In Re Digitek® Product Liability Litigation

648 F. Supp. 2d 795, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122504, 2009 WL 2224646
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. West Virginia
DecidedJuly 23, 2009
DocketMDL 1968
StatusPublished

This text of 648 F. Supp. 2d 795 (In Re Digitek® Product Liability Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Digitek® Product Liability Litigation, 648 F. Supp. 2d 795, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122504, 2009 WL 2224646 (S.D.W. Va. 2009).

Opinion

PRETRIAL ORDER # 31 (Ex Parte Contact with Former Actavis Employees)

MARY E. STANLEY, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the court is Plaintiffs’ motion for an order permitting ex parte contact with former Actavis employees (docket # 153). The Actavis defendants have responded in opposition (# 156), and Plaintiffs have filed a reply (# 158). Positions of the parties

Plaintiffs contend that the court should apply the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to counsel’s ex parte contact with the former employees of the Actavis defendants. (# 153, at 1.) They assert that in multidistrict litigation, the transferee court applies the law of the circuit in which it is sitting when ruling on discovery disputes. Id., at 4. Plaintiffs argue that the West Virginia Rules permit ex parte contact with former employees of an adverse corporate party. Id., at 1.

The Actavis defendants respond that Plaintiffs’ motion does not comport with either New Jersey or West Virginia law. (# 156, at 2.) They urge the court to adopt reasonable restrictions and protections for ex parte interviews of their former employees, including identification and notice of each former employee to be contacted, *796 and advance notice in writing to each former employee with specified information included. Id., at 4.

Plaintiffs’ reply notes that the Aetavis defendants’ brief contains no discussion on the choice of law issue in MDL cases. (# 158, at 2.) They contend that the Actavis defendants’ proposed restrictions and protections are meritless and lack a basis in law. Id., at 3.

Applicable Law

The court begins with the controlling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), which provides, in pertinent part, that transfers of cases to a multidistrict litigation court “will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.” It appears to be well-settled that with respect to discovery disputes and other pretrial issues, section 1407 “requires the application of the law of the transferee circuit where the motions are being considered.” In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products, 241 F.R.D. 185, 193 (S.D.N.Y.2007); In re Automotive Refinishing Paint, 229 F.R.D. 482, 486 (E.D.Pa.2005) (“We are satisfied that the goals of § 1407(b) are best served by applying the transferee court’s interpretations of federal law, rather than being bound by the precedents of the subpoena-issuing court.”). As pointed out in United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. 99-3298, 2004 WL 2009413, at *4 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004), “[discovery disputes that arise in an MDL action are appealed to the circuit in which the action originated.” Thus “it is sensible for reasons of ‘uniformity and intracircuit consistency’ to apply the law of the forum where the MDL action is being adjudicated.” In re Automotive Refinishing Paint, 229 F.R.D. at 486 (quoting Pogue, id.) Accordingly, the undersigned will apply the law of the Fourth Circuit, as stated by decisions by that court, the district courts within the Fourth Circuit, and particularly this district and its Local Rules.

The issue of whether opposing counsel may have ex parte contact with the former employees of a party which is represented by attorneys is based upon concerns arising from the attorney-client relationship. The undersigned has located only one Fourth Circuit case which addresses the issue of the scope of the attorney-client privilege with respect to former employees, In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir.1997). In that case, the Fourth Circuit held that “the analysis applied by the Supreme Court in Upjohn [Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) ] to determine which employees fall within the scope of the privilege applies equally to former employees.” Id., at 606. In Upjohn, the Supreme Court extended the attorney-client privilege to corporate employees who provided information not available from upper-echelon management, which concerned matters within the scope of the employees’ corporate duties. The information was needed “to supply a basis for legal advice concerning compliance with ... laws, ..., [certain] regulations, ... and potential litigation in each of these areas.” Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394, 101 S.Ct. 677. The employees were “sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice.” Id. In footnote 3, the Court declined to address the issue of former employees. Id.

West Virginia

In the Southern District of West Virginia, our Local Rules provide as follows:

LR Civ P 83.7. Codes of Professional Conduct
In all appearances, actions and proceedings within the jurisdiction of this court, attorneys shall conduct themselves in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Standards of Professional Conduct promulgated and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ap *797 peals of West Virginia, and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct published by the American Bar Association.

The Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia include Rules 4.2 and 4.3, which are relevant to the issue:

Rule 4.2. Communication with person represented by counsel.
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
COMMENT
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications by a lawyer for one party concerning the matter in representation with persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization, and with any other person whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization. If an agent or employee of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule.
Rule 4.3. Dealing with unrepresented person.
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.

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Related

Upjohn Co. v. United States
449 U.S. 383 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Cole v. Appalachian Power Co.
903 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. West Virginia, 1995)
Bryant v. Yorktowne Cabinetry, Inc.
538 F. Supp. 2d 948 (W.D. Virginia, 2008)
Sharpe v. Leonard Stulman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership
12 F. Supp. 2d 502 (D. Maryland, 1998)
In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation
229 F.R.D. 482 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2005)
Koch v. Hicks
241 F.R.D. 185 (S.D. New York, 2007)
McCallum v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
149 F.R.D. 104 (M.D. North Carolina, 1993)

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Bluebook (online)
648 F. Supp. 2d 795, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122504, 2009 WL 2224646, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-digitek-product-liability-litigation-wvsd-2009.