In Re: Douglas, M., Appeal of: Douglas, C.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 22, 2019
Docket1557 WDA 2017
StatusUnpublished

This text of In Re: Douglas, M., Appeal of: Douglas, C. (In Re: Douglas, M., Appeal of: Douglas, C.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re: Douglas, M., Appeal of: Douglas, C., (Pa. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

J-A08005-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: MARIE E. DOUGLAS, AN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALLEGED INCAPACITATED PERSON : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: CHARLES R. DOUGLAS, : JR. : : : : No. 1557 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered September 1, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Orphans' Court at No(s): 42-2017 O.C.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2019

Charles E. Douglas, Jr., (”Robbie”) appeals from the order entered

September 1, 2017, finding Marie E. Douglas, his mother, to be a totally

incapacitated person and appointing her daughters, Karla Renee Douglas

(“Renee’) and Kerrie L. Tipton (“Kerrie”), to act as a plenary co-guardians of

her person and estate. Robbie contends that the record does not support the

trial court’s order removing Marie from his home and appointing guardians of

her person and her estate.

Renee and Kerrie filed a petition alleging that Marie had been diagnosed

with Alzheimer’s disease and dementia, and that she was resultantly unable

to care for herself or to manage her financial affairs. They further alleged that,

subsequent to Marie becoming incapacitated, she had executed a Durable

Power of Attorney in which she appointed her son, Robbie, as her primary J-A08005-19

agent. Renee and Kerrie asserted that Robbie and his wife had exploited

Marie’s assets and were using her money to build an addition to his home.

The issues before us are limited to whether the appointment of the

plenary guardian of the person and estate for Marie was supported by clear

and convincing evidence and whether there was sufficient evidence to support

Marie’s removal from Robbie’s home.1 The trial court granted numerous forms

of relief in its Opinion of September 1, 2017, including removing Marie from

Robbie’s home, appointing Renee and Kerrie to be co-guardians, and vacating

Marie’s most recently executed will, her power of attorney granted to Robbie,

and deeds which the trial court found that Marie had executed after she had

already become incapacitated.

Robbie initially raised numerous errors by the Orphans’ Court and

challenged most of the Court’s decisions. However, as stated on the first page

of his brief:

Robbie has elected to drop the appeals of the orders invalidating Marie’s will, the power of attorney under which Marie appointed him her agent, and the deeds out of Marie’s revocable trust (numbers 1554, 1555, and 1556 WDA 2017).

Therefore, we will review (1) whether the evidence in support of the plenary

guardianship was legally sufficient and (2) whether it was necessary for the

Orphans’ Court to order Marie’s relocation to her daughter’s home. See

____________________________________________

1 Marie had been residing with Robbie since 2015.

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Appellant’s Brief, at 3. When reviewing a decree entered by the Orphans'

Court,

this Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error and the court's factual findings are supported by the evidence. Because the Orphans' Court sits as the fact-finder, it determines the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we will not reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of that discretion. However, we are not constrained to give the same deference to any resulting legal conclusions. Where the rules of law on which the court relied are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable, we will reverse the court's decree.

In re Estate of Rosser, 821 A.2d 615, 618 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Estate of Haertsch, 649

A.2d 719, 720 (Pa. Super. 1994) (noting that appointment of a guardian is

within the sound discretion of the trial court).

We employ a deferential standard when reviewing an orphans' court

decree. In re Estate of Smaling, 80 A.3d 485 (Pa. Super. 2013). We must

ensure, however, that the court's decision is free from legal error. In re

Estate of Rosengarten, 871 A.2d 1249, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2005). Our

Supreme Court reiterated this principle in In re Peery, 727 A.2d 539, 540

(Pa. 1999) (quoting Lawner v. Engelbach, 249 A.2d 295 (Pa. 1969)),

wherein it stated that reviewing courts are “bound by the trial judge's findings

of fact unless those findings are not based on competent evidence.

Conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court whose duty

it is to determine whether there was a proper application of law to fact by the

lower court.”

-3- J-A08005-19

We are mindful of the purpose of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciary

Code's (“PEF Code”) provisions relating to incapacitated

persons, 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 5501-5555. Section 5502 recognizes that “every

individual has unique needs and differing abilities.” The purpose of the PEF

Code is to establish “a system which permits incapacitated persons to

participate as fully as possible in all decisions which affect them ... and which

accomplishes these objectives through the use of the least restrictive

alternative.” 20 Pa.C.S. § 5502. An incapacitated person is

an adult whose ability to receive and evaluate information effectively and communicate decisions in any way is impaired to such a significant extent that he is partially or totally unable to manage his financial resources or to meet essential requirements for his physical health and safety.

20 Pa.C.S. § 5501.

Instantly, Robbie argues that the record does not contain competent

evidence sufficient to sustain the Orphans' Court's findings that Marie’s

condition requires a plenary guardian. It is well-established that “[t]he

selection of a guardian for a person adjudicated incapacitated lies within the

discretion of the trial court whose decision will not be reversed absent an

abuse of discretion.” Estate of Haertsch, 649 A.2d 719, 720 (Pa. Super.

1994).

The PEF Code provides the standards governing findings of incapacity:

(a) Determination of incapacity – In all cases, the court shall consider and make specific findings of fact concerning:

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(1) The nature of any condition or disability which impairs the individual to make and communicate decisions.

(2) The extent of the individual's capacity to make and communicate decisions.

(3) The need for guardianship services, if any, in light of such factors as the availability of family, friends and other supports to assist the individual in making decisions....

(4) The type of guardian, limited or plenary, of the person or estate needed based on the nature of any condition or disability and the capacity to make and communicate decisions.... .... (c) Plenary guardian of the person – The court may appoint a plenary guardian of the person only upon a finding that the person is totally incapacitated and in need of plenary guardianship services.

20 Pa.C.S. § 5512.1.(a) and (c). Accordingly, Renee and Kerrie had the burden

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Related

Lawner v. Engelbach
249 A.2d 295 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1969)
In Re Peery
727 A.2d 539 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1999)
In Re Estate of Rosser
821 A.2d 615 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2003)
Estate of Haertsch
649 A.2d 719 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1994)
In re Estate of Rosengarten
871 A.2d 1249 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2005)
In re Estate of Smaling
80 A.3d 485 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
In Re: Douglas, M., Appeal of: Douglas, C., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-douglas-m-appeal-of-douglas-c-pasuperct-2019.