adhered closely” to the guidelines and to best practices in conducting the

analysis when the specimen was at the lab. No evidence was presented that the hair follicle

specimen was compromised and any alleged deficiencies in the chain of custody go to the

weight, not admissibility, of the evidence. See People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 467 (2005)

(after the State has established the probability that the evidence was not compromised, and

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absent any evidence of tampering or substitution, deficiencies in the chain of custody go to the

weight, not admissibility, of the evidence).

¶ 62 As for the rest of the arguments related to the toxicology tests, the trial court heard all the

testimony from witnesses, including how to interpret the test results. Nothing in Angel S.’s

arguments suggest that the admission was an abuse of discretion. Rather, all of his other

arguments regarding the reliability and the results of the tests go only to the weight to be given to

the test results, not their admissibility. See People v. Hutchison, 2013 IL App (1st) 102332, ¶ 37

(“It is well settled that the credibility of witnesses, the weight of the evidence and the resolution

of any conflicts in the evidence are matters for the trier of fact to resolve”). Accordingly, no error

occurred in the admission of either of the toxicology tests.

¶ 63 Since we have found that none of the complained-of errors had merit, Angel S.’s claim of

cumulative error necessarily fails. See People v. Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 82-83 (1984) (finding

no cumulative error where the defendant’s individual contentions were meritless).

¶ 64 Finally, Angel S. argues that the trial court’s dispositional order that it was in D.S.’s best

interest to be adjudged a ward of the court was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Specifically, he contends that the court erred in finding he was unable to provide the necessary

care for D.S. based on his decision not to participate in the sexual abuse assessment. According

to Angel S., there was no credible evidence of sexual abuse to support this assessment and it was

error for the trial court to find him unable to provide the necessary care for D.S. Based on his

progress with the DCFS recommended services, he maintains that the trial court should have

found him fit, willing, and able to care for D.S. The State maintains that the record refutes Angel

S.’s claim because he had not completed all of the offered services. The court found that multiple

services remained outstanding, such as the sexual abuse assessment, Angel S. had not yet been

25 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

referred to participate in parenting coaching, and he was still only allowed supervised visitation

with D.S.

¶ 65 Before reaching this argument, we address the Guardian’s motion to dismiss based on

mootness that was taken with the case. On January 28, 2025, the trial court granted Imelda G.

full legal custody of D.S., terminated his wardship with DCFS, as well as the order of protective

supervision, and closed the case. The court also ordered that Angel S. was to remain out of the

home until his criminal cases, listed as 24CR0294001, 24CR0294101, 23DV7139201, and

23DV7138601, were resolved. As a result, the Guardian asserts that the July 30, 2024

dispositional order at issue has been rendered moot by this January 28, 2025 order. The Guardian

argues that this court lost jurisdiction over the initial dispositional order when the child

protection case was closed with full custody restored to Imelda G. The Guardian further argues

that even if this court reviewed the July 30, 2024 dispositional order, we cannot grant the relief

requested by Angel S. because custody has already been determined.

¶ 66 The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to secure for a minor the “care and guidance,

preferably in the minor’s own home, as will serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, and

physical welfare of the minor,” to “preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever

possible,” and to “remov[e] the minor from the custody of the minor’s parents only when the

minor’s safety or welfare or the protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded

without removal.” 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 2024). The Juvenile Court Act further provides

that the court and parties in neglect and abuse proceedings should “act in a just and speedy

manner to determine the best interests of the minor ***.” 705 ILCS 405/2-14(a) (West 2024).

¶ 67 After disposition, the trial court maintains jurisdiction and may modify the dispositional

order at any time until the case is finally closed or the child reaches majority. In re Desiree O.,

26 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

381 Ill. App. 3d 854, 864 (2008) (citing 705 ILCS 405/2-23(2) (West 2006)). Stated differently,

the trial court loses jurisdiction on the initial dispositional order or the underlying finding of

abuse or neglect while on appeal, but it retains jurisdiction to enter a new dispositional order in

light of changed circumstances. See In re Rayshawn H., 2014 IL App (1st) 132178, ¶ 39 (finding

the mother’s appeal of the disposition order moot when the trial court subsequently modified the

order to return the minor to the mother’s custody).

¶ 68 An appeal becomes moot where events occurring after the filing of the appeal render it

impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party. In re Shelby

R., 2013 IL 114994, ¶ 15. “As a general rule, courts in Illinois do not decide moot questions,

render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of

how those issues are decided.” In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 351 (2009). This court may

take judicial notice of events which, while not appearing in the record, disclose that an actual

controversy no longer exists, rendering the issue before the court moot. In re Andrea F., 208 Ill.

2d 148, 156 (2003).

¶ 69 We agree with the Guardian. Following the closure of the child protection case, the

question of whether the trial court erred in its July 30, 2024 decision to adjudge D.S. a ward of

the court has been rendered moot. See Rayshawn H., 2014 IL App (1st) 132178, ¶ 39. As a

result, even if we found the trial court’s ruling was in error, which we have not found, we are

unable to grant Angel S. any effectual relief because the case has been closed under the

subsequent January 28, 2025 order.

¶ 70 Angel S. does not contest that the issue has been rendered moot, nor does he deny that he

has four pending criminal cases as listed in the January 28, 2025 order. Instead, he argues that

this court should review his claim under an exception to the mootness doctrine and refers to both

27 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

the public interest and the capable of repetition yet avoiding review exceptions.

¶ 71 The public interest exception requires a clear showing of each of the following criteria:

(1) the question presented is of a public nature; (2) an authoritative determination of the question

is desirable for the future guidance of public officers; and (3) the question is likely to recur.

Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994, ¶ 16. This exception is construed narrowly and a clear showing of

each element is required. In re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365 (2009).

¶ 72 Here, Angel S. has challenged the trial court’s factual findings following the disposition

hearing as against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, sufficiency of the evidence

claims are inherently case-specific reviews and do not present the kinds of broad public interest

issues necessary to meet the requirements for this exception. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 357.

Accordingly, Angel S.’s claim does not fall within the public interest exception to the mootness

doctrine.

¶ 73 The capable of repetition exception requires: (1) the challenged action must be of a

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation; and (2) there must be a reasonable

expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. Id. at

358. Even if we assume that the first prong was satisfied, Angel S. cannot meet the burden of the

second prong. Again, because Angel S. is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented

at the disposition hearing, “[t]here is no clear indication of how a resolution of this issue could be

of use to [him] in future litigation.” Id. at 360. Therefore, the requirements for the capable of

repetition yet avoiding review exception have not been met. Since Angel S.’s claim does not fall

within an exception, his claim is barred under the mootness doctrine.

¶ 74 Based on the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Angel S.’s challenge to the circuit court’s

dispositional order and affirm all other orders entered by the circuit court of Cook County.

28 Nos. 1-24-1635 and 1-24-1641 (Cons.)

¶ 75 Affirmed in part, dismissed in part.