In re: Dial Complete Marketing

2015 DNH 222

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: December 8, 2015
• Docket: Case No. 11-md-2263-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

In re: Dial Complete Marketing Case No. 11-md-2263-SM and Sales Practices Litigation Opinion No. 2015 DNH 222

O R D E R

This consolidated, multi-district litigation is brought by

consumers in Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana,

Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin, on behalf of themselves and

similarly situated consumers in those states. Plaintiffs say

that defendant, The Dial Corporation (“Dial”), continually

misrepresented the antibacterial properties of its “Dial

Complete” branded soaps. They advance claims under their

respective state consumer protection/unfair trade practices

statutes, as well as statutory and common law causes of action

for breach of warranty and unjust enrichment.

Plaintiffs move to certify a class consisting of each

state’s purported class members, for a total of eight subclasses,

defined as follows: “All persons residing in [the state] who

purchased Dial Complete Antibacterial Foaming Hand Soap for

household use at any point in time from Dial Complete’s

commercial launch in 2001 through the present.” Dial objects. Background

Dial manufactures Dial Complete Foaming Antibacterial Hand

Wash (“Dial Complete”), an antibacterial liquid hand wash. (See

Def.’s Br. in Opp. to Class Certification (document no. 86)

p. 4.) Since 2002, Dial has shipped 158,370,479 units to

retailers and distributors in the United States for sale to

retail consumers. (See Pls.’ Mot. for Class Certification

(document no. 57), Exh. 15 at p. 8.)

Dial Complete’s product labels feature claims asserting that

Dial Complete “Kills 99.99% of Germs*,” that it is “#1 Doctor

Recommended**,” and “Kills more germs than any other liquid hand

soap.”1 (See Pls.’ Mot. for Class Certification (document no.

57), at Exhs. 1, 5.) In the past, Dial Complete labels have

included the claims: “Superior Germ Kill,” “10x More Effective

Germ Kill,” “Protects your family better than ordinary liquid

hand soap,” and “Kills 10x More Germs.” (See id. at Exhs. 2-4.)

Those claims appear on the product packaging of every bottle of

Dial Complete sold. (See id. at Exh. 13 (Deposition of Dial’s

Vice President of Marketing for Personal Care Products,

Christopher Sommer (“Sommer Dep.”) at 156:8-11 (“On the base

1 The asterisk following “Kills 99.99% of Germs” leads to the statement “Encountered in household settings,” while the double asterisk following “#1 Doctor Recommended” leads to the language “Antibacterial Liquid Hand Wash.” (Def.’s Br. in Opp. to Class Certification (document no. 86), p. 5.)

2 level, we try and maintain a consistent look and feel, and to

point of fact, we would only have, to my knowledge, one standard

[product] design at any given time being produced for Dial

Complete.”); see also, id. at 195:16-18 (“[Dial] intend[s] to

have a consistent appearance and messaging across our primary

packaging.”)).

The plaintiffs challenge those claims (collectively, the

“challenged claims”), arguing that they are false and misleading

because the label statements about germ-killing efficacy are not

true, and are unsupported by scientific evidence or

substantiation. (See Pls.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Class

Certification (document no. 57) at p. 5; Consolidated Class

Action Compl. ¶ 69.) According to plaintiffs, “[t]here is no

credible evidence that any triclosan containing hand wash as used

by consumers in community settings protects those consumers from

disease or illness better than ordinary hand soaps that do not

contain triclosan.”2 (Id.; see also Consolidated Class Action

Compl. ¶¶ 70-76.) In support of that position, plaintiffs rely,

in part, on the conclusion of their expert, Dr. Allison E.

Aiello, that the veracity of the challenged claims can be

2 Dial Complete’s active ingredient is a compound known as triclosan. (See Def.’s Br. in Opp. to Class Certification (document no. 86) p. 5; see also Consolidated Class Action Compl. ¶ 35.)

3 evaluated through common evidence, and that, “based on [her]

preliminary review,” the challenged claims are “false, deceptive,

and/or misleading.” (See Pls.’ Mot. for Class Certification

(document no. 57), Exh. 20 at p. 25.)

Dial vigorously disputes Dr. Aiello’s conclusions, as well

as plaintiffs’ allegations relating to Dial Complete’s efficacy.

Dial argues that the product has been extensively tested, and

“[a]lthough other antibacterial hand soaps contain the same

active ingredient as Dial Complete (triclosan), none is as

effective in killing common household germs.” (Def’s. Br. in

Opp. to Class Certification (document no. 86) at p. 5.) In

support, Dial points to the conclusions of its own expert, Rhonda

Jones, that the efficacy studies she has reviewed “substantiate

the claims that Dial has made about Dial Complete.” (Expert

Report of Rhonda Jones (document no. 86-76) at p. 34.)

The Consolidated Amended Complaint advances four causes of

action: violation of the consumer protection laws of Arkansas,

California, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin

(count one); breach of express warranty under the laws of

Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, and

Ohio (count two); breach of implied warranty under the laws of

Arkansas, California, Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, and Ohio

4 (count three); and unjust enrichment under the law of all eight

states (count four). Plaintiffs seek class certification

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 for each of those claims.3

Dial posits that class treatment is not appropriate in this

case for several reasons. First, Dial argues, the class is not

ascertainable at the certification stage without the need for

extensive individual inquiries. Second, Dial contends that

plaintiffs cannot establish predominance or superiority using

generalized proof. According to Dial, individual issues of

reliance, causation, damages, and defenses specific to the named

plaintiffs or certain class members will overwhelm any common

issues. In support of its argument, Dial points to evidence in

the record purporting to show that some consumers choose Dial

Complete for reasons unrelated to the challenged claims, such as

fragrance, bottle shape, or its foamy consistency. (See, e.g.,

Def’s. Br. in Opp. to Class Certification (document no. 86), Exh.

15 (Dial Hand Washing Segmentation Study)) Finally, Dial argues

3 After being pressed by Dial, plaintiffs indicated that they will identify class members through a testimonial claims form administrative process. (See Pls.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Class Certification (document no. 161) at p. 37.) At oral argument on the plaintiffs’ class certification motion, counsel for the plaintiffs further indicated that the plaintiffs were working with expert consultants to potentially mine consumer data from retailers that would further allow for identification of individual class members. (See 4/16/2015 Hearing Tr. at 11- 13.)

5 that the plaintiffs have failed to present a functional damages

model, and therefore have not met their burden of demonstrating

that damages can be proven on a class-wide basis.

Discussion

Legal Standard for Class Certification

In a purported class action, the “party seeking

certification must establish ‘the elements necessary for class

certification: the four requirements of [Rule] 23(a) and one of

the several requirements of Rule 23(b).’” Kenneth R. v. Hassan,

293 F.R.D. 254, 263 (D.N.H. 2013) (quoting In re Relafen

Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 337, 341 (D. Mass. 2003) (citing

Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., 323 F.3d 32, 38 (1st

Cir. 2003))). “Whether the movant has carried that burden is a

question the district court must resolve through a rigorous

analysis of Rule 23's requirements. Id. (citing General Tel. Co.

of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “A party seeking class certification

must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with [Rule 23] –

that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact

sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact,

etc.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551

(2011) (emphasis in original).

6 The court’s analysis “may ‘entail some overlap with the

merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim.’” Amgen Inc. v.

Connecticut Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194,

(2013) (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551)). But the overlap

must necessarily be limited, for “Rule 23 grants courts no

license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the

certification stage.” Id. at 1194-1195. Rather, “[m]erits

questions may be considered to the extent — but only to the

extent — that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule

23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Id. at

1195. In short, “[b]y sifting the abundant evidence through the

sieve of the legal claims, [a] court [will] satisf[y] the

requirement to perform a ‘rigorous analysis.’” Glazer v.

Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d 838, 852 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551)).

Class Certification under Rule 23

Plaintiffs seeking to certify a class under Rule 23 must

first satisfy Rule 23(a)’s requirements – numerosity,

commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation – and also

one of the three prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(b). See S.

States Police Benevolent Ass’n v. First Choice Armor & Equip.,

Inc., 241 F.R.D. 85, 87 (D. Mass. 2007) (citing Smilow, 323 F.3d

at 38; Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997)).

7 There are three possible bases for class certification under

Rule 23(b). Under the third, litigation may proceed as a class

action if the four criteria of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, and the

court finds that: (1) the questions of law or fact common to

class members predominate over any questions affecting only

individual members, and (2) a class action is superior to other

available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the

controversy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

Finally, “[i]n addition to the explicit requirements of Rule

23, courts generally recognize the ‘implicit requirement’ that

the class definition must be sufficiently definite to allow the

court, parties, and putative class members to ascertain class

membership.” Kenneth R., 293 F.R.D. at 263 (citing Shanley v.

Cadle, 277 F.R.D. 63, 67-68 (D. Mass. 2011)).

Ascertainability

It is common sense that for a court to certify a class

action, the class must be “sufficiently defined,” meaning, in

this circuit, that “the court must be able to resolve the

question of whether class members are included or excluded from

the class by reference to objective criteria.” Matamoros v.

Starbucks, Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 139 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting

James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 23.21[3][a]

8 (3d ed. 2012)). In other words, “an implicit prerequisite to

class certification is that a ‘class’ exist[] — that is, it must

be ‘administratively feasible to determine whether a particular

individual is a member.’” Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,

No. CIV.A. 06-12234-DJC, 2012 WL 957633, at *26 (D. Mass. Mar.

21, 2012) (quoting Kent v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 190 F.R.D.

271, 278 (D. Mass. 2000) (citing 7C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur

R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1760 (2d ed. 1972)));

see In re Bank of Am. Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)

Contract Litig., No. MDL 10-2193-RWZ, 2013 WL 4759649, at *3

(D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2013) (“[T]he class must be defined by

objective criteria” so that it is “administratively feasible for

the court to determine whether a particular individual is a

member”). Courts often refer to this unremarkable fact as the

ascertainability requirement. See Donovan, 2012 WL 957633, at

*26.

However, a “class need only be determinable by ‘stable and

objective factors’ at the outset of a case; not every class

member must be identified, but the class must be sufficiently

ascertainable to permit a court to ‘decide and declare who will

receive notice, who will share in any recovery, and who will be

bound by the judgment.’” Id. (quoting Kent, 190 F.R.D. at 278

9 (citing Crosby v. Soc. Sec. Admin. of the U.S., 796 F.2d 576, 580

(1st Cir. 1986))).

In this case, Dial relies upon a recent Third Circuit case,

Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013) and its

progeny, in an attempt to graft an almost, if not completely,

insurmountable burden on plaintiffs in small-claim consumer class

action cases. Dial asks this court to adopt a heightened

ascertainability requirement as defined in Carrera, and

summarized by the Seventh Circuit as follows: “(1) the class must

be defined with reference to objective criteria (consistent with

long-established law . . .;) and (2) there must be a ‘reliable

and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether

putative class members fall within the class definition.’”4

4 As the Seventh Circuit points out in Mullins, 795 F.3d at 661:

[the] Third Circuit's innovation began with Marcus v. BMW of North America, LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012), where the court vacated certification of a poorly defined class. The decisive portion of the opinion, id. at 592-594, certainly seems sound, but the opinion went on to caution that on remand, if defendants' records would not identify class members, the district court should not approve a method relying on “potential class members' say so,” and the opinion said that reliance on class members' affidavits might not be “proper or just,” id. at 594 (internal quotation marks omitted). The opinion did not explain this new requirement other than to cite an easily distinguishable district court decision.

10 Mullins v. Direct Dial, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015)).

Dial argues that named plaintiffs’ and the class members’

“lack of objective proof of their purchases of Dial Complete”

(e.g., the lack of receipts) render the class unascertainable,

and that Dial’s due process rights would be violated if it did

not have the opportunity to challenge each potential class

member’s memory regarding purchase and price, thus requiring

thousands of individualized mini-trials to establish class

membership, and rendering self-identification by affidavit

ineffective. (Def.’s Br. in Opp. to Class Certification

(document no. 86) at pp. 37-38; see also Def.’s Surreply in Opp.

to Class Certification (document no. 175) at pp. 2-7.) Dial

expresses similar concerns relating to whether the predominance

and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are met in this

case.

In support of its argument, Dial points to the First

Circuit’s recent decision in In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777

F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2015), in which the court of appeals quoted

Carrera for the proposition that a proposed class mechanism must

be administratively feasible: “[a]t the class certification

stage, the court must be satisfied that, prior to judgment, it

11 will be possible to establish a mechanism for distinguishing the

injured from the uninjured class members. The court may proceed

with certification so long as this mechanism will be

‘administratively feasible,’ . . . and protective of defendants’

Seventh Amendment and due process rights.” (quoting Carrera, 727

F.3d at 307).

Nexium, however, does not appear to support Dial’s argument.

At issue in Nexium was whether class certification was

permissible when the class included a de minimus number of

uninjured parties. 777 F.3d at 14. The defendant argued in part

that the class should not have been certified because the

plaintiffs had failed to establish a mechanism for distinguishing

injured from uninjured class members. Id. at 18.

After noting that the plaintiffs had yet to propose a

mechanism for limiting recovery to injured parties, the court

considered how an injury could be established:

[Another] . . . approach would be to establish injury through testimony by the consumer that, given the choice he or she would have purchased the generic. Such testimony, if unrebutted, would be sufficient to establish injury in an individual action. And if such consumer testimony would be sufficient to establish injury in an individual suit, it follows that similar testimony in the form of an affidavit or declaration would be sufficient in a class action. There cannot be a more stringent burden of proof in class actions than in individual actions. “Rigorous analysis,” [Gen. Tel.

12 Co. Of Sw. v.] Falcon, 457 U.S. [147, 161 (1982)], of Rule 23 requirements does not require raising the bar for plaintiffs higher than they would have to meet in individual suits. Thus, we have confidence that a mechanism would exist for establishing injury at the liability stage of this case, compliant with the requirements of the Seventh Amendment and due process.

Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added). Thus, the court of appeals for

this circuit has plainly supported the view that testimonial

affidavits and declarations are an acceptable methodology for

establishing class membership at the liability stage of a case.5

It bears mention that Carrera’s heightened ascertainability

standard has been rejected by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.

See Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir.

2015) (“We see no reason to follow Carrera, particularly given

the strong criticism it has attracted from other courts.”);

Mullins, 795 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The Third Circuit's

approach in Carrera, which is at this point the high-water mark

of its developing ascertainability doctrine, goes much further

than the established meaning of ascertainability and in our view

5 In a footnote in Nexium, the court did distinguish the affidavits proposed in that case (“affidavits concerning likely future purchases of the consumers, as to which documents are not available”) from “affidavits concerning the past purchase of the product in question.” Id. at 21, n.17. However, such a distinction has little consequence in the consumer products class action context, because most consumers do not save receipts for small purchases, and so, “documents are not [generally] available,” id. (emphasis added), to establish class membership.

13 misreads Rule 23.”); but see Karhu v. Vital Pharma., Inc., ___

Fed. Appx. ____, 2015 WL 3560722 (11th Cir. Jun. 9, 2015)

(applying Carrera’s heightened standard). Courts in the Ninth

Circuit and the Second Circuit have also rejected Carerra’s

approach. See McCrary v. Elations Co., LLC, No. EDCV 13-00242

JGB OP, 2014 WL 1779243, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014) (finding

a class ascertainable where “the proposed class definition simply

identifies purchasers of Defendant’s products that included the

allegedly material misrepresentations” when “the alleged

misrepresentations appeared on the actual packages of the

products purchased” because “there is no concern that the class

includes individuals who were not exposed to the

misrepresentation”) (quoting Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D.

493, 500 (S.D. Cal. 2013)); Lilly v. Jamba Juice Co., 308 F.R.D.

231, 238 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Ebin v. Kangadis Food, Inc., 297

F.R.D. 561, 566-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

As courts rejecting Carrera’s approach to ascertainability

in consumer class actions have realized, in each of those cases,

“[e]ssentially, [d]efendant’s concern is that class members do

not have actual proof that they belong in the class,” for

purposes of ascertainability, causation, and damages. McCrary,

2014 WL 1779243, at *7. However, if those arguments “were

correct, ‘there would be no such thing as a consumer class

14 action.’” Id. (quoting Ries v. Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 287

F.R.D. 523, 535 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding ascertainability

satisfied where class members were required to self-identify that

they purchased iced tea with “natural” on the label during the

class period)); see also Mullins, 795 F.3d at 662 (“In general,

we think imposing this stringent version of ascertainability does

not further any interest of Rule 23 that is not already

adequately protected by the Rule’s explicit requirements. On the

other side of the balance, the costs of imposing the requirement

are substantial. The stringent version of ascertainability

effectively bars low-value consumer class actions, at least where

plaintiffs do not have documentary proof of purchases, and

sometimes even when they do.”); Ebin, 297 F.R.D. at 567

(permitting self-identification in a consumer marketing

misrepresentation case and certifying the class notwithstanding

potential class members’ lack of receipts because it would

“render class actions against producers almost impossible to

bring”).

For those reasons, the court is not persuaded by the

reasoning of Carrera and its progeny. As expressed by a member

of the Third Circuit in a concurring opinion in Byrd v. Aaron’s

Inc.:

15 In 2012 [the Third Circuit] adopted a second element, namely, requiring district courts to make certain that there is “a reliable, administratively feasible” method of determining who fits into the class, thereby imposing a heightened evidentiary burden. Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594. We have precluded class certification unless there can be objective proof “beyond mere affidavits” that someone is actually a class member. Id.; accord Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 308- 12 (3d Cir. 2013). This concept has gained traction in recent years. I submit that this “business record” or “paper trail” requirement is ill-advised. In most low-value consumer class actions, prospective class members are unlikely to have documentary proof of purchase, because very few people keep receipts from drug stores or grocery stores. This should not be the reason to deny certification of a class. As Judge Ambro's dissent from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc in Carrera noted, “[w]here a defendant's lack of records ... make it more difficult to ascertain the members of an otherwise objectively verifiable low-value class, the consumers who make up that class should not be made to suffer.” Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 3887938, at *3 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014) (Ambro, J. dissenting).

Records are not the only way to prove that someone is in a class. It is the trial judge's province to determine what proof may be required at the claims submission and claims administration stage. It is up to the judge overseeing the class action to decide what she will accept as proof when approving the claim form. Could not the judge decide that, in addition to an individual's “say so” that he is a member of the class, the claimant needs to submit an affidavit from another household member or from his doctor corroborating his assertion that he did, in fact, take Bayer aspirin? Is that not permissible and appropriate? Yet, we foreclose this process at the outset of the case by requiring that plaintiffs conjure up all the ways that they might find the evidence sufficient to approve someone as a class member.

This puts the class action cart before the horse and confuses the class certification process, as this case makes manifest. The irony of this result is that it thwarts “[t]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism,” i.e., “to overcome the problem that

16 small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). Indeed, “[a] class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor.” Id. We have effectively thwarted small-value consumer class actions by defining ascertainability in such a way that consumer classes will necessarily fail to satisfy for lack of adequate substantiation. Consumers now need to keep a receipt or a can, bottle, tube, or wrapper of the offending consumer items in order to succeed in bringing a class action.

784 F.3d 154, 173-75 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Apr. 28, 2015)

(Rendell, J., concurring); see also Daniel Luks, Ascertainability

in the Third Circuit: Name that Class Member, 82 Fordham L. Rev.

2359, 2393-2397 (2014) (urging the rejection of the Carrera

standard of ascertainability “so as not to destroy consumer class

actions”); Lilly, 308 F.R.D. at 238 (“Adopting the Carrera

approach would have significant negative ramifications for the

ability to obtain redress for consumer injuries. Few people

retain receipts for low-priced goods, since there is little

possibility they will need them later to verify that they made

the purchase. Yet it is precisely in circumstances like these,

where the injury to any individual consumer is small, but the

cumulative injury to consumers as a group is substantial, that

the class certification mechanism provides one of its most

important social benefits. In the absence of a class action, the

17 injury would go unredressed.”); Ebin, 297 F.R.D. at 567 (“the

class action device, at its very core, is designed for cases like

this where a large number of consumers have been defrauded but no

one consumer has suffered an injury sufficiently large as to

justify bringing an individual lawsuit.”).

Indeed, the leading treatise on class action lawsuits has

confirmed that a “simple statement or affidavit may be sufficient

where claims are small or are not amenable to ready

verification.” Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class

Actions § 18:54 (4th ed.); see also Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667 (“In

most cases, the expected recovery is so small that we question

whether many people would be willing to sign affidavits under

penalty of perjury saying that they purchased the good or

service.”); Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, 2012 WL 957633, at *26-

27 (suggesting methods other than customer receipts to verify

purchase of consumer products are acceptable, including incentive

programs and customer self-identification where incentive to lie

would be minimal, when class definition is sufficiently clear).

Moreover, to the extent that Dial’s argument is motivated by

concerns about the submission of fraudulent or mistaken claims,

Dial “has provided no evidence . . . that claims of this

magnitude have provoked the widespread submission of inaccurate

18 or fraudulent claims.” Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667. But, even if

Dial had submitted such evidence, “courts are not without tools

to combat this problem during the claims administration process.

They can rely, as they have for decades, on claim administrators,

various auditing processes, sampling for fraud detection,

follow-up notices to explain the claims process, and other

techniques tailored by the parties and the court to take into

account the size of the claims, the cost of the techniques, and

an empirical assessment of the likelihood of fraud or

inaccuracy.” Id.

Finally, every bottle of Dial Complete sold featured the

challenged claims. As discussed by the court in Ault v. J.M.

Smucker Co., “[c]ourts across the country have expressed doubt

that a class is ascertainable in cases . . . where only certain

products on the market during the class period contain the

allegedly misleading labels.” 310 F.R.D. 59, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

(discussing cases). However, such cases are distinguishable from

this action, where “the uniformity of the products” makes “it far

easier for a potential class member to recall whether they had

purchased the good containing the misrepresentation.” Id.

(quoting Randolph v. J.M. Smucker Co., 303 F.R.D. 679, 689 (S.D.

Fla. 2014)).

19 In sum, the plaintiffs proposed class definition is “not

vague,” and it adequately “identifies a particular group of

individuals” (purchasers of Dial Complete). Mullins, 795 F.3d at

660. The plaintiffs’ proposed classes are defined by objective

criteria — whether the potential class members purchased Dial

Complete containing the challenged claims on the packaging during

a fixed time period — and the potential class members can be

feasibly identified by sworn affidavits of purchase, among other

methods. The plaintiffs have not impermissibly created a “fail-

safe” class, a class “defined in terms of success on the merits.”

Id. Consequently, the classes are sufficiently ascertainable to

warrant class certification.6

6 As the court explained in Donovan, “what [the defendant] complains of is a potential administrative burden in determining who is a class member, but this issue is ‘primarily one of manageability, and not ascertainability.’” Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 268 F.R.D. 1, 9 (D. Mass. 2010); see also Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663 (“concern about administrative inconvenience is better addressed by the explicit requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that the class device be ‘superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.’ One relevant factor is ‘the likely difficulties in managing a class action.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D)). Thus, Dial’s further concerns about individual issues of reliance, causation, and damages will be addressed in the court’s consideration of the Rule 23(b)(3) factors of predominance and superiority below.

20 Requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)

I. Numerosity

Under Rule 23(a)(1), the class must be “so numerous that

joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(a)(1). “The numerosity requirement ‘has two components, the

number of class members and the practicability of joining them in

a single case.’” Kenneth R. v. Hassan, 293 F.R.D. at 265

(quoting Rolland v. Celluci, No. CIV A 98–30208–KPN, 1999 WL

34815562, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 2, 1999)). “[N]umbers alone are

not usually determinative,” rather both the number of potential

class members and their geographic distribution are relevant to

the numerosity determination. In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd., No.

MD-02-1335-PB, 2006 WL 2349338, at *1 (D.N.H. Aug. 15, 2006)

(quoting Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 131-32

(1st Cir. 1985)).

Dial does not meaningfully contest that this element is

satisfied, and the evidence before the court suggests that Dial

has shipped millions of units of Dial Complete to retailers and

distributors in the United States since the product’s launch.

(See Pls.’s Mot. for Class Certification (document no. 57), Exh.

15 at p. 8). Based on that volume, the class is sufficiently

numerous to satisfy Rule 23(a).

21 II. Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be “questions of law or

fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “Although

a court need find only a ‘single common question,’ a certain

rigor, as prescribed by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart, must

attend the commonality inquiry.” Kenneth R., 293 F.R.D. at 265

(quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (quotation and alterations

omitted)). The Supreme Court explained that commonality

“requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members

have ‘suffered the same injury.’” Id. at 266 (quoting Wal-Mart,

131 S. Ct. at 2551). The Court further stated that “claims must

depend upon a common contention” that is “capable of classwide

resolution — which means that the determination of its truth or

falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of

each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at

2551. “‘What matters to class certification,’” the Court

emphasized, “‘is not the raising of common questions — even in

droves — but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to

generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the

litigation.’” Kenneth R., 293 F.R.D. at 266 (quoting Wal-Mart,

131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class

Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev.

97, 132 (2009)) (emphasis in original).

22 In this case, plaintiffs have identified four questions of

law or fact common to potential class members:

1. Did the Dial Corporation claim that consumer use of Dial Complete provides greater health benefit than consumer use of regular soap and water on the packaging of every bottle of Dial Complete sold?

2. Were Dial’s representations false, misleading, or deceptive?

3. Did the challenged claims have any economic effect on consumers?

4. How much, if anything, must Dial pay in restitutionary damages to consumers who purchased Dial Complete, if the challenged claims are shown to be false, deceptive or misleading?

(See Pls.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Class Certification

(document no. 161) at p. 3.)

Dial does not meaningfully contest that such common

questions exist, only whether they predominate over individual

questions of reliance, causation, and damages sufficiently to

satisfy Rule 23(b)(3). After careful consideration, the court is

satisfied that answers to the common questions, even excluding

the damages question, would “drive the resolution of the

litigation.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551; see Suchanek v. Sturm

Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding “that the

question whether the [defendant’s] packaging was likely to

deceive a reasonable consumer is common. The claims of every

23 class member will rise or fall on the resolution of that

question.”).

III. Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the

representative parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of

the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “The typicality analysis

is designed to ensure that class representatives, in pursuing

their own interests, concurrently will advance those of the

class.” In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach

Litig., 293 F.R.D. 21, 27 (D. Me. 2013). The claims of class

representatives “are ‘typical’ when their claims ‘arise from the

same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to

the claims of other class members, and . . . are based on the

same legal theory.’” Id. (quoting Garcia-Rubiera v. Calderon,

570 F.3d 443, 460 (1st Cir. 2009)) (further citation omitted).

In other words, the typicality requirement is satisfied if

the class representative’s claims are not likely to “be subject

to unique defenses that would divert attention from the common

claims of the class,” In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd. Multidistrict

Litig., No. 03-cv-1352-PB, 2007 WL 1703067, at *2 (D.N.H. June

12, 2007) (quoting In re Bank of Boston Corp. Sec. Litig., 762

F. Supp. 1525, 1532 (D. Mass. 1991) (quotations omitted)), and

24 where the court need not “make highly fact-specific or

individualized determinations in order to establish a defendant’s

liability to each class member.” Id. (quoting Collazo v.

Calderon, 212 F.R.D. 437, 443 (D.P.R. 2002) (quotations

omitted)).

Typicality “should be determined with reference to the

defendant’s actions, not with respect to particularized defenses

it might have against certain class members.” In re Neurontin

Mktg. & Sale Practices Litig., 244 F.R.D. 89, 106 (D. Mass. 2007)

(quoting Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir.

1996) (quotations omitted)).

According to Dial, the named plaintiffs’ claims are not

typical because they are subject to unique spoliation defenses

due to the named plaintiffs’ failure to retain receipts for their

purchases of Dial or other hand soaps since the parties exchanged

discovery requests in March 2012. This argument is premised on

the notion that the named plaintiffs’ and potential class

members’ receipts for Dial Complete and substitute products are

relevant to the determination of class membership and damages.

Dial argues that the plaintiffs’ failure to preserve receipts is

prejudicial because Dial will be unable to determine: (1) whether

25 plaintiffs ever purchased Dial Complete; (2) whether plaintiffs

paid more for Dial Complete than an alternative soap.

Spoliation “can be defined as the failure to preserve

evidence that is relevant to pending or potential litigation.”

Jimenez-Sanchez v. Caribbean Restaurants, LLC, 483 F. Supp. 2d

140, 143 (D.P.R. 2007). However, as discussed above in the

context of ascertainability, because potential class members are

highly unlikely to retain receipts for such small purchases, the

plaintiffs are not required to rely solely on receipts to prove

class membership. Thus, the named plaintiffs’ and potential

class members’ receipts are not strictly relevant to the claims

or defenses in this case, rendering Dial’s purported individual

spoliation defenses inapplicable. See Jimenez-Sanchez, 483 F.

Supp. 2d at 143.7

Because the named plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same

alleged misrepresentations on the packaging of Dial Complete as

those of the potential class members, they are typical of the

alleged class claims.

7 Moreover, as the plaintiffs point out, one of Dial’s arguments against certification is that few, if any, potential class members will have retained their receipts for purchases of Dial Complete or substitute products. Thus, to the extent that spoliation might conceivably be thought an issue, it ultimately becomes a common defense to the class claims rather than a unique individual defense.

26 IV. Adequacy

Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement will be satisfied if

“the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect

the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The

adequacy requirement has two components. First, plaintiffs must

show that “counsel chosen by the representative party is

qualified, experienced and able to vigorously conduct the

proposed litigation.” Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d

124, 130 (1st Cir. 1985). Second, plaintiffs must show “that the

interests of the [class representatives] will not conflict with

the interests of any of the class members.” Id.

A. Adequacy of Class Counsel

Dial does not argue that class counsel is inadequate, and

the court having previously found class counsel adequate (see

document no. 20) (“Order granting Partially Assented-to Majority

Plaintiffs Group’s Motion for Designation of Lucy J. Karl as

Interim Lead Counsel and Approval of Proposed Leadership

Structure”), class counsel satisfies the adequacy requirement.

B. Adequacy of Class Representatives

Class representatives are not required to have “expert

knowledge” about the case, and may rely heavily on class counsel

for guidance. In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 52, 69

27 (D. Mass. 2005) (further citation omitted). “A ‘perceived lack

of subjective interest’ is ordinarily insufficient to disqualify

proposed class representatives.” In re Tyco, 2006 WL 2349338,

at *2 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718,

728 (11th Cir. 1987)). However, a named plaintiff would be

inadequate if he or she possesses “so little knowledge of and

involvement in the class action that [he or she] [is] unable or

unwilling to protect the interests of the class against the

possibly competing interests of the attorneys.” Id. (quoting

Kirkpatrick, 827 F.2d at 727). The adequacy requirement is

satisfied “unless [the class representatives’] participation is

so minimal that they virtually have abdicated to their attorneys

the conduct of the case.” Id. (quoting Kirkpatrick, 827 F.2d at

728).

Dial argues that the named plaintiffs are inadequate because

of the alleged receipt-related spoliation defenses uniquely

applicable to them — an argument the court has already rejected.

Dial further argues that the named plaintiffs are inadequate

because they do not understand or agree with the theory of the

case, and because one of the named plaintiffs, Eric Capdeville,

has been effectively absent from the case and another named

plaintiff, Alicia Gentile, has filed for bankruptcy while failing

to disclose her claim.

28 Having read the transcripts submitted by the plaintiffs and

Dial in this case, the court is satisfied that the named

plaintiffs are sufficiently cognizant of the claims and issues in

this case to serve as named plaintiffs, with three exceptions.

David Walls (Illinois). The first exception is David Walls

of Illinois. In his deposition testimony, Mr. Walls testified

that he “can’t recall . . . buying [Dial Complete] at all, let

alone reading the labels on it, because [his] wife buys the

majority of those products.” (Def.’s Opp. to Class

Certification, (document no. 86) Exh. 13 (Deposition of David

Walls at 58:2-15).) Mr. Walls further testified that he could

not recall any occasion on which he actually purchased Dial

Complete. (Id. at 57:8-13.)

As discussed below in the context of predominance, while the

state laws under which the purported classes can maintain these

claims may not require individualized fact-finding of reliance

and proximate causation, at a minimum the named plaintiffs and

class members must be able to affirm under oath that they

purchased Dial Complete during the proposed class period.

Otherwise, the plaintiff has not suffered an injury sufficient to

confer Article III standing and fulfill the requirement that the

“representatives must have the essential characteristic common to

29 the claim of the class” in order to serve as a class

representative. In re Wellnx Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 673

F. Supp. 2d 43, 54-55 (D. Mass. 2009) (providing that “named

plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they

personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered

by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong

and which they purport to represent” to establish Article III

standing). Because Mr. Walls cannot swear under oath that he

actually purchased Dial Complete, he is not an adequate class

representative. Mr. Walls’ inadequacy, however, is of no moment

to the Illinois class because its interests are adequately

represented by another named plaintiff, Kristina Pearson.

Eric Capdeville (Louisiana). The second exception is Eric

Capdeville of Louisiana. Dial argues that Mr. Capdeville has not

met the minimum standard required to serve as named plaintiff for

the Louisiana class because, despite repeated attempts by Dial,

he has never appeared for deposition. The plaintiffs admit that

Mr. Capdeville’s “poor health prevent[s] his continued

participation as the proposed representative of the Louisiana

class,” but argue that they should be permitted to substitute a

new named plaintiff for Mr. Capdeville. (Pls.’ Reply Br. in

Supp. of Mot. for Class Certification (document no. 161) at

p. 45.) Several months have passed since the plaintiffs made

30 this argument, but they have yet to petition the court to

substitute a new plaintiff for Mr. Capdeville. Given the

undisputed evidence of Mr. Capdeville’s inability to fulfill his

duties as a named plaintiff, the court concludes that he cannot

meet the adequacy requirement. Accordingly, and as set forth

below, the plaintiffs may move to substitute a representative

Louisiana plaintiff who adequately represents the putative

subclass.

Alicia Gentile (California). Dial’s objections to Alicia

Gentile’s adequacy as a named plaintiff are well taken. See

Rader v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 524, 529

(D. Nev. 2011) (“Plaintiff filed for personal bankruptcy

approximately one year after he filed the present class action

complaint. Thus, his claims are the property of his bankruptcy

estate, and only the bankruptcy trustee can bring, litigate, or

settle causes of action that are property of the debtor's estate.

See Lopez v. Specialty Rests. Corp., 283 B.R. 22, 28 (9th Cir.

BAP 2002). ‘Because [Plaintiff] lacks standing to sue, [he] may

not serve as a class representative.’ Deloach v. Provident

Health Servs., Inc., No. CV493-120, 1993 WL 850445, at *2 (S.D.

Ga. Sept. 1, 1993)”). Ms. Gentile is not an adequate class

representative because she lacks standing to pursue her own

claims. But, as with Mr. Walls, Ms. Gentile’s inadequacy is of

31 no moment to the California subclass because named plaintiff

Sonia Herrera adequately represents its interests.

Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements

In analyzing the predominance and superiority requirements

of Rule 23(b)(3), this circuit has instructed that the “class

certification prerequisites should be construed in light of the

underlying objectives of class actions.” Smilow v. Southwestern

Bell Mobile Sys., 323 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing S.S.

Partridge & K.J. Miller, Some Practical Considerations for

Defending and Settling Products Liability and Consumer Class

Actions, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 2125, 2129 (2000); Mace v. Van Ru Credit

Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997); Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(b)(3) advisory committee's note (construing predominance as a

prerequisite for obtaining economies of scale)).

The court in Smilow further explained that “Rule 23(b)(3) is

intended to be a less stringent requirement than Rule 23(b)(1) or

(b)(2).” Id. (citing Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 615

(“Framed for situations in which class-action treatment is not as

clearly called for as it is in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)

situations, Rule 23(b)(3) permits certification where class suit

may nevertheless be convenient and desirable.”) (internal

quotations omitted)). “The core purpose of Rule 23(b)(3),”

32 Smilow provides, “is to vindicate the claims of consumers and

other groups of people whose individual claims would be too small

to warrant litigation.” Id. (citing Amchem Prods., Inc., 521

U.S. at 617). It is with those important, and sometimes

overlooked, principles in mind that the court turns to the Rule

23(b)(3) factors.

I. Superiority

Rule 23(b)(3) provides four non-exhaustive factors relevant

to the court’s superiority inquiry: (1) the class members’

interest in individually controlling the prosecution or defense

of separate actions; (2) the extent and nature of any litigation

concerning the controversy already begun by or against class

members; (3) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating

the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (4) the

likely difficulties in managing a class action. Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(b)(3).

All four non-exclusive factors, and the policy supporting

consumer product class action litigation, point to a finding that

a class action is the superior method for adjudicating this case.

It does not appear that individual litigation has been initiated

to adjudicate these claims, and “[g]iven the size of the claims,

individual members have virtually no interest in individually

33 controlling the prosecution of separate actions.” In re

Hannaford Bros., 293 F.R.D. 21, 33-34 (D. Me. 2013).

Given that this is multi-district litigation and the cases

will be eventually transferred back to their home districts for

trial, there are no concerns about forum. With respect to

manageability, there is no evidence that this consumer class

action will be any more difficult to manage than any other

consumer class action. Consequently, given the large number of

potential class members and small value of individual claims, not

only is a class action the superior method of resolving this

case, it is the very sort of case for which the Rule 23(b)(3)

class action mechanism was intended.

II. Predominance

Dial contends that rather than predominating, the admittedly

common issues identified by plaintiffs would be overwhelmed by

individual issues of reliance, causation, injury, and damages.

Dial also argues that its defenses to the plaintiffs’ claims

raise individualized questions, most notably relating to the

applicable statutes of limitation for each putative class member.

Finally, Dial challenges the methodologies put forth by the

plaintiffs’ experts for ascertaining damages on a classwide basis

34 as unrelated to plaintiffs’ theory of the case and ineffective to

show that damages are susceptible to classwide proof.8

For a court to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3),

the rule “requires merely that common issues predominate, not

that all issues be common to the class.” Smilow, 323 F.3d at 39.

“Rule 23(b)(3) ‘does not require a plaintiff seeking class

certification to prove that each element of her claim is

susceptible of classwide proof.’ Rather the question is whether

there is ‘reason to think that [individualized] questions will

overwhelm common ones and render class certification

inappropriate.” In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d at 21

(quoting Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1196, and Halliburton Co. v. Erica

P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2412 (2014)) (emphases in

original).

A. Underlying State Claims

“Considering whether questions of law or fact common to

class members predominate begins, of course, with the elements of

8 To the extent spoliation is an issue raised by Dial, as pointed out in the typicality analysis above, it is better thought of as a likely defense common to most, if not all, of the named plaintiffs and potential class members. That militates in favor of finding that common issues predominate. See Smilow, 323 F.3d at 39 (“Courts traditionally have been reluctant to deny class action status under Rule 23(b)(3) simply because affirmative defenses may be available against individual members.”).

35 the underlying cause of action.” Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.

Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011) (quotations

omitted). Dial contends that the state claims at issue require

proof of either individual reliance or causation, and argues that

determining which class members relied on the alleged

misrepresentations and were harmed thereby would require

innumerable mini-trials that would overshadow the litigation of

the common question addressing the truth or falsity of the

challenged claims. Plaintiffs counter that under the laws of all

eight relevant states, individual issues of reliance and

causation are irrelevant, because those issues are analyzed from

the perspective of either the named plaintiff or a reasonable

consumer.

It is necessary to determine, then, whether the claims

plaintiffs seek to certify in each state require a showing of

reliance and/or causation, and, if so, whether those elements can

be established on a classwide basis. See In re ConAgra Foods,

Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 919, 982 (C.D. Cal. 2015).

ARKANSAS

In Arkansas, plaintiffs seeks class certification for their

Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim, breach of express

36 warranty claim, breach of implied warranty claim, and their claim

for unjust enrichment.

1. Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (A.C.A. § 4-88 101 et seq.)

“When a person ‘suffers actual damage or injury as a result

of an offense or violation’ of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade

Practices Act (“ADTPA”), Ark. Code Ann. § 4–88–113(f), a cause of

action may be brought for any ‘unconscionable, false, or

deceptive act or practice in business, commerce, or trade,’ Ark.

Code Ann § 4–88–107(a)(10).” White v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am.,

Inc., No. 2:11 CV 02243, 2013 WL 685298, at *6 (W.D. Ark. Feb.

25, 2013).

According to Dial, the ADTPA requires both proof of

individual reliance and individual proof of causation. But,

Arkansas courts have allowed ADTPA class actions to proceed where

there are common questions concerning the defendant’s alleged

wrongdoing that must be resolved for all class members. See

DIRECTV, Inc. v. Murray, 423 S.W.3d 555, 565 (Ark. 2012) (“Our

law is now well settled that the mere fact that individual issues

and defenses may be raised by the defendant cannot defeat class

certification where there are common questions concerning the

defendant's alleged wrongdoing that must be resolved for all

class members.”); see also GGNSC Arkadelphia, LLC v. Lamb by &

37 through Williams, 465 S.W.826, 834-35 (Ark. 2015), reh'g denied

(July 23, 2015) (“[W]e have said time and time again, the mere

fact that individual issues or defenses may be raised regarding

the recovery of individual class members cannot defeat class

certification where there are common questions that must be

resolved for all class members”); Philip Morris Companies, Inc.

v. Miner, 462 S.W.3d 313, 317-18 (Ark. 2015) (“We conclude that

proof of misrepresentation does not turn on each class member's

smoking habit because the key inquiry under the ADTPA focuses on

the defendant's actions.”).9

Here, the core of the plaintiffs’ ADTPA claim rests on

Dial’s allegedly deceptive conduct in marketing Dial Complete.

The alleged misrepresentations appear on the packaging of each

and every container of Dial Complete sold. Whether those claims

are, indeed, false or misleading is the significant common

question to be resolved for all class members.

9 The case law on this topic is far from clear. For example, the federal district court in Jarrett v. Panasonic Corp. Of N. Am., 8 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1089 (E.D. Ark. 2013), held that an “ADTPA claim requires each class member to prove reliance on the allegedly fraudulent conduct and that such fraudulent conduct caused damage.” However, the case relied upon in Jarrett, and relied upon by Dial in support of its argument, White v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 2013 WL 685298, at *8-9, simply does not stand for that proposition. In White, the court was considering whether the plaintiff had adequately pled an ADPTA claim for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) purposes, not whether the ADPTA requires each individual class member to prove reliance.

38 Plaintiffs’ Arkansas consumer protection claim is capable of

classwide proof.

2. Breach of Express Warranty (Ark. Code. Ann. § 4-2-313)

Under Arkansas law, “‘[a]n affirmation of fact must be part

of the basis of the parties’ bargain to be an express warranty;’”

if a buyer “is not influenced by the statement in making his or

her purchase, the statement is not a basis of the bargain.’” In

re Horizon Organic Milk Plus DHA Omega-3 Mktg. & Sales Practice

Litig., 955 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1340-41 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (quoting

Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 834 S.W.2d 136, 147 (Ark. 1992)). “In

other words, under Arkansas law, ‘reliance is an essential

element of an express warranty claim.’” Id. (quoting Brooks v.

Remington Arms Co., No. 1:09-cv-01054, 2010 WL 6971894, at *5

(W.D. Ark. Oct. 27, 2010)).

Thus, Dial correctly posits that individualized proof is

required as to whether each potential class member was influenced

by or relied upon Dial’s purported misrepresentations when

purchasing the soap: “If the consumer was not influenced by the

representation . . ., the representation . . . cannot be a basis

for the bargain and no express warranty exists.” Clayton v.

Batesville Casket Co., No. 5:07-CV-00214 JMM, 2009 WL 2448164, at

*5 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 10, 2009). Because individual factual

39 determinations would overwhelm the common questions posed, the

court declines to certify plaintiffs’ breach of express warranty

claim.

3. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Ark. Code. Ann. § 4-2-314)

To recover on a breach of implied warranty of

merchantability claim under Arkansas law, “the plaintiff must

prove 1) that he has sustained damages; 2) that the product sold

to him was not merchantable, i.e., fit for the ordinary purpose

for which such goods are used; 3) that this unmerchantable

condition was a proximate cause of his damages; and 4) that he

was a person whom the defendant might reasonably expect to use or

be affected by the product.” E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.

Dillaha, 659 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Ark. 1983).

The plaintiffs cite to M.S. Wholesale Plumbing, Inc. v.

Univ. Sports Publ’cns Co., Inc., No. 4:07-cv-730, 2008 WL 90022,

at *5 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2008), in support of their argument that

individual proof of reliance and causation is not required. In

M.S. Wholesale Plumbing, a case involving a breach of an implied

contract, the court stated: “The terms of a contract implied in

fact can be inferred from conduct, and the conduct of the parties

is to be evaluated from the point of view of a reasonable person,

considering all of the attendant circumstances.” 2008 WL 90022,

40 at *5; but see Jarrett v. Panasonic Corp. of N. Am., 8 F. Supp.

3d 1074, 1089 (E.D. Ark. 2013) (stating that individual issues of

fact would make class certification inappropriate because “a

breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim requires each

class member to prove that the alleged unmerchantable condition

was a proximate cause of her damages.”).10

Arkansas law in this area is murky, at best. However,

taking into consideration the Arkansas courts’ expressed “certify

now, decertify later” approach, see Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Robertson, 370 S.W.3d 179, 187 (Ark. 2010),11 the court

10 In support of its argument that individual proof of causation is required, Dial cites to Boshears v. Certainteed Corp., No. 4:05CV01052-WRW, 2007 WL 1381652, at *3 (E.D. Ark. May 10, 2007). Boshears is of no assistance in resolving the issue, as it involved an individual litigant, not a class action, and contains no substantive discussion of the cause of action’s causation requirement. Dial also cites to Clayton v. Batesville Casket Co., 2009 WL 2448164, at *5-6, but Clayton is distinguishable on this point because the court there found that plaintiff had not set forth sufficient class-wide proof that the caskets at issue failed, or that conditions of the caskets when purchased caused the class members’ damages. 11 Generally, the Arkansas Supreme Court has supported a bifurcated approach to class actions, which allows courts to divide a case into two phases: (1) certification for resolution of the preliminary, common issues; and (2) decertification for the resolution of the individual issues. See General Motors Corp. v. Bryant, 374 Ark. 38, 49 (2008) (observing that “challenges based on the statutes of limitations, fraudulent concealment, releases, causation, or reliance have usually been rejected and will not bar predominance satisfaction because those issues go to the right of a class member to recover, in contrast to underlying common issues of the defendant's liability.”); see also Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 370 S.W.3d at 189 (“we adhere

41 concludes that the plaintiffs’ implied warranty claim is capable,

under Arkansas law, of classwide proof, employing the “reasonable

person” standard to determine the elements of reliance and

causation.

4. Unjust Enrichment

To establish a claim for unjust enrichment under Arkansas

law, “a party must have received something of value, to which he

was not entitled and which he must restore.’” In re Horizon

Organic Milk Plus DHA Omega-3 Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig., 955

F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (citing Varner v.

to our well-settled precedent that allows class actions to be certified first when there are predominating threshold issues of liability common to the class, even though there may be individualized issues that come later requiring either the creation of subclasses or decertification altogether. . . . And, although Appellant asserts that Arkansas ‘stands alone’ in its approach, we have not been presented with any convincing argument that gives us cause to reconsider our prior decisions concluding that our approach is what we believe to be the more efficient method.”).

Thus, Arkansas law suggests that “predominance does not fail simply because there are individual issues that may arise; the central question to be resolved . . . is whether there are overarching issues that can be addressed before resolving individual issues.” GGNSC Arkadelphia, LLC v. Lamb by & through Williams, 465 S.W. at 835. Here, reliance and causation, elements of liability, would not preclude certification under Arkansas’ certification rules, because those elements lend themselves to classwide proof. So, here too, class-wide proof is available and does not preclude certification under federal procedural rules.

42 Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1018 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying

Arkansas law)).

Plaintiffs point to no authority supporting their argument

that this claim is capable of classwide proof, and a cursory

review of the pertinent case law indicates that adjudicating an

Arkansas unjust enrichment claim will depend on the factual

circumstances surrounding purchases of Dial Complete made by each

individual buyer at issue. See Thompson v. Bayer Corp., No. 07-

00017, 2009 WL 2424352, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 6, 2009) (“At a

minimum, Plaintiff must provide evidence that each class member

saw the alleged false advertisements and subsequently purchased

WeightSmart in order to prove that each class member is entitled

to restitution.”); see also Jarrett, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 1089

(“Defendants' liability for unjust enrichment to a particular

plaintiff depends on the factual circumstances of the particular

purchase at issue.”). Accordingly, the court finds this claim

incapable of classwide proof.

CALIFORNIA

In California, plaintiffs seek class certification for the

following claims: the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act

(Civil Code § 1750 et seq.), California’s False Advertising Law

(California Business and Professions Code § 17500 et seq.),

43 California Unfair Competition Law (California Business and

Professions Code § 17200 et seq.), breach of express warranty,

breach of implied warranty, and unjust enrichment.

As a preliminary matter, Dial generally argues that

California state and federal courts have declined to certify

classes “where there is no common method for proving that a class

member was exposed to an alleged misrepresentation, or that the

exposure factored into the individual’s decision to purchase the

product.” (Def.’s Br. in Opp. to Class Certification (document

no. 86) at p. 17.) This action, however, is unlike the cases

upon which Dial relies, like Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666

F.3d 581, 595 (9th Cir. 2012), where the court denied

certification largely because “it is likely that many class

members were never exposed to the allegedly misleading

advertisements, insofar as advertising of the challenged system

was very limited.” See also Pfizer Inc. v. Superior Court, 182

Cal. App. 4th 622, 631-32 (Cal. App. Ct. 2010); Sevidal v. Target

Corp., 189 Cal. App. 4th 905, 926 (Cal. App. Ct. 2010). Here,

each Dial Complete consumer was directly exposed to the purported

misrepresentations: they were printed on the packaging of each

44 and every bottle of Dial Complete sold.12 Therefore, Dial’s

argument lacks merit.

1. Consumer Protection Claims

“Courts generally consider claims under California's Unfair

Competition Law (“UCL”), False Advertising Law (“FAL”) and

Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) together.” In re ConAgra

Foods, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d at 982-83. “Each statute allows

plaintiffs to establish materiality and reliance (i.e., causation

and injury) by showing that a reasonable person would have

considered the defendant's representation material.” Id.13

12 Dial correctly points out that it made different specific claims about Dial Complete at different points in time. (See Def.’s Br. in Opp. to Class Certification (document no. 86) at p. 15.) However, that the exact language Dial used to promote Dial Complete was modified over the years does not alter the fact that the message Dial conveyed about Dial Complete was uniform and consistent: that Dial Complete provided a greater health benefit to consumers than ordinary liquid hand soap. And, that allegedly deceptive message is at the core of plaintiffs’ claims. That the allegedly deceptive message was worded slightly differently over a period of years does not preclude a finding that common issues predominate. Cf. In re NJOY, Inc. Consumer Class Action Litig., No. CV1400428MMMJEMX, 2015 WL 4881091, at *34 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2015) (“Assuming the advertisements were materially misleading, and conveyed a safety message, the fact that they were worded differently does not preclude a finding that materiality can be proved on a classwide basis.”). 13 Dial’s reliance on Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 47-48 (Cal. 2d DCA 2009), is misplaced. Subsequent decisions interpreting California’s UCL have stated: “To the extent the court of appeal’s decision in Cohen might be read to require individualized evidence of class members’ reliance, it is inconsistent with [the California Supreme Court’s decision in] In re Tobacco II cases, [46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009)].” Greenwood v.

45 “A misrepresentation is material if ‘a reasonable man would

attach importance to its existence or nonexistence’ in deciding

whether to engage in the conduct that caused his injury.” In re

Celexa & Lexapro Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. CIV.A.

10 10154 NMG, 2014 WL 3908126, at *7 (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 2014)

(quoting In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 327 (2009))

(additional citations omitted). “Therefore, the determination of

materiality, and thus reliance, is determined using objective

criteria that apply to the entire class and do not require

individualized determination.” McCrary, 2014 WL 1779243, at *14.

Dial argues that it is improper to presume that the

challenged claims were material to consumers because individuals

take into account numerous factors when buying hand soaps. (See

Def.’s Br. in Opp. to Class Certification (document no. 86) at

p. 13.) For example, Dial argues, many consumers purchased Dial

Complete because of its “foaming, fragrance, bottle design or any

other product features.” (Def.’s Surreply in Opp. to Class

Certification (document no. 175) at p. 8.) As support, Dial

points to consumer research that “shows that many consumers do

not read soap packaging or are unfamiliar with Dial Complete’s

Compucredit Corp., No. CIV. 08 04878 CW, 2010 WL 4807095, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010).

46 labeling claims.” (Def.’s Br. in Opp. to Class Certification

(document no. 86) at p. 13.)

As the court has previously stated, the challenged claims

were printed on the label of each and every Dial Complete bottle

sold. Those claims consistently asserted that Dial Complete was

more effective than ordinary liquid hand soap. That message —

that Dial Complete would “[p]rotect[] your family better than

ordinary liquid hand soap”14 — is the message that Dial intended

to convey to consumers.15 Dial would not have chosen to promote

Dial Complete’s purported effectiveness if Dial did not believe

that claim was a material selling point, one to which a

reasonable buyer would attach importance when purchasing soap.

See Beck-Ellman v. Kaz USA, Inc., 283 F.R.D. 558, 568 (S.D. Cal.

2012) (“For the purposes of class certification, it is sufficient

that the alleged material omission was part of a common

advertising scheme to which the entire class was exposed.”) For

this reason, the court finds that the evidence in the record is

sufficient to support a finding that the challenged claims were

14 See, e.g., Pl.’s Motion for Class Certification, Exh. 3 (document no. 58-2). 15 See Pl.’s Motion for Class Certification (document no. 57), Exh. 13 (Sommer Deposition at 229:14-23) (indicating that Dial is “trying to – convey, because it’s a claim that no other product is making, [that] we kill a lot of germs and this is a higher level than other products . . . It’s a point of difference with this product.”).

47 material, and that individualized evidence is therefore not

required. Plaintiffs’ California consumer protection claims are

subject to classwide proof.

2. Breach of Express Warranty (Cal. Comm. Code § 2313)

To prevail on a breach of express warranty claim under

California law, a plaintiff need not prove reliance on specific

promises or representations. In re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 90

F. Supp. 3d at 984. California courts have found breach of

express warranty claims appropriate for class treatment where

“whether defendant misrepresented its product and whether such

misrepresentations breached warranties are issues common to

members of the class.” Id. at 985. Class treatment is

appropriate if plaintiffs can demonstrate the materiality of the

alleged misrepresentation. Id.

Having previously determined that the evidence in the record

is sufficient to support a finding that the challenged claims

were material, the court concludes that plaintiffs’ breach of

express warranty claim are capable of classwide proof.

3. Breach of Implied Warranty (Cal. Comm. Code § 2314)

While neither party raises the issue, an action for breach

of an implied warranty under California law requires that the

48 plaintiff be in vertical privity with the defendant. Allen v.

Hyland’s Inc., 300 F.R.D. 643, 669 (C.D. Cal. 2014); see also In

re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d at 986-87. The Ninth

Circuit has recognized an exception to that privity requirement

where the purchaser of a product relied on representations made

by the manufacturer in “written labels or advertisements,”

Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir.

2008), but the exception is seemingly applicable only to express

warranties. See Allen, 300 F.R.D at 669, n.24 (relying on Burr

v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 696 (1954)).

Because each member of the California class would need to

establish vertical privity with Dial in order to prove an implied

warranty claim, individual issues would predominate.16

Therefore, certification of a class to pursue this claim is not

appropriate.

[I]n California, there is not a standalone cause of action for ‘unjust enrichment,’ which is synonymous with ‘restitution.’ However, unjust enrichment and restitution are not irrelevant in California law. Rather, they describe the theory underlying a claim that a defendant has been unjustly conferred a benefit

16 “A buyer and seller stand in privity if they are in adjoining links of the distribution chain.” Clemens, 534 F.3d at 1023 (citing Osborne v. Subaru of Am. Inc., 198 Cal. App. 3d 646, 656 n.6 (Cal. App. Ct. 1988)).

49 through mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. The return of that benefit is the remedy typically sought in a quasi-contract cause of action. When a plaintiff alleges unjust enrichment, a court may construe the cause of action as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution.

Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 762 (9th Cir.

2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A plaintiff

seeking to recover restitution damages must demonstrate a

defendant's (1) receipt of a benefit; and (2) unjust retention of

the benefit at the expense of another. Cartwright v. Viking

Indus., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-02159FCDEFB, 2009 WL 2982887, at *13

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009).

To be sure, some courts interpreting these requirements have

found that unjust enrichment claims are capable of class-wide

proof, reasoning that these claims “require common proof of the

defendant’s conduct and raise the same legal issues for all class

members.” Beck-Ellman v. Kaz USA, Inc., 283 F.R.D. at 568; see

also Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 505 (S.D. Cal. 2013).

But, as the Ninth Circuit stated in Berger v. Home Depot USA,

Inc., unjust enrichment “does not turn merely on the transfer of

money or other benefits from one party to another – it requires

injustice.” 741 F.3d 1061, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding

district court’s denial of class certification on unjust

enrichment claim) (citing Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572

50 F.3d 677, 684 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The fact that one person benefits

another is not, by itself, sufficient to require restitution.

The person receiving the benefit is required to make restitution

only if the circumstances are such that, as between the two

individuals, it is unjust for the person to retain it.”)).

In light of that requirement, the court is not persuaded

that plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim can be established by

common proof. Plaintiffs have defined the purported class in

such a way that, by definition, it includes consumers with a

variety of motivations for purchasing Dial Complete. Those

varying motivations for purchase do not defeat predominance when

the claim asserted is capable of generalized proof. But, an

“unjust enrichment” claim would typically require a factual

inquiry into the circumstances of each purchase to determine

whether it would be “unjust” for the defendant to retain the

alleged benefit. See 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 5:60 (11th

ed.) (“The majority view is that unjust enrichment claims usually

are not amenable to class treatment because the claim requires

evaluation of the individual circumstances of each claimant to

determine whether a benefit was conferred on defendant and

whether the circumstances surrounding each transaction would make

it inequitable for the Defendant to fail to return the benefit to

each claimant.”). Given the necessity for individualized

51 inquiries into motivations and purchasing decisions, as well as

the benefit defendant derived by the buyer (e.g., effective use

of the soap, purchased at a substantial discount) of each class

member, the court concludes that the California plaintiffs’

unjust enrichment claim is incapable of classwide proof.

FLORIDA

The Florida plaintiffs seek certification for claims based

on the following: Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices

Act (Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1), et seq.) (“FDUTPA”), the Florida

Misleading Advertising Statute, (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 817.41 et

seq.), breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty,

and unjust enrichment.

(a) FDUTPA

Under Florida law, a plaintiff “need not prove reliance on

the allegedly false statement to recover damages under the

FDUTPA, but rather a plaintiff must simply prove than an

objective reasonable person would have been deceived.”

Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 635 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir.

2011); see also Randolph v. J.M. Smucker Co., 303 F.R.D. 679, 692

(S.D. Fla. 2014) (stating that a “plaintiff need not demonstrate

actual reliance in order to prove causation,” but instead “that

52 the alleged practice was likely to deceive a consumer acting

reasonably in the same circumstances.”).

However, “some Florida courts have required that plaintiffs

present individualized proof to satisfy the FDUTPA’s causation

element.” In re Glaceau Vitaminwater Mktg. & Sales Practice

Litig., No. 11-CV-00925 DLI RML, 2013 WL 3490349, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.

July 10, 2013) (collecting cases); see also In re Sears, Roebuck

& Co. Tools Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 05 C 4742, 2012

WL 1015806, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2012) (“[The Florida

Supreme Court] has not spoken on the issue of the interaction

between the reliance and causation elements of an FDUTPA claim,

but Florida appellate courts have. Those decisions control,

unless there are persuasive indications that the Florida Supreme

Court would decide the issue differently. . . . Although there

is conflicting precedent in the Florida state appellate courts

. . ., the great weight of recent authority in those courts, as

set forth above, supports Sears's position and holds that

causation typically requires individualized proof.”). However,

as the Sixth Circuit recently stated in Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble

Co., where the defendant has made a “generally uniform material

misrepresentation to the entire class,” courts have held that

plaintiffs do not need to show individualized causation. 799

F.3d 497, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2015) (interpreting Florida law).

53 Since there can be no real question that Dial made a purported

“generally uniform material misrepresentation,” the court

concludes that plaintiffs’ FDUTPA’s claim is capable of classwide

proof.

(b) Florida Misleading Advertising Statute

Plaintiffs seeking to recover under Florida’s Misleading

Advertising Statute must “prove each of the elements of common

law fraud.” Kaser v. Swann, 141 F.R.D. 337, 341 (M.D. Fl.

(1991). Courts have held that: “[p]laintiffs are not entitled to

a presumption of fraud; each plaintiff must show how he has been

defrauded.” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the court finds

that this claim is not capable of classwide proof.

2. Breach of Express Warranty (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 672.313)

The weight of authority seems to suggest that an express

warranty claim under Florida law is not capable of classwide

proof. Indeed, in the one Florida case cited by plaintiffs that

involves an express warranty claim, Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills,

Inc., the court found that the express warranty claim was not

capable of classwide proof:

Under Florida law, only an “affirmation of fact or promise” that “becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty.” Fla. Stat. § 672.313(1)(a). General Mills' promise that Yo-Plus helps improve digestive health, therefore, could only

54 create an express warranty if that “affirmation of fact or promise” was “part of the basis” that caused a consumer to purchase Yo-Plus. Put differently, there is no express warranty that could be breached unless a plaintiff actually relied on General Mills' promises about Yo-Plus in reaching a decision to purchase it. Accordingly, each plaintiff must show that General Mills' alleged misrepresentations concerning Yo-Plus' digestive health benefits was ‘part of the basis’ in his or her decision to buy Yo-Plus.

263 F.R.D. 687, 695 (S.D. Fla. 2010), vacated on other grounds,

635 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2011). Other courts have held

similarly. See, e.g., City of St. Petersburg v. Total

Containment, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 630, 639-40 (S.D. Fla. 2010)

(declining to certify express warranty claim and stating:

“Plaintiffs' claims for breach of express warranty . . . would

require putative class members to present a substantial amount of

individualized proof in order to establish the elements of their

claims. In order to establish liability for a breach of express

warranty claim, Plaintiffs need to establish both causation and

damages. See McCraney v. Ford Motor Co., 282 So.2d 878, 878

(Fla. Ct. App. (1st Dist.) 1973).”). Consistently with that

authority, the court declines to certify the Florida plaintiff’s

express warranty claim.

3. Breach of Implied Warranty (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 672.314)

Florida courts have held that proof of individual reliance

is necessary to establish a breach of implied warranty as well.

55 Cohen v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 617, 624 (S.D. Fl.

2008) (finding that magistrate judge properly declined to certify

plaintiff’s breach of implied warranty claim because “reliance is

a necessary element of a breach of implied warranties claim” and

therefore each putative class member would have to show reliance

on an individualized basis) (citing Light v. Weldarc Co., 569

So.2d 1302, 1305 (Fla. Ct. App. (5th Dist.) 1990)).17 Plaintiffs

fail to provide any authority to the contrary. In light of the

applicable precedent and because plaintiffs bear the burden of

demonstrating the predominance of common questions, the court

finds that the Florida plaintiffs’ breach of implied warranty

claim is incapable of classwide proof.

17 Additionally, while neither party addresses the point, Florida courts likely require privity of contract between the parties for a breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim. See Smith v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 663 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“The Florida Supreme Court has clarified the law in West [v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 226 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976),] and Kramer v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 520 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1988), in cases involving implied warranty claims. See David v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 629 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1321-23 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (containing a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of implied warranty claims under Florida law). It is now well-settled that, barring certain exceptions, ‘[u]nder Florida law, a plaintiff cannot recover economic losses for breach of implied warranty in the absence of privity.’ Mesa v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 904 So.2d 450, 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).”); see also David, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 1323. But the court having determined that the plaintiffs’ breach of implied warranty claim is incapable of classwide proof for other reasons, the court need not decide this issue.

56 4. Unjust Enrichment

“In Florida, the essential elements of a claim for unjust

enrichment are: (1) a benefit conferred upon a defendant by the

plaintiff, (2) the defendant's appreciation of the benefit, and

(3) the defendant's acceptance and retention of the benefit under

circumstances that make it inequitable for him to retain it

without paying the value thereof.” Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,

564 F.3d 1256, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009).

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Florida

law, has stated: “common questions will rarely, if ever,

predominate an unjust enrichment claim, the resolution of which

turns on individualized facts.” Vega, 564 F.3d at 1274. “That

is because a claim for unjust enrichment requires the court to

assess whether the individual circumstances of each particular

claim would result in inequity. In this case, plaintiffs would

each need to present evidence that they individually conferred a

benefit upon one of the Defendants and that the circumstances

surrounding that transaction would make it inequitable for that

Defendant to fail to return the benefit to that Plaintiff.” City

of St. Petersburg v. Total Containment, Inc., 265 F.R.D. at 640.

That is, whether it would be inequitable for Dial to retain the

revenue received from a particular buyer turns on the buyer’s

57 individual motivation, circumstances, and even individualized

benefits derived from using the soap.

Nevertheless, some Florida courts have determined that

common questions can predominate in unjust enrichment claims when

the “defendant’s conduct is the same as to all class members of

the putative class.” James D. Hinson Elec. Contracting Co. v.

BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 275 F.R.D. 638, 647 (M.D.

Fla. 2011); see also County of Monroe, Florida v. Priceline.com,

Inc., 265 F.R.D. 659, 671 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Arvida/JMB Partners

v. Council of Villages, Inc., 733 So.2d 1026, 1031 (Fla. Ct. App.

(4th Dist.) 1999). As the court in County of Monroe, 265 F.R.D.

at 671, explained, “the Eleventh Circuit's underlying concern is

that unjust enrichment claims typically require individualized

inquiries into the equities of each class member's interaction

with each defendant. This concern, however, is not present here,

[where] it is undisputed that Defendants' business operations are

the same as to all members of the putative class.”

To be sure, Dial’s “alleged misconduct was common to all

class members.” In re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d at

994. Nevertheless, as the ConAgra court observed:

[C]ases in which plaintiffs assert that they were misled by a misrepresentation in advertising or on a product label and that they purchased a product they

58 otherwise would not have are the type that require individualized inquiries similar to those discussed by the Vega court. Where individualized inquiries concerning the reasons class members purchased a product are required, Florida courts find that those inquiries predominate over common questions, and that class certification is inappropriate.

Id. (analyzing cases). So it is in this case. Accordingly, the

court concludes that the Florida plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment

claim is not capable of classwide proof.

ILLINOIS

The Illinois plaintiffs seek certification for the following

claims: Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices

Act, breach of express warranty, and unjust enrichment.

1. Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505, et seq.)

A claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive

Business Practices Act (“ICFA”) requires: “(1) a deceptive act or

practice by the defendant, (2) the defendant's intent that the

plaintiff rely on the deception, (3) the occurrence of the

deception in a course of conduct involving trade or commerce, and

(4) actual damage to the plaintiff that is (5) a result of the

deception.” Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d at 514

(citing De Bouse v. Bayer AG, 922 N.E.2d 309, 313 (Ill. App. Ct.

2009). “When the deceptive act alleged is a misrepresentation,

59 that misrepresentation must be ‘material’ [which is] established

by applying a reasonable person standard.” Id. (internal

citations omitted). While proof of individual reliance is not

required to establish an ICFA claim, to establish the last two

elements of the claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the

“allegedly deceptive act proximately caused any damages suffered

by the plaintiff.” Id.

However, “where the representation being challenged was made

to all putative class members, Illinois courts have concluded

that causation is susceptible of classwide proof and that

individualized inquiries concerning causation do not predominate

if plaintiffs are able to adduce sufficient evidence that the

representation was material.” Id. (citing In re ConAgra Foods,

90 F. Supp. 3d at 997 (collecting cases)).

Because the court previously determined that the evidence in

the record is sufficient to support a finding of materiality, the

plaintiffs’ ICFA claim is capable of classwide proof.

2. Breach of Express Warranty (810 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2- 313)

To state a claim for breach of warranty under Illinois law,

“the buyer must allege that the seller made: (1) an affirmation

of fact or promise made to the plaintiff; (2) relating to the

60 goods; (3) which becomes part of the basis of the bargain; and

(4) guaranteeing that the goods will conform to the affirmation

or promise.” Intl. Bd. of Teamsters Local 734 Health & Welfare

Trust Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 656, 664

(N.D. Ill. 1998) aff'd sub nom. Intl. Bd. of Teamsters, Local 734

Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 196 F.3d 818

(7th Cir. 1999).

Illinois courts have held that a seller’s affirmations and

promises relating to goods create a rebuttable presumption of

reliance by a buyer. In re General Motors Corp. Dex-Cool

Products Liability Litig., 241 F.R.D. 305, 320 (S.D. Ill. 2007).

Therefore, a seller’s representations are presumed to be part of

the basis of the bargain, regardless of the buyer’s reliance,

unless the seller can show otherwise by affirmative proof. See

Felled v. Singleton, 705 N.E.2d 930, 934 (Ill. Ct. App. 1999)

(holding that representations made during the bargaining process

for used cars are presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain

unless seller can demonstrate that they are not); Crest Container

Corp. v. R.H. Bishop Co., 445 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982)

(“Such affirmations made during a bargain become a basis of the

bargain unless clear affirmative proof shows otherwise.”).

61 Such a rebuttable presumption makes the claim incapable of

classwide proof, since “individual issues of reliance will still

need to be litigated.” Mowbray v. Waste Management Holdings,

Inc., 189 F.R.D. 194, 198 (D. Mass. 1999) (interpreting Illinois

law). Therefore, the court declines to certify the Illinois

plaintiff’s breach of express warranty claim.

3. Unjust Enrichment

To state a claim for unjust enrichment under Illinois law, a

plaintiff must allege (1) the defendant unjustly retained a

benefit to the plaintiff’s detriment; and (2) the defendant’s

retention of the benefit violates fundamental principles of

justice, equity, and good conscience. In re ConAgra Foods, Inc.,

90 F. Supp. 3d at 1000 (citing Drury v. County of McLean, 89 Ill.

2d 417, 425-26 (1982) and Kenneke v. First National Bank, 65 Ill.

App. 3d 10, 12 (1978)).

In Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir.

2011), the Seventh Circuit stated: “if an unjust enrichment claim

rests on the same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then

the unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related claim

and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall with the

related claim.” And, “[i]n cases where plaintiffs plead ICFA and

unjust enrichment claims based on the same deceptive and/or

62 fraudulent conduct, Illinois courts have applied the same

predominance analysis to both claims.” In re ConAgra Foods, 90

F. Supp. 3d at 1000.

However, such an approach ignores the fact that proving

unjust enrichment — by its very elements — requires consideration

of individual equities to determine whether it would be unjust

for Dial to retain any benefit conferred upon it in exchange for

the soap it sold. Stated another way, an ICFA claim may be

capable of classwide proof because the cause of action does not

require proof of individual reliance. But, an unjust enrichment

claim does require additional proof of inequity – and that is not

susceptible to proof on a classwide basis. As discussed above in

the context of the California plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment

claim, the problem is largely a function of how plaintiffs have

defined the class. As defined, the purported class would

include, for example, consumers who would not have acted any

differently had they known that Dial Complete was not more

effective than ordinary hand soap. See Cleary, 656 F.3d at 519-

520 (upholding dismissal of unjust enrichment claim because

plaintiffs’ theory of recovery could not establish that

defendants’ retention of the revenue paid by a consumer was to

each consumer’s detriment). For some consumers, “the defendants’

retention of the [purported benefit] is not a detriment to them.”

63 Id. at 519.18 Thus, a class member’s right to recover for unjust

enrichment would necessarily require individualized inquiry into

the equities, making the Illinois plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment

claim incapable of classwide proof.

LOUISIANA

The Louisiana plaintiffs seek certification for the

following claims: breach of express warranty, redhibition

(implied warranty), and unjust enrichment.

1. Breach of Express Warranty (La. R. § 9:2800.51, et seq.)

To prove an express warranty claim under the Louisiana

Products Liability Act (“LPLA”), La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.51 et

seq., a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the manufacturer made

an express warranty regarding the product; (2) the plaintiff was

induced to use the product because of that warranty; (3) the

product failed to conform to that express warranty; and (4) the

plaintiff’s damage was proximately caused because the express

warranty was untrue. Caboni v. General Motors Corp., 278 F.3d

448, 452 (5th Cir. 2002).

18 In Cleary, 656 F.3d at 519, the Seventh Circuit did state that defendants’ continued retention of money could conceivably be to the plaintiffs’ detriment in situations, like here, where plaintiffs have alleged that “revenue was obtained by deceiving the plaintiffs.” However, the statement was made in dicta, and does not alter the court’s analysis.

64 Dial does not argue that Louisiana law requires proof of

reliance for an LPLA claim, but contends that the statute

requires each putative class member to establish that Dial’s

actions were a proximate cause of their purported injury. (See

Def.’s Opp. to Class Certification, Appendix 2 at p. 10.) In

support of that proposition, Dial cites to Brandner v. Abbott

Labs., Inc., No. CIV.A. 10-3242, 2012 WL 195540, at *4 (E.D. La.

Jan. 23, 2012), where the court stated that an LPLA claim

requires that “each putative class member must establish that

[defendant’s] actions were a proximate cause of his or her

injury.”

Plaintiffs fail to provide any contrary authority, or to

even meaningfully distinguish Brandner.19 (See Pls.’ Reply in

Supp. of Class Cert., Exh. 2 at p. 10.) Because it is the

plaintiffs’ burden as the proponents of class certification to

19 Brandner involved a motion for class certification in connection with the defendant’s nationwide recall of all Similac powdered infant formula produced at a facility where beetles were observed in a batch of finished product. Brandner, 2012 WL 195540, at *1. The court held that to establish proximate cause, the plaintiff would be required to establish proof of medical causation, which included both general causation and specific causation. Id. at *4. The latter, the court found, would require a highly individualized inquiry, thus defeating the purpose of class certification. Id. In the court’s view, Brander is distinguishable. However, because the plaintiffs fail to point the court to any authority that supports their argument and because the court’s own research has not found any persuasive authority, the point is forfeited and the court declines to certify the Louisiana breach of express warranty claim.

65 demonstrate the predominance of common questions, and because

they have failed to carry that burden — indeed, have forfeited

the argument by failing to fully brief it — the court declines to

certify the Louisiana plaintiffs’ breach of express warranty

2. Breach of Implied Warranty (La. Civ. Code Art. 2475, 2520)

Louisiana courts have held that redhibition claims are

capable of classwide proof. For example, in Mire v. EatelCorp.,

a purported class action filed on behalf of all consumers who had

purchased a particular phone and had not been adequately informed

by the defendant that the phone could only be used on the

defendant’s network, the defendant argued on appeal that the

trial court had improperly certified the plaintiffs’ redhibition

claim because it involved subjective issues of individual

knowledge and reliance. 849 So.2d 608, 613 (La. Ct. App. 1st

Cir. 2003). The appellate court disagreed, stating: “the inquiry

under a redhibition claim does not involve the buyer’s subjective

knowledge or reliance, but rather an objective inquiry into the

deficiency and whether it diminishes the product’s value or

renders it so inconvenient that the reasonable buyer would not

have purchased it had he known of the deficiency.” Id. at 614.20

20 Dial argues that individual issues will predominate because individual proof of causation is required. However, the

66 Louisiana case law on this topic is far from clear, however.

See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. CIV.A. 14-201-SDD,

2015 WL 1221560, at *3 (M.D. La. Mar. 17, 2015). Nevertheless,

the court finds Mire instructive and persuasive, and therefore

concludes that the plaintiffs’ redhibition claim is capable of

“Under Louisiana law, unjust enrichment has five elements:

(1) there must be an enrichment, (2) there must be an

impoverishment, (3) there must be a connection between the

enrichment and resulting impoverishment, (4) there must be an

absence of justification or cause for the enrichment and

impoverishment, and finally (5) the action will only be allowed

when there is no other remedy at law, i.e., the action is

subsidiary or corrective in nature.” Richard v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 559 F.3d 341, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

cases upon which Dial relies are distinguishable. In both Brandner v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 2012 WL 195540, at *9, and Welch v. Atlas Roofing Corp., No. CIV.A. 07-2711, 2007 WL 3245444, at *6 (E.D. La. Nov. 2, 2007), the plaintiffs could not establish that the products at issue were uniformly defective for all class members. And, at issue in Waters v. Bayer Corp., was an individual plaintiff’s failure to effectively establish the causation element of a redhibition claim, not whether causation could be effectively established on a classwide basis. No. 01- 1819, 2006 WL 725820, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2006).

67 Louisiana courts have held that, given the essential

elements of the cause of action, unjust enrichment claims are

incapable of classwide proof. See LeBlanc, 2015 WL 1221560, at

*4 (stating that determination of applicability of unjust

enrichment claim will require “a legal determination of which

class members have no other viable claim under the law. For

those individuals able to assert a claim of unjust enrichment,

individualized proof of the nature, extent, and degree of

impoverishment or damage is related to the alleged enrichment.”)

(citing Mouton v. State, 525 So.2d 1136, 1142 (La. Ct. App.

1988)); see also Bauer v. Dean Morris, L.L.P., No. CIV.A.

08-5013, 2011 WL 3924963, at *6 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2011)

(“plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment do not present common

issues of liability. . . . Of the five requisites for liability,

only the element of ‘no other available remedy at law’ is

susceptible to common analysis and resolution. The other

elements require assessments of the specific facts and

circumstances of each plaintiff's claim which would mandate a

series of mini-trials, a necessity which class action litigation

was designed to avert.”).

Because the essential elements of the Louisiana plaintiff’s

unjust enrichment claim do not lend themselves to classwide

proof, certification of that claim is not appropriate.

68 MISSOURI

The Missouri plaintiffs seek certification for the following

claims: Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, breach of express

warranty, breach of implied warranty, and unjust enrichment.

1. Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (Mo. Ann. Stat. § 407.020 et seq.)

The Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”)

“specifically authorizes class actions where an unlawful practice

has caused similar injury to numerous other persons.” Hope v.

Nissan N. Am., Inc., 353 S.W.3d 68, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)

(citations omitted). As stated by the court in Hope, “[t]he fact

that class actions are specifically provided for by statute does

not necessarily mean MMPA class actions should be certified; nor

does public policy suggest otherwise. However, the fact that the

MMPA specifically authorizes class actions is pertinent to

consideration of class certification motions.” 353 S.W.3d at 81-

82.

Dial does not argue that the MMPA requires individual proof

of reliance, but does argue that it requires individual proof of

causation, relying on Plubell v. Merck & Co., Inc., 289 S.W.3d

707, 714, (Mo. App. Ct. 2009). Plubell, however, does not stand

for the cited proposition. In Plubell, the defendant argued that

each plaintiff would be required to show (1) causation – that is

69 that he or she would not have used the product had the risks been

known, and (2) the amount that each plaintiff would have paid for

an alternative product. The court rejected both of those

arguments. First, the court found that “class members are not

individually required to show what they would or would not have

done had the product not been misrepresented and the risks

known.” Id. at 714. Second, the court found that the plaintiffs

were not required to prove “‘loss’ by individually showing the

cost of alternative therapy,” and that, by stating that the

product was worth less than the product as represented, “they

stated an objectively ascertainable loss under the MMPA using the

benefit-of-the-bargain rule.” Id. at 715.21

Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiffs’ MMPA claim

is capable of classwide proof.

21 Dial also relies upon In re BPA Liability Litig., but that case does not support its position either. No. 08-1967-MD-W-ODS, 2011 WL 6740338, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 22, 2011). The court in In re BPA denied certification of the plaintiffs’ MMPA claim because the plaintiffs were unable to establish that materiality could be proven on a classwide basis. Id. (“just because materiality is an objective inquiry does not mean it is to be determined in a vacuum, especially when the undisclosed fact is a scientific debate or controversy.”). Here, in contrast, the evidence in the record is sufficient to support a finding that the challenged claims were material.

70 2. Breach of Express Warranty (Mo. Rev. Stat. §400.2-313)

Missouri courts have held that breach of express warranty

claims are not capable of classwide proof because these claims

require proof that each individual class member knew of and

relied on the warranty. See, e.g., Hope v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.,

353 S.W.3d at 86 (“Because each class member's claim for breach

of express warranty would rely on an individual determination of

whether they had in fact read or seen the marketing materials,

brochures, catalogs, and advertisements that the Plaintiffs

purport were a material factor in inducing each FX Vehicle owner

into purchasing the car, the claims include an individual issue

that predominates over the common issue of mere ownership.”); see

also Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 97

(W.D. Mo. 1997 (“claims that Defendant breached expressed

warranties are permeated with individual issues because these

claims require proof that purchasers were induced to make

purchases based on affirmative representations”). Plaintiffs

fail to point to any Missouri authority to the contrary. The

court declines to certify the Missouri plaintiffs’ breach of

3. Breach of Implied Warranty (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-314)

“To prove a claim for breach of implied warranty of

merchantability in Missouri, a plaintiff must show: (1) that a

71 merchant sold goods, (2) which were not ‘merchantable’ at the

time of the sale, (3) injury and damages to the plaintiff or his

property (4) which were caused proximately or in fact by the

defective nature of the goods, and (5) notice to the seller of

the injury.” Hope, 353 S.W.3d at 90 (citation omitted).

Whether implied warranty claims are suitable for classwide

proof under Missouri law is unclear. See Hope, 353 S.W.3d at 91-

92 (reversing trial court’s decision to certify implied warranty

claim, and stating: “[c]lass membership would require individual

determinations of whether each putative class member actually

experienced manifestation of the . . . defect, so as to be able

to maintain a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of

merchantability, and then subsequently, individual inquiries into

the extent of damage sustained, whether the alleged defect was

the cause in fact or proximate cause of the damage sustained, and

finally whether each individual class member notified

[defendant]. The overwhelming requirement of individual

determinations is fatal to a showing of predominance of common

questions.”); but see Dale v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 204 S.W.3d

151, 176-77 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (certifying implied warranty

claim and stating, ”the appellant claims that a class action

cannot be maintained because the core question of whether a

particular . . . vehicle is ‘not merchantable’ cannot be made on

72 a class-wide basis. This, of course, goes to the issue of

whether the respondent can make a submissible case at trial . . .

as to this particular proof element. That, however, is not an

issue in determining the propriety of a class action.”).

The plaintiffs make no effort to distinguish the conflicting

authority, or, indeed, to even cite to a case supporting their

argument that their claim is capable of classwide proof. Because

the burden to show predominance is the plaintiff’s – and, indeed,

plaintiffs have forfeited the point by failing to adequately

brief it – the court declines to certify the Missouri plaintiff’s

breach of implied warranty claim.

In order to state a claim for unjust enrichment, plaintiffs

must establish: “‘(1) that the defendant was enriched by the

receipt of a benefit; (2) that the enrichment was at the expense

of the plaintiff; and (3) that it would be unjust to allow the

defendant to retain the benefit.’” Garrett v. Cassity, No.

4:09CV01252 ERW, 2011 WL 3235633, at *9 (E.D. Mo. July 28, 2011)

(quoting Title Partners Agency, LLC v. Devisees of Last Will &

Testament of M. Sharon Dorsey, 334 S.W.3d 584, 588 (Mo. Ct. App.

2011).

73 There is some authority supporting plaintiffs’ proposition

that unjust enrichment claims under Missouri law are capable of

classwide proof. See, e.g., Hale v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 231

S.W.3d 215, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). However, the court’s view

is in line with the analysis of the claim performed by the

district court in In re BPA Liability Litig., 276 F.R.D. 336, 344

(W.D. Mo. 2011).

In that case, the plaintiffs argued that a determination as

to whether defendants’ retention of the benefits conferred by

plaintiffs was unjust would not be an individualized inquiry, “as

each member purchased or used the . . . products and Defendants’

omissions were perpetrated in a standardized manner.” The

district court disagreed, stating: “[a]s a general proposition,

determining whether a defendant's retention of the benefit (i.e.,

the purchase price for the goods) is ‘unjust’ requires

considering what a particular plaintiff received in exchange for

bestowing that benefit. . . . [I]f a person completely used a

product without encountering ill-effects or other difficulties

and can only declare after the fact that s/he would not have

purchased the goods had the truth been known, such a person may

not have ‘unjustly’ enriched the seller.” 276 F.R.D. at 344.

That analysis is not only consistent with the court’s view, but

also with the majority of courts to have considered this

74 particular issue. See 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 5:60 (11th

ed.) (discussed supra).

Thus, because unjust enrichment would require an

individualized inquiry as to whether Dial unjustly retained a

benefit at the expense of each plaintiff, plaintiffs’ unjust

enrichment claim is incapable of classwide proof.

OHIO

The Ohio plaintiffs seek certification for the following

claims: Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, Ohio Deceptive Trade

Practices Act, breach of express warranty, breach of implied

warranty, and unjust enrichment.

(a) Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act

Courts have found Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act claims

capable of classwide proof. See In re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 90

F. Supp. 3d at 1011-1012 (analyzing and collecting authority, and

stating: “A classwide inference of reliance is permitted where

defendant’s fraudulent or deceptive conduct is common to all

consumers.”). “Omissions are actionable under the OCSPA if they

‘concern a matter that is or is likely to be material to a

consumer's decision to purchase the product or service

75 involved.’” In re Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d

801, 871 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (quoting Temple v. Fleetwood

Enterprises, Inc., 133 Fed. Appx. 254, 265 (6th Cir. 2005)).

The court having previously determined that there is

sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that the

“alleged or misrepresented fact[s] at issue would likely have

been material to a consumer’s decision to purchase” Dial

Complete, In re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d at 1012, it

also finds that plaintiffs’ Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act

claim is capable of classwide proof.

(b) Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act

While neither party briefed (or even raised) the issue, the

weight of authority in the Northern District of Ohio — where the

Ohio plaintiffs filed suit — supports the proposition that

consumers lack standing to file suits under the Ohio Deceptive

Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”).22 See Leonard v. Abbott Labs.,

Inc., No. 10-CV-4676 ADS WDW, 2012 WL 764199, at *14 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 5, 2012) (“courts in the Northern District of Ohio have held

22 “[W]e are required to address the issue [of standing] . . . even if the parties fail to raise the issue before us. The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, and standing is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines.” United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995).

76 that consumers lack standing under the ODTPA [b]ecause the Lanham

Act denies standing to consumers, and Ohio courts apply the same

analysis applicable to the Lanham Act to ODTPA claims.”)

(citations and quotations omitted); Phillips v. Philip Morris

Companies Inc., 290 F.R.D. 476, 482 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (“The vast

majority of federal courts and all lower state courts to address

the issue have concluded that relief under the DTPA is not

available to consumers.”) (collecting cases); McKinney v. Bayer

Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 733, 749 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (noting split

between courts in the Northern District of Ohio and the Southern

District of Ohio on the question of who has standing to file suit

under the ODTPA).

Because the case is pending in the Northern District of Ohio

and will return there for trial, the court declines to certify

the plaintiffs’ DTPA claim at this time. Instead, the court

orders the plaintiffs to show cause why their DTPA claim should

not be dismissed for lack of standing pursuant to the briefing

schedule set out below.

2. Breach of Express Warranty (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1302.26)

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1302.26 states that “[e]xpress

warranties by the seller are created as follows: (1) Any

affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer

77 which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the

bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform

to the affirmation or promise[;] (2) Any description of the goods

which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express

warranty that the goods shall conform to the description[;]

(3) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the

bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods

shall conform to the sample or model.”

Ohio courts have found express warranty claims capable of

classwide proof. For example, in Godec v. Bayer Corp., No. 10-

CV-224, 2011 WL 5513202, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 11, 2011), the

plaintiff filed a purported class action, claiming a breach of

express warranty for alleged misrepresentations Bayer made by

promoting certain men’s vitamins. The court noted that the

vitamin packaging contained similar statements, which meant that

the packaging could be proved on a classwide basis and,

therefore, whether the packaging contained “‘descriptions of the

goods’ or ‘affirmations of fact or promise made by [Bayer] to the

[class] which relate[] to the goods’ can also be proved on a

classwide basis.” Id. at *3 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann.

§ 1302.26). The court further found that whether “any of those

promises, statements of fact or descriptions of the goods became

part of the basis of the bargain” could also be proven on a

78 classwide basis because “when the representation is made during a

bargain, no particular reliance on such statements need be shown

in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement.” Id. at

3-4 (internal citations omitted). The court went on to state:

Of [course], rather than negotiate with individual consumers face-to-face, Bayer usually “bargain[s]” from afar. So it ships its products to retail outlets with its offer to consumers printed right on the package, e.g., “60 TABLETS,” or “SUPPORTS PROSTATE HEALTH.” Thus, when a consumer selects a Bayer product from the shelf, carries it to the cashier, and pays for it, the consumer carries with him the written terms of his agreement with Bayer. Those terms become part of the basis of the bargain by virtue of their appearance [] during a bargain, not because of any individual consumer's reliance. Because this is true for every purchaser, and because the packaging was uniform across the class, whether the prostate-health message on the packaging gave rise to an express warranty is a common question that can be resolved with common evidence.

Id. at *5. The court finds that reasoning persuasive, and

therefore concludes that the plaintiffs’ express warranty claim

3. Breach of Implied Warranty (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1302.27)

While Dial does not make the argument, “[u]nder Ohio law,

privity of contract is generally a prerequisite to a claim for

breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.” McKinney v.

Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d at 756 (citing, inter alia, Curl v.

Volkswagon of Am., Inc., 871 N.E.2d 1141, 1147-48 (Ohio 2007) and

79 Flex Homes, Inc. v. Ritz-Craft Corp. of Mich., No. 07cv1005, 2008

WL 746669, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2008).); see also Cancino v.

Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., No. 3:04CV274, 2010 WL 2607251, at

*10 (S.D. Ohio June 24, 2010) (denying motion for class

certification on breach of implied warranty claim because of

privity requirement, and stating: “a fundamental, individualized

issue will have to be resolved with regard to each member of the

class — was that member of the class in privity of contract with

[the defendant] — before he or she could recover for breach of

contract or breach of implied warranty of merchantability.”);

Savett v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 12 CV 310, 2012 WL 3780451, at *10

(N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2012) (“Ohio law requires privity in order to

sustain a breach of implied warranty claim.”).23

There is some authority for the proposition that an

exception to the privity requirement exists where the purchaser

is the intended beneficiary of the manufacturer’s agreement with

the retailer/distributor. Bobb Forest Products, Inc. v. Morbark

Industries, Inc., 783 N.E.2d 560, 576 (Ohio Ct. App. (7th Dist.)

2002). However, the court finds the pertinent analysis set forth

in McKinney v. Bayer Corp. persuasive and concludes that the

exception does not apply here. 744 F. Supp. 2d at 756-58

23 Plaintiffs do not assert that their Ohio implied warranty claim sounds in anything but contract (e.g., tort).

80 (analyzing Ohio authority and declining to extend “the limited

privity exception articulated in Bobb Forest beyond the facts of

that case.”).

Because each member of the Ohio class would need to

establish vertical privity with Dial to prove an implied warranty

claim, individual issues would predominate. Certification of a

class to pursue this claim is therefore inappropriate.

For a plaintiff to state a claim for unjust enrichment, Ohio

courts seem to require privity between the parties, with a few

limited exceptions that are inapplicable here. See, e.g., Savett

v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 12 CV 310, 2012 WL 3780451, at *7 (N.D.

Ohio Aug. 31, 2012) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim where the

plaintiff purchased the allegedly defective product from a

retailer: “the Court finds that plaintiff fails to state a claim

against defendant . . . for unjust enrichment because plaintiff

does not allege that he conferred a direct benefit on this

defendant. Under Ohio law, indirect purchasers may not assert

unjust enrichment claims against a defendant without establishing

that the purchaser conferred a benefit on the defendant through

an economic transaction.”); see also In re ConAgra Foods Inc.,

908 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing

81 exceptions to privity requirement: “Ohio courts have found that

plaintiffs conferred a benefit on defendants absent privity of

contract in cases involving subcontractors, or sales to a

customer whose identity defendant knew and for whom it

specifically tailored the product. This case falls into neither

category. Plaintiffs purchased [product] from retailers, and did

not confer a direct economic benefit on ConAgra. . . .

Consequently, plaintiffs' Ohio unjust enrichment claim must be

dismissed.”) (internal citations omitted); Johnson v. Microsoft

Corp., 834 N.E.2d 791, 799 (Ohio 2005) (“The rule of law is that

an indirect purchaser cannot assert a common-law claim for

restitution and unjust enrichment against a defendant without

establishing that a benefit had been conferred upon that

defendant by the purchaser. The facts in this case demonstrate

that no economic transaction occurred between Johnson and

Microsoft, and, therefore, Johnson cannot establish that

Microsoft retained any benefit to which it is not justly

entitled.”); Bower v. Int'l Bus. Machines, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d

837, 844 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“Plaintiffs claim that IBM has

benefitted from their purchase of the Deskstars, but nowhere have

they alleged that they purchased the Deskstars directly from IBM.

Absent such an allegation, their Complaint is fatally

indefinite.”); Hoffer v. Cooper Wiring Devices, Inc., No.

106CV763, 2007 WL 1725317, at *4 (N.D. Ohio June 13, 2007)

82 (dismissing unjust enrichment claim despite plaintiff’s argument

that he had purchased product and therefore conferred a pecuniary

benefit through the “chain of sale:” “Ohio courts have not . . .

held that purchase of products within a ‘chain of sale’ is

sufficient to establish that a plaintiff has bestowed a benefit

on a defendant. Therefore, this Court finds Plaintiff's unjust

enrichment claim insufficient due to a lack of a factual

allegation of a benefit conferred on Defendant by Plaintiff.”).

In light of Ohio law’s requirement, the court concludes that

the Ohio plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim is incapable of

WISCONSIN

The Wisconsin plaintiffs seek certification for the

following claims: Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act and

unjust enrichment.

1. Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18, et seq.

Dial argues that the plaintiffs’ Wisconsin Deceptive Trade

Practices Act (“DTPA”) claim is incapable of classwide proof

because it requires an individual showing of causation. The

weight of authority suggests that Dial is correct.

83 As for the Wis. Stat. 100.18 claim, the elements are that the defendant made a representation to the public with intent to induce an obligation; the representation was untrue, deceptive, or misleading; and the representation caused a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff. Novell v. Migliaccio, 309 Wis. 2d 132, 149 (2008). Reasonable reliance is not an element of the claim. See id. However, the reasonableness of a plaintiff's actions in relying on the representation is a defense to the claim. Id. Whether a plaintiff's loss was caused by the misrepresentation depends on whether the plaintiff would have acted in its absence, and the misrepresentation had to have been a significant factor contributing to the plaintiff's decision. Here, whether [defendant] made a representation with the required intent and whether the representation was untrue, deceptive, or misleading may be common questions. On the other hand, questions of reasonable reliance by purchasers will vary.

Doster Lighting, Inc. v. E-Conolight, LLC, No. 12-C-0023, 2015

WL 3776491, at *18 (E.D. Wis. June 17, 2015); see also Schmidt v.

Bassett Furniture Indus., No. 08-C-1035, 2011 WL 67255, at *6

(E.D. Wis. Jan. 10, 2011) (finding that resolution of plaintiff’s

DTPA claim via class action would be impracticable and stating,

“The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that reasonable reliance is

not an element of a claim under the DTPA but that the

reasonableness of a plaintiff's reliance may be relevant in

considering whether a representation materially induced the

plaintiff to sustain a pecuniary loss. Novell v. Migliaccio,

749 N.W.2d 544, 554 (Wis. 2008) (noting that “the reasonableness

of a plaintiff's reliance may be relevant in considering whether

the representations materially induced the plaintiff's pecuniary

loss....’). Here whether [defendant’s] representation caused

84 each plaintiff a pecuniary loss will require an individualized

analysis by the finder of fact.”); Wyatt v. Philip Morris USA,

Inc., No. 09-C-0597, 2013 WL 4046334, at *4, n.2 (E.D. Wis.

Aug. 8, 2013) (denying motion for class certification and

stating, “to prevail on a claim under the DTPA, a plaintiff must

still prove that the defendant's deceptive advertising caused the

plaintiff to suffer a pecuniary loss. Here, it is the causation

element that gives rise to the need to identify each class

member's subjective beliefs: each class member will need to prove

that he or she purchased Philip Morris's light cigarettes during

the class period because he or she believed that the labels

‘Lights’ and ‘Ultra Lights’ implied that the cigarettes were

safer to smoke than regular cigarettes.”) (internal citations

omitted).

Plaintiffs do not cite any relevant legal authority to the

contrary.24 Accordingly, the court finds that the Wisconsin

plaintiff’s DTPA claim is incapable of classwide proof.

24 Indeed, the only case cited by the plaintiffs that actually involves a DTPA claim, K&S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 792, 802 (Wis. 2007), did not involve a class action. And while the court in K&S Tool did state that “plaintiff does not have the burden of proving reasonable reliance” to establish a DTPA claim, the court went on to state: “the reasonableness of a plaintiff's reliance may be relevant in considering whether the representation materially induced the plaintiff's pecuniary loss.” Id.

85 2. Unjust Enrichment

“To establish a claim for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff

must prove three elements: (1) the plaintiff conferred a benefit

upon the defendant; (2) the defendant had an appreciation or

knowledge of the benefit; and (3) the defendant accepted or

retained the benefit under circumstances making it inequitable

for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its

value.” Hegel v. Brunswick Corp., No. 09-C-882, 2010 WL 2900379,

at *5 (E.D. Wis. July 20, 2010) (citing Buckett v. Jante, 767

N.W.2d 376 (Wis. 2009)).

Wisconsin courts have held that unjust enrichment claims are

incapable of classwide proof because (1) “each Plaintiff would

have to demonstrate how [defendant] benefitted from his or her

own actions”; and (2) the claim “requires an inquiry into the

equities involved with each class member.” Id. (concluding that

individual inquiries would make impracticable any attempt to

adjudicate the unjust enrichment claim through a class action);

see also Wyatt v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 2013 WL 4046334, at *6

(“The obstacle to class treatment of this claim relates to the

third element — proving that every sale of light cigarettes

during the class period was made under such circumstances that it

would be inequitable for [defendant] to retain the benefit (i.e.,

the profits from the sale). Plaintiff contends that he can prove

86 this by showing that the cigarettes were less valuable than they

would have been had they been necessarily safer to smoke than

regular cigarettes. But . . . , the fact that a class member

would have paid more for cigarettes that were necessarily safer

to smoke than regular cigarettes is irrelevant unless it is first

proved that the class member thought he was purchasing cigarettes

that were necessarily safer to smoke than regular cigarettes. If

he did not think that he was purchasing cigarettes with that

feature, then his receiving cigarettes that did not have that

feature would not have resulted in unjust enrichment. Thus,

plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim will require individualized

inquiries into each class member's beliefs at the time of each

purchase and therefore is not maintainable as a class action.”)

The plaintiffs fail to provide any authority to the

contrary. Accordingly, the court finds the Wisconsin unjust

B. Rule 23(b)(3) - Common Question

The court having concluded that certain of the plaintiffs’

claims are capable of classwide proof, the court now must

determine whether common questions will predominate over

individual issues with respect to those claims.

87 Dial makes one argument that the court has not already

addressed. Dial argues that plaintiffs offer “no methodology at

all to prove injury” on a class-wide basis. (Def.’s Br. in Opp.

to Class Certification (document no. 86) at p. 27.) Dial

contends that to prove injury, class members will need to prove

that they paid a premium for each purchase of Dial Complete,

which would require a determination of (1) the amount each

individual class member paid for each purchase of Dial Complete;

and (2) how that amount compares to the price that class member

would have paid for an alternative product. In support of its

argument, Dial points out that some class members may have paid

more for an alternative product had they not bought Dial

Complete, and so were not injured.

Dial’s argument is off the mark in that it conflates injury

with damages. If Dial Complete is not, in fact, more effective

than other liquid hand soaps, than the “common actual injury

consisted of the payment of the price” for a product that did not

provide the benefits it promised, and “the associated receipt of

an inferior product different from that which the consumers

purchased.” Ebin v. Kangadis Food Inc., 297 F.R.D. 561, 569; see

also Nelson v. Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., 270 F.R.D. 689, 692

n.2 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (“Upon closer inspection, however, a

deceptive practice can cause a consumer damages even if the

88 consumer does not rely on the deceptive practice when purchasing

a particular product. Ostensibly, a deceptive practice allows a

manufacturer or vendor to charge a premium for a product that the

manufacturer would not be able to command absent the deceptive

practice. Thus, even if an individual consumer does not rely on

a deceptive practice when deciding to purchase that product, the

consumer will have paid more for the product than she otherwise

would have. Consequently, the consumer suffers damages.”);

Belfiore v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 14-CV-1142, 2015 WL

5781541, at *30 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2015) (“the injury is the price

premium on every [falsely advertised] product sold.”). But, to

the extent that some class members were satisfied that any

premium that they paid for Dial Complete “was worthwhile,” those

class members “can opt out or decline to file for damages awarded

to the class.” Belfiore, 2015 WL 5781541 at *30.

As previously discussed, Rule 23(b)(3) does not require that

all issues be common. It only requires that common issues

predominate. See Smilow, 323 F.3d at 39 (1st Cir. 2003); see

also Garner v. Healy, 184 F.R.D. 598, 602-03 (N.D. Ill. 1999)

(“The critical question here is whether Defendants have

misrepresented their products to consumers. Unlike a mass tort

case or a defective pharmaceutical device case, there are no

‘subsidiary concepts’ such as duty of care, foreseeability or

89 medical/scientific causation lurking in the background here.

This is a fairly straight-forward consumer fraud case involving

what has been alleged to be standardized conduct by Defendants.”)

(internal citation omitted). The state law claims at issue here

raise common questions as to whether Dial materially

misrepresented Dial Complete’s efficacy and misled reasonable

consumers. And, at bottom, the gist of the plaintiffs’ complaint

is that purported class members paid for “better than basic

soap,” but received “basic soap.” Whether, in fact, Dial

Complete is “better than basic soap” is an issue that relates to

and will be resolved with respect to all plaintiffs. Indeed,

Dial seems to concede the point in its briefing, stating: “The

core fiction at the heart of plaintiffs’ case is the assertion

that Dial Complete is no more effective than regular soap at

killing germs.” (Def.’s Br. in Opp. to Class Certification

(document no. 86) at p. 1.)

The court therefore concludes that the plaintiffs have

sufficiently established the predominance of common issues of

liability.

C. Statute of Limitation Defenses

Dial argues that its statute of limitations defenses against

putative class members present individualized questions and weigh

90 against certification, pointing out: “with a putative class

period of 12 years, many claims are certain to be barred by the

statute of limitations.” Dial then directs the court to an

appendix where it helpfully sets out the applicable statutes of

limitation for each of the plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs

respond perfunctorily that the application of any limitations

period should be tolled, or, alternatively, that the class period

should be limited to consumers who purchased Dial Complete within

any particular statutory period.

On this topic, the First Circuit has stated:

Although a necessity for individualized statute- of-limitations determinations invariably weighs against class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), we reject any per se rule that treats the presence of such issues as an automatic disqualifier. In other words, the mere fact that such concerns may arise and may affect different class members differently does not compel a finding that individual issues predominate over common ones. As long as a sufficient constellation of common issues binds class members together, variations in the sources and application of statutes of limitations will not automatically foreclose class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).

Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 296 (1st

Cir. 2000). In light of that precedent, the court rejects Dial’s

argument that “variations in the sources and application of

statutes of limitations,” id., defeats predominance. Since

neither party fully, or even adequately, briefed the equitable

tolling issue, the court declines to consider the matter at this

91 juncture. The court will initially limit the class definition

for each claim to consumers who purchased Dial Complete within

the relevant statutory period, but without prejudice to

plaintiffs revisiting the issue should they determine that a good

faith, well-grounded, class-wide application of equitable tolling

can be asserted.

D. Damages

Even if there are many common issues of liability, Dial

urges this court to deny class certification because individual

questions of damages would require mini-trials of each potential

class member’s claim to determine how much each person paid for

Dial Complete, what soap they would have purchased if they had

not purchased Dial Complete, what the effective hand-cleaning

ability of Dial Complete was worth to each of them, and the like.

Dial further contends that the methods for calculating damages on

a classwide basis proposed by plaintiffs’ experts are not

sufficiently tied to their theory of the case or insufficiently

cohesive and rigorous at this stage to satisfy Comcast Corp. v.

Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).

As an initial matter, the court rejects the notion that

because individual damages calculations might be necessary, the

class is not properly certifiable. Indeed, it is “well-

92 established that the individuation of damages in consumer class

actions is rarely determinative under Rule 23(b)(3). Where

common questions predominate regarding liability, then courts

generally find the predominance requirement to be satisfied even

if individual damages issues remain.” In re Nexium Antitrust

Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 21 (ellipsis omitted). The principle remains

valid even after Comcast. As the First Circuit recently stated:

“the Supreme Court in Amgen and the circuits in other cases have

made clear that the need for some individualized determinations

at the liability and damages stage does not defeat class

certification. Amgen [, 134 S. Ct. at 1196]. Rather, the

question is whether there is ‘reason to think that individualized

questions will overwhelm common ones and render class

certification inappropriate.’” Id. at 21 (quoting Halliburton,

134 S. Ct. at 2412) (alterations omitted) (emphasis in 777 F.3d

9). Indeed, “[e]ven in cases where the ‘issue of injury-in-fact,

not just damages calculation[,] presents individual questions, it

does not necessarily follow that they predominate over common

ones and that class action treatment is therefore unwarranted.’”

Id. (quoting Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. A.G. Edwards &

Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (alterations omitted)

(emphasis added in 777 F.3d 9).

93 As Judge Posner observed with respect to the Supreme Court’s

decision in Comcast:

It would drive a stake through the heart of the class action device, in cases in which damages were sought rather than an injunction or a declaratory judgment, to require every member of the class have identical damages. If the issues of liability are genuinely common issues, and the damages of individual class members can be readily determined in individual hearings, in settlement negotiations, or by creation of subclasses, the fact that damages are not identical across all class members should not preclude class certification. Otherwise defendants would be able to escape liability for tortious harms of enormous aggregate magnitude but so widely distributed as not to be remediable in individual suits.

Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013)

cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014).

Instead, our court of appeals instructs that Comcast should

be understood to require that a plaintiff’s “theory of liability

is limited to the injury caused by the defendants.” In re

Nexium, 777 3d at 18. “In other words, the defendants cannot be

held liable for damages beyond the injury they caused.” Id. To

satisfy Comcast, plaintiffs must establish that their theory of

damages is tied to their theory of liability, and that their

damages theory is subject to calculation by a “‘common

methodology’ applicable to the class as a whole.” In re Nexium

(Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 297 F.R.D. 168, 182 (D. Mass.

94 2013), aff'd sub nom. In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9

(1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Comcast 133 S. Ct. at 1430).

Plaintiffs’ experts have proposed four methodologies for

computing damages on a class-wide basis: (1) disgorgement of the

total purchase price paid by consumers; (2) disgorgement of the

total wholesale price charged by Dial; (3) disgorgement of profit

contribution accruing to Dial by its sale of Dial Complete to

consumers; and (4) disgorgement of any premium paid by consumers.

Dial is correct in pointing out that plaintiffs’ experts’

theories based on disgorgement of either the full purchase price

of Dial Complete, the full wholesale price, or the full profit

margin realized by Dial do not satisfy Comcast. Those theories

ignore the reality that plaintiffs realized value from Dial

Complete in that it was unarguably effective as soap in cleaning

their hands. That leaves plaintiffs’ damages theory based on

disgorgement of the premium paid by consumers, if any, for

properties promised in the alleged misrepresentations but found

wanting in the soap.

Dial contends, through its own expert, that plaintiffs’

experts’ damages methodology purporting to calculate the price

premium associated with each unit of Dial Complete based on the

95 value of the claimed germicidal properties is flawed for several

reasons. First, Dial submits that its expert and the evidence

establish that there was no actual premium paid for the

challenged properties.25 Second, similar to its reliance

arguments, Dial asserts that there would be no way to identify a

competing product, or set of competing products, against which to

measure the price of Dial Complete at any given time, especially

when sales and promotions impact consumer prices, and a wide

variety of considerations impact consumer preference. Third,

with respect to plaintiffs’ experts’ “conjoint analysis” model,

25 In support of its argument that there was no premium, and that Dial Complete would have been priced the same with or without the claimed germicidal properties, Dial points to its expert’s conclusion that Dial Complete did not command a premium over competing foaming soaps without similar germicidal claims. (See Def.’s Surreply in Opp. to Class Certification (document no. 175) at p. 14.) But on this point, the court finds the report prepared by plaintiffs’ experts, Rosen and Burke, persuasive:

The term ‘premium’ is better described as the amount of money consumers pay to acquire a certain attribute of a product. Assuming the allegations in this case to be true, [class members] have paid to purchase antibacterial attributes of Dial Complete they did not receive, and they have thus been damaged as a result thereof. This is true whether the price of the product is higher, lower, or the same as other products without the attribute. The costs of including the anti-bacterial agent becomes embodied in the price of the product in the same way all other costs such as packaging, advertising[,] etc. and are paid for by all class members regardless of the reasons they may have purchased the product.

(See Burke and Rosen Rebuttal Report (document no. 162-4) at ¶ 36.)

96 Dial argues that plaintiffs’ experts fail “to present an actual

testable model even for the purpose of evaluation, and instead

simply describe[] the theory behind the methodology.” (Def.’s

Surreply in Opp. to Class Certification (document no. 175) at

p. 16.) Dial further argues that plaintiffs’ proposed conjoint

model would, at most, be effective to approximate consumer

preferences for a particular product attribute through consumer

surveys but would not accurately calculate the price premium, if

any, a consumer actually paid for a given characteristic.

Plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. John Burke and Dr. Harvey Rosen,

both of whom hold doctoral degrees and have over eighty combined

years of experience in calculating class damages, submitted

reports attesting to the existence of data available from Dial

and from data collection services in the market sufficient to

calculate a price premium attributable to Dial Complete’s claims

that it “[k]ills 99.99% of germs” and the other similar

challenged claims. As Dial points out, and plaintiffs

acknowledge, these calculations will certainly consist of

averages and best-estimates. But that fact alone does not defeat

class certification. “[It] is . . . clear in the First Circuit

that ‘[t]he use of aggregate damages calculations is well

established in federal court and implied by the very existence of

the class action mechanism itself.’” In re Nexium (Esomeprazole)

97 Antitrust Litig., 297 F.R.D. at 182 (quoting In re Pharm. Indus.

Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d 156, 197 (1st Cir. 2009)

(citing 3 Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class

Actions § 10.5, at 483-86 (4th ed. 2002) (“Aggregate computation

of class monetary relief is lawful and proper. Courts have not

required absolute precision as to damages....”))).

But, plaintiffs have provided insufficient detail regarding

their proposed methodologies for calculating classwide damages.

As Dial points out, plaintiffs’ experts’ damages methodologies

are “bare bones,” (Def.’s Br. in Opp. to Class Certification

(document no. 86) at p. 25) and set forth little detail

concerning the “significant conceptual, implementation, or data

issues that would be encountered” if their approach were adopted.

Wiener v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07-civ-8742(DLC), 2010 WL

3119452, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010); see also Randolph v. J.M.

Smucker Co., 303 F.R.D. 679, 698 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (finding

proposed methodology inadequate where “[o]ther than the bald,

unsupported assertion that this method will work, Plaintiff

presents no hard-and-fast evidence that the premium is capable of

measurement. Plaintiff merely asserts that other courts have

found such models to be feasible mechanisms by which damages

could be measured and that this court should do the same, yet, as

mentioned, no evidence on the actual model to be applied has been

98 submitted, nor has Plaintiff demonstrated that the model will

isolate premium received by the inclusion of the alleged

misrepresentation.”)

In their initial report, Rosen and Burke propose to

calculate the premium paid by consumers by comparing Dial

Complete to alternative competing substitute products that do not

contain the challenged claims. In their rebuttal report,

however, they seemingly move away from their earlier reliance on

such a model. (Compare Burke and Rosen Expert Report (document

no. 57, Exh. 21) at ¶ 9 (indicating that calculating premium paid

by consumers would require data “for all substitute products

(cross elasticity of demand) to determine an average premium

charged”) with Burke and Rosen Rebuttal Report (document no. 162-

4) at pp. 13, 15 (“Another advantage of conjoint analysis is that

it obviates the need to choose a benchmark product because there

is no need to calculate a price differential between Dial

Complete and any such benchmark.”)

To the extent plaintiffs are still relying on that

methodology, their efforts to identify a workable model fall

short. Burke and Rosen have not made any effort to identify

which products might serve as effective comparators to Dial

Complete, or even to determine which criteria should be used to

99 determine whether a particular product would serve as an

effective comparator. (See Rosen Dep. (document no. 86-7) at

121:3-122:24.) Indeed, Rosen’s own testimony seems to suggest

that he has yet to ascertain exactly how he will identify an

appropriate comparator or specifically calculate a premium

associated with the claimed attributes against a designated

comparator. (See Rosen Dep. (document no. 86-7) at 124:15-127:8;

154:7-16.) Because the methodology proposed by Rosen and Burke

does not attempt to isolate the premium due only to the

challenged attributes, it is not consistent with plaintiffs’

theory of liability. See Brazil v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC,

No. 12-CV-01831-LHK, 2014 WL 5794873, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6,

2014) (finding that expert’s proposed regression model did not

sufficiently isolate the price impact of defendant’s alleged

misrepresentations, and “therefore fails under Comcast to

adequately tie damages to Dole's supposed misconduct.”).26

26 Burke and Rosen did perform a preliminary analysis comparing the average price of Dial Complete with Dial Gold, a Dial product marketed without the challenged claims. But, as Dial’s expert notes, Burke and Rosen only “calculated the price difference between Dial Complete and Dial Pump, not an alleged price premium attributable to the Challenged Claims.” (Ugone Report at p. 26.) Rosen himself testified that such an analysis would not ultimately suffice for calculating damages:

Q: Do I understand correctly that you propose to determine damages by calculating the difference between two figures, first of all the average retail price of Dial Complete. And second of all, the average retail price of a range of alternative competing substitute products?

100 As for their proposed conjoint analysis methodology, Rosen

and Burke fail to provide an actual model for evaluation, or any

details regarding exactly how “the estimated attribute value of

the challenged claims” will be established. Instead, in their

rebuttal report, Rosen and Burke discuss how the conjoint

analysis works generally, stating: “Data is collected on consumer

preferences by the use of questionnaires and panel surveys, like

those used by Dial. After the statistical data is collected[,]

part-worth values are calculated using regression analysis from

the surveys and are used to value dollar different attributes of

the product, such as the challenged claims.” (Burke and Rosen

Rebuttal Report (document no. 162-4) at ¶ 41.) Rosen and Burke

provide minimal detail, however, about what data they will rely

upon, where the data will come from, or how they will isolate the

value attributable to the allegedly false efficacy claims.27

A: Well, first of all, that might not be the only way or the way at all because we have four different methodologies which may be employed; however, you’re referring to the third methodology on the premium analysis, and it would not be simply taking as we did in Exhibit A [to Rosen’s Expert Report] where we looked at your marketing report. That was just so I could see whether there was any kind of consistent differential or not. It would have to be much more sophisticated than that.

(Rosen Dep. 130:2-15.) 27 The excerpts of Rosen’s deposition testimony provided to the court fail to fill in the blanks:

Q: You say you were asked to provide methodology.

101 Moreover, as Dial’s expert points out, Rosen and Burke do not

provide any specifics regarding the regression analysis they

intend to use, or how the estimated attribute value of the

challenged claims will be applied to the price paid by consumers

in the market. (See Ugone Surreply (document no. 175-1) at ¶¶ 6-

10, 12.) Greater detail is essential to the valid assessment of

the feasibility of plaintiffs’ proposed methodology.28

To be clear, at the class certification stage, it is not

necessary that class damages be calculated to a mathematical

certainty. Even in Comcast, the Court held that “[c]alculations

need not be exact,” but rather “at the class-certification stage

(as at trial), any model supporting a ‘plaintiff’s damages case

But my question actually was whether you have developed a methodology. A: Well, there are the methodologies. Q: Right, but I take it– A: Measure purchase price, measure, you know, the wholesale revenues. Q: Right, but you haven’t developed any method for applying those general tools to the specific question of whether any price premium for Dial Complete is attributable to the challenged class? A: Well, as we said in here, it may very well be some form of regression analysis or something similar to that. Q: Right, but you haven’t developed one? A: No.

(Rosen Dep. (document no. 86-7) at 182:23-183:14.) 28 Rosen repeatedly testified that he did not have sufficient data when performing his analyses. (See, e.g., Rosen Dep. (document no. 86-7) at 132:10-19; 133:4-6.)

102 must be consistent with its liability case . . . .’” Comcast,

133 S. Ct. at 1433 (quoting ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Proving

Antitrust Damages: Legal and Economic Issues 57, 62 (2d ed.

2010)).

Plaintiffs simply have not provided the court with

sufficient details to permit a full assessment of whether damages

can be feasibly calculated on a classwide basis. That is

certainly not to say that damages cannot be calculated on a

classwide basis here. Indeed, courts have held that the “use of

conjoint analysis in conjunction with a proposed hedonic

regression” that accounts for supply and demand factors can

satisfy Comcast. See ConAgra, 90 F. Supp. 3d 919. 1027-1032; see

also Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-01067-CAS, 2014 WL

6603730, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 24, 2014) (“Both models calculate

the premium classwide — every class member paid the same extra

charge for each bottle of Serum. Of course, plaintiffs' premium

calculation may be wrong. Or, as L'Oreal suggests, a properly

performed RCDE and Conjoint analysis may reveal that there was in

fact no extra charge associated with the removal of the

flammability warning. But under either scenario, plaintiffs'

claims would fail across the board, not plaintiff-by-plaintiff.”)

As the court of appeals has noted, “[a]t the class certification

stage, however, the district court must still ensure that the

103 plaintiffs' presentation of their case will be through means

amenable to the class action mechanism. We are looking here not

for hard factual proof, but for a more thorough explanation of

how the pivotal evidence behind plaintiff's theory can be

established. If there is no realistic means of proof, many

resources will be wasted setting up a trial that plaintiffs

cannot win.” In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust

Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 29 (1st Cir. 2008).

In sum, plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(a)’s requirements,

and Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirements. However,

plaintiffs have not shown that common questions predominate over

individualized questions with respect to damages calculation, and

therefore certification of the putative classes under Rule

23(b)(3) is not appropriate.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons and as set forth herein, the court

rules on plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (document no.

57) as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a

Wisconsin class is denied;

104 2. Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of an

Arkansas class with respect to the express

warranty and unjust enrichment claims is denied;

3. Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a

California class with respect to the implied

4. Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a Florida

class with respect to the Florida Misleading

Advertising Statute claim, and claims for express

warranty, implied warranty and unjust enrichment

is denied;

5. Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of an

Illinois class with respect to the express

6. Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a

Louisiana class with respect to the express

7. Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a Missouri

class with respect to the express warranty,

implied warranty and unjust enrichment claims is

denied;

8. Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of an Ohio

class with respect to the implied warranty and

unjust enrichment claims is denied; and

105 9. Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a class

with respect to the remaining claims is denied,

albeit without prejudice. While plaintiffs have

satisfied Rule 23(a)’s requirements for those

claims, they have not yet demonstrated that

damages can be calculated on a classwide basis,

and therefore have not met Rule 23(b)(3)’s

requirements.

If the plaintiffs believe, in good faith, that they can

adequately address the deficiencies described in this order, they

may, on or before February 12, 2016: (1) move to substitute a

plaintiff who can adequately represent the putative Louisiana

class; and (2) file an amended motion for class certification,

specifically addressing those deficiencies discussed in this

order related to plaintiffs’ Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act

claim, and their methodology for computing damages on a class-

wide basis.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________ Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

December 8, 2015

cc: Tamar G. Arminak, Esq. Richard J. Arsenault, Esq. Eugene F. Assaf, Esq.

106 Daniel E. Becnel, Jr., Esq. Robert M. Becnel, Esq. Karl A. Bekeny, Esq. Paul E. Benson, Esq. Amy Bloom, Esq. Jordan L. Chaikin, Esq. Elizabeth M. Chiarello, Esq. Salvadore Christina, Jr., Esq. John R. Climaco, Esq. Randall S. Crompton, Esq. Stuart A. Davidson, Esq. Mark J. Dearman, Esq. Douglas P. Dehler, Esq. Christopher M. Ellis, Esq. John E. Galvin, III, Esq. Jonathan H. Garside, Esq. Mark J. Geragos, Esq. Jayne A. Goldstein, Esq. Eric D. Holland, Esq. D. Scott Kalish, Esq. Lucy J. Karl, Esq. Shelley Kaufman, Esq. Sean T. Keith, Esq. Adam J. Levitt, Esq. Patricia E. Lowry, Esq. Thomas D. Mauriello, Esq. Robert H. Miller, Esq. Matthew B. Moreland, Esq. Cullin A. O’Brien, Esq. Edward K. O’Brien, Esq. John A. Peca, Jr., Esq. Chad W. Pekron, Esq. Frank E. Piscitelli, Jr., Esq. David C. Rash, Esq. Richard D. Raskin, Esq. Allison W. Reimann, Esq. Fred R. Rosenthal, Esq. Charles E. Schaffer, Esq. Miriam L. Schimmel, Esq. Gerard B. Schneller, Esq. Eugene A. Schoon, Esq. James C. Shah, Esq. Joseph J. Siprut, Esq. Andrew J. Sokolowski, Esq. Steven J. Stolze, Esq. John C. Theisen, Esq. Robert C. Tucker, Esq. John-Mark Turner, Esq. Edwin John U, Esq. Reginald Von Terrell, Esq. Patrick G. Warner, Esq. Robert R. Younger, Esq.