In Re Dant

9 B.R. 117, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 4939, 7 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 462
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedFebruary 10, 1981
Docket19-70372
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 9 B.R. 117 (In Re Dant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Dant, 9 B.R. 117, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 4939, 7 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 462 (Va. 1981).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BLACKWELL N. SHELLEY, Bankruptcy Judge.

On April 8, 1980, Frederick V. Dant and Joan C. Dant, Debtors herein, filed a Voluntary Joint Petition in Bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of Title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code pursuant to § 302 thereof. On April 18, 1980, a plan was filed by the Debtors as required by § 1321 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.). William C. Parkinson, Jr., standing Chapter 13 trustee, in his Recommendation of Standing Trustee, filed July 22, 1980, recommended that the plan not be confirmed for the reason that “[t]he plan has not been proposed in good faith, nor does it meet the best efforts test 1325(a)(4).” On July 25,1980, a hearing on the confirmation of the plan was held as prescribed by § 1324 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.). On October 3, 1980, pursuant to a request to reopen the confirmation hearing previously held in the matter, an additional confirmation hearing was held at which time the Court requested briefs to be submitted. Upon the receipt of said briefs, and upon the foregoing, the Court renders the following opinion.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Mr. Dant is a crane operator for Brown & Root Company of Virginia, is married to Joan C. Dant, a housewife, and has four children. Neither he nor his wife has been in bankruptcy prior to the current Chapter 13 proceeding. Since the filing of the Chapter 13 petition and plan, the Debtors have been able to adhere to their proposed budget, and have in fact, been able to save a few dollars.

The Debtors’ schedules filed in this proceeding reflect that the Debtors own real and personal property valued at $3,213. With the exception of two automobiles, an offset camera, and miscellaneous jewelry, all the Debtors’ properties have been exempted under applicable Virginia exemption statutes. There are no unencumbered assets available for liquidation and distribution to creditors. The debt of the Debtors, as reflected in the schedules, total $13,-863.65.

The plan provides for the retention of the lien of Commercial Credit Plan Industrial Loan Company (Commercial Credit) on the two automobiles. In addition, the plan provides that the Debtors pay into the plan the sum of $20 per month for distribution to Commercial Credit up to the sum of $600, which represents the value of the automobiles ($350) plus an additional $250. The additional $250 proposed to be paid to Commercial Credit is being offered due to “the good relationship the Debtors have enjoyed with Commercial Credit” and due to the willingness of Commercial Credit to “work with the Debtors when the Debtors were unable to obtain financial assistance from any other source.” The plan further provides for the surrender of the offset camera to the estate to Robert Nester, the holder of a security interest. With the exception of $250 of the unsecured portion of the debt to Commercial Credit, the plan provides for no payment of dividends to the unsecured creditors.

The budget provided in the schedules reflects a total monthly income of $1,473.66 and a total estimated average, future monthly expense of $1,443, resulting in the net excess of estimated income over estimated expenses of $30.66. At the confirmation hearing, Mr. Dant testified that his take-home pay averages $318 per week ($1,378 per month) and that Mrs. Dant receives $212.50 per month in child support, producing a revised total monthly, average income of $1,590.50. Due to changes in rent, food and automobile insurance since filing, his monthly budget for living expenses now totals $1,558, creating an excess of monthly income over expenses of $32.50.

The creditors would receive no more in liquidation than they would have received under the plan. The fair market value of the scheduled property of the Debtors is accurate. There is a valid and perfected *119 security interest in favor of the secured creditors on the automobiles and offset camera. The watch and miscellaneous jewelry valued at a total sum of $30 have not been considered in determining the availability of property for the payment of a dividend to creditors.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The general question presented for determination to this Court is whether a plan under Chapter 13 which proposes no payments or de minimus payments to unsecured creditors is confirmable under § 1325 (11 U.S.C.). Each provision of said section must be complied with to enable this Court to confirm the plan. 1

The entire thrust of Chapter 13 is to allow a debtor to propose a plan which will enable him to repay his creditors some percentage of his outstanding debt. Chapter 13 contemplates payments to creditors. In re Terry, 630 F.2d 634, 635 (8th Cir. 1980); In re Hobday, 4 B.R. 417, 3 Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 78179, 78180 (Bkrtey.N.D.Ohio 1980); In re Cook, 3 B.R. 480, 3 Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 77995, 77996-97 (Bkrtcy.S.D.W.Va.1980); In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256, 262-63 (Bkrtcy.D.Utah 1980). Further a Chapter 13 plan must propose repayment to unsecured creditors. Hobday, supra, 4 B.R. 417, 3 Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) at 78180-81; Iacovoni, supra at 264-65.

Sections 109(e) and 101(24) set forth the criteria to qualify as a Chapter 13 debt- or. 2 If a debtor cannot make payments (or only de minimus payments) to his unsecured creditors for the reason that his income is insufficient to provide a regular payment to fund a plan, the debtor is not eligible for Chapter 13 relief under § 109(e), and any proposed plan is unconfirmable as a violation of § 1325(a)(1). 3 Terry, supra at 635.

Moreover, the plan is in violation of § 1325(aXl) in that it unfairly discriminates between classes of unsecured creditors by providing an additional $250 repayment to Commercial Credit’s unsecured portion of the debt, but providing nothing to the remaining unsecured creditors. See § 1322(bXl). This Court does not consider the “willingness of Commercial Credit to work with the Debtors” a rational basis or fair classification as against the remaining unsecured creditors. Such a classification is nothing more than preferential treatment of one creditor over another as the Debtors see fit.

The de minimus plan also violates § 1325(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.), a separate and distinct provision which requires that the plan be proposed in “good faith”.

“Good faith” has not been defined in the Bankruptcy Code. It has created a variety of opinions as to what constitutes good faith. Compare, In re Burrell, 2 B.R. 650, 5 *120 B.C.D. 1321 (Bkrtcy .N.D.Cal.1980) 4 in which the court held good faith required at least 70% payout to unsecured creditors with In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584 (Bkrtcy.D. Colo.1980), holding no payments necessary to unsecured creditors to meet requirement of “good faith”.

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Bluebook (online)
9 B.R. 117, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 4939, 7 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 462, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-dant-vaeb-1981.