In re D.N.W.

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE D.N.W. :

: No. 116160

A Minor Child :

:

[Appeal by A.R., Mother] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 20, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division

Case No. AD24904222

Appearances:

Rachel A. Kopec, for appellant.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee CCDCFS.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

Appellant A.R. (“Mother”) challenges the judgment of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights and awarding permanent custody of her child, D.N.W. (d.o.b. 2/2/2019), to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “agency”). She raises one assignment of error for our review:

Permanent Custody of the children [sic] was against the sufficiency of the evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence.

After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we find that the juvenile court’s decision was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We overrule Mother’s sole assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

I. Factual and Procedural History The agency first obtained custody of D.N.W. at the time of his birth when he had tested positive for PCP; he remained in agency custody for the first year of his life. He was returned to Mother’s care after she engaged in services and addressed issues relating to substance abuse and anger management. Five months later, in July 2020, D.N.W. was again placed in agency custody. This removal had been prompted by two separate instances of law enforcement finding Mother wandering nude around her neighborhood while high on PCP. D.N.W. remained in agency custody for the next two years.

When D.N.W. was again returned to Mother, the agency maintained protective supervision for the next nine months. However, approximately six months after protection supervision had ceased, in October 2023, D.N.W. sustained an injury during an altercation between Mother and appellee R.W. (“Father”).1 Mother and Father offered different versions of the events that occurred during the altercation. Mother maintained that Father had come to her residence while he was

1 Father has filed his own appeal, No. 116121, which is a companion case to this appeal. Accordingly, we will focus solely on facts and issues pertinent to Mother.

under the influence of drugs, kicked in the door, grabbed D.N.W. out of his bed, and fell as he was carrying D.N.W. down the steps. Father asserted that he had broken down the door because Mother had suffered a mental breakdown and he feared for D.N.W.’s safety. He stated that Mother had pushed him from behind, causing him to fall while he was carrying D.N.W. down the stairs. D.N.W. sustained a head wound that left a scar on his forehead. D.N.W. later corroborated Father’s version of the incident.

CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging that D.N.W. was abused, neglected, and dependent, seeking custody of the child. The complaint was resolved by agreement; D.N.W. was adjudicated to be abused, neglected, and dependent, and temporary custody was awarded to the agency. D.N.W. remained in agency custody until the time of trial in January 2026.

As a result of the incident with Father, Mother was convicted of child endangering. Shortly after, Mother was also convicted of assault for an unrelated incident where Mother had pushed another individual down the stairs, causing significant injuries. Mother was incarcerated as a result. Following her release from jail, Mother began to engage in case-plan services. The agency had implemented a case plan for Mother including services to address issues with substance abuse, mental health, domestic violence, and parenting. Mother completed parenting and domestic-violence services but claimed that she did not need substance-abuse treatment and maintained that her substance use was not relevant to D.N.W.’s removal.

The temporary-custody order was extended twice pursuant to statute, after which the agency filed a motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody. Mother filed her own motion seeking custody of D.N.W. or placing D.N.W. in the legal custody of his maternal aunt. The court held a hearing on both motions.

At the hearing, the agency presented the testimony of the agency case workers assigned to D.N.W.’s case, his therapist, Mother’s case worker at Ohio Guidestone, and the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) assigned to the case.

Sarah Smith (“Smith”), the first case worker who was assigned to D.N.W.’s case, testified about the services in Mother’s case plan. She stated that Mother failed to demonstrate any benefit from the parenting and domestic-violence services because she continued to exhibit aggression towards others and engaged in inappropriate interactions with D.N.W. during visitation. (Tr. 135.)

In particular, Smith testified that during Mother’s supervised visitation with D.N.W., Mother allowed D.N.W. to play on her phone and used it as a “babysitter” for D.N.W. (Tr. 86.) Although a court order was later issued restricting Mother’s phone usage during visitation, Smith testified that Mother continued to let D.N.W. play on her phone and indicated that she would do what she wanted. Smith further stated that D.N.W. asked to hold her hand on the way to the visits and asked if he had to go. (Tr. 59.)

Regarding Mother’s substance-abuse issues, Smith testified that Mother refused to complete certain screenings and only occasionally submitted to others. (Tr. 50.) She tested positive for PCP multiple times, and Smith noted that

Mother had smelled of alcohol during several of her visits with D.N.W. (Tr. 46 and 51.)

During all three of his removals, D.N.W. had been placed with the same foster caregivers. Smith testified that he referred to them as “mommy” and “daddy” and was very bonded with them. (Tr. 77.) She stated that they are very loving and affectionate toward him. (Tr. 79.)

Regarding Mother’s desire for legal custody of the child to be awarded to D.N.W.’s aunt, Smith testified that the aunt had attended half of a visit with D.N.W. (Tr. 73.) Smith also witnessed a phone call with Mother and D.N.W., and heard the child asking Mother who “that lady” was. He later informed Smith that he did not know who the aunt was and questioned why she had said that she had a room ready for him at her house. (Tr. 73-74.)

After working on D.N.W.’s case for nearly one year, Smith was removed from the case after Mother had become verbally and physically aggressive with her during a visit. On the day in question, Smith had given Mother the court’s order restricting D.N.W.’s use of electronic devices during visitation. (Tr. 82-83.) Mother blamed Smith for the order and “escalate[d]” verbally. (Tr. 83.) Mother then took D.N.W. to the restroom, and when they came back, D.N.W. told Smith that Mother told him he had to go home, that she was going to buy him a cat, and that she was going to have a big party for him. (Tr. 84.) She also told him that Smith was the reason that he could not come home. (Id.)

Smith told Mother that she was disappointed that Mother had told D.N.W. those things and that she was cancelling the visit. (Id.) Mother began “screaming,” “yelling,” and “shoulder-checked” Smith. (Id.) A security guard intervened and tried to calm Mother down. Smith was fearful for her own safety, as well as D.N.W.’s. (Tr. 85.) She testified that she was “terrified” because of Mother’s criminal history and prior aggressive behaviors. (Tr. 85-86.)

The case was reassigned to another case worker, Alease Chisholm (“Chisholm”). Mother continued to have issues submitting to drug testing. (Tr. 161.) The court issued an order requiring Mother to submit to hair tests, but Mother refused. (Tr. 170-171.) When Mother finally submitted to a hair test, it was positive for PCP. (Tr. 173.) She admitted having used the drug. (Tr. 173-174.) While Mother maintained that she was engaged in substance-abuse treatment with Ohio Guidestone, she did not sign a release of information regarding her treatment. (Tr. 176.) Chisholm learned from Mother’s case worker from Ohio Guidestone that Mother had not informed her of her substance-abuse issues. (Id.)

Chisholm testified about Mother’s visitation with D.N.W. She stated that Mother needed to be more engaged with D.N.W. and that D.N.W. was quiet during his visits with Mother. (Tr. 187.) The visits occurred at a library because when visits had occurred in the home, a “random guy” had been in Mother’s home and D.N.W. did not feel comfortable. (Tr. 181.) During the library visits, Mother spoke with other people there and did not interact with D.N.W. (Id.)

Chisholm ultimately testified that Mother had not demonstrated sufficient benefit from her services, had not remedied the conditions causing D.N.W.’s removal, and was unable to provide a safe and stable permanent home for D.N.W. (Tr. 213-214.)

Mother had engaged in some services through Ohio Guidestone;

however, Mother had not told the case worker there of her substance-abuse issues. (Tr. 176-177.) Mother had also worked with a therapist, but after that therapist left the organization where she had been employed, Mother did not engage with a new therapist. (Tr. 183 and 302.) At the time of trial, Mother had not engaged with any mental-health provider for over a year. (Tr. 302.)

D.N.W.’s therapist testified that she had begun working with D.N.W.

when he was 18 months old. (Tr. 346.) D.N.W. had been diagnosed with acute stress disorder caused by the trauma he had experienced. (Tr. 355.) The therapist worked with D.N.W. for two years until Mother stopped his therapy, maintaining that he did not have any mental-health concerns and blaming the agency for any issues. (Tr. 62.)

After his most recent removal, D.N.W. again worked with the same therapist for trauma counseling. (Tr. 357.) They also worked to address his anxiety and his constant worry that he is not safe. (Tr. 185.) D.N.W. has exhibited aggression and disruptive behaviors in school and receives specialized services there. (Tr. 299-300 and 359.) He was prescribed medication to assist with impulsivity, sleep issues, and aggressive behavior. (Tr. 364.)

The therapist testified that D.N.W. had been doing well in his foster home and that he feels safe. (Tr. 360.) She further stated that his caregivers were engaged and supportive of him. (Id.) He had told his therapist that he enjoyed his visitation with Mother but that he likes to know that he is going back to his foster parents when the visit is over. (Id.)

With regard to whether custody of D.N.W. could be awarded to another relative, the therapist testified that she did not know if D.N.W. had a relationship with any other relatives with whom he would have felt safe living with. (Tr. 365.) She further stated that returning D.N.W. to Mother’s care would require much more intensive therapy services because it would constitute a major disruption in D.N.W.’s life. (Id.)

Mother testified on her own behalf and admitted her issues with PCP.

(Tr. 376, 378, 381, and 402.) She acknowledged that she had relapsed but stated that she was in an intensive outpatient program through Ohio Guidestone. (Tr. 402- 403.) Mother also noted that she had completed a parenting program and a domestic-violence course. (Tr. 405-406.)

Mother’s case worker through Ohio Guidestone testified that Mother engaged in weekly sessions with her. (Tr. 438.) She explained that she had worked with Mother on coping skills and emotional regulation. (Tr. 438.) She noted that Mother was trying to “stay on her path to sobriety, continue to be a good mom, and just continue to get her life where . . . she wants it to go.” (Tr. 439.)

D.N.W.’s maternal aunt, who is Mother’s sister, also testified. She stated that she was willing to accept legal custody of D.N.W. and care for him. (Tr. 447.) She was a licensed foster provider and would keep him involved in therapy. (Tr. 448.) She also said that she had a grandson around D.N.W.’s age who visited her frequently and would play with D.N.W. (Tr. 456 and 499.)

The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) assigned to the case had written a report recommending permanent custody to the agency. (Tr. 517.) D.N.W. was only six years old at the time of trial and unable to understand the proceedings or state his desire regarding his future custody. The GAL further stated that D.N.W. was happy living with his foster parents and considered the foster placement his home. The GAL further recommended against committing D.N.W. to the legal custody of his maternal aunt based upon the aunt’s physical issues and her lack of knowledge about D.N.W. and his needs.

Following the hearing, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights and awarded permanent custody of D.N.W. to the agency. The court noted that D.N.W. had been in agency custody three separate times and had spent the majority of his life in the custody of the agency. The trial court acknowledged the GAL’s recommendation of permanent custody and noted that it had conducted an in camera interview of D.N.W. prior to trial. The court found that testimony at trial indicated that D.N.W. was happy with his caregivers and wished to remain with them. The court considered the statutory factors and ultimately determined that

D.N.W. could not or should not be placed with Mother and that permanent custody was in D.N.W.’s best interest.

The court further denied Mother’s motion for legal custody to maternal aunt, finding that it would not be in D.N.W.’s best interest. D.N.W. did not have a bond with his aunt and had only met her a limited number of times. The court found that the aunt was unaware of D.N.W.’s likes and needs.

Mother then filed the instant appeal.

II. Law and Analysis

We take our responsibility in reviewing cases involving the termination of parental rights and the award of permanent custody very seriously. A parent has a “fundamental liberty interest . . . in the care, custody, and management of [his or her child].” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). The “‘termination of parental rights has been described as the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.’” In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Hoffman, 2002-Ohio-5368, ¶ 14. Thus, “‘parents must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law allows.’” In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997), quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16 (6th Dist. 1991).

Nevertheless, a parent’s right to the care and custody of his or her child is not absolute. In re L.G., 2022-Ohio-529, ¶ 49 (8th Dist.). “‘The natural rights of a parent are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’” In re L.D., 2017-Ohio-1037, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979).

“‘All children have the right, if possible, to parenting from either natural or adoptive parents which provides support, care, discipline, protection and motivation.’” In re J.B. at ¶ 66, quoting In re Hitchcock, 120 Ohio App.3d 88, 102 (8th Dist. 1996). When parental rights are terminated, the goal is to create “a more stable life for the dependent children and to facilitate adoption to foster permanency for children.” In re N.B., 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67 (8th Dist.), citing In re Howard, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7860, *5 (5th Dist. Aug. 1, 1986).

“‘Ohio statutes governing child custody and protection appropriately reflect the need to balance . . . [the] parents’ . . . interest in the custody, care, nurturing, and rearing of their own children, and the state’s parens patriae interest in providing for the security and welfare of children under its jurisdiction[.]’” In re P.S., 2023-Ohio-144, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Thompson, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1890 (10th Dist. Apr. 26, 2001).

In her sole assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights and grant permanent custody of D.N.W. to the agency was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “the sufficiency-of-the-

evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards of review are the proper appellate standards of review of a juvenile court’s permanent-custody determination, as appropriate depending on the nature of the arguments that are presented by the parties.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 11.

When reviewing for manifest weight, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. [Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20.] “In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21. “The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). “‘If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.’” Id. at fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jur. 3d, Appellate Review, § 603, at 191-192 (1978).

Id. at ¶ 14.

“Although sufficiency and manifest weight are distinct legal concepts, a finding that a judgment is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding that sufficient evidence supports the judgment.” (Citations omitted.) In re P.S., 2023-Ohio-144, at ¶ 30 (8th Dist.).

R.C. 2151.414 provides a two-prong analysis to be applied by the juvenile court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody. In re S.C., 2018- Ohio-2523, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing R.C. 2151.414(B). The first prong authorizes the juvenile court to grant permanent custody of a child to the public agency if, after a hearing, the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that any of the following factors apply: (a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned, but the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents; (b) the child is abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody; (d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22- month period; or (e) the child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another state. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e). “Only one of the factors must be present to satisfy the first prong of the two-part analysis for granting permanent custody to an agency.” In re D.H., 2021-Ohio-3821, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.), citing In re L.W., 2017- Ohio-657, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.).

Under the second prong of R.C. 2151.414, when any one of the above factors exists, the juvenile court must then analyze whether, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is evidence that ‘will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established.’” In re T.B., 2014-Ohio-2051, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477 (1954).

1. First Prong – R.C. 2151.414(B)

With regard to the first prong of the permanent-custody analysis, the court determined that D.N.W. had been in the custody of the agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. Mother does not dispute this finding, and it is supported by the record — D.N.W. had continuously been in custody of the agency since November 2023, until the time of trial in January 2026. Because only one factor is needed, the first prong of the two-part analysis is therefore satisfied.

2. Second Prong – Best Interest of the Child Having determined that competent and credible evidence existed to support the first prong, we now turn to the second prong of our analysis. This prong requires the court to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, whether the order granting permanent custody of D.N.W. to the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D) is in the best interest of the child.

In determining the best interest of the child under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the juvenile court must consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents, and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4) the child’s need for a legally secure placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and (5) whether any factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) are applicable.

Although a trial court is required to consider each of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors in making its permanent-custody determination, “[t]here is not one element that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute.” In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56. Moreover, only one factor needs to be resolved in favor of permanent custody in order to find that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest. E.g., In re S.C., 2015-Ohio-2410, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.).

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). “Consideration is all the statute requires.” In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 31. And, as previously stated, only one factor needs to be resolved in favor of permanent custody in order to find that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.

Here, the juvenile court considered the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing and specifically referenced the (D)(1) factors in its decision. The court noted D.N.W.’s strong bond with his caregivers and that Mother did not interact well with D.N.W. and he was not bonded with her. In addition, the court cited the GAL’s recommendation of permanent custody in its own in camera interview with D.N.W., and testimony at trial regarding D.N.W.’s bond with his caregivers and his desire to remain with them.

The court ultimately determined that D.N.W.’s return to Mother’s home would be contrary to his best interest and that he needed a permanent safe and secure environment. Specifically, the court found that Mother had “failed to remedy the cause for removal, ha[d] not maintained her sobriety, [did] not engage with case plan services or follow court orders, and ha[d] placed the child’s safety at risk.” The court specifically cited the incident where Mother had pushed Father down the stairs while he was holding D.N.W. and that even though she was criminally charged and pled guilty to child endangerment, “she continue[d] to not accept responsibility for harming the child.”

Mother does not dispute any specific finding regarding D.N.W.’s best interest. Instead, she argues that she had substantially completed her case-plan services, including those related to domestic violence and parenting. She also asserts that she had utilized a parenting coach, visited with her son, had negative urine screens, and was engaged in an intensive outpatient program. Mother acknowledges that her relapse was a large impediment to reunification and that she has not yet reached six months of sobriety but maintains that she has demonstrated a dedicated commitment to D.N.W. Mother further argues that she has continued to engage in services since the trial.

The agency disputes that Mother had “substantially” completed her case plan. Regardless, significant or even substantial compliance with case-plan services is not, in and of itself, “dispositive” and “does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a social services agency.” In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, at ¶ 90 (8th Dist.), citing In re C.C., 2010-Ohio-780, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.); see also In re R.D., 2022-Ohio-4519, ¶ 59 (8th Dist.). Simply because a parent completes the services identified in a case plan does not mean he or she has achieved the objectives of the case plan related to those services or has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child to be removed from the home. In re J.B. at ¶ 90. “‘The issue is not whether the parent has substantially complied with the case plan, but whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s removal.’”

Id., quoting In re McKenzie, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4618, *11 (9th Dist. Oct. 18, 1995). Thus, even if Mother had completed her case plan, such a plan is “a means to a goal, but not the goal itself.” In re C.C., 2010-Ohio-780, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.).

Our review of the record reveals that D.N.W. had been with the same foster caregivers for nearly three-quarters of his young life. He is bonded with those caregivers, and they provide a supportive environment for him. Testimony indicated that Mother did not interact well with D.N.W. during their visitation and that D.N.W. did not have a bond with her. In addition, the record does not reflect that Mother has remedied the issues that caused D.N.W.’s removal, and his return to her home would not be in his best interest.

Following careful consideration of the evidence presented at the permanent-custody hearing, we cannot find that the juvenile court erred in concluding that granting permanent custody of D.N.W. to the agency was in D.N.W.’s best interest.

We cannot say that the juvenile court lost its way in its resolution of evidentiary conflicts and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. The juvenile court’s judgment entry granting permanent custody of D.N.W. to the agency demonstrates that the court considered the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), and the court’s findings are supported by competent, credible evidence.

Additionally, while not set forth as a separate assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court also erred in denying her motion for legal custody to her sister, D.N.W.’s maternal aunt. We disagree.

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(3), after a child has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent, the court may “[a]ward legal custody of the child to . . . any . . . person who, prior to the dispositional hearing, files a motion requesting legal custody of the child or is identified as a proposed legal custodian in a complaint or motion filed prior to the dispositional hearing by any party to the proceedings.”

Legal custody is defined by R.C. 2151.011(B)(21) as follows:

[A] legal status that vests in the custodian the right to have physical care and control of the child and to determine where and with whom the child shall live, and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child and to provide the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to any residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.

Consequently, legal custody is significantly different from the termination of parental rights — despite losing legal custody of a child, the parents of the child retain residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities. R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(c).

For this reason, “‘[w]hen a juvenile court awards legal custody following an adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency, “it does so by examining what would be in the best interest of the child based on the preponderance of the evidence.”’” In re A.C., 2019-Ohio-5127, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), quoting In re T.R., 2015- Ohio-4177, ¶ 44 (8th Dist.), quoting In re M.J.M., 2010-Ohio-1674, ¶ 11, 14 (8th Dist.).

R.C. 2151.414 “requires a weighing of all the relevant factors” in order to “find the best option for the child . . . .” In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, at ¶ 64.

If a court finds that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child, then legal custody cannot be. In re D.E., 2025-Ohio-654, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing In re Y.F., 2024-Ohio-5605, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.). Given the record in this matter and the concerns that were raised, as well as the juvenile court’s proper determination that permanent custody to CCDCFS was in the child’s best interest, we find no error in the juvenile court’s denial of Mother’s motion for legal custody to be awarded to D.N.W.’s maternal aunt.

Mother’s sole assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR