The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Chief Clerk for compliance with Rule 23- 112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion.
1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 Opinion Number:
3 Filing Date: July 10, 2026
4 NO. S-1-SC-40574
5 INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, 6 JSC Inquiry Nos. 2023-061, 2023-078, 7 2024-020, 2024-021, 2024-024, 8 2024-030, 2024-085, 2024-089, 9 2024-090, 2024-111, 2024-130
10 IN THE MATTER OF 11 HON. BRENT A. DETSOI, 12 McKinley County Magistrate Court 13 New Mexico Judicial Standards Commission 14 Phyllis A. Dominguez 15 Marcus J. Blais 16 Albuquerque, NM
17 for Petitioner
18 Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, PA 19 Jack M. Brant 20 Charles K. Purcell 21 Albuquerque, NM 22 Wiggins, Williams & Wesenberg, PC 23 Patricia G. Williams 24 Albuquerque, NM 25 for Respondent 1 OPINION
2 PER CURIAM.
3 {1} This matter came before the Court on a petition for discipline filed by the
4 Judicial Standards Commission (the Commission). As grounds for recommending
5 the immediate and permanent removal of the Honorable Brent A. Detsoi
6 (Respondent) from his position as a magistrate judge in McKinley County, New
7 Mexico, the Commission determined that Respondent had engaged in willful
8 misconduct in a series of thirteen cases in which he raised the issue of criminal
9 jurisdiction sua sponte at various points in cases, including at arraignment and, after
10 informally confirming the respective defendants’ Indian status, summarily dismissed
11 each of the prosecutions without sufficient or any notice and without a hearing.
12 Testimony elicited at Respondent’s hearing before the Commission indicated that
13 Respondent had dismissed as many as sixty-three criminal prosecutions under
14 similar circumstances. Respondent continued to dismiss criminal prosecutions
15 despite multiple prior occasions on which he was reversed on appeal or counseled,
16 warned, or admonished about the impropriety of such wholesale dismissals by fellow
17 judges, court staff, and Administrative Office of the Courts personnel.
18 {2} To counter the Commission’s recommendation to discipline and remove him
19 from office, Respondent advances two principal contentions. First, Respondent 1 argues that the Commission violated principles of fundamental fairness and
2 procedural due process by denying his motion to appoint masters to adjudicate the
3 charges against him. In Respondent’s view, the Commission could not be fair and
4 impartial because, in accordance with its own rules, it had overseen the investigation
5 into the allegations of his misconduct and engaged in “secret, ex parte
6 communications” with the executive director of the Commission and investigative
7 trial counsel before issuing a notice of formal proceedings and adjudicating the
8 charges against him. See, e.g., Rule jsc-15(G)(1) NMRA (“[U]ntil issuance of a
9 notice of formal proceedings, investigative trial counsel shall report to the
10 Commission at each regular meeting on the progress of an investigation and the
11 response to a notice of investigation. The Commission may monitor reports, direct
12 the nature and extent of the investigation, or dispose of the complaint.”). To be clear,
13 Respondent does not argue or offer evidence to support a finding that the
14 Commission was actually biased or prejudged the charges against him; 1 rather, he
15 argues the Commission’s dual roles of investigator and adjudicator create the
1 Respondent also conceded at oral argument before this Court that he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the Commission’s factual findings in this case. 1 appearance of prejudgment bias and “a lack of impartiality inherent in the challenged
2 procedure.”
3 {3} Second, Respondent challenges the validity of the Commission’s disciplinary
4 recommendation on the ground that the charges against him are founded on nothing
5 more than accusations of simple legal error, which he asserts “[can]not constitute
6 willful misconduct in office . . . [and are not] a permissible basis upon which to
7 discipline a [j]udge.” As Respondent sees it, reversal on appeal—not a judge’s
8 discipline or removal—is the appropriate remedy for a judge’s legal error.
9 {4} After oral argument, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on
10 Respondent’s first argument, limited to the following question: “whether the
11 procedure provided by [the Commission] in this proceeding is constitutional under
12 the New Mexico Constitution.” Amended Order, In re Detsoi, S-1-SC-40574 (N.M.
13 Nov. 3, 2025). Upon review of the briefing from the parties, we issued an order
14 granting the Commission’s petition for discipline and imposing the recommended
15 sanction of removal. Order, In re Detsoi, S-1-SC-40574 (N.M. Feb. 25, 2026). At
16 the Commission’s request, we now file this opinion to set out the reasoning behind
17 our prior order. Order, In re Detsoi, S-1-SC-40574 (N.M. Apr. 13, 2026). 1 I. DISCUSSION
2 A. Standard of Review
3 {5} In deciding whether to discipline a judge, this Court “undertake[s] an
4 independent evaluation of the record to determine whether clear and convincing
5 evidence supports the Commission’s recommendation, but in so doing, . . . give[s]
6 weight to the evidentiary findings of those who were able to judge credibility.” In re
7 Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 617, 190 P.3d 338 (per curiam) (internal
8 quotation marks and citation omitted). The meaning of clear and convincing
9 evidence is well established: the evidence “‘instantly tilts the scales in the
10 affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder’s
11 mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.’” Id. (text only)2
12 (quoting State ex rel. Child., Youth & Fams. Dep’t v. Joseph M., 2006-NMCA-029,
13 ¶ 15, 139 N.M. 137, 130 P.3d 198). And “[t]here need not be clear and convincing
14 evidence to support each and every one of the Commission’s evidentiary findings,”
15 so long as there is “clear and convincing evidence that there is willful judicial
16 misconduct which merits discipline.” In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 37, 119
2 “(Text only)” indicates the omission of nonessential punctuation marks— including internal quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets—that are present in the text of the quoted source, leaving the quoted text otherwise unchanged. 1 N.M. 140, 889 P.2d 175 (per curiam). “[W]e review conclusions of law and
2 recommendations for discipline de novo.” In re Griego, 2008-NMSC-020, ¶ 7, 143
3 N.M. 698, 181 P.3d 690 (per curiam). Applying our standard of review to this case,
4 we turn first to Respondent’s arguments related to the constitutionality of the
5 Commission’s procedures. Finding no merit in those arguments, we address his
6 argument about the viability of judicial discipline founded on legal error and
7 determine that he is not entitled to relief based on that theory.
8 B. The Commission Has Wide Discretion Under Article VI, Section 32 of the 9 New Mexico Constitution and as a Matter of Federal Due Process to 10 Decide Whether to Appoint Masters or Hear a Matter Itself Absent 11 Evidence of Unconstitutional Bias
12 {6} A body of binding and persuasive case law already exists to help navigate the
13 question of whether the procedures followed by the Commission in this disciplinary
14 proceeding pass muster under the New Mexico Constitution. As explained below,
15 this Court has repeatedly recognized the Commission’s discretionary authority to
16 appoint masters absent evidence of actual or inherent bias under Article VI, Section
17 32 of the New Mexico Constitution and as a matter of federal due process. This
18 recognition reflects the rule in New Mexico for more than sixty years that, absent
19 evidence of actual or inherent bias, the combining of investigatory and adjudicatory
20 functions by an administrative body is permissible. See In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-
21 050, ¶¶ 5-8 (discussing the history of Article VII, Section 32). This is hardly a 1 minority view, particularly in the context of judicial disciplinary proceedings;
2 indeed, courts have routinely dismissed and refused to consider arguments such as
3 those advanced by Respondent.
4 1. Role of the Commission
5 {7} From a historical perspective, the Commission was created by constitutional
6 amendment in 1967 for the purpose of “oversee[ing] and investigat[ing] the
7 performance, conduct and fitness of members of the judiciary.” State ex rel. N.M.
8 Jud. Standards Comm’n v. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶ 2, 134 N.M. 59, 73 P.3d
9 197 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The provisions of Article VI,
10 Section 32 establish the framework of the Commission, define the Commission’s
11 membership, and set out the procedure for disciplining or removing a “justice, judge
12 or magistrate of any court” for, inter alia, “willful misconduct in office.” Article VI,
13 Section 32 authorizes the Commission to investigate potential misconduct and either
14 hold a hearing itself or appoint a panel of masters “to hear and take evidence.” “[I]f
15 the commission finds good cause, it shall recommend to the supreme court the
16 discipline, removal or retirement of the justice, judge or magistrate.” Id. The relevant
17 portion of Article VI, Section 32 provides as follows:
18 The commission may, after investigation it deems necessary, order 19 a hearing to be held before it concerning the discipline, removal 20 or retirement of a justice, judge or magistrate, or the commission 21 may appoint three masters who are justices or judges of courts of 1 record to hear and take evidence in the matter and to report their 2 findings to the commission. After hearing or after considering the 3 record and the findings and report of the masters, if the 4 commission finds good cause, it shall recommend to the supreme 5 court the discipline, removal or retirement of the justice, judge or 6 magistrate.
7 (Emphasis added.)
8 {8} The New Mexico Constitution assigns this Court an active—and ultimately
9 dispositive—role in those judicial disciplinary cases in which discipline is
10 recommended. Upon receiving a recommendation for discipline from the
11 Commission, the Court “shall review the record of the proceedings on the law and
12 facts” and order any discipline it deems “just and proper.” Id. The Court also may
13 “wholly reject the recommendation.” Id. Thus, Article VI, Section 32 creates a
14 scheme in which the Commission “acts as an advisory body, and makes
15 recommendations to this Court, which has the final decision[-]making authority.”
16 Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶ 13.
17 {9} Article VI, Section 32 says little about the procedures the Commission should
18 follow when investigating and adjudicating alleged judicial misconduct and instead
19 provides that “[t]he commission shall promulgate regulations establishing
20 procedures for hearings under this section.” The constitutional provision provides:
21 “No justice, judge or magistrate who is a member of the commission or supreme
22 court shall participate in any proceeding involving the justice’s, judge’s or 1 magistrate’s own discipline, removal or retirement.” Id. But relevant here, the
2 constitutional provision explicitly states that the Commission may preside over the
3 adjudicatory hearing or appoint masters “to hear and take evidence,” without
4 providing a standard to guide the Commission in exercising that discretion. Id. The
5 Legislature has clarified that masters shall be appointed “if the commission deems it
6 necessary or convenient,” a broad and forgiving standard the Commission has also
7 adopted in its own rules. NMSA 1978, § 34-10-2.1(B)(3) (2023); Rule jsc-4(G)(1)
8 NMRA (“[A]t any time the Commission deems it necessary or convenient, it may
9 appoint three (3) masters . . . to hear testimony and receive other evidence.”).
10 Plainly, the repeated use of the permissive term may together with the disjunctive
11 term or in these contexts affords wide discretion to the Commission in deciding
12 whether to hold a hearing itself or instead appoint a panel of masters to do so.
13 2. Our precedent supports the Commission’s discretion to hear disciplinary 14 matters or appoint masters without violating due process
15 {10} Applying these ground rules, this Court held in In re Rodella that “the decision
16 whether to appoint special masters is left to the discretion of the Commission” and
17 is reviewed for “an abuse of that discretion.” 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 8; see also In re
18 Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 16 (declining to impose limitations on the
19 Commission’s “flexibility in adopting procedures” for the appointment of masters).
20 The conclusion in In re Rodella came in response to and refuted an argument that 1 the Commission was politically biased against the respondent judge and should have
2 referred the Commission’s “investigation and fact finding . . . to special masters in
3 order to ensure objectivity.” 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 5. The In re Rodella Court was “not
4 persuaded that the Commission is either inherently biased or that there is evidence
5 that it was [actually] biased in its investigation or examination of [the judge in that
6 case].” Id. ¶ 6. With regard to inherent bias, the Court stated that “there are sufficient
7 checks on political influence, both in the form of confidentiality, and in this Court’s
8 power to review the Commission’s actions, to ensure the independence of the
9 Commission in fulfilling its role in overseeing judicial conduct.” Id. ¶ 7. And
10 regarding actual bias, the Court concluded that the respondent judge had not
11 provided evidence to show that the Commission abused its discretion by refusing to
12 appoint masters in his case. Id. ¶ 8.
13 {11} In re Rodella is consistent with In re Castellano, an earlier case from this
14 Court, which rejected arguments that due process was violated when the
15 Commission appointed masters who were also members of the Commission.3 See
16 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 16. Before addressing the merits, the In re Castellano Court
The In re Castellano Court did not specify whether it decided that case under 3
the federal or state constitutional guarantee of due process. While the Court’s silence suggests it relied on the federal right to due process, the Court’s reasoning seems rooted in general principles of fairness, rather than any specific understanding or application of federal law. See In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 15-16. 1 acknowledged that the Commission proceedings “must be conducted to provide the
2 respondent with procedural due process.” Id. ¶ 15; accord In re Rodella, 2008-
3 NMSC-050, ¶¶ 5-8 (considering whether the Commission was unconstitutionally
4 biased against the respondent judge, an issue that sounds in due process). The In re
5 Castellano Court also announced a harmless error standard for procedural errors in
6 the Commission proceedings, holding errors will not affect the Court’s review
7 “unless the errors actually prejudiced the respondent.”4 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 15.
8 {12} Addressing the merits, the In re Castellano Court disagreed that the masters’
9 participation in multiple stages of the proceedings violated due process. Id. The
10 Court saw “no basis in the record for finding . . . conduct that could be viewed as
11 having predetermined the facts,” even in circumstances where the masters had
12 presided over the respondent judge’s hearings, issued findings of fact and
13 conclusions of law recommending his removal, and voted with the Commission to
14 recommend his removal by the Court. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. The Court also disagreed that
15 the Commission had given “disproportionate influence” to its member-judges by
Respondent has not offered evidence or argument that unconstitutional bias 4
actually affected the outcome of this proceeding. Therefore, even if we were to agree with Respondent that the Commission’s dual roles create the appearance of prejudgment bias and a “lack of impartiality inherent in the challenged procedure” such that the Commission should have appointed masters in this case, Respondent simply has not shown—or even claimed—that he suffered resultant prejudice as In re Castellano requires. 1 appointing them as masters. Id. ¶ 16. The Court readily acknowledged that
2 “[c]hoosing special masters who are not Commissioners might be a wise precaution
3 against an erroneous perception of even greater influence.” Id. But because the
4 masters were “judges of courts of record” and therefore met the sole qualification
5 for appointment under Article VI, Section 32, their appointments nonetheless
6 satisfied due process. In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 16.
7 {13} A final aspect of the parallel reasoning of In re Rodella and In re Castellano
8 is noteworthy. In both cases, the Court emphasized the distinct roles assigned to the
9 Commission and the Court under Article VI, Section 32, recognizing that the
10 Commission’s authority is limited to “recommend[ing discipline or] removal to this
11 Court,” while this Court “independently review[s] the proceedings below to
12 determine, de novo, whether to accept the recommendation of the Commission.” In
13 re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 8; In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 15 (citing
14 In re O’Dea, 622 A.2d 507, 514 (Vt. 1993), as standing for the proposition that a
15 “due process violation [is] less likely when [an] administrative body is not [the] final
16 decision[-]making authority”). The Court’s role as “the final decision[-]making
17 authority” thus serves as a significant safeguard against accusations of bias in a
18 particular case. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶ 13. 1 {14} At bottom, In re Rodella and In re Castellano provide a ready framework for
2 determining whether the Commission’s procedures in this case pass muster under
3 the New Mexico Constitution. Be it based on the explicit provisions of Article VI,
4 Section 32 or as a matter of basic fairness and due process, this Court has long
5 deferred to the Commission’s discretion to appoint masters, absent evidence of
6 unconstitutional bias that “prejudiced the respondent [judge].” In re Castellano,
7 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 15; see also In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 8. And
8 particularly in In re Castellano, the Court saw no cause for concern even though the
9 masters’ participation throughout the Commission’s proceedings was extensive. See
10 In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 13, 15. Absent any suggestion of
11 unconstitutional bias or resulting prejudice in this case—and indeed with no
12 challenge whatsoever to the Commission’s factual findings overall—it is clear that,
13 under governing New Mexico case law, the Commission neither abused its
14 discretion under Article VI, Section 32 nor violated general principles of due process
15 when it opted not to appoint masters to adjudicate the charges against Respondent.
16 3. This Court’s longstanding interpretation of federal due process in the 17 administrative context additionally undercuts Respondent’s position
18 {15} Even beyond In re Rodella and In re Castellano, this Court has long adopted
19 the consensus—if not unanimous—view that, as a matter of federal due process, an
20 administrative agency’s dual role as investigator and adjudicator does not, “in itself,” 1 create an unconstitutional risk of bias. Seidenberg v. N.M. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs,
2 1969-NMSC-028, ¶ 24, 80 N.M. 135, 452 P.2d 469 (“The fact that charges are made
3 by the same body which tries the issues does not, in itself, operate as a
4 disqualification.”). This approach is consistent with a long line of federal
5 jurisprudence on the issue. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 54-55 (1975)
6 (holding there was no violation of due process where adjudicators presided over
7 hearings on charges they themselves investigated); Knapp v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
8 796 F.3d 445, 468 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that “an agency’s dual role of
9 investigating and adjudicating disputes and complaints does not alone demonstrate
10 unconstitutional bias” (text only) (citation omitted)). In order to establish a due
11 process violation in the judicial disciplinary context, adherence to this approach
12 requires a showing “that the Commission [was] either inherently biased or that there
13 [was] evidence that it was [actually] biased in its investigation or examination of
14 [the respondent judge].” In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 6. The combined force
15 of the holdings in Seidenberg and Withrow undermine a determination that the
16 Commission was inherently biased as a structural matter, while Respondent’s full
17 acceptance of the factual findings made by the Commission below all but preclude
18 a determination that the Commission was actually biased in this case. 1 4. Similar procedures have been unanimously upheld by state courts 2 nationwide under substantively identical challenges
3 {16} Looking to other state court jurisdictions for guidance, there seems to be near
4 unanimity that a judicial disciplinary body’s combined investigatory and
5 adjudicatory functions do not violate due process. Because these cases are heavily
6 influenced by the United States Supreme Court’s holding to that effect in Withrow,
7 we summarize Withrow’s holding and rationale before discussing the uniform out-
8 of-state authorities that cut against Respondent’s position here.
9 {17} Similar to the approach taken by Respondent in this case, the physician in
10 Withrow objected to a licensing board’s dual roles of investigator and adjudicator in
11 overseeing his disciplinary proceeding, arguing the arrangement would violate the
12 physician’s right to a neutral, detached decisionmaker. See 421 U.S. at 38-39, 42.
13 The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that due process requires “a fair
14 trial in a fair tribunal,” including in administrative agencies. Id. at 46 (internal
15 quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court also noted circumstances when
16 “the probability of actual bias . . . is too high to be constitutionally tolerable,” such
17 as when a decisionmaker “has a pecuniary interest in the outcome . . . [or] has been
18 the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him.” Id. at 47
19 (footnote omitted). But the Court remained unpersuaded that “conferring
20 investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of 1 actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden.” Id. Rather, the Court
2 established “a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators”
3 that may be overcome with contradictory evidence, on a case-by-case basis. Id.
4 “Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators are assumed to be [people]
5 of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy
6 fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.” Id. at 55 (internal quotation marks and
7 citation omitted).
8 {18} In the matter at hand, the Commission cites persuasive authority from other
9 jurisdictions citing and reaching the same conclusion as Withrow, specifically in the
10 context of judicial disciplinary proceedings. See Gentry v. Jud. Conduct Comm’n,
11 612 S.W.3d 832, 841 (Ky. 2020) (citing Withrow in concluding that the judge under
12 investigation “offer[ed] no persuasive evidence to overcome the presumption of lack
13 of bias” purportedly resulting from “the combined investigative and adjudicative
14 functions of the [c]ommission”); Adams v. Comm’n on Jud. Performance, 897 P.2d
15 544, 550 (Cal. 1995) (en banc) (discussing precedent that relied on Withrow to reject
16 the argument that “the [c]ommission did not provide a neutral forum, because the
17 accusatory, investigatory, and adjudicatory functions were combined so that the
18 adjudicatory process did not comport with generally accepted standards of due
19 process”); In re Zoarski, 632 A.2d 1114, 1121 (Conn. 1993) (citing Withrow and 1 other cases in rejecting the judge’s argument that due process was violated when
2 “members of the council . . . conducted the investigatory hearing that led to a finding
3 of probable cause and thereafter . . . adjudicated the ultimate merits of the charges
4 against him”).
5 {19} Further, in a case cited by neither party, the Alaska Supreme Court explained
6 that as of 1975, twenty-four states, including New Mexico, had adopted procedures
7 allowing “the [c]ommission both to conduct a preliminary investigation and to
8 adjudicate facts and make a recommendation to the supreme court.” 5 In re Hanson,
9 532 P.2d 303, 306 & n.9 (Alaska 1975). Disagreeing that this “combination of
10 judicial and investigative functions” violated due process “under [either] the federal
11 constitution or Alaska’s constitution,” the In re Hanson court observed that the
12 “argument has been rejected by all courts which have considered the question.” Id.
13 at 306; see also In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727, 736 (Mich. 1977) (per curiam)
14 (“[T]he authority is legion in support of the proposition that combining the
15 investigative and adjudicative roles in a single agency does not necessarily violate
16 due process in administrative adjudications such as judicial fitness hearings.”). Since
5 At oral argument in this case, the Commission represented that New Mexico is one of thirty-three states currently operating under a “single-tiered system,” where the judicial disciplinary body investigates and adjudicates charges against a judge before recommending discipline to the state’s high court. 1 then, the trend of rejecting arguments similar to the one advanced by Respondent
2 herein has continued, most recently in 2022 by the Michigan Supreme Court. See In
3 re Morrow, 976 N.W.2d 644, 651 (Mich. 2022) (per curiam) (reaffirming under
4 Withrow that the Michigan commission’s combined investigatory and adjudicative
5 functions do not violate due process).
6 {20} In re Hanson also presaged this Court’s approach in In re Rodella on two
7 important points. First, in holding that the Alaska commission’s dual functions “did
8 not result in a biased or partial tribunal,” the Alaska Supreme Court emphasized its
9 own role in the disciplinary process, noting that it has “the ultimate authority in
10 disciplinary matters affecting the judiciary.” In re Hanson, 532 P.2d at 306-07;
11 accord In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 8. Second, the Alaska high court rejected
12 an argument—identical to the one made by Respondent here—that due process was
13 violated by the Alaska commission’s “option to hear the matter itself or to refer the
14 charges to a master for a hearing.” In re Hanson, 532 P.2d at 307 & n.15. The In re
15 Hanson court found it “untenable” that “the [c]ommission must always appoint a
16 master,” reasoning as follows:
17 The [c]ommission should have the option of referral to a master where 18 the particular matter requires extensive testimony or specialized fact- 19 finding. On the other hand, where the [c]ommission wishes to handle 20 the matter without appointment of a master, we can discern no legal 21 impediment to proceeding in such a manner. 1 Id. at 307. Thus, as in New Mexico, the decision whether to appoint a master in In
2 re Hanson was properly entrusted to the commission’s discretion. Accord In re
3 Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 8.
4 {21} The rule appears to be unanimous in New Mexico and elsewhere that the
5 Commission’s combined investigatory and adjudicatory functions do not, of
6 themselves, violate generally accepted standards of due process, including in the
7 many states that employ judicial disciplinary structures and procedures substantially
8 identical to those in use in New Mexico. Effectively conceding as much, Respondent
9 urges this Court to “part company with Withrow” and its progeny by invalidating the
10 Commission’s procedures through a broadening of the due process provisions of
11 Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution. For reasons discussed below,
12 we decline Respondent’s request. 1 C. Respondent Has Offered No Persuasive Reason to Depart from Our 2 Existing Procedural Due Process Protections in the Judicial Disciplinary 3 Context in New Mexico
4 {22} In undertaking an interstitial analysis6 in support of his state constitutional
5 claim, Respondent invokes two of the three grounds generally relied on to justify a
6 state constitutional departure from federal jurisprudence: first, that “the federal
7 analysis [in Withrow] is flawed,” and second, that “distinctive state characteristics
8 exist that would support the departure.” See State v. Crane, 2014-NMSC-026, ¶ 15,
9 329 P.3d 689 (citing State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 777, 932
10 P.2d 1). As we explain, Respondent misses the mark on both points.
11 {23} To begin, Respondent likens the situation at bar to that presented to this Court
12 in State v. Martinez, 2021-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 36, 85, 478 P.3d 880, in which we agreed
13 to construe the due process provisions of Article II, Section 18 of our state
14 Constitution more broadly than its federal counterpart in assessing the admissibility
15 of eyewitness identification evidence. The chief inspiration underlying this doctrinal
6 Respondent acknowledges this Court’s invitation in Lujan Grisham v. Van Soelen, 2023-NMSC-027, ¶ 19 n.7, 539 P.3d 272, to revisit whether the interstitial approach still serves New Mexico and promotes the development of independent state-constitutional protections. But Respondent has chosen to adhere to the interstitial method in his argument here, maintaining that it remains the law and “neither alters the outcome of the present inquiry nor fails to give the New Mexico Bill of Rights its due.” 1 sea change was “the substantial body of empirical scientific studies on human
2 memory and perception undertaken in the wake of [the, then outdated, governing
3 federal precedent] and the legal literature, decisional law, and statutory enactments
4 that have developed accordingly.” Id. ¶ 38. Clearly, the “vast body of social science
5 research” and “[t]he legal literature . . . replete with discussions of the doctrinal and
6 scientific shortcomings of the [federal] reliability test” that were presented to the
7 Martinez Court, id. ¶¶ 40, 53 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), are a
8 far cry from the sparse—three in all—and narrowly conceived psychological journal
9 and law review articles relied on by Respondent in this case. While this trio of
10 commentaries—primarily addressing a concept known in the scientific community
11 as confirmation bias7—may provide an articulable basis to question the rationale
12 supporting the Commission’s joint investigative and adjudicatory framework, these
13 isolated writings are inadequate, standing alone, to warrant the complete
14 abandonment of a long-held administrative practice.
7 Confirmation bias has been defined as “bias that results from the tendency to process and analyze information in such a way that it supports one’s preexisting ideas and convictions.” Confirmation bias, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary .com/browse/confirmation-bias [https://perma.cc/RE72-FD9Y] (last visited June 2, 2026). 1 {24} And despite Respondent’s protestations to the contrary, New Mexico case
2 authorities such as Reid v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry, 1979-
3 NMSC-005, 92 N.M. 414, 589 P.2d 198, and New Mexico Board of Veterinary
4 Medicine v. Riegger, 2007-NMSC-044, 142 N.M. 248, 164 P.3d 947, provide no
5 persuasive basis to depart from the teachings of Seidenberg and Withrow in the
6 matter now before us. As explained below, neither Reid nor Riegger establishes any
7 distinct feature of New Mexico law that would afford Respondent an expanded right
8 to greater due process protections during disciplinary proceedings than Seidenberg
9 and Withrow now provide.
10 {25} As Respondent would have it, “Reid calls for heightened vigilance against
11 denials of due process in administrative settings,” in contrast to Withrow’s more
12 permissive approach in entertaining what the United States Supreme Court described
13 therein as a rebuttable “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
14 adjudicators.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. Respondent further argues that since Reid
15 was decided, this Court has favored its requirement that there need be “the
16 appearance of complete fairness” in administrative proceedings, Reid, 1979-NMSC-
17 005, ¶ 7, over Withrow’s above-stated “presumption of honesty and integrity,”
18 Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. But the only support Respondent offers for these assertions
19 is Riegger, which held that allowing the Board of Veterinary Medicine’s recovery 1 of costs for both the hearing officer who served the agency and the hearing room
2 used by the agency would violate the accused veterinarian’s due process rights. See
3 2007-NMSC-044, ¶ 26. This Court in Riegger concluded that allowing the recovery
4 of a hearing officer’s costs would create “a possibility that future licensees subject
5 to disciplinary proceedings may objectively believe that hearing officers will be
6 biased in order to be fully-compensated for their services.” Id. ¶ 30. The Riegger
7 Court acknowledged that neither party had accused the hearing officer of bias and
8 that the record demonstrated a lack of actual bias on the hearing officer’s part. Id.
9 Nonetheless, the Court held that the appearance of potential bias outweighed the
10 Withrow “presumption of honesty and integrity in those [who serve as]
11 adjudicators.” Riegger, 2007-NMSC-044, ¶ 30 (internal quotation marks and
12 citation omitted). Thus, Respondent’s argument goes, Riegger demonstrates the
13 Court’s preference for a more protective rule than Seidenberg and Withrow presently
14 require.
15 {26} Respondent overstates the holdings in both Reid and Riegger in arguing that
16 they support a higher standard of neutrality in administrative proceedings under
17 Article II, Section 18. This Court’s prior analysis in each of the two cited cases is
18 inapposite to the facts now before us and therefore is not binding here. Neither Reid
19 nor Riegger spoke directly to the core structural issue litigated in this matter: how 1 best to treat the combined investigative and adjudicative functions of the
2 Commission. Instead, Reid primarily serves to illustrate the general rule that due
3 process is violated when there is evidence that an adjudicator may have been biased,
4 demonstrated by “a prejudicial statement” made by one of the board members that
5 signaled “his bias and prejudgment of the issues.” Reid, 1979-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 5, 9.
6 And Riegger, for its part, represents little more than a straightforward application of
7 the age-old prohibition against a judge presiding over a matter in which the judge
8 has a pecuniary interest in the outcome. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo,
9 1933-NMSC-087, ¶ 22, 38 N.M. 73, 28 P.2d 511 (“By the common law, the slightest
10 pecuniary interest would disqualify a judge.”); see also Rule 21-211(A)(3) NMRA
11 (requiring a judge to disqualify themself “in any proceeding [when] . . . [t]he judge
12 knows that [they have] . . . an economic interest in the subject matter in
13 controversy”).
14 {27} Neither Reid nor Riegger can be read to stray from the core rule articulated in
15 Seidenberg and Withrow that, absent evidence of unconstitutional bias, the
16 combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions in the administrative realm
17 does not violate due process. We thus conclude that neither Reid nor Riegger is
18 imbued with any distinctive state characteristics relevant to this case that would 1 warrant an expansion of the due process provisions of Article II, Section 18 of our
2 state Constitution.
3 {28} Having rejected Respondent’s constitutional challenges to the Commission’s
4 disciplinary recommendation, we turn next to Respondent’s alternative argument
5 that even if he committed legal error as alleged—which he steadfastly refuses to
6 concede—his actions did not rise to the level of willful misconduct subject to
7 discipline. As will be shown below, this contention too must fail.
8 D. The Commission Properly Relied on the Series of Improper Case 9 Dismissals Ordered by Respondent as a Basis for Discipline in This Case
10 {29} Respondent relies on the committee commentary to the “[i]mpartiality and
11 fairness” requirement of the Code of Judicial Conduct contained in Rule 21-202
12 NMRA, which provides: “When applying and interpreting the law, a judge
13 sometimes may make good-faith errors of fact or law. Errors of this kind do not
14 violate this rule.” That guidance, in Respondent’s view, is consistent with rulings
15 from other jurisdictions that emphasize the importance of judicial independence and
16 the freedom to make good-faith rulings, “free from extraneous considerations of
17 punishment or reward.” In re Curda, 49 P.3d 255, 261 (Alaska 2002); see also, e.g.,
18 Oberholzer v. Comm’n on Jud. Performance, 975 P.2d 663, 680 (Cal. 1999) (“[A]
19 judge must be free not only to make the correct ruling for proper reasons, but also to 1 make an incorrect ruling, believing it to be correct.”).8 Respondent insists that
2 reversal on appeal is the appropriate remedy for a judge’s legal error, not judicial
3 discipline.
4 {30} The Commission, on the other hand, asserts in its petition seeking
5 Respondent’s removal from office that its disciplinary recommendation is not based
6 on “mere legal mistakes.” Instead, the Commission maintains that Respondent’s
7 repeated dismissal of cases on jurisdictional grounds at the preliminary arraignment
8 stage of multiple proceedings and without a hearing, “despite repeated guidance
9 from mentors, peers, and higher courts” to refrain from such conduct, “reflects
10 intentional, repeated, and egregious legal error made in bad faith, clearly exceeding
11 the threshold established by this Court and consistent with standards adopted in other
12 jurisdictions.” The Commission goes on to argue that discipline is warranted because
8 These citations, and their accompanying quotations, are taken directly from Respondent’s briefing to this Court. While the quotations are accurate, they do not represent the actual holdings of the cases from which they are taken. In In re Curda, for example, the Alaska Supreme Court ultimately held that “legal error that is neither willful nor part of a repeated pattern of misconduct is not an appropriate subject for discipline.” 49 P.3d at 261. Similarly, the California Supreme Court in Oberholzer held as follows: “[A] judge who commits legal error which, in addition, clearly and convincingly reflects bad faith, bias, abuse of authority, disregard for fundamental rights, intentional disregard of the law, or any purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duty, is subject to investigation.” 975 P.2d at 680 (citations omitted). Neither of these holdings is consistent with the blanket rule sought by Respondent in this case. 1 Respondent engaged in a “pattern of defiance—rooted in a personal and expansive
2 view of tribal boundaries rather than binding precedent—[that] demonstrates a
3 willful disregard for the judge’s duty to apply the law as it exists.”
4 {31} Respondent’s contention is foreclosed by In re Locatelli, 2007-NMSC-029, ¶
5 6, 141 N.M. 755, 161 P.3d 252 (per curiam), a case in which this Court considered
6 the respondent municipal judge’s analogous argument that legal error presents a
7 “question for the appellate courts” and “should not expose [the respondent] to
8 discipline.” The In re Locatelli Court disagreed, holding that legal error may support
9 discipline when there is clear and convincing evidence that the alleged error
10 amounted to “[w]illful misconduct in office[, which] is improper and wrong conduct
11 of a judge acting in his official capacity done intentionally, knowingly, and,
12 generally, in bad faith.” Id. ¶¶ 7-8 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation
13 marks and citation omitted). This Court clarified, however, that to constitute willful
14 misconduct, the challenged conduct must be “more than a mere error of judgment or
15 an act of negligence.” Id. ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
16 Applying that standard, the In re Locatelli Court rejected the recommendation for
17 discipline based on the Commission’s findings that the judge had improperly held
18 two lawyers in contempt without a legal or factual basis. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11, 17. The Court
19 held that the Commission’s disciplinary recommendation was not supported by clear 1 and convincing evidence in circumstances where the judge was, in fact, bestowed
2 with the authority to hold the attorneys in contempt and the judge provided
3 uncontradicted testimony that he had “researched what action he could take” under
4 the circumstances and had “consulted with attorneys from the Municipal League and
5 the Attorney General’s Office” before taking action in holding the attorneys in
6 contempt. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. That the judge charged the attorneys with contempt without
7 procuring or reviewing the transcript of the district court proceedings served only to
8 show that the judge had been negligent in his contempt rulings, a showing
9 insufficient—on its own—to support a finding of willful misconduct. Id. ¶ 17.
10 {32} The reasoning employed by the In re Locatelli Court, while reaching a
11 different result than that produced here, plainly endorses the Commission’s ability
12 to recommend discipline based on “improper and wrong conduct,” including legal
13 error, so long as the conduct rises to the level of willful misconduct. Id. ¶ 8 (internal
14 quotation marks and citation omitted). As this Court made clear in In re Rodella,
15 discipline is often imposed on judges based on their “patterns of behavior,” 2008-
16 NMSC-050, ¶ 35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), a conclusion
17 buttressed by commentators and courts alike. See, e.g., Cynthia Gray, The Line
18 Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing Judicial Independence
19 and Accountability, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 1245, 1263-64 & n.98 (2004) (recognizing 1 that “most cases in which judicial error [is] elevated to the level of judicial
2 misconduct involve[] more than one example of legal error”; that “a pattern is one
3 of the identified exceptions to the ‘mere legal error’ rule”; and, citing In re Holien,
4 612 N.W.2d 789, 792-93 (Iowa 2000) (en banc), that “[j]udges have been sanctioned
5 for patterns of . . . violating procedural requirements when conducting
6 arraignments”).
7 {33} And considering Respondent’s choice in this case to forego any challenge to
8 the Commission’s factual findings, we are left with a record that establishes
9 Respondent’s habitual practice—often at arraignments and without the benefit of a
10 hearing—of “routinely dismiss[ing] matters sua sponte . . . if he [determined that]
11 jurisdictional issues were present on the face of a complaint.” He did this “despite
12 repeated guidance [to the contrary] from mentors, peers, and higher courts.”
13 {34} We emphasize that, as a general matter, “[t]he burden [is on the] defendant to
14 demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction in the district court.” State v. Cutnose, 1974-
15 NMCA-130, ¶¶ 4-7, 87 N.M. 307, 532 P.2d 896; see also, e.g., State v. Verdugo,
16 901 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (“The majority of other courts addressing
17 this issue have held that a defendant bears the burden to show facts that would
18 establish an exception to the state court’s jurisdiction under the Indian Country
19 Crimes Act.”). And such a determination demands an opportunity for the State to 1 present evidence to support its case. See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 2003-NMSC-012, ¶
2 7, 133 N.M. 763, 70 P.3d 753 (“[P]retrial dismissal under Rule 5-601(B) [NMRA]
3 is inappropriate if the State could reasonably assert the availability of additional
4 evidence.”); cf. Rule 6-305(A)(2) NMRA (“It shall be unnecessary for a complaint
5 to contain the following allegations unless such allegations are necessary to give the
6 defendant notice of the crime charged: . . . place of the commission of the offense.”).
7 Respondent’s repeated practice of dismissing cases at arraignment and without
8 hearings constituted legal error that clearly and consistently rose to the level of
9 willful misconduct. Stern discipline was in order. We turn next—and finally—to the
10 question of the appropriate level of discipline warranted in this case, a question that
11 stands “separate from the question of whether the evidence supports a determination
12 that the judge’s actions constituted willful judicial misconduct.” In re Castellano,
13 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 39.
14 E. Respondent’s Pattern of Willful Misconduct Was More than Sufficient to 15 Warrant His Removal from Office
16 {35} Traditionally, this Court has “removed judges from the bench when their
17 conduct threatened the integrity and independence of the judiciary.” In re Rodella,
18 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 34, citing, inter alia, In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 40
19 (removing the judge because of a “pattern [of behavior that] adversely affected his
20 reputation for impartiality, independence, and integrity”). The impetus to remove a 1 judge from office for engaging in such a pattern of behavior is only heightened
2 where, as the Commission found to be the case here, the judge wrongly shows not
3 “remorse but demonstrated defiance [by] insisting that his interpretation of the law
4 was correct” in offering “evasive” testimony determined not to be “credible.” As the
5 In re Rodella Court reasoned:
6 In this case, we see a pattern of misconduct that was not corrected, but 7 which increased in its seriousness, despite training and mentoring. In 8 addition, we are deeply troubled by the Commission’s determination, 9 which our independent review of the record supports, that Judge 10 Rodella’s testimony lacked credibility. When a new judge, through lack 11 of knowledge, experience or judgment, acts in ways that are 12 inconsistent with [a judge’s] new role, we hope that such conduct can 13 be corrected through discipline in the form of training, mentoring, and 14 supervision. However, when a judge denies making mistakes, [the 15 judge] cannot learn from the mistakes, and there is little that can be 16 done to correct the behavior. Under such circumstances, to allow a 17 judge who is not truthful to remain on the bench betrays the public trust 18 and threatens the integrity and independence of the judiciary as a whole. 19 . . . [W]e cannot allow a judge who lacks credibility to preside over 20 cases in which he is charged with weighing evidence and determining 21 the credibility of others.
22 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 36 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The same
23 rationale applies here.
24 II. CONCLUSION
25 {36} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Respondent committed willful
26 misconduct in office and stand by our prior order directing his permanent removal
27 from the bench. 1 {37} IT IS SO ORDERED.
2 3 JULIE J. VARGAS, Chief Justice
4 5 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice
6 7 C. SHANNON BACON, Justice
8 9 DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice
10 11 BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice