FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 27 2024 SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP Nos. CC-23-1105-FGC DEEPA B. WILLINGHAM, CC-23-1184-FGC Debtor. (Related)
DEEPA B. WILLINGHAM, Bk. No. 9:20-bk-10858-MB Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* C. RICHARD WILLINGHAM; JERRY NAMBA, Trustee, Appellees.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California Martin R. Barash, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Before: FARIS, GAN, and CORBIT, Bankruptcy Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 71 debtor Deepa B. Willingham appeals from the bankruptcy
court’s docket entry closing her chapter 7 case in March 2023, arguing that
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. the chapter 7 trustee failed to administer certain claims against her then-
husband. She also challenges orders concerning the sale of her residence
and disposition of her homestead exemption that were entered in 2020 and
2021 and orders sustaining the trustee’s objections to her proofs of claim
that were entered in 2022.
Ms. Willingham is laboring under an incorrect view of the
bankruptcy process. She says that she filed her bankruptcy petition because
she expected that the chapter 7 trustee would protect her in a dispute with
her then-husband. But the chapter 7 trustee’s primary duty is to generate
money with which to pay creditors and return to the debtor any assets that
cannot or need not be liquidated for that purpose. In this case, the chapter 7
trustee did his job: he sold enough assets to pay Ms. Willingham’s creditors
in full; and when the court closed the bankruptcy case, the remaining
assets of the estate became Ms. Willingham’s property again.
Ms. Willingham can now pursue whatever claims she has against her ex-
husband. She cannot force the trustee to pursue those claims for her.
Ms. Willingham also believes that, at the end of her case, she is
entitled to appeal from any orders entered during the case. She is mistaken:
the time to appeal many of the orders she challenges expired long ago.
We AFFIRM the closing of the case, and we DISMISS as untimely her
appeal from the orders disposing of her homestead exemption and her
proofs of claim.
2 FACTS2
A. Ms. Willingham’s bankruptcy petition
Ms. Willingham filed an individual chapter 7 petition in July 2020.
She disclosed that she was in the process of divorcing her estranged
husband, Charles Richard Willingham. Appellee Jerry Namba was
appointed chapter 7 trustee (“Trustee”).
Ms. Willingham scheduled three pieces of real property:
• Her residence in Solvang, California (“Solvang Property”) that she
valued at $2.2 million. She claimed a $175,000 homestead exemption
and indicated her intention that the Trustee sell the Solvang Property.
• A condominium unit in Houston, Texas (“Texas Property”) that she
described as her husband’s residence that he had allegedly acquired
with community assets. She indicated her intention to surrender the
property.
• A single-family home in San Bernardino, California (“San Bernardino
Property”) that her husband had inherited; she claimed that he used
community assets to pay the mortgage. She indicated her intention to
surrender the property.
She also scheduled claims against her husband for allegedly
transferring nearly $300,000 in community assets without her knowledge
2 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically filed in the underlying bankruptcy case and related cases. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).
3 or consent. Alternatively, she asserted an equitable interest in the accounts
and property allegedly funded with community assets.
Ms. Willingham received her discharge on October 26, 2020.
B. The motion to sell and distribution of the homestead exemption
In November 2020, the Trustee filed a motion to sell the Solvang
Property (“Motion to Sell”) and pay to Ms. Willingham the $175,000
homestead exemption; no one had objected to her claimed exemption.
Mr. Willingham filed a response to the Motion to Sell. He admitted
that the Solvang Property was estate property but asserted that he had a
community claim against a substantial portion of the net sale proceeds.
On or around November 30, 2020, Mr. Willingham filed a chapter 7
bankruptcy petition in Houston, Texas. The Trustee filed a supplemental
brief to address the effect of Mr. Willingham’s bankruptcy case and urged
the court to deny Mr. Willingham’s claim to the sale proceeds.
After a hearing, the bankruptcy court entered its order (“Sale Order”)
on December 11, 2020, authorizing the Trustee to sell the Solvang Property
for $1.9 million. The court directed escrow to disburse $87,000 of the
homestead exemption to Ms. Willingham and ordered the Trustee to hold
the balance of the exemption.
At a further hearing regarding the disbursement of the sale proceeds,
the bankruptcy court tentatively ruled that the Texas bankruptcy court
should decide the disposition of the remainder of the homestead
exemption. Ms. Willingham’s counsel agreed:
4 [U]pon further thought after reviewing all the pleadings, I think your analysis is correct. I don’t think that this is property of the bankruptcy estate anymore. And I don’t really think that the California bankruptcy court really has jurisdiction to decide where the money goes.
So as it stands, granting the relief requested by the trustee and allowing the homestead exemption to go to the debtor makes sense and then whatever the Texas trustee decides to do, then Ms. Willingham will have to file an appropriate pleading in response to that.
On February 19, 2021, the bankruptcy court issued a supplemental
order (“Supplemental Sale Order”) authorizing the Trustee to pay
Ms. Willingham the $88,000 balance of her homestead exemption, unless
the Texas bankruptcy court ordered otherwise. Ms. Willingham did not
appeal from the Sale Order or the Supplemental Sale Order within fourteen
days after entry of those orders.
About a month later, the Trustee filed a Motion to Disburse Funds.
He reported that the Texas bankruptcy court had ordered that the $88,000
balance be delivered to the chapter 7 trustee in that case. Ms. Willingham
did not object to this motion, so the bankruptcy court entered an order
(“Disbursal Order”) granting the Motion to Disburse Funds on April 9,
2021. Ms. Willingham did not appeal from the Disbursal Order within
fourteen days after its entry. 3
3 Ms. Willingham says that she later received $12,500 of the $88,000 portion transmitted to Mr. Willingham’s bankruptcy trustee.
5 C. The Trustee’s Final Report
On May 25, 2022, the Trustee filed the Trustee’s Final Report in which
he stated that he had administered the estate and that “[a]ll scheduled and
known assets of the estate have been reduced to cash, released to the
debtor as exempt property . . . or have been or will be abandoned pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 554.” He stated that he had realized gross receipts of
approximately $1.9 million and that the estate retained a balance of
$269,422.89 available for distribution. He reported that he had enough
money to pay all unsecured claims in full and return a surplus to
Ms. Willingham. (Ultimately, the Trustee distributed over $100,000 to
Ms. Willingham.)
Additionally, the Trustee noted that the San Bernardino Property and
the Texas Property had been fully administered.4
The Trustee filed a notice of the Trustee’s Final Report and hearing.
The notice advised that objections to the Trustee’s Final Report must be
filed no later than fourteen days before the hearing and that “[u]ntimely
objections may be deemed waived.” Ms. Willingham’s counsel received
electronic notice of the Notice of Trustee’s Final Report. No one objected to
the Trustee’s Final Report.
D. Ms. Willingham’s proofs of claim
On June 16, 2022, Ms. Willingham filed five proofs of claim. (This was
4 The Trustee also included a notation that Mr. Willingham had sold San Bernardino Property postpetition.
6 almost seventeen months after the November 2, 2020, deadline to file a
proof of claim.) Claims 6 through 8 implicated claims that she allegedly
held against her husband or his interest in the San Bernardino Property
and Texas Property. Claim 9 asserted a claim for “exemption for rental
deposit,” and Claim 10 sought reimbursement for removal of solar panels
from the Solvang Property.
The Trustee objected to Ms. Willingham’s proofs of claim. He argued
that her claims were against her husband, who was not a debtor in the case;
moreover, she could not be a creditor of herself and could not maintain a
claim against her own estate. Finally, the proofs of claim were untimely, as
they were filed over a year after the claims bar date and over ten days after
E. Hearings on the Trustee’s Final Report and the claim objections
The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the Trustee’s Final Report.
On July 25, 2022, the court entered the Order on Final Fee Applications,
which approved payment to the Trustee and his professionals.
Three days later, the Trustee filed a motion to amend the Trustee’s
Final Report to seek additional compensation for his efforts to object to
Ms. Willingham’s late proofs of claim.
The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the claim objections on
August 25, 2022. Ms. Willingham appeared pro se.5 The bankruptcy court
5 Around this time, Ms. Willingham’s attorney withdrew as counsel, pursuant to an order entered August 1, 2022. 7 explained to Ms. Willingham that it was improper for her to file proofs of
claim against her own estate. But it discovered that, although
Ms. Willingham’s counsel had received a copy of the Trustee’s Final
Report, she may not have seen the report. It set the matter for further
hearing to allow Ms. Willingham a chance to review the Trustee’s Final
Report and directed her to file a response indicating whether she had an
objection.
On August 30, 2022, the bankruptcy court entered orders sustaining
the Trustee’s claim objections (“Claim Objection Orders”).
The bankruptcy court held a continued hearing on October 13, 2022.
Ms. Willingham did not file any document prior to the hearing and
appeared at the hearing pro se. We do not have a transcript of the hearing,
so we do not know what the court or Ms. Willingham said. But the court
later entered a written order in which it noted that no one had filed an
opposition and granted the motion to amend.
F. The docket entry closing the bankruptcy case
On March 9, 2023, the Trustee filed his Final Account and
Distribution Report. He reported that all funds had been distributed
pursuant to the Trustee’s Final Report and that the case was fully
administered.
The following day, on March 10, 2023, the bankruptcy court entered
the following docket entry (“Docket Entry”) closing the case:
Bankruptcy Case Closed - CHAPTER 7 ASSET. Pursuant to the
8 Trustee’s Final Account and Distribution Report Certification that the Estate has been Fully Administered and Application to be Discharged, it is ordered that the above case be closed. No objections having been made by the United States Trustee, the trustee is discharged and the bond is exonerated.
The docket entry does not include an electronic signature of a judge or
clerk. There was no separate written order closing the case.
G. Ms. Willingham’s appeal
Over a month later, on April 12, 2023, Ms. Willingham filed a notice
of appeal from the Docket Entry closing the bankruptcy case and a motion
to extend time to appeal. She indicated that she intended to appeal from
the March 10, 2023 Docket Entry closing her case. She acknowledged that
her notice of appeal was past the fourteen-day deadline; however, she
argued that she was allowed an additional twenty-one days under Rule
8002(d) for excusable neglect because she did not receive notice of the
Docket Entry closing the case until April 3, 2023.
On November 9, 2023, after the bankruptcy court granted
Ms. Willingham’s “motion for an extension of time for the Debtor to file a
notice of appeal of the closing of the bankruptcy case,” Ms. Willingham
filed another notice of appeal, which we construed as an amended notice of
appeal.
On December 1, 2023, Ms. Willingham filed yet another notice of
9 appeal that expanded the scope of the earlier notices of appeal.6
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and
157(b)(2)(A) and (B). Subject to our discussion below, we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
ISSUES
Whether Ms. Willingham’s appeal is timely.
Whether the bankruptcy court erred in closing the bankruptcy case
even though the Trustee did not prosecute Ms. Willingham’s alleged claims
against her husband.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review for an abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s decision
to authorize or deny abandonment of estate property or to prevent a
technical abandonment. See Viet Vu v. Kendall (In re Viet Vu), 245 B.R. 644,
647 (9th Cir. BAP 2000) (“[T]he court’s decision to authorize or deny
abandonment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” (quoting Johnston v.
Webster (In re Johnston), 49 F.3d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1995)); DeVore v. Marshack
(In re DeVore), 223 B.R. 193, 198 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (“[C]ourts have
discretion to affect or prevent technical abandonment simply by ordering
6 At oral argument, Ms. Willingham presented two documents for consideration. We do not consider late-filed documents, particularly where they attempt to state facts that, as far as the record reveals, she never brought to the bankruptcy court’s attention. However, even if we were to consider Ms. Willingham’s submissions, they would not alter our decision. 10 otherwise.”). To determine whether the bankruptcy court has abused its
discretion, we conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) we review de novo whether
the bankruptcy court “identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief
requested[,]” and (2) if it did, we consider whether the bankruptcy court’s
application of the legal standard was illogical, implausible, or without
support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.
United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
DISCUSSION
Because Ms. Willingham is not an attorney and is not represented by
counsel, she is unfamiliar with the appellate rules and with the limits on
this Panel’s jurisdiction. Because we have a duty to determine whether and
to what extent we have jurisdiction to consider her appeal, we must
address the procedural problems. But even if she had not committed any
procedural errors, her appeal would not succeed, because the Trustee did
what bankruptcy trustees are supposed to do.
A. The Docket Entry
Congress has given the BAP jurisdiction to hear appeals “from final
judgments, orders, and decrees[.]” § 158(a)(1). The Ninth Circuit has stated
that “[a] disposition is final if it contains ‘a complete act of adjudication,’
that is, a full adjudication of the issues at bar, and clearly evidences the
judge’s intention that it be the court’s final act in the matter.” Slimick v.
Silva (In re Slimick), 928 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir. 1990); see Ritzen Grp., Inc. v.
Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 587 (2020) (“By providing for appeals
11 from final decisions in bankruptcy ‘proceedings,’ as distinguished from
bankruptcy ‘cases,’ Congress made orders in bankruptcy cases . . .
immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within
the larger bankruptcy case. In short, the usual judicial unit for analyzing
finality in ordinary civil litigation is the case, but in bankruptcy, it is often
the proceeding.” (cleaned up)).
The Docket Entry is not in the usual form of a judgment, order or
decree. But “[e]ven a minute entry order can be a final, appealable order ‘if
it fully adjudicates the issues and clearly evidences the court’s intent that
the order be the court’s final act.’” Key Bar Invs., Inc. v. Cahn (In re Cahn),
188 B.R. 627, 630 (9th Cir. BAP 1995) (quoting McDonald v. Sperna (In re
Sperna), 173 B.R. 654, 657 (9th Cir. BAP 1994)). The Ninth Circuit has
determined that “[a] minute entry may constitute a dispositive order for
notice of appeal purposes if it: (1) states that it is an order; (2) is mailed to
counsel; (3) is signed by the clerk who prepared it; and (4) is entered on the
docket sheet.” Ingram v. ACandS, Inc., 977 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1992).
Cf. Carswell v. Rojas (In re Carswell), BAP No. CC-15-1100-KuKiTa, 2015 WL
8775748, at *5 (9th Cir. BAP Dec. 11, 2015) (remanding the appeal from a
docket entry closing the adversary proceeding where “[t]here is no
dispositive language in the docket entry to that effect [that it was a
dispositive ruling]”). But if the minute order does not meet the above-
requirements and “is not followed by a properly entered dispositive order,
this court will have appellate jurisdiction when a notice of appeal is filed
12 any time after the district court’s ruling.” Id. at 1339.
The Docket Entry did not include a signature by the judge or clerk,
and there was no proof of service indicating that it was delivered to
counsel or Ms. Willingham (although she admits that she eventually
received notice of the case closure).7 However, the Docket Entry reflects the
bankruptcy court’s final intention to close the case after fully adjudicating
the issues as bar, and, indeed, the bankruptcy court did not enter a
separate, more definitive order from which Ms. Willingham could
subsequently appeal. We hold that the Docket Entry is an appealable order
and that Ms. Willingham properly appealed from the Docket Entry when
she filed her notice of appeal.
Ms. Willingham argues that the Trustee should have pursued her
claims against her husband. She asserts that Mr. Willingham “defrauded
her on two occasions” with regard to using community assets toward the
San Bernardino Property and Texas Property. She claims that the Trustee
“did nothing to defend Debtor’s claim” and maintains that it was the
Trustee’s duty “to restore Debtor’s property to her[,]” because the “claims
of loss due to her spouse’s fraud are valid secured claims against the real
property in question.” We see no error.
When the bankruptcy court closed the case, all of the assets of
7 We also note that the bankruptcy court’s order granting the motion to extend time to appeal could arguably indicate that it intended the Docket Entry as a final order and could have led Ms. Willingham to believe that the Docket Entry was an appealable order. 13 Ms. Willingham’s estate, including her claims against Mr. Willingham,
reverted to her. Section 554(c) provides that, “[u]nless the court orders
otherwise, any property scheduled under section 521(a)(1) of this title not
otherwise administered at the time of the closing of a case is abandoned to
the debtor and administered for purposes of section 350 of this title.” See
Schwaber v. Reed (In re Reed), 89 B.R. 100, 103 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (Under
§ 554(c), “once the bankruptcy case is closed, all scheduled, unadministered,
and non-exempt property of the estate is deemed abandoned.”),
subsequently aff’d, 940 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1991). “The abandonment of
property of the estate that results from the closing of a case is commonly
referred to as a ‘technical abandonment’ because it occurs automatically,
without any notice or hearing.” In re Gonzalez, 302 B.R. 687, 691 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 2003).
“[T]he prefatory language of § 554(c), ‘unless the court orders
otherwise,’ indicates that courts have discretion to affect or prevent
technical abandonment simply by ordering otherwise.” In re DeVore, 223
B.R. at 198. We have stated that the bankruptcy court can prevent or undo
technical abandonment in “appropriate circumstances,” which “depend on
a finding that the property in question was not properly scheduled . . . or
on equitable considerations.” Id. In this case, Ms. Willingham has not
shown any “appropriate circumstances” warranting reversal of the
technical abandonment of her claims and real property. She only states that
the Trustee should have pursued the claims against her husband and the
14 properties. But the bankruptcy court correctly declined to require the
Trustee to administer Ms. Willingham’s purported claims, particularly
where the Trustee’s administration has already resulted in a surplus estate.
See generally In re Reed, 178 B.R. 817, 821 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1995) (“The
Trustee is not, however, required to pursue every asset or cause of action
belonging to the estate. . . . If the asset is disclosed, and unadministered
during the bankruptcy proceeding, it is deemed abandoned once the case
has been closed.” (citations omitted)); Jubber v. Bird (In re Bird), 577 B.R. 365,
376 (10th Cir. BAP 2017) (“[A] trustee’s duty to liquidate property of the
estate is not without its limits. In certain situations, such as when
liquidation will result in little to no payment to the unsecured creditors, the
proper course of action is for a trustee to abandon the property pursuant to
§ 554.”).
Put another way, the Trustee is the “representative of the estate.”
§ 323(a). He is not Ms. Willingham’s representative or attorney, and he did
not owe her a duty to vindicate her claims against her husband. Section 704
prescribes his duties, and we discern nothing in this appeal that suggests
misconduct or a dereliction of those duties. Furthermore, as the Trustee
points out, the abandonment of the San Bernardino Property and Texas
Property means that Ms. Willingham is free to pursue whatever claims she
believes that she has against those properties. In short, she cannot force the
Trustee to prosecute her claims for her benefit, and the bankruptcy
proceedings did not affect her present ability to prosecute the abandoned
15 claims on her own.
B. The Trustee’s Final Account and Trustee’s Final Report
The Trustee’s Final Account and Trustee’s Final Report are not orders
or judgments. These documents were merely the Trustee’s reports to the
court that he had fully administered the estate, including paying creditors
as the court had previously approved. They are evidence that the Trustee
complied with the Code and the court’s orders; they are not orders of the
court from which Ms. Willingham could appeal.
Construed liberally, Ms. Willingham might be appealing from the
bankruptcy court’s approval of the Trustee’s Final Report, which it
memorialized in the Order on Final Fee Applications on July 25, 2022. This
order is a judgment, order, or decree from which one may appeal. See, e.g.,
Stanley v. Crossland, Crossland, Chambers, MacArthur & Lastreto (In re
Lakeshore Vill. Resort, Ltd.), 81 F.3d 103, 105 (9th Cir. 1996) (determining that
the order denying the chapter 7 trustee’s attorneys’ fee application was a
final order for purposes of appeal). But, as we explain in the next section,
Ms. Willingham filed her notice of appeal too late.
Even if Ms. Willingham had filed a timely notice of appeal, we would
still affirm because (as far as the record shows) she failed to present her
objections to the bankruptcy court. Ms. Willingham argues that she did not
have notice of the Trustee’s Final Report, but it is undisputed that her
counsel had notice of the Trustee’s Final Report and did not object.
Additionally, even after the bankruptcy court approved the Trustee’s Final
16 Report, it gave Ms. Willingham another opportunity to object to the
Trustee’s Final Report; yet she failed to do so. 8 Because Ms. Willingham did
not timely object to the Trustee’s Final Report in the bankruptcy court, she
cannot do so now for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d
983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that we do not consider arguments and
allegations raised for the first time on appeal).
C. The remainder of the appeal
Ms. Willingham argues that the bankruptcy court erred in
transferring half of the homestead exemption to the trustee of her
husband’s bankruptcy estate and denying her proofs of claim. These orders
became final months (and sometimes years) before she filed her notice of
appeal, and this portion of her appeal must be dismissed as untimely.
Under Rule 8002(a)(1), “[e]xcept as provided in subdivisions (b) and
(c), a notice of appeal must be filed with the bankruptcy clerk within 14
days after entry of the judgment, order, or decree being appealed.”
Subsection (d)(1) allows the bankruptcy court to “extend the time to file a
notice of appeal upon a party’s motion that is filed[ ]” either “within the
time prescribed by this rule[ ]” or “within 21 days after that time, if the
8 In her reply brief and at oral argument, Ms. Willingham complains for the first time about the sale of farm vehicles and a tax return filed by the Trustee. We do not consider arguments not presented in the appellant’s opening brief. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[O]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”). Even if we did consider these arguments, they were untimely and waived for the same reasons stated above.
17 party shows excusable neglect.” Rule 8002(d)(1)(A) & (B). “[T]he 14-day
time deadline in Rule 8002(a) is a jurisdictional requirement that acts as an
immutable constraint on our authority to consider and hear appeals.”
Wilkins v. Menchaca (In re Wilkins), 587 B.R. 97, 107 (9th Cir. BAP 2018).
The bankruptcy court’s decisions to approve the sale, direct the
Trustee to pay approximately half of the homestead exemption to
Ms. Willingham, and approve the release of the remainder of the
homestead exemption to the Texas trustee implicate the Sale Order,
Supplemental Sale Order, and Disbursal Order. Those orders were entered
between December 2020 and April 2021. They are final orders that were
immediately appealable. See, e.g., In re Douglas J. Roger, M.D., Inc., APC, 393
F. Supp. 3d 940, 955-56 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (holding that a sale order is a final,
appealable order under the “pragmatic approach”); In re Gilman, 887 F.3d
at 961-63 (holding that an order allowing or disallowing an exemption was
final as an appealable judgment). Because Ms. Willingham did not file her
notice of appeal within the time prescribed in Rule 8002, and in fact
initiated this appeal years later on April 12, 2023, her appeal of those orders
is untimely.9 As a result, we lack jurisdiction to consider her appeal of
9 Additionally, Ms. Willingham did not object to the division of the homestead exemption and has waived that issue on appeal. In fact, at the February 2, 2021 hearing, her counsel agreed that the court’s analysis was “correct” and stated that “granting the relief requested by the trustee . . . makes sense . . . .” Ms. Willingham did not object to the court’s ruling or object to the subsequent agreement between the trustees to turn over the homestead exemption balance to the trustee of her husband’s estate.
18 those orders.
Similarly, Ms. Willingham challenges the bankruptcy court’s Claim
Objection Orders. She says that she was a creditor, had a secured interest in
the Texas Property, and was entitled to moving expenses.
The Claim Objection Orders were final orders entered on August 25,
2022. See, e.g., Slimick v. Silva (In re Slimick), 928 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the order on appeal was a “complete act of adjudication”
because it was an order “sustaining the trustee’s objections to the debtors’
amended exemption claim, finally resolved all issues regarding the claimed
exemption”). Ms. Willingham’s notice of appeal on April 12, 2023 was half
a year beyond the outer limit to seek an extension of time to appeal. Thus,
the appeal of the Claim Objection Orders was also untimely, and we lack
jurisdiction over that portion of her appeal. 10
Ms. Willingham may think that the bankruptcy court’s order
granting her an extension of time to appeal gave her carte blanche to
appeal from any order. However, the bankruptcy court only granted the
“motion for an extension of time for the Debtor to file a notice of appeal of
the closing of the bankruptcy case . . . .” (Emphasis added.) It did not
purport to allow a timely appeal of any other order. Moreover, it could not
have extended the time to appeal those orders even if it wanted to do so.
10 Even if this appeal were timely, we would easily affirm. Ms. Willingham cannot be a creditor of her own estate. She was probably trying to assert claims against her husband, but a proof of claim in her case was not a correct way to do that. 19 Ms. Willingham had to file her motion to extend time no later than thirty-
five days after the entry of the orders she wished to appeal. Rule
8002(d)(1)(B). She waited between seven months and two years, so her
motion filed on April 12, 2023, was untimely.
CONCLUSION
The bankruptcy court did not err in closing the case without
requiring the Trustee to prosecute claims against Mr. Willingham.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM that portion of the appeal. Additionally,
Ms. Willingham’s appeal was untimely as to the orders concerning the sale
of the Solvang Property, the disposition of the homestead exemption, and
the Trustee’s objections to her proofs of claim. We thus DISMISS the
remainder of the appeal.