NOTICE 2016 IL App (5th) 130573 Decision filed 05/31/16. The text of this decision may be NO. 5-13-0573 changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Peti ion for Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________
In re DEBRA B., Alleged to Be a Person ) Appeal from the Subject to Involuntary Treatment With ) Circuit Court of Psychotropic Medication ) Madison County. ) (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) No. 13-MH-156 Appellee, v. Debra B., Respondent-Appellant). ) ) Honorable Thomas W. Chapman, ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Schwarm and Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The respondent, Debra B., appeals a trial court order authorizing the involuntary
administration of psychotropic medication to her. See 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 (West 2012).
She argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) she
was suffering as a result of her mental illness; or (2) her ability to function had
deteriorated since the onset of her symptoms. She also argues that the State failed to
prove that she was unable to make a reasoned decision regarding the medications because
the record does not establish that she was informed about alternatives to medication. The
State argues that we should dismiss this appeal because it is moot. We find that review is
1 appropriate under the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine, and we reverse
the trial court's order.
¶2 Debra B. has a lengthy mental health history. Although the record does not
contain a detailed history, Debra's treating psychiatrist indicated that Debra was
previously admitted for treatment in a mental health facility multiple times, including
both voluntary and involuntary admissions. She was first admitted to a facility in the
mid-1980s. There was some evidence to suggest that she was able to function reasonably
well between hospitalizations, at least some of the time. She testified that she owned her
own home, raised a daughter alone, and cared for her elderly mother and several pets.
¶3 In 2013, Debra B. was found unfit to stand trial on a charge of aggravated battery.
On October 2, 2013, she was admitted to the forensic unit at Alton Mental Health Center
(Alton). Her previous admissions were all to the civil unit. On October 21, Dr.
Jagannath Patil became Debra's treating psychiatrist. On October 25, he filed a document
with the trial court entitled "petition and affidavit for involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication."
¶4 On November 5, 2013, the court held a hearing on the petition. Dr. Patil testified
that Debra B. had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, manic with psychotic symptoms.
He explained that her symptoms included racing thoughts, pressured speech, increased
psychomotor activity, florid mania, and grandiose delusions. Among her delusions,
Debra believed that she was a home-educated medical doctor, the queen of
Czechoslovakia, and "smarter than anyone around." Dr. Patil testified that Debra had a
2 history of asthma, head trauma, and substance abuse. He noted that he did not know her
entire medical history.
¶5 Dr. Patil testified that Debra was sleeping adequately since he began administering
medication to her on an emergency basis. He did not provide any information concerning
how little sleep she was getting prior to being medicated, nor did he provide any
information on how this affected Debra.
¶6 Dr. Patil was asked if he believed that Debra B. had experienced a deterioration in
her ability to function. See 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(B)(i) (West 2012). He
responded, "Yes." Asked to elaborate, Dr. Patil testified that she engaged in intrusive
behavior towards staff and other patients. He explained, "She has been into everyone's
business on the unit." Asked to be more specific about Debra being intrusive and "into
the business" of other patients, Dr. Patil stated, "She always aggravates the peers. Talks
to them." He testified that Debra accused other patients "of phone sex and things." He
noted that these behaviors had improved with the administration of medication on an
emergency basis.
¶7 Dr. Patil was then asked if he believed that Debra B. was suffering. See 405 ILCS
5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(B)(ii) (West 2012). He replied, "Yes, she is." Asked to explain why
he believed Debra was suffering, he explained, "All the symptoms that she exhibited is a
suffering basically. She cannot function because of the suffering of these symptoms."
Dr. Patil noted that Debra "writes numerous papers" which "indicate that she is
suffering." He stated that she was "incessantly writing." He then described the content
of some of Debra's writings. We note that the writings themselves were not admitted into
3 evidence, and it is not clear from Dr. Patil's testimony whether he was reading from these
writings as he testified or describing them from memory.
¶8 Dr. Patil first described a paper Debra wrote which was received by a staff
member on October 17, 2013. In it, Debra wrote, "Respect. Learn the Ten
Commandments. I am the Lord. God will not put any God in front of me." The letter
went on to recite some of the Ten Commandments. It ended, "I am tired of this bullshit.
Get it together. You have been warned." It was signed by "God." Dr. Patil described
another letter from the same date. In it, Debra wrote, "God is love." She went on to
write, "I died for your sins. So did I." The letter was signed, "The Mother of the Holy
Ghost." Dr. Patil next described an October 18 letter in which Debra wrote, "Welcome to
hell or heaven. It is what you make it." This letter was signed, "Signed the Holy Ghost.
Yours truly, Witchpoo."
¶9 Dr. Patil next described an October 23 letter Debra wrote to Prince William and
Kate Middleton congratulating them on the christening of their son. She wrote, "I wish I
could be there to give little George Alexander gifts," and, "Tell Dad hello." She signed
the letter as "Queen Debra of Czechoslovakia." In a postscript, she stated that she hoped
to see Prince George before he learned to walk, that it was difficult for her to keep in
touch because she had no computer, and that her mother had undergone eye surgery the
previous week.
¶ 10 Finally, Dr. Patil described an October 23 letter Debra wrote to the St. Louis
Cardinals. In it, she wrote, "I just want the Cardinals to absolutely know that they are
unconquerable." She also wrote, "Numbers don't lie. Neither does the Bible. *** They
4 will never be able to outrun his love." Dr. Patil indicated that Debra asked staff members
to mail this letter to the Cardinals.
¶ 11 Dr. Patil was asked, "So these letters *** cause you to understand that she is
suffering?" He replied, "She is suffering."
¶ 12 Dr. Patil was next asked about Debra B.'s ability to make a reasoned decision
about whether to take medication. See 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(E) (West 2012). He
testified that she was not able to make a reasoned decision because she did not believe
that she had a mental illness. He acknowledged that, although Debra did not recognize
that she suffers from bipolar disorder, she did recognize that she suffers from
posttraumatic stress disorder and that she had been diagnosed with head trauma. Dr. Patil
indicated that he explained to Debra the benefits and risks of all of the medications he
proposed administering to her. He also provided her with written information about the
medications. He acknowledged that Debra was well-educated and of normal to above
normal intelligence. He further acknowledged that she was capable of reviewing this
information. Dr. Patil noted that Debra had been given several different types of
psychotropic medications in the past. Notably, however, Dr. Patil did not testify either
that he discussed alternative forms of treatment with Debra or that he provided her with
any written information regarding alternative forms of treatment.
¶ 13 Dr. Patil testified that less restrictive forms of treatment–such as therapy,
education, and redirection–had been attempted unsuccessfully. He acknowledged that
Debra willingly participated in these types of treatment. However, he opined that these
treatment options would only be effective if used in conjunction with medication. He
5 further noted that counseling in a group setting was not appropriate for Debra because of
the severity of her symptoms.
¶ 14 Dr. Patil testified that Debra B. had not exhibited any threatening behaviors since
being admitted to Alton. See 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(B)(iii) (West 2012). He noted,
however, that she "put her[self] in a dangerous situation because of many behaviors"
involving "getting in the business" of other patients. He further noted that while she was
at the St. Clair County jail prior to her admission, Debra exhibited "suicidal ideations and
manic symptoms" and "threatened the officer and his family."
¶ 15 Debra B. also testified. She stated that she had no desire to harm anyone,
including herself. She was aware that she had been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress
disorder and head trauma. She stated, however, that she was "not suffering from it at this
time." In addition, Debra denied that she suffered from bipolar disorder. She testified
that she was involuntarily admitted to Alton in 1996 only because her husband "made
[her] look bipolar" because he did not want her "to take anything that [she] had worked
for." Debra testified that she was willing to participate in therapy. She further testified
that she considered writing to be a form of therapy, noting that she kept a journal.
¶ 16 Debra B. explained her unwillingness to take medication as follows: "I don't feel
like I need medication. I'm a psychologist. I've got my Ph.D. I feel like I do not deserve
to have to take this medication. I've had cancer. I've got glaucoma. I've got
osteoarthritis. I don't need these medications to make my illnesses worse." She further
explained that the medication being administered to her on an emergency basis made her
so tired that she was "sleeping around the clock." She stated that before being medicated,
6 she slept six to eight hours per night. As a result, she testified, she was often too tired to
eat or take a shower.
¶ 17 Debra's attorney asked her if she was refusing to take medication because she
believed it would cause her to suffer. In response, Debra testified that she was suffering
because she was at Alton. She explained that she missed her 20-year-old daughter and
worried that her daughter would not be able to handle taking care of Debra's three-story
house, 75-year-old mother, four dogs, and two cats. Debra testified that she believed the
medication would cause her to suffer more.
¶ 18 Following the hearing, the court entered an order authorizing the involuntary
administration of psychotropic medications to Debra B. The court found that the State
had not proved that Debra exhibited threatening behavior. However, the court found by
clear and convincing evidence that she was suffering, that her ability to function had
deteriorated, and that she lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision regarding her
treatment. Debra B. timely filed the instant appeal challenging that order.
¶ 19 Before addressing the merits of Debra's arguments, we must first address the
State's argument that we should dismiss this appeal. As the State correctly contends, this
appeal is technically moot. The order authorizing the involuntary administration of
medication to Debra B. was entered on November 5, 2013, and expired 90 days later.
See 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(5) (West 2012). It is therefore impossible for this court to
grant her effective relief from that order. See In re Joseph M., 398 Ill. App. 3d 1086,
1087 (2010). This fact means that our decision in this matter is "essentially an advisory
opinion." In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1101 (2003). This court does not have
7 jurisdiction to decide a moot question or render an advisory opinion unless the case falls
within an exception to the mootness doctrine. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 351
(2009). Mental health cases "usually fall within one of the established exceptions to the
mootness doctrine." Id. at 355. However, "there is no per se exception" applicable to all
mental health cases. Id. Instead, we must decide on a case-by-case basis whether one of
the recognized exceptions applies. Id.
¶ 20 One such exception is the public-interest exception. Under the public-interest
exception, we may consider an otherwise moot appeal if (1) the case presents a question
of a public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative determination to guide public
officials; and (3) it is likely that the question will recur. Id. All three of these criteria
must be met for the exception to apply. Id. at 355-56.
¶ 21 We find that the instant case meets all three criteria. First, we have long
recognized that the procedures a court must follow before it may "authorize the
involuntary medication of mental health patients are a matter of 'substantial public
concern.' " In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1102 (quoting In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.
2d 393, 402 (2002)). This does not mean that all mental health cases raise questions of a
public nature. As our supreme court has explained, cases challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence "are inherently case-specific," as a result of which such cases usually "do
not present the kinds of broad public[-]interest issues" presented by most other mental
health cases. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 356-57. It is important to emphasize that
the court did not hold that a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim will never involve the type
8 of public concerns necessary to bring it within the public-interest exception. See In re
Joseph M., 405 Ill. App. 3d 1167, 1173 (2010).
¶ 22 Although the instant case involves a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
we believe that the questions raised by Debra B. have "broader implications than most
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims" (id.). As we will discuss, Debra does not merely ask
us to assess the strength of the particular evidence presented here. Instead, she argues
that the court's order was flawed because Dr. Patil's testimony addressed the fact that she
was "suffering from" symptoms of a mental illness without addressing how she was
"suffering" as a result. She also argues that the State was required to prove that there was
some physical manifestation to her suffering. Similarly, she argues that the State must
demonstrate that her symptoms are adversely impacting her ability to take care of her
health or safety before a court may find that her ability to function has deteriorated.
These questions relate to the substance of what the State must demonstrate in order to
prove that involuntary medication is warranted. We find this to be a matter of great
public concern. Thus, the first criterion is met in this case.
¶ 23 Second, we believe that a definitive decision is needed to provide guidance. As
Debra points out, only two appellate decisions squarely address the question of what
constitutes "suffering" sufficient to warrant involuntary medication–In re Wendy T., 406
Ill. App. 3d 185 (2010), overruled on other grounds by In re Rita P., 2014 IL 115798, ¶¶
33-34; In re Lisa P., 381 Ill. App. 3d 1087 (2008). Third, because of the short duration of
orders authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication, the
questions presented in this appeal are likely to recur without the opportunity to be fully
9 litigated before becoming moot. See In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d at 402-03; In re
Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1102. We will therefore consider Debra B.'s arguments
under the public-interest exception.
¶ 24 In order for a respondent to be subject to the involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication, the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that (1)
the respondent suffers from a serious mental illness (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(A)
(West 2012)); (2) the benefit of the medication outweighs the harm (405 ILCS 5/2-
107.1(a-5)(4)(D) (West 2012)); and (3) other less restrictive types of treatment have been
explored and found to be inappropriate (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(F) (West 2012)). In
addition, the State must show that, as a result of the respondent's mental illness, at least
one of the following is true: (1) she is suffering; (2) there has been a deterioration in her
ability to function; or (3) she is exhibiting threatening behavior. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-
5)(4)(B) (West 2012). Finally, the State must also prove that the respondent lacks the
capacity to make a reasoned decision about whether to take the medication. 405 ILCS
5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(E) (West 2012). In this case, the only questions are whether the State
proved that Debra B. lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision and whether it
proved either that she was suffering or that her ability to function had deteriorated. We
review the court's factual findings to determine whether they were against the manifest
weight of the evidence. In re Wendy T., 406 Ill. App. 3d at 192.
¶ 25 Debra's first contention is that the State failed to demonstrate that she lacked the
capacity to make a reasoned decision regarding the medications because it failed to prove
10 she was provided with written information regarding reasonable alternatives to
medication. See 405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West 2012). We agree.
¶ 26 Proof that a respondent has been advised and given written information about
alternatives to medication is crucial for two reasons. First, this is explicitly required
under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code).
405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West 2012). Strict compliance with the procedural safeguards
found in the Mental Health Code is essential in order to protect the rights of patients. In
re John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d 778, 785 (2003). Failure to comply with this requirement is a
sufficient basis to reverse an order authorizing involuntary treatment. In re Bobby F.,
2012 IL App (5th) 110214, ¶ 20; In re Nicholas L., 407 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1073 (2011).
¶ 27 Second, adequate proof that a respondent has been provided with all of the
information necessary to make a reasoned decision is crucial to a determination
concerning the respondent's capacity to make such a decision. In re Bobby F., 2012 IL
App (5th) 110214, ¶ 18 (quoting In re John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d at 783). Respondents in
mental health cases are presumed to be competent to make decisions regarding their care.
In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d 965, 974 (2009) (citing 405 ILCS 5/2-101 (West
2006)). If the respondent has the capacity to make decisions regarding her care, she has
the right to refuse to be medicated even if the medication is "clearly in that individual's
best interests." In re John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d at 782-83. A respondent has the capacity
to make reasoned decisions regarding her treatment if, "based upon the conveyed
information concerning the side effects, risks, benefits, and reasonable alternatives to the
proposed treatment, [she] makes a reasoned choice to either accept or refuse the
11 treatment." (Emphases added.) In re Bobby F., 2012 IL App (5th) 110214, ¶ 18. It
would be at odds with these principles to allow a court to find that a respondent lacks the
capacity to make a reasoned decision without evidence that the respondent has all the
information necessary to make such a decision. See In re Steven T., 2014 IL App (5th)
130328, ¶ 14; In re John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d at 783.
¶ 28 As we stated earlier, Dr. Patil testified that he gave Debra B. the required written
information about the medications he proposed giving her. He also testified that he gave
her written information about the medications he proposed administering to her if his
preferred medications were ineffective or produced serious side effects. He did not,
however, testify that he discussed with Debra or provided her with any written
information regarding alternatives to medication. Thus, there was no information in the
record to allow the court to conclude that Debra had been provided with this information.
¶ 29 The State calls our attention to the petition and affidavit filed by Dr. Patil. That
document appears to be a preprinted form. One provision states, "I have explained the
risks and the intended benefits of the treatment, as well as alternative forms of the
treatment, to the recipient." Dr. Patil checked a box marked "Yes" after this statement.
The next provision states, "And I also have provided that information in written or
printed form to the recipient." Again, Dr. Patil checked the box marked "Yes" after the
statement. The document was filed with the court, but it was not entered into evidence.
The State argues that the petition and affidavit provided sufficient proof to rebut any
claim that Dr. Patil did not provide Debra B. with the requisite information. We disagree.
12 ¶ 30 Although the State cites no authority in support of its contention, we acknowledge
that the Third District found that a supporting affidavit filed with the petition constituted
"uncontroverted evidence" that the treating psychiatrist provided the necessary
information to the respondent regarding the risks and benefits of the proposed
medication. In re E.F., 2014 IL App (3d) 130814, ¶ 59. (We note parenthetically that the
In re E.F. court nevertheless reversed the order because it found no indication that the
State had provided the respondent with written information about alternatives to
medication. Id. ¶ 60.) However, this court has repeatedly held that allegations in a
petition and information in supporting documents are not sufficient to support an order
authorizing involuntary treatment if they are not admitted into evidence. See In re Bobby
F., 2012 IL App (5th) 110214, ¶¶ 22-23; In re Phillip E., 385 Ill. App. 3d 278, 284
(2008). We note that the Fourth District has consistently reached the same conclusion.
See In re A.W., 381 Ill. App. 3d 950, 957 (2008); In re Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d 774, 780
(2005). This is because we must decide the sufficiency of the evidence based solely on
the evidence presented at the hearing. In re Bobby F., 2012 IL App (5th) 110214, ¶ 23
(quoting In re Laura H., 404 Ill. App. 3d 286, 291 (2010)). Here, evidence that Debra
received the necessary information may well have existed, but it was not admitted into
evidence at the hearing.
¶ 31 The State also argues that because Dr. Patil testified that alternative forms of
therapy were not effective, "there were no appropriate alternatives" about which to
inform Debra B. In support of this contention, the State cites In re Vanessa K., 2011 IL
13 App (3d) 100545. We find In re Vanessa K. distinguishable because it did not address
the precise issue before us in this case.
¶ 32 There, Vanessa K.'s treating psychiatrist filed a petition to involuntarily administer
psychotropic medication to Vanessa. Specifically, he sought authority to administer
Risperdal, an antipsychotic. He listed 20 different medications as alternatives. Id. ¶ 3.
Among the 20 alternative medications he proposed was Prolixin (id.), an antipsychotic
medication that Vanessa had taken in the past which had been effective (id. ¶ 23). At a
hearing on the petition, the psychiatrist testified that subsequent to filing the petition, he
determined that Prolixin would be a better drug for Vanessa than Risperdal. Id. He
explained that when he filed the petition, he was not aware that Vanessa had used
Prolixin in the past. Id. ¶ 8.
¶ 33 Based on this testimony, the trial court determined that the petition should be
amended to substitute Prolixin as the primary medication. Id. ¶ 9. Both parties objected.
The court adjourned for 10 minutes, advising the parties to decide whether they wanted to
amend the petition. Id. During the 10-minute break, the psychiatrist provided both oral
and written information to Vanessa about the benefits, risks, and possible side effects of
Prolixin, and he testified to this fact when court reconvened. Id. Prior to the break, he
acknowledged that he had not previously given Vanessa the required written information.
Id. ¶ 8.
¶ 34 On appeal, Vanessa did not contend that her doctor failed to provide her with
information about alternatives to medication. Instead, she argued that the order
authorizing treatment "must be reversed because she was not provided written
14 information about all the medication approved for adminstration by the court, noting the
lengthy list of alternative medications attached to the order." (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 21.
In rejecting this argument, the Third District noted that "there was no need to provide
information on all the medications listed as alternatives in the attachment" because
Vanessa's doctor "did not consider them to be viable options." Id. ¶ 23. This is the
language relied upon by the State to support its position in this case. More importantly,
however, the In re Vanessa K. court twice emphasized that the trial court's order did not
authorize the administration of any drug other than Prolixin. Id. This fact negated
Vanessa's claim that she did not receive written information on all of the medications
authorized by the court. We have already concluded that the State's failure to offer
evidence that Dr. Patil provided Debra with oral or written information about alternative
forms of treatment requires reversal. In re Vanessa K. does not require us to reach a
different result.
¶ 35 Debra next argues that the State did not prove either that she was suffering or that
her ability to function had deteriorated since the onset of her symptoms. As the State
correctly notes, it was only required to prove one of these propositions. See In re Lisa P.,
381 Ill. App. 3d at 1095. We will address these arguments in turn; however, we will first
discuss the principles applicable to both questions.
¶ 36 We begin by emphasizing the importance of the rights at stake. As Illinois courts
have repeatedly stated, "the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs involves a
'massive curtailment of liberty.' " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Joseph M.,
398 Ill. App. 3d at 1089-90 (quoting In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 46 (2004), quoting In
15 re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 496 (1998), quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491
(1980)). The right to refuse these medications is among "the 'liberty' interests recognized
in constitutional jurisprudence." In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 213 (1994). There are "[t]wo
fundamental concerns" that underscore the importance of protecting this right. Id. at 214.
Our first concern is "the substantially invasive nature of psychotropic substances and
their significant side effects." Id. Our second concern is the potential for these drugs to
be used for patient management and control rather than for treatment. Id. at 215. Thus,
even during involuntary admissions, a mental health patient retains the right "to remain
free from unwarranted intrusions into [her] body and mind." In re Orr, 176 Ill. App. 3d
498, 512 (1988) (citing Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982)). For this reason, we
believe it is imperative that before a respondent may be forced to take psychotropic
medication against her will, the State must prove something more than the fact that a
patient is mentally ill or the fact that the patient is subject to involuntary admission
because of her illness.
¶ 37 In addition, we reiterate that the State must prove that involuntary medication is
appropriate by clear and convincing evidence. This standard requires the State to present
expert medical testimony. See In re Joseph M., 398 Ill. App. 3d at 1090. Generally, the
testimony of an expert medical witness coupled with the court's observation of the
respondent is sufficient to meet this standard. In re Perona, 294 Ill. App. 3d 755, 766
(1998). However, expert testimony is not sufficient unless the medical expert testifies to
specific facts to support his opinions. See In re Joseph M., 398 Ill. App. 3d at 1090.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the parties' contentions.
16 ¶ 38 In support of her contention that the State did not meet its burden of proving that
she was suffering, Debra points out that the Mental Health Code does not define the term
"suffering." As such, she correctly contends, we must give the word its plain and
ordinary meaning. See Cojeunaze Nursing Center v. Lumpkin, 260 Ill. App. 3d 1024,
1029 (1994). She further contends that the dictionary definitions of suffering include
physical, mental, and emotional pain or distress. See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 1179 (1988) (defining suffering as "pain" and noting that "distress" is a
synonym); Black's Law Dictionary 1109 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "pain and suffering" as
a "[t]erm used to describe not only physical discomfort and distress but also mental and
emotional trauma"). Thus, to prove that a respondent is suffering, the State must show
that she is experiencing physical pain or emotional distress. As we will explain, we agree
with Debra that Dr. Patil's testimony did not support such a finding.
¶ 39 Debra calls our attention to the cases of In re Wendy T. and In re Lisa P. In In re
Wendy T., the respondent's illness resulted in disorganized thinking. This made it
impossible for her to carry on ordinary conversations, process what other people said to
her, or make decisions. In re Wendy T., 406 Ill. App. 3d at 187-88. Her treating
psychiatrist testified that Wendy T. often became angry because she was unable to
effectively communicate, and that she was unable to perform "simple tasks that the
average person could easily perform." Id. at 188. On appeal, the court found this
testimony sufficient to support a finding that Wendy T. was suffering. Id. at 194.
¶ 40 In In re Lisa P., the treating psychiatrist testified that Lisa P. experienced rage and
paranoia as a result of her mental illness. In re Lisa P., 381 Ill. App. 3d at 1090. The
17 psychiatrist further testified that Lisa P. "believed that her entire family was 'after [her],'
that the world was evil, and that she was a victim." Id. In addition, the trial judge
observed Lisa P. during the hearings, and he noted that she appeared to be suffering every
time he saw her in court. Id. at 1091. On appeal, the court found this evidence sufficient
to uphold the trial court's finding that she was suffering. Id. at 1095.
¶ 41 There are two significant distinctions between both of these cases and the case
before us. First, both cases included at least some evidence that the respondents were
suffering beyond a mere recitation of their symptoms. As just discussed, there was
testimony that Wendy T. was often angry because of her inability to communicate (In re
Wendy T., 406 Ill. App. 3d at 188) and that Lisa P. experienced rage, an intense negative
emotion (In re Lisa P., 381 Ill. App. 3d at 1090). In addition, Lisa P.'s demeanor in court
led the trial judge to believe she was suffering. Id. at 1091. The record in this case
contains no similar evidence.
¶ 42 Second, the symptoms experienced by both Wendy T. and Lisa P. lead more
readily to an inference that they were suffering than do the symptoms described by Dr.
Patil here. Wendy T.'s inability to manage even the simplest of tasks and her inability to
effectively communicate would obviously lead to a great deal of frustration. Lisa P.'s
extreme paranoia–particularly her belief that everyone, including her own family, was out
to get her–would cause anyone to feel isolated and fearful. The nexus in this case is less
obvious.
¶ 43 Debra argues that absent the "obvious signs of either extreme paranoia or inability
to carry out simple tasks" that were present in In re Wendy T. and In re Lisa P., the State
18 must provide some evidence of "the physical manifestations" of suffering. She notes that
such evidence might include testimony that the respondent is exhibiting "the common
physical manifestations of suffering in depression, such as crying, insomnia, changes in
appetite, or other digestive disorders."
¶ 44 Although we do not believe that evidence of physical manifestations of depression
is necessary to meet the clear-and-convincing standard, we do believe that the State must
provide some factual basis for an assertion that a respondent is suffering. For example,
the medical expert might testify that the respondent has reported feeling sorrow,
frustration, anger, anxiety, or some other intense negative emotion, or that the respondent
has behaved in a manner that indicates she is experiencing some sort of emotional
anguish. No such evidence was present in the instant case.
¶ 45 As discussed previously, Dr. Patil testified that he believed Debra was suffering.
When asked to elaborate, he simply described her grandiose delusions and other
symptoms. He did not provide any insight into why he believed these symptoms caused
her to suffer. That is, he did not explain how these symptoms caused her to feel grief,
anxiety, depression, or any other type of emotional distress. He did not even specifically
testify that Debra actually felt any of these emotions. To hold that Dr. Patil's testimony
here was sufficient to establish suffering would be tantamount to holding that any patient
with a serious mental illness is subject to involuntary administration of medication. Such
a holding would be untenable.
¶ 46 We note that Dr. Patil did testify that Debra B. was "sleeping adequately" since he
began administering medication to her on an emergency basis. This at least implies that
19 she was experiencing some difficulty in sleeping without the medication. Debra refers to
insomnia as a physical manifestation of depression and appears to acknowledge that
evidence of insomnia may therefore support a finding that a respondent is suffering. We
agree. However, there was no testimony regarding the severity or regularity of any sleep
deprivation Debra might have suffered. This does not meet the clear-and-convincing
standard.
¶ 47 In addition, we note that, as the State points out, Debra herself used the word
"suffering" in her testimony. As discussed previously, she testified that she was suffering
because she was in Alton, she missed her daughter, and she was concerned about her
daughter's ability to properly manage her home and care for her mother and her pets
while Debra was in Alton. This is not the type of "suffering" that can be alleviated by
psychotropic medication. In addition, the testimony came in response to a question in
which Debra's attorney used the word "suffering." In any case, we do not believe this
testimony provides any support for a finding that Debra was suffering. We conclude that
the State failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that Debra B. was subject to
being medicated against her will because she was suffering.
¶ 48 For similar reasons, we find that the State failed to prove the requisite
deterioration in Debra's ability to function. As previously discussed, Dr. Patil offered the
somewhat conclusory opinion that Debra's ability to function had deteriorated, and he
then described the symptoms of her mental illness. In describing her symptoms, Dr. Patil
focused on the fact that she was "into the business" of other patients and was "always
aggravating" them by "talking to them." He explained that due to her grandiose
20 delusions, Debra believed that she was able to help people. Dr. Patil did not elaborate or
give examples of how Debra "got into the business" of other patients. He did not testify
that she was violent or that she posed a threat to other patients or staff; in fact, he testified
to just the opposite.
¶ 49 We find that this testimony falls short of what is necessary to prove the type of
deterioration in ability to function sufficient to warrant the involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication for two reasons. First, the focus of most of this testimony is on
Debra's interactions with other patients. If the main goal in administering psychotropic
medication is to modify nonthreatening behavior towards other patients, this raises
serious questions concerning whether the medication is being used primarily as a means
of managing her behavior rather than as a means of treating her illness. This is precisely
the type of misuse our supreme court has warned against. See In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at
215.
¶ 50 Second, as we have repeatedly emphasized, before a mental health patient may be
medicated against her will, the State must prove more than the fact that she suffers from a
serious mental illness. Debra argues that to show deterioration in ability to function, the
State must prove that the respondent's behavior endangers her own health or threatens
others. While we find this view too constricted, we believe that the State must show a
deterioration in the respondent's ability to function on a basic level. See id. at 228
(explaining that this statutory language "must be considered in the context of the mental
illness or disability from which the mental health recipient is suffering").
21 ¶ 51 In this regard, we note that the instant case stands in marked contrast to cases in
which courts have upheld the finding that involuntary medication is warranted on the
basis of a deterioration in the respondent's ability to function. See, e.g., In re Wendy T.,
406 Ill. App. 3d at 194 (respondent was unable to carry on conversations, carry out even
simple tasks, process information, or behave appropriately in court); In re Lisa P., 381 Ill.
App. 3d at 1096 (respondent exhibited explosive rage and such inappropriate behavior
that she had to be physically restrained); In re M.T., 371 Ill. App. 3d 318, 320 (2007)
(respondent's extreme paranoia led her to stop eating for fear her food was contaminated,
barricade the entrance to her home, attempt to heat her home using an oven and a waffle
iron instead of her furnace, and refuse food even after admission to a facility); In re
Hannah C., 367 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 1023 (2006) (respondent's "health was at risk and she
was a danger to others"); In re Perona, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 766 (patient's inability or
unwillingness to remain clothed, disruptive behavior, depression, and loss of appetite
showed the deterioration of his ability to function even within the hospital environment).
¶ 52 Here, by contrast, Dr. Patil admitted that Debra was eating properly and was not
threatening staff or patients. Although he testified that she aggravated other patients, he
did not testify that she was disruptive. He specifically testified that she did not need to be
restrained or monitored on a one-on-one basis since her arrival at Alton. Both Debra and
Dr. Patil testified that Debra participated in therapy, although Dr. Patil testified that group
therapy was inappropriate due to her intrusive behavior. Debra testified that although she
was too tired to eat or shower, she forced herself to get up and shower so that she would
be permitted to use the "comfort room," which she described as a room with a recliner,
22 small table, puzzles, and stereo. From this evidence, it appears that Debra was able to
function reasonably well, at least in the environment of the facility. We therefore
conclude that the State did not show the type of deterioration in Debra's ability to
function that would support an order for involuntary administration of medication.
¶ 53 Finally, we note that the State asks us to consider Dr. Patil's testimony about
Debra's behavior at the jail before her admission. As noted earlier, he testified that she
threatened an officer and expressed suicidal ideations. We are not persuaded. The statute
explicitly provides that the court must find that the respondent's illness has been "marked
by the continuing presence of the symptoms" justifying involuntary medication "or the
repeated episodic occurrence of these symptoms." 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(C) (West
2012). Thus, we limit our consideration to the behaviors and symptoms Dr. Patil
observed that occurred on an ongoing basis at Alton. Applying these standards, we
believe the court's findings that Debra was suffering and that her ability to function had
deteriorated were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 54 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the trial court finding Debra B.
to be subject to the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.
¶ 55 Reversed.
23 2016 IL App (5th) 130573
NO. 5-13-0573
IN THE
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re DEBRA B., Alleged to Be a Person ) Appeal from the Subject to Involuntary Treatment With ) Circuit Court of Psychotropic Medication ) Madison County. ) (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) No. 13-MH-156 Appellee, v. Debra B., Respondent-Appellant). ) ) Honorable Thomas W. Chapman, ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: May 31, 2016 ______________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.
Honorable S. Gene Schwarm, P.J., and Honorable Bruce D. Stewart, J., Concur ______________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Barbara A. Goeben, Staff Attorney, Veronique Baker, Director, for Legal Advocacy Service, Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, Appellant Metro East Regional Office, 4500 College Avenue, Suite 100, Alton, IL 62002 ______________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Honorable Thomas D. Gibbons, State's Attorney, Madison County for Courthouse, 157 N. Main Street, Suite 402, Edwardsville, IL 62025; Appellee Patrick Delfino, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Whitney E. Atkins, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Fifth District Office, 730 E. Illinois Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864 ______________________________________________________________________________